

## A NEW VIEW OF MAN

IT is always hazardous, and often presumptuous, to announce the beginning of a "new" epoch. Anything "new" on a large scale is seldom recognized in its proper proportions and relations until after many years—centuries, perhaps—and the more far-reaching the change, the less evident, objectively, is its character likely to be. This, at least, has been the case in the past; whether it will be so in the future remains to be seen. It is just possible, however, that there is one factor in modern life—the intensified self-consciousness of the time—which gives hope of a more accurate appraisal of this age by its contemporaries, and this, at any rate, may serve as an excuse for examining, here, the proposition that a new view of man is now emerging.

The view we have in mind received an unusually articulate and precise statement in 1946 by Dwight Macdonald, in the April issue of his magazine, *Politics*, for that year. Before the first issue of *Politics* appeared, in February, 1944, Mr. Macdonald had been one of the editors of the *Partisan Review*, and, apparently, an adherent of the Socialist Workers Party—a Trotskyist group which split off from the Communist Party in the late '30's. Some of the most astute political commentary that has appeared on the New Deal was contributed by Macdonald to the *Socialist Appeal*, the SWP organ, during the latter half of 1939. For reasons that later became evident in the pages of *Politics*, Macdonald broke with the Socialist Workers Party, and, during the war years, ceased to be an editor of *Partisan Review* on the ground that this periodical had adopted a policy of neglect of basic political issues. The magazine which he then founded and kept going for about four years became an extraordinary achievement in personal journalism.

The critical synthesis afforded by *Politics* was in a sense a forced growth unnaturally stimulated

by the war. Its articles had a kind of desperation about them, yet they were never noticeably emotional or unbalanced. Macdonald and his contributors (most of them) saw the issues of the war in so different a light from the light which determined the opinions of the great majority that their desperation might be compared to what would be felt by two or three sane men left alone in a great ward filled with maniacs. *Politics* was therefore more a clinical study of a world at war than an attempt at planning the good society.

During the war, Macdonald became a pacifist. Whether, in the face of the threatened war with Russia, he still holds to this position, we cannot say, but what he wrote in 1945 and 1946 concerning war—the last war, almost any war—and the basic problems of human beings in the sphere of political relationships, will remain, we think, to be recognized in years to come as a record of some of the clearest, the most humane, as well as the most intellectually articulate thinking that came to light during the epoch of the two world wars. Macdonald's conclusions were set down in two major articles or studies: "The Responsibility of Peoples," which appeared in *Politics* for March, 1945, and "The Root Is Man," published in the April and July, 1946, issues. (Both articles were subsequently made into pamphlets, and while "The Responsibility of Peoples" is out of print, copies of "The Root Is Man" are available or were until very recently—from the Libertarian Press of Bombay, India.)

"The Responsibility of Peoples" deals with the horrors of the last war—not with just the ordinary and expected horrors of war, but with the peculiar and almost unimaginable horrors which resulted from the Nazi use of technology in the torture and murder of millions of defenseless human beings. The tremendous moral impact of this discussion is something that should be felt by

every member of our society. The young man or woman who grows to maturity in the present or the future years of the twentieth century without being exposed to Macdonald's essay or something very like it will be in a sense a cheated individual, so far as basic education is concerned. Macdonald strives to get at the responsibility for modern war. He does not try to "fix" responsibility so much as to understand the general nature of that responsibility and how it might work.

Where else will the youth of today find an unblinking examination of the atrocities of war, an examination which seeks no scapegoats? Macdonald's essay excites the mind, and it excites compassion. We know of no tract for the times possessed of greater honesty or depth of purpose.

For our present purposes, however, "The Root Is Man" is even more pertinent. The essence of this essay lies in Macdonald's distinction between the "Progressive" and the "Radical," as he defines the meaning of these terms. The Progressive, according to the definitions given, is one who believes that Progress is something to be achieved through Science and through the establishment of the Right Political System, while the Radical believes that the Root is Man—that the steps along the way of the Progressives have to be judged by *their present meaning and effect* on human beings, and not in terms of what is promised for tomorrow, or for the next generation. The radical refuses to be the creditor of an increasingly dubious Posterity. We think, says Macdonald, speaking for his sort of radicals, that "it is an open question whether the increase of man's mastery over nature is good or bad in its actual effects on human life to date, and favor adjusting technology to man, even if it means—as may be the case—a technological regression, rather than adjusting man to technology. . . . we feel the firmest ground from which to struggle for that human liberation which was the goal of the old Left is the ground not of History but of those nonhistorical Absolute Values (truth, justice, love,

etc.) which Marx has made unfashionable among socialists."

Following are the basic points of the distinction between the Progressive and the Radical:

The Progressive makes History the center of his ideology. The Radical puts Man there. The Progressive's attitude is optimistic both about human nature (which he thinks is basically good, hence all that is needed is to change institutions so as to give this goodness a chance to work) and about the possibility of understanding history through scientific method. The Radical is, if not exactly pessimistic, at least more sensitive to the dual nature of man; he sees evil as well as good at the base of human nature he is sceptical about the ability of science to explain things beyond a certain point; he is aware of the tragic element in man's fate not only today but in any conceivable kind of society. The Progressive thinks in collective terms (the interests of Society or the Workingclass); the Radical stresses the individual conscience and sensibility. The Progressive starts off from what actually is happening, the Radical starts off from what he wants to happen. The former must have the feeling that History is "on his side." The latter goes along the road pointed out by his own individual conscience; if History is going his way, too, he is pleased; but he is quite stubborn about following "what ought to be" rather than "what is."

Because its tragic, ethical and non-scientific emphasis corresponds partly with the old Right attitude, leading to criticisms of Progressive doctrine that often sound very much like those that used to be made from the Right, the Radical viewpoint causes a good deal of confusion today. . . . Another frequent allegation of the Progressives, especially those of the Marxian persuasion, is that the Radical viewpoint which POLITICS frequently expresses is of necessity a religious one. If by "religious" is meant simply non-materialistic or non-scientific, then this is true. But if God or some kind of otherworldly order of reality is meant, then I don't think it is true. The Radical viewpoint is certainly compatible with religion, . . . but I personally see no necessary connection, nor am I conscious of any particular interest in religion myself.

I might add that the Radical approach, as I understand it at least, does not deny the importance and the validity of science in its own proper sphere. . . . It rather defines a sphere which is outside the reach of scientific investigation, and whose value judgments cannot be proved (though they can be demonstrated in

appropriate and completely unscientific terms); this is the traditional sphere of art and morality. The Radical sees any movement like socialism which aspires towards an ethically superior kind of society as rooted in that sphere, however its growth may be shaped by historical process. This is the sphere of human, personal interests, and in this sense, the root is man.

And now Macdonald tells why or how he has come to these conclusions:

The best of the Marxists today see no reason for the dissection of the old Left that is proposed here. They still hold fast to the classic Left faith in human liberation through scientific progress, while admitting that revisions of doctrine and refinements of method are necessary. This was my opinion until I began publishing *POLITICS*; in "The Future of Democratic Values" (*Partisan Review*, July-August, 1943), I argued that Marxism, as the heir of 18th-century liberalism, was the only reliable guide to a democratic future, the experience of editing this magazine, however, and consequently being forced to follow the tragic events of the last two years in some detail, has slowly changed my mind. The difficulties lie much deeper, I now think, than is assumed by Progressives, and the crisis is much more serious. The brutality and irrationality of Western social institutions have reached a pitch which would have seemed incredible a short generation ago; our lives have come to be dominated by warfare of a ferocity and on a scale unprecedented in history; horrors have been committed by the governments of civilized nations which could hardly have been improved on by Attila: the extermination of the Jewish people by the Nazis; the vast forced-labor camps of the Soviet Union, our own saturation bombing of German cities and the "atomization" of the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is against this background that the present article is written, it is all this which has forced me to question beliefs I have long held.

In this essay, Macdonald offers one keynote of a new view of man, writing with a particular vocabulary and out of a particular background of experience and reflection. But a "new view" is seldom born from the insight of a single individual, or even from the common perspective of a single group. The "view" we are talking about is something that arises at a deeper level than any particular vocabulary or political outlook—it is a profound temper of the human

spirit, obtaining its prophetic voice and confirming sanction from multiple sources.

This brings us to an entirely different approach to the root problems with which Macdonald is concerned—with which all of us are or ought to be concerned: the approach of Herbert Butterfield, professor of modern history at the University of Cambridge, in his recent volume, *Christianity and History*, published by Scribner's. But what, a reader may ask—and well may ask—can "a confirmed Christian and a Yorkshire Methodist" (as the book-jacket describes Mr. Butterfield) have in common with Dwight Macdonald? They have in common the rejection of the "progress-through-the-system" theory of human life, and they unite in proclaiming that the Root Is Man. They probably have very little in common, intellectually, except honesty and lack of pretense; their sentiments have only the chilliest sort of tangence through logical correspondence; and the sources of their inspiration, insofar as they get them on paper, seem poles apart. Macdonald grew up in and out of the old leftwing political circles of New York City, while Butterfield seems to have spent a large part of his time brooding upon the pronouncements of the Hebrew Prophets of the Old Testament. We should add, however, that Mr. Butterfield exhibits a healthy respect for Karl Marx, and as a historian manifests considerable knowledge of what Marx has written, so that here, at least, the two are on common ground.

But what is impressive about *Christianity and History* is not its author's sources of inspiration, nor even the way in which he applies his convictions as a Christian to the interpretation of history, but the functional cutting-edge of the book in considering the sort of judgments a man may make of what he and other men are doing with their lives. We may be mistaken, but there is a great likeness, we think, at this level, between the ideas of Macdonald and of Butterfield. Just why the Methodist God (it may not be, of course, the Methodist God, but something more real)

should lead Mr. Butterfield to take a stand that is "operationally" or "objectively" like Macdonald's, or why the ideal of a free socialist society should produce for Macdonald a working theory of human relations very much like Butterfield's, we will not presume to say. It is worth noting, however, in respect to much of what he affirms, that Mr. Butterfield explains there is nothing peculiarly "Christian" about his reasoning; and that Macdonald, too, feels that his view is at least "compatible" with religion—it is surely compatible with large portions of Butterfield's religion.

We by no means intend to underwrite everything that is in *Christianity and History*—but say this about it: When Mr. Butterfield says "God" it does not offend the reader who wishes to have no truck with the "God" of ecclesiastical Christianity. Mr. Butterfield's God is something he earns the reader's respect for, whatever it is. He does not wave God like a flag, as a substitute for rational forms of persuasion. In fact, the reader can feel greatly benefited by reading his book without entertaining for even a moment the thought of becoming a Christian.

Concerning the reading of history, Mr. Butterfield says:

We are right if we want to see our history in moral terms, but we are not permitted to erect the human drama into a great conflict between good and evil in this particular way. If there is a fundamental fight between good and evil in history, therefore, as I think there is, we must regard it as being not directly between Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth century, or between Germans and Russians in the twentieth, but in a deeper realm for the most part out of reach of the technical historian. In reality the essential strategies in the war of good against evil are conducted within the intimate interior of personalities. And if Christianity fights in the world it does not (when Churches are in their right mind) wage war on actual flesh and blood. Like the spread of charity or of education and like most of the good things of the world, it carries on a campaign only in the sense that the leaven may be said to carry on a campaign when it seeks to leaven the whole lump.

And, for a conclusion, there is this succeeding passage on the meaning of history and the responsibility of man:

For this reason the historian does not content himself with a simple picture of good men fighting bad, and he turns the crude melodrama that some people see in life into a more moving kind of tragedy. In the last resort he sees human history as a pilgrimage of all mankind, and human achievement as a grand co-operative endeavor in which whigs and Tories complement one another, both equally necessary to the picture. In the last resort, even Tories and socialists are to the historian only allies who happen to have fallen out with one another. In modern history this view is all the more necessary in that, owing to the complicated character of society, moral responsibility is so subtly diffused and so complicated and dispersed that the forces in a democracy may drive a government to war, or may perpetuate a grave abuse, and it yet may be impossible to pin the precise responsibility for this anywhere.

Neither Macdonald nor Butterfield, it may be, nail anything down, in the manner that the Progressives and the Dogmatists would like, but they unravel a great deal. And this, if not all, is a large part of what men may do for their fellows.

## *Letter from* **ENGLAND**

LONDON.—There has been much discussion here lately over the question of the relations between Rome and the rest of the Christian world. There has always been a section of the Church of England (which abjured the Pope in the reign of King Henry VIII) that has ardently explored every avenue for reunion with Rome, and two articles in the London *Times* recently angled diplomatically for renewed conversations, having as their aim a rapprochement of some sort. The only result of this effort, and of the voluminous newspaper correspondence that followed, was a reply from the Vatican which made it clear that while "the Faithful" might be allowed to co-operate with other denominations in certain matters of social welfare, in no circumstance were they to be permitted to enter upon any discussions of the deep doctrinal issues that cause the Roman Catholic Church to regard other Christian sects as heretics in the faith. There seems to be little chance that, in this "Holy Year," Rome will do what the *Times* so hoped it would do—"make a gesture to the Christian world in keeping with the realities of the hour."

It may be asked, however, what the 398,277,000 Roman Catholics which the 1949 *Catholic Directory* estimates as the world population owing allegiance to the Pope—or the estimated world population of Christians of all denominations amounting to some 692,000,000, or, indeed, the total non-Christians numbering over 1,000,000,000—have to do, in any special manner, with "the realities of the hour." Have they any arcane insight into what those realities may be for the world today? There is certainly no reason to suppose that only "religionists" are aware of the obvious conflict between those who deny and those who affirm the reality of spiritual values. It is not even the case that such a conflict is to be found only within the framework of an ideological collision between Soviet Communism and the rest of the world—a fancy which instigates many of these enquiries into the possibility of Christian reunion

In the course of an important speech on foreign affairs in the House of Commons, Mr. Winston Churchill said: "The dominant forces in human history have come from the perception of great truths and the faithful pursuance of great causes." But how subtle the responsibility of deciding between the genuine and the counterfeit! It has been said, for instance, that the political freedom of the twentieth century, more often than not, has had the effect of landing us in the refined servitude of ennui or fear, and has brought many to find consolation in some form of ideological determinism. Similarly, in the religious field. In Western lands, the talk is of reunion of the Christian Church, not on the basis of the Sermon on the Mount, but only because of the perils besetting vested religious interests, due to the challenge of Communism. Ironically, the reaction to political totalitarianism seems to point in the direction of seeking security in the arms of a church which still holds to the encyclical *Quanta Cura* (1864), in which Pius IX condemns the "insanity" (*deliramentum*) of the idea that "liberty of conscience and of worship is the right of every man," and censures the idea that "the right of the Church is not competent to restrain with temporal penalties the violators of her laws." Obviously, determinism has more than one meaning!

Individual choice remains, however, even in a conditioned world like ours, and nothing is so hazardous as suspending judgment in a time for decision. As one writer has put it, all that is asked of modern man is "to examine the evidence to take as much trouble over the problems of human destiny as over the niceties of a General Election." But the decisive element in any choice will still be the same factors of human nature. These will only be redeemed by a deeper perception of the Oneness of all life, and a realization of the integral nature of each unit in the totality of Nature.

ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

## *REVIEW*

### EDUCATION AND A FREE PRESS

HIGH SCHOOL debates have for years featured the old issue, "Do We Have a Free Press ?" as part of the regular stock-in-trade for such occasions. The popularity of this subject for school debates and also for editorial discussion by small newspapers is fairly obvious—forensic ability can run the gamut without necessitating commitment to anything except generally recognized "good sentiments." The orator or the writer can fulminate with fine abandon against monopoly, against the imposition upon the public of views sponsored by "vested interests," or against the sensationalism of "yellow journalism" which arranges news items according to their luridness.

Inasmuch as the conception of "free education" and a "free press," operating according to a natural law supposed to inhere in the Democratic Way, and contributing to the general enlightenment of the public, is so much a part of that Democratic Way, each phase of such arguments has pertinence even though the arena is shadowy with the flitting ghosts of past generalizations. At the present time, three phases of the question, we submit, are especially worth pondering. First there is the matter of the correlation between managerial control of newspaper and magazine writing and the managerial control of the policies of our universities, as indicated, for example, by the attempt of the Regents of the University of California to exact loyalty oaths from its professors. The crucial issue in the latter case seems clearly to be whether or not we believe that the "free pursuit of truth," which professors are presumably allowed to follow, renders them more capable or less capable of enlightened judgment in the regulation of a university's policies—including that of determining the way to deal with lecturers suspected of communist sympathies.

Our national addiction to that noble phrase, Academic Freedom, has really been put on the block, because we have to side either with the teachers who have had the opportunities to enlighten themselves the most as to "free" democratic procedure—and who don't like the implications of the Loyalty Oath—or with the Regents and Politicians who wish to safeguard us with home-grown Politburo directives. If we *really* decide in favor of a "free university," we must hold that teachers, not fund-raisers or politicians, are the people who should control the policies of their institutions within their own small democracy. And if this be recognized as the crucial point upon which ultimate decision will be made, we may consistently hold, too, that the only "free" press is one controlled democratically by its writers. However difficult this ideal might be for a large newspaper to achieve, there is no other way to guarantee the internal integrity of the news stories and editorials we read.

In the glaring spotlight of international publicity, political representatives of the U. S. Government gave fulsome concurrence to "The Declaration of Human Rights" expressed in Article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations: "Everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." We might logically expect, then, that the federal government would endeavor to persuade the men who financially control our news-gathering services to refrain from using the Power of Wealth and Position to enforce the opinions and attitudes they personally favor, just as we might logically expect that a federal government espousing the virtues of the UN Charter would encourage State universities to stand rock-ribbed for *less* rather than for *more* interference with policies in the hiring and firing of teachers.

A second important focus for the free-press issue is the case of The Hollywood Ten, the

writers and artists convicted in federal courts of contempt in refusing to testify before a Senate Committee as to whether they "were or ever had been" Communists. The last of the Ten, Samuel Ornitz, was found guilty on June 30, fined \$1000, and sentenced, as were the other nine, to serve one year in a federal penitentiary. Even the Supreme Court here wavered from an earlier position, in denying re-hearing to the Ten. Previously, as defenders of the Ten have pointed out, the position of the Supreme Court had been unequivocal, for that august body once expounded: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Why shouldn't this apply to the Hollywood Ten?

The answer is the same as for the University Loyalty Oath. Freedom is on the block. Communists *do* "take advantage" of every avenue of propaganda, and a particularly disturbing aspect of Communist propagandizing is the technique of concealment of Party affiliation. But the question for us must ultimately hinge on the *means* we choose to oppose such tactics. When we use any sort of threat or force to win, we lose—we lose, that is, if we believe that there is no freedom for those who fear ideas, even corrupt ideas.

A third focus for attention on the subject of the freedom of the press at first seems tangential. It is a debate about the present policy of the New York *Post*. The *Post*, about ready to fail ten months ago, hired a Washington correspondent named James Wechsler to stave off collapse. Mr. Wechsler made good, but he did so by converting the *Post's* news treatment into deliberate sensationalism. The *Post* acquired a questionable sort of sex appeal, and while its editorials continued to favor worthy causes, many readers began to discover they couldn't feel happy about bringing the paper home to lie around the house where the children could see it. Defending his

policy in a debate in the *Saturday Review of Literature* with an editorial writer of the *Herald Tribune*, Wechsler argues that the public must be served with what it wants—that the first function of a newspaper is to achieve circulation, and that it is in the context of a large circulation that journalists can best serve the cause of liberal democracy.

Wechsler, of course, is passing the buck. He says, in effect, that the job of the liberal newspaper need not be a full-time job. *Political liberalism*, he seems to think, is enough. If people want their news items saturated by and wrapped up in sex, that is what he will give them. But can a newspaper be dedicated, in any true sense, to the liberation of the minds of the populace (the only definition of Liberal which has ever satisfied us) and pursue this task only part of the time? This is like the Regents saying that academic freedom is fine, "except under unusual circumstances." This is like the Supreme Court saying that "freedom of opinion" is fine, "except under unusual circumstances."

Wechsler's opponent in the *Saturday Review*, August Heckscher, says something about the liberal newspaper which seems to us an apt way of expressing what we all probably know well enough, intellectually. But its applicability seems to stand out a little more clearly when we correlate the debate about "Sex in the *Post*" with some of the other contentions of "liberalism"—that, for one thing, the truth may be left to win or lose on its own merits:

A newspaper [Heckscher says] is neither read nor edited in water-tight compartments. A liberal newspaper must be liberal all through; it must pay its readers the compliment throughout of assuming them to be intelligent and mature. For a time it may carry on a double life successfully. But at some point, if it continues, it will cease being a liberal newspaper and become a sensational paper with an editorial page that is irrelevant and without influence.

A similar fate, we fear, can also overtake our Universities and our Supreme Court.

## COMMENTARY

### SAFEGUARDS OF DEMOCRACY

THE August 11 number of *U.S. News & World Report* provides its readers with an interview with J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, on the subject, "How Communists Operate." Mr. Hoover seems to be well-informed concerning their activities, and he offers good advice to the public in saying, "Avoid reporting malicious gossip or idle rumor."

Other of his judgments, however, need further examination. Take for example his statement that "the 'philosophical Communist' who advocates Marxism-Leninism might just as well be working as an agent of a foreign power because he is aiding its cause." Mr. Hoover is not concerned with philosophy, but with treason, so that it may be too much to expect him to know who are or have been the principal "philosophical communists" in the United States, and what their influence has been. It is fair to say, however, that he ought to know that the more "philosophical" they have been, the more they have been opposed to Stalinist Russia. It seems a mistake for the Director of the FBI to declare against any brand of social *philosophy*, when, as a matter of fact, many of the philosophical communists, here and elsewhere, have been far more consistent in their opposition to the USSR than the United States itself. They, at any rate, never implied that the Soviet Union was a "Great Democracy" fighting for world freedom during the recent war; as philosophical communists, they knew better. Further, philosophical communists have done by far the best job of criticism and interpretation of Soviet psychology and foreign policy. Sidney Hook, James Burnham, and Dwight Macdonald could all be described as having been at one time philosophical communists. They were not or did not remain *party* communists, or even "Marxist-Leninists," precisely because they were philosophical.

What sermons to the people from men like Mr. Hoover never point out is that the philosophical quality of a man's thinking in his approach to social questions is far more important to a democracy than his particular views at any given time. A philosopher is a man who requires the right to think for himself, whatever the political system under which he lives. A democracy, therefore, has no real safeguards except its philosophers. What Mr. Hoover might have pertinently pointed out is that a card-holding philosopher is a contradiction in terms. But that, again, is not his department.



## CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

PERHAPS the most concise way of summarizing the contributions of true educators to the improvement of the modern university would be to say that they convince a great many professors and teachers that they should expect more of themselves—and more of the university. This is certainly true of John Dewey, who undertook to formulate a basis for a radical revision of teacher training, and of Robert Hutchins, who has attempted a radical revision of almost everything in education. Of course, it will take a long time for any revision to be actually accomplished at the university level, but some encouraging changes seem worth noting.

Since World War II, two major changes in attitude are apparent. First, students are expecting more of their professors, and more professors seem to feel an obligation to keep in tune with the thoughts and the problems of the young men and women who come to class. One focal point for attempts to increase the alertness and social conscience of the universities may be seen in the work of a University of California professor named Franz Schneider. Dr. Schneider has been particularly interested in introducing the "rating" or "reaction sheet" type of questionnaire, which students may fill out with the grades and comments they feel appropriate as estimates of their professor's abilities.

A considerable amount of experimentation has gone on in the use of these sheets as a result of Dr. Schneider's labors, and it can now be ascertained that the majority of students who have answered such questionnaires were capable of furnishing useful information. More important than this particular system, however, is Dr. Schneider's statement of the reasons why a faculty isolated from student opinion is a very poor arrangement. A few months ago Dr. Schneider was interviewed on Station KPFA in Berkeley, California, two interrogators putting to him a

great variety of questions about the "reaction sheet." Dr. Schneider first indicated that he realized that "reaction sheet" sounds like a stunt rather than a serious contribution to education. In his view, however, such a method is invaluable, furnishing the teacher with "thermometer, microscope, and test tube." "The situation in the classroom," he added, "is analogous to that of a good physician who goes back to his patient to find out whether the prescription has helped the patient and how well the patient is cooperating."

Next, Dr. Schneider was questioned about the capability of most students to comment intelligently on such things as "organization of courses; knowledge of the subject; range of interest and culture; ability to stimulate thinking in independent work." Schneider's experience and that of a good many others who have used the reaction sheet, is that most students do a serious job in answering the questions, and that to the extent that they try to be impartial and useful, they contribute something worthwhile on the ten or fifteen questions usually provided. After meeting such queries from his studio interrogators, Dr. Schneider proceeded to discuss the typical weaknesses of the modern university, taking as a text the following observation of Dr. Waldo G. Leland:

It too often happens that much time, labor and often substantial funds are devoted to tasks which do not yield results utilizable even by scholarship itself. Not only do they fail to add usefully to knowledge, but they too often stunt the intellectual growth of those who labored at them.

Dr. Schneider's elaboration of this criticism was especially convincing:

The trouble is we begin with the wrong criteria. We hire a man because he has had the patience to compile some article or even write a doctor's thesis full of footnotes. This is a purely intellectual pursuit, often indulged in by people who actually have a kind of inferiority complex, as far as human problems are concerned. The vastness and seriousness of these problems frighten them. So they duck into a library and hide away in a niche with a heap of books, and there they concoct something for "publication." Then

we hire them as professors, as "teachers," because they have "published" something and are "scholars." But they are not *teachers*. They are not interested in helping society; they are not fighters against sloppy popular practices and political shenanigans; they are far from assuming responsibility for the thinking and the mores of our society, as they should do, holding the high office of *teachers*. I speak here chiefly of the liberal arts courses and the "humanistic" studies. The "sciences" belong to another category.

A graduate of the University of California, Dr. Schneider also spent many years at the University of Leipzig, where he witnessed the tragic inadequacies of the German university to prepare young men and women for the challenges of their age. He sees in present-day Europe a "lesson" which everyone may recognize, and which, in his mind, is closely related to the need for academic reform in America:

Europe is devastated, Asia is seething, the labor and joy of centuries is destroyed, vaster problems than ever before face our human world. Yet many "professors" go on living in their bookish isolation, and actually short-change those students who want to become teachers in high school or in junior college and who want to help in the "world's work." They still give lectures of anaemic respectability as though they lived in the 19th century; they still assign bookish topics for "term papers" and give petty examinations testing sheer memory, not thought. These "professors" have not yet learned that Germany disintegrated despite its outstanding scientists, its great artists, and its men of letters—such as Lessing, Schiller, and Goethe—whom the Germans could read in the original!

Routine class work of the old sort will protect no nation. The only thing that will help us in the storms ahead is a purposeful militancy of the spirit, intellectual honesty and a deep devotion to all members of our society—down to the lowest wretch in some filthy county jail. This comprehensive sense of life must be an intrinsic part of "What a college professor should know," if he wants to know right what he happens to know as his specialty. Only then is his special knowledge likely to serve us in a vital way.

Dr. Schneider's proposal for increasing student influence in the selection of teachers dovetails with recent MANAS discussions on

freedom of thought for university faculties. It seems reasonable to think that more freedom of student opinion would reinforce academic freedom in all the relations of university activity.

## *FRONTIERS* "Scientific" Mysticism

THE mood of essayists in the philosophy of science is rapidly changing. A generation ago, staunch mechanists dominated scientific theory, eager for combat with anyone daring to propose a "vitalist" or "metaphysical" view of natural phenomena. Scientific Method and Determinism were regarded as practical equivalents, and the writer who proposed any sort of "purpose" as an ingredient in natural happenings was ridiculed as a throwback to medievalism. Today, however, what amounts to a practical reversal has taken place. "Purpose," so long ostracized from nature, is now granted a limited authenticity. This restoration of *meaning* to other regions of the universe than the grey matter of scientific thinkers is of course a reform proceeding with great caution—accompanied by numerous disclaimers of "mysticism" and "metaphysics"—but that it takes place at all constitutes a great advance for investigators whose theories depend almost entirely upon mechanistic analysis.

The first step in this reform occurred when it began to be admitted that Mechanism is, after all, only an assumption of method. The admission ran something like this: "Of course, it is conceivable that there are events for which no cause can be fixed; the path of an individual electron—if there is an individual electron—cannot be predicted in terms of what we know about physical causation; Mechanism means simply that scientific knowledge grows by establishing the relationships of cause and effect. But if there are things which happen without physical causes, we can know nothing about them, and as scientists who are interested only in knowledge, we have nothing to say about such matters."

Then, after a series of impacts coming from diverse sources, some of them scientific, some of them not, this formula began to undergo changes. Dr. Carrel, for one, proposed an order of causation which most scientists had not considered to exist at all. He accepted, for example, the extraordinary cures accomplished at the Grotto of Lourdes—this was mind-over-matter, purpose-over-determinism, in a concretely revolutionary sense. Dr. Rhine of Duke University began reporting the results of his telepathic investigations, drawing conclusions little less than fatal

to the familiar mechanistic assumptions about causation. Biologists like Edmund Sinnott published papers describing the development of plants in all their intricate cellular differentiation and detail—a process which, if accounted for by the mechanistic hypothesis, would transform Determinism from an abstract formula of scientific method into some kind of invisible but all-potent Michael Angelo of Nature.

Biological research, psychic research, biophysical research: these, and, doubtless, the ever-increasing pressures of world disorder, created the matrix for a new theory of causation—*purposive* causation—which was found to exist as a principle in the organism-as-a-whole. It was finally admitted, for example, that when a man goes to a drinking fountain to get a drink of water, he goes because he wants a drink of water.

This may not seem like much of a concession—the rest of us, who are not scientists, knew it all along—but for scientists, who make a special effort to be consistent, it amounted to a basic revision in point of view. What sort of consistency was it which delayed this recognition?

A scientist is a man who tries to regulate his thinking by general principles. When, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the scientific thinkers decided that the will of God had better be left out of their calculations, they wanted to be sure it was *really* left out. And as theologians could discover the will of God almost anywhere, the scientists resolved to start at the other end—with what seemed to them the absolutely unintelligent units of matter and forces of nature. The world, they said, is a machine. They liked Lucretius' idea that there is nothing at all but atoms and the void. Let the atoms bounce around in the void long enough, said Laplace, and you get a universe, a sun, and an earth with people on it. That's *natural* evolution. God is not necessary. And that is the heart of mechanistic theory—God is not necessary. What did the scientists have against God? The only God they knew about objected strenuously to the progress of science, and sponsored the Holy Inquisition.

So, the scientists were very careful to keep any kind of God or gods out of their theories. Science, they said, stops where Revelation begins. If you say that something more than bouncing atoms makes a man go to get a drink of water, pretty soon you'll be saying that the man has a "soul" that wants to be "saved." And if

you can say that, you can believe in a God that created him and is willing to save him. And when a man wants to be "saved" more than he wants to learn the facts of life, then he will begin to hate the scientists for insisting that Knowledge is more important than Revelation.

The scientists, therefore, have very good reason for moving cautiously in the direction of a theory which includes the idea of purpose as a factor in causation. But that they are so moving there can be no doubt. In the *Scientific Monthly* for July, Adrian C. Moulyn, a practicing psychiatrist, discusses "The Limitations of Mechanistic Methods in the Biological Sciences." He shows that while mechanistic analysis of behavior is quite adequate for giving an account of actions which are independent of the total organism, it can by no stretch of the imagination deal with those acts which express volition. Mechanism can, for example, "explain" the jerky movements of a spastic—the bodily motions which are not under the control of his will—but it cannot deal with the unified activity of a normal individual. Moulyn comments:

The objective, mechanistic approach toward the organism studies partial functions, isolated from the total organism, thereby excluding the concept of totality from the scope of physiology. This mechanistic approach should be complemented by a subjective holistic approach, in order to learn about the organism as a whole. Since the methods of mechanics do not apply in this subjective field, one cannot use coordinate system, measuring rod, and clock; therefore, other methods of study have to be developed.

Man, in other words, may be a machine, but he is also a mechanic. To know something about the machine, which of itself is unintelligent—"mechanistic"—is doubtless important, but knowledge of the mechanic who makes the machine work is also important. How is such knowledge obtained?

If one wants to find an answer to the question of how a living organism constitutes a whole, one has to look within himself. Looking at partial functions of the organism after the manner of mechanics will never give us insight into the totality of the organism, because this totality cannot be reconstructed from artificially, experimentally, or pathologically isolated phenomena. This very isolation does away with the organism's totality, since phenomena which can be studied in isolation do not partake of the specific temporal organization of the whole organism. These isolated parts are apprehended by what Yakovlev has called

"extrospection," whereas introspection gives us knowledge about our own wholeness.... The question then revolves around the problem of developing a scientific method of introspection. . . .

Dr. Moulyn makes it plain, however, that he is not planning to rush out and join the nearest "Know-Thyself" society in his neighborhood. He puts his reservations in his important last paragraph:

Holistic principles need not be a catchall for those aspects of reality which we do not yet understand from a mechanistic-atomistic point of view, but can be raised from the level of semi-mystical, animistic, intuitive convictions to the status of scientifically defined and practically useful concepts, through the analysis of the temporal structure of the various modalities of movement of living organisms.

But what is this "mysticism" or "semi-mysticism" which Dr. Moulyn wants to avoid? According to Josiah Royce, who was a fairly good definer, the mystic is the only pure empiricist—he examines what is *immediately* given, namely, the field of consciousness which is the primary reality of our existence. Introspection means an examination of the contents of that field. And what does "animism" mean? It is the theory, as William McDougall suggests in his book, *Body and Mind*, that there is an intelligence in organisms which has an independent integrity, which works through the body, which fulfills purposes in the body, but is *not* the body nor the sum of its parts. Finally, an "intuitive conviction" is surely behind Dr. Moulyn's view that introspection can be placed on a scientific basis. Dr. Moulyn seems to be really saying to his colleagues, "Well, gentlemen, if we must become mystics and introspectionists—and it seems that we must—let us do it soberly and carefully, without any sudden illuminations or hearing of voices in burning bushes." We can hardly blame him for feeling that way.