

## THE ANXIOUS QUEST

A GENERATION or so ago, writers and thinkers were still attempting to describe or define the Good Life. The nineteenth-century expectation of endless progress hung on tenaciously, even after many disappointments, until well into the twentieth century. But today, although there remain a few who still reflect the atmosphere of nineteenth-century hopes, most of the energy of serious inquiry is aimed in another direction—toward an explanation of the evil that men do. Ten years ago, it was the Nazi evil we wanted to understand, and now, naturally enough, it is the Russian variety.

A concentration upon evil is perhaps no better than its disregard in favor of enthusiastic "progressivism," but it at least amounts to a recognition that superficial theories based upon "human goodness" alone are hardly worth discussing. The fact seems to be that man is potentially capable of as much evil as good, and to overlook the fact is to invite the evil. But supposing we admit the fact—what then? There is still the question of what "evil" is, what causes it, or where it comes from. This-question is pressed upon us by a subscriber who writes:

I have not yet noticed that MANAS has seriously taken up the problem of evil. Or are the editors in agreement with those "modernist" Protestants who believe that what appears to be evil is merely ignorance?

It is possible to think that much of what men call evil is the result of ignorance, yet to deny that it is "merely" ignorance. The "merely ignorance" theory of evil virtually destroys the meaning of some of the most important words and ideas in the human vocabulary. The "merely ignorance" theory reduces all morality to a sort of psychological mechanism. The terms denoting motive, as contrasted with knowledge, cease to

have significance. The idea that a man may "know better" than he does loses its meaning.

At this point, of course, the argument could turn into a discussion of what is meant by "knowing." It can be urged that if a man doesn't do the best he knows, he doesn't really *know* the best, but has only partial or illusory knowledge. But then the person who claims that a distinction ought to be made between knowing and righteousness may say that when "knowing" is used in this way, it includes the factor of moral perception, and moral perception, after all, is the imponderable we are trying to get at, so why pretend that it is undifferentiated from knowing, or that it is not, at the very least, a special kind of knowing. If moral perception is not different from knowing, then Pope's reference to Bacon as "The wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind" is nonsense. Most of us feel that it is not nonsense—that knowledge, on the one hand, and what a man does with his knowledge, on the other, may be rooted in different departments of human nature.

Our old friend Socrates is often charged with having over-simplified the moral problem by defining virtue as knowledge. But even in the Platonic dialogues, the mystery of motive keeps on appearing like a repeating decimal. Socrates is never quite sure how virtue is taught, or whether it *can* be taught, although he gives a pretty good demonstration of both, himself. The conclusion we read from Socrates is that there is an incommensurable in human life—some ineffable essence which is beyond good and evil—from which alone knowledge of the mystery of good and evil can spring.

Approaching the subject in a common-sense mood, we soon arrive at the view that the most-difficult-to-deal-with kind of evils seem to be the

most mysterious. The "evils" arising from the physical environment are merely peripheral, easy to overcome. That is, they would be easy to overcome if human beings would only get together and overcome them. We hardly think of the effects of external nature as evils at all, any more. They are rather problems for the engineer to solve, and this is the age of genius in engineering.

Getting human beings to work together is the real problem, as we see it, so that our studies of evil are mostly concerned with human behavior. Right now, we are very much concerned with Russian behavior. The engineer's solution for the difficulties which the Russians present to us is the military solution, which would deal with the Soviets as though they represented some impersonal force of nature that has to be either controlled or eliminated. Another class of minds looks upon the Communist threat as a psycho-social problem; in fact, psychological analyses of the Russians are becoming quite numerous. Geoffrey Gorer's book, *The People of Great Russia*, is perhaps typical of the so-called "objective" approach in psychology. Mr. Gorer examines the Russians the way an entomologist might study a community of white ants, offering hypothetical explanations of why they are such "peculiar" and "unpredictable" people—so unlike our presumably normal and sensible selves. Out of such cultural habits as the rigid swaddling of Russian infants by their parents, Mr. Gorer constructs a theory to account for the erratic political behavior of Soviet diplomats.

Robert Payne, whose studies of China and the Far East generally have gained him deserved standing as an authority on the revolutionary spirit of modern Asia, contributed to the September *United Nations World* an article, "How the Russian Mind Works," in an effort to enlighten Western readers on the suspecting and suspicious complexes of the Communists. These fears are nothing new for Russians, he explains, whose lands have been overrun by invaders, whose

homes have been pillaged and burned, whose lives have been forfeited, again and again, to morally insensible tyrants, from the Tartar massacres of the thirteenth century to the attack on Stalingrad by the Nazis in 1944.

Mr. Payne adds a psychological dimension to his analysis by quoting Lord Bryce:

Perhaps the most revealing thing which has ever been said of the Russians was spoken by Lord Bryce in his work on the Holy Roman Empire. "*The Russians*," he wrote, "*are as much a religious as a political community, and they carry with them over the vast spaces of northern and central Asia the traditions of an empire which is at once the offspring and the guardian of the Orthodox Faith.*" Substitute the religion of Communism for Christianity, and Lord Bryce's statement first made in 1864 is seen to have a purely modern application.

Fear of invasion, the sense of being Defenders of the Faith—these form a part of Mr. Payne's explanation of the dynamics of the Soviet menace, and he draws also on the nihilist tradition and on the speeches of the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* to account for what seem to him the obsessive psychological factors behind the Russian drive to power.

But these explanations, after all, are based upon accidents of birth and circumstances. The same influences could have possessed any other people and may, yet, if there are not other considerations to be added to this theory of psycho-physical determinism. The real question is whether or not there are ever moments in human life when human beings—individually or in groups—have opportunity to see and to comprehend the implications of the physical and psychological environment. Is there, in short, any such thing as moral freedom?

This is the question which no one wants very much to discuss. But it is the question which must be discussed in order to determine whether or not there is a problem of good and evil. For if there is no moral freedom, then evil, in the traditional philosophical meaning of the term, has no existence at all, and morality is simply a

complicated department of psychological technology.

The reluctance of modern man to consider the idea of moral freedom is quite understandable. With freedom comes accountability. If we are free, we are responsible, and if we are responsible, the logic of justice implies that we should be rewarded or punished for what we do.

On the other hand, the Western world has only lately been able to discard the doctrine of reward and punishment taught for centuries by the Christian Church. The most "progressive" thinkers of the past hundred years have struggled bravely and in some measure successfully to destroy the theological conception of Divine punishment. Nearly a century ago, Lecky pointed out that belief in a jealous and vengeful God soon produces justification for jealous and vengeful behavior among believers in that God. The terrors and the cruelties of the Dark Ages he assigns to the terrors and cruelties practiced by a wrathful Jehovah. In later years, students of penology revealed how theological beliefs were reflected in the brutal methods of punishment of European law. Bold criticisms were made of the complacent self-righteousness of the comfortable and wealthy classes, and the counter-doctrine of *social* responsibility emerged to displace gradually the doctrine of personal responsibility. Meanwhile, the new criminology used the theories of science to attempt to disprove the idea of moral freedom. Enrico Ferri, a pupil of Lombroso and a leader in the Italian positivist school of criminology, wrote in his *Criminal Sociology* (1917):

Physiology and psycho-pathology concur in demonstrating that the human will is completely subject to natural influences, not only of the moral or psychological order but also of the purely physical order and is far removed from dominating them in a more or less absolute way. Statistics in turn show that individual wills taken collectively obey the exterior influences of the physical and social environment. Every man has his own physical and psychic personality (temperament and

character) which is essentially determined by physio-psychic heredity, and is developed and modified according to environment . . . . A high temperature, a hot wind, nervous exhaustion following excessive labor, a period of slow digestion, and many other accidental causes have a power, which everyone has experienced. Everyone knows how health, or better still an excellent digestion makes a man benevolent and generous. Poverty or chronic hunger is really a great cause of physical and moral degeneracy. The will of a man for good or evil may be modified by a special diet. . . .

Finally, let us add the recent eloquent data of hypnotism permitting the experimental production of a species of psychological vivisection to such an extent that it is not possible longer to deny that the human will depends absolutely and continually on the organic and, hence, psychic conditions of the individual. If this dependence of will in relation to special congenital or acquired, permanent or transitory, states of the organism, be conceded (since it cannot be denied in clear cases), by what right can we deny it under all other circumstances where it appears less clearly ?

From this closely woven argument which has the practical effect of eliminating all moral responsibility—since all human behavior is shaped by outside causes—Ferri proceeds to adopt an almost Buddhist compassion for all men, particularly all wrong-doers, who, as he explains behavior, do what they do because they can do nothing else. This was also the position assumed by Clarence Darrow, who was psychologically without the capacity to "blame" anyone for anything. Darrow believed that human beings act according to the various determinisms of heredity, environment, and external stimuli. Never, according to his biographer, did Darrow lose his temper or give evidence of a feeling of self-righteousness, in connection with his long humanitarian career in the courts, except on one occasion, during the Scopes trial, when the bigotry of the judge became too great even for

Darrow's large-hearted tolerance, and he gave vent to feelings of resentment. However, we may forgive Darrow this one departure from his avowed principles, for it shows that even the most confirmed mechanist is nevertheless a moralist at the core of his being—a man who thinks that there is an element of personal responsibility in human life.

It should be evident that unless moral responsibility be acknowledged, the logic of dictatorship is inescapable. The dictator is the man who promises to construct the "perfect" physical and psychological environment. Why else should we give him power? And the theory of human betterment solely by reforming the environment also involves us in the doctrine of a special caste of beings who are free of the deterministic law, and who are able, therefore, to act "creatively" to establish the perfect environment for the benefit of all the rest, who are by definition *creatures* of their environment.

This is the consequence of denying moral freedom. On the other hand, to accept moral freedom is to declare that both good and evil are *subjective* in principle—that men, all men, are makers of good and evil—which is also a candidly metaphysical idea. For if men may make good and evil, they are greater than their environment, which is the same as saying that human beings are transcendental beings, beings in whom there is the stuff of immortality and ultimate causation.

The fact that we are somewhat determined by outside circumstances, by uncontrolled feelings, can hardly be denied. But the claim that we are *entirely* determined by these forces is no better than the Calvinist claim of Divine predestination, against which modern man has struggled for three long centuries.

A final question of importance is this: if we are free if every man has his own measure of responsibility appropriate to his circumstances and moral light—have we then the right to blame others for what they do, to condemn them when their light seems different from our own?

Studying the history of Western culture, the modern sociologist seems to think that the idea of moral freedom and the habit of moral condemnation are inseparable. But are they? They were not inseparable for a Buddha, a Christ, or a Socrates. It was the churches which persuaded us that to believe in moral responsibility is to believe in moral condemnation and punishment—not the great teachers of philosophy and religion. Recognition of this seems an essential introduction to any productive study of the mystery of evil in human life.

## *Letter from* **ENGLAND**

LONDON.—The Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, Professor G. M. Trevelyan, in his *English Social History* (1944), remarks that, in the twentieth century, drink found fresh enemies in the cinema and radio. But, he adds, "Gambling perhaps now does more harm than drink." It is not necessary to agree with this conclusion in order to realize that gambling has indeed become one of the most formidable social problems of the day. Comparative international statistics are not available; but the evil has certainly reached large proportions here. A Royal Commission is hearing evidence at the present time with a view to reporting to the Government on the whole subject of betting, lotteries, and gaming. In relation to the saving habit, Lord Kindersley has told the Commission that betting and football pools (these latter carrying large winnings for forecasting correct football results) are undoing much of the good which the organized thrift movement had been trying to do for thirty years. He expressed himself strongly against any proposal for a State Lottery, and held that "betting and gambling corrupted moral judgment, and became a fevered and absorbing passion in the same way as the taking of alcohol and opium." Reinforcing these views, a metropolitan magistrate has called attention to his experience in the courts showing that many homes came to grief because of the gambling habits of the parents.

A review of gambling last year has been furnished to the Commission by a joint Churches' Committee. Whereas 1910 saw stakes on horseracing amounting to about £52,000,000, and on football to about £48,000,000, in 1932 the figures rose to about £200,000,000 on horses, and some £100,000,000 on football and other events. Last year, the estimated figures on the main forms of gambling were football and other pool betting £58,000,000; greyhound racing £200,000,000; horseracing £450,000,000; and other forms,

including fun fairs, etc., £17,000,000. This makes a total of £725,000,000 in a year, an enormous sum, especially when it is remembered that this country is so largely dependent upon American aid for its very existence. It cannot be assumed that these colossal sums are staked by people who can afford them. So far as football pools are concerned, for instance, of the total of £58,000,000 the average weekly stake among all participants is 3s/2d.

It has been said that one of the illusions preventing the growth of civilized life in the modern world is "externalism"—the passion for being amused or thrilled. During the past fifty years, the mode of gambling which has developed greatly in England is the betting on sporting events. But, whilst much of the debate on the subject centres around the evil of gambling in its impact upon the home and the habit of thrift, the fundamental fact of the desire for excitement is usually left unexplored. The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century is blamed for a lot of deplorable things, and rightly so, yet this particular vice of gambling is as old as human history, and, for over a thousand years at least it has been one of the major impediments to progress in China. The truth is that, in its modern form, it is part of the larger sociological problem of the place and use of leisure in our "way of life." This, without taking into account the important fact that gambling and all that goes with it (professional sport, for example) is one of the most important "industries" organized on a profit basis.

We crave excitement because (we say) our lives are dull. And our lives are dull because, for the most part, we have been sentenced to an economic determinism bereft of any purpose that could possibly have any appeal to our innate capacities for creative work. In the conception of the modern Welfare State, as in the never-ending controversy as to whether slave labour was not a necessary concomitant of such fine personalities and works of art as graced ancient Athens, we

find implicit a rigid metaphysical dogma of predeterminism that has had its fruition in the elimination from human life of any sense of inner purpose or unbiased reflection. Everything is to be reduced to the imagined importance of profit or loss, in money, or in emotional or intellectual increase. Even pleasure loses its savour without this element. And so we have the excitement, not only of gambling, where the stakes are financial, but of war also, where the stakes are pre-eminently human lives.

Obviously, the roots of this evil, as of other dangers, go deep down into the soil of human nature, perverted from its rightful ends. We have not begun seriously to discuss the function of leisure in a modern industrial society, or to explore, in the wider setting of society as a whole, the opportunities afforded by leisure for adding to what A. N. Whitehead has called "the permanent richness of the soul's self-attainment." Factually, we have forgotten in all these questions that have to do with man's relation to his environment, the missing component of the human soul, its nature and destiny, free from the preconceptions of the theological mind to remind man of his essential qualities is the real act of social justice for which the whole world is seeking.

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## *REVIEW*

### VOYAGE INTO MYSTERY

THE September Book-of-the-Month selection, *Kon-Tiki*, by Thor Heyerdahl, is the 304-page log of an incredible voyage—forty-one-hundred miles on a balsa-wood raft—undertaken by Heyerdahl and his five companions to prove that the Polynesian islands might have been populated by similarly equipped exiles or adventurers from Peru. This in itself certainly makes *Kon-Tiki* "unusual" enough to excite attention, and the out-of-this-world novelty of the journey must have considerably excited reviewers, since more than one of them has likened Heyerdahl's sea saga to those of Joseph Conrad. We may doubt, however, whether any chiefly factual recital in Heyerdahl's manner, no matter how unusual the circumstances, should be favorably compared with adventure writing of Conrad's sort. As James Michener points out in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, "Masterpieces of the sea have invariably dealt with human beings in relationship to nature. The six brave men aboard the *KonTiki* are never portrayed as anything but one-dimensional." Michener does, however, suggest one good reason for hoping that *Kon-Tiki* will be widely read:

This is a book to make one proud that we still have in the world six young men who would venture upon the ocean on a raft, merely to prove an idea. It is good to know that such courage still exists.

Since the reviews undertaken in this column have been attempts at sociological and philosophical analysis rather than recommendations of "good reading" in the entertainment sense, we wondered for a time if we would be justified in giving much space to the Heyerdahl adventure. Michener's point is a good one, but can be put succinctly. And "making copy" by lengthening one's writing unnecessarily should always be deplored. There come times, as every editor or columnist knows, when the need to fill a page coincides with the availability of material of doubtful merit. We, however, as all

editors or writers in such a position, attempted to talk ourselves into doing a full-length review. The following rationalization is submitted as excuse: Though one cannot help but agree with Michener that it is good to know there are still young men in the world who will risk their lives to prove an idea, we think that Heyerdahl's story may have a greater value to the reading public because it illuminates the unfortunate incapacity of most scientific specialists to entertain new hypotheses, outside the realm of orthodox opinion. The early chapters of *Kon-Tiki* offer some evidence of this, for archaeologists and maritime experts united in pronouncing the Heyerdahl theory of Peruvian emigration impossible.

One of the lessons gained from David Lindsay Watson's book, *Scientists Are Human*, is this: In all departments of human knowledge labelled "scientific," we encounter entrenched orthodoxies, which are dislodged only in rare instances by men of more than normal ingenuity. Authorities may be benevolent in disposition, moreover, while remaining utterly frustrating to innovators. The ethnologists and archaeologists who talked with Heyerdahl during the ten years he spent developing his theory were inevitably kindly and patronizing. They *wished* to be friendly patriarchs to enterprising young men—but they also wished to see that the young men trod a very narrow path. Heyerdahl, of course, did not prove by his voyage on a raft that Easter Island and the Polynesian reefs had been populated by immigration of the Incas, but he did offer conclusive evidence that the experts were wrong in denying this possibility.

Heyerdahl's preliminary studies raised many broad questions worth pondering. There is a value, for instance, in wondering how men came to distribute themselves around the face of the globe, especially at a time when ancient common lineages, if recognized, might assist in creating a feeling of universality in the human bond. The reader who pays special attention to Heyerdahl's ethnological speculations will also have his

imagination constructively stirred by mention of Peruvian and Polynesian legends about "white men with beards" who "were the wandering teachers" of an earlier race. They are reported to have taught some basic rules of agriculture and of social living—religious and political codes fundamentally similar to those of all peoples who have grasped interdependence as the law of mature human existence. And in *Kon-Tiki*, too, we run upon a link in the lengthening chain of evidence against the theory of the world's great cultures being developed gradually, by chance, out of stone-age primitivism. Further, the following passage of Heyerdahl's may be correlated with the view of Frederic Wood Jones (in *Hallmarks of Mankind*) that the human being has *not* ascended from a Simian ancestry:

There is not a trace of gradual development in the high civilizations which once stretched from Mexico to Peru. The deeper the archaeologists dig the higher the culture, until a definite point is reached at which the old civilizations have clearly arisen without any foundation in the midst of primitive cultures.

Though Heyerdahl is chiefly concerned with vindicating his theory that Peruvians brought to Easter Island and Polynesia their own crafts and artisan's skills—thus accounting for the famous Easter Island statues—we can also note a similarity between Peruvian and Easter Island remains and the immense stone carvings of both Egyptians and East Indians.

But to focus our attention once again on Heyerdahl's linking of the Americas and Polynesia: *Kon-Tiki* was a legendary god-like leader for both the Peruvians and the Polynesians. For Heyerdahl, this clearly establishes that:

Kon-Tiki's sculptors were driven in flight from Peru, leaving behind them similar gigantic stone statues on the Andes plateau. In both places the quarry can be found where the legendary white people with beards hewed blocks of stone thirty feet long or more right out of the mountainside with the help of axes of still harder stone. And in both places the gigantic blocks, weighing many tons, were transported for many miles over rough ground before

being set up on end as enormous human figures, or raised on top of one another to form mysterious terraces and walls.

Here is the old question of the Pyramids again, in different guise—a thought-provoking question, whether we look to the Nile or the Andes:

Easter Island has become one of the foremost symbols in the insoluble mysteries of antiquity. Here and there on the slopes of the treeless island their huge figures have risen to the sky, stone colossi splendidly carved in the shape of men and set up as a single block as high as a normal building of three or four floors. How had the men of old been able to shape, transport, and erect such gigantic stone colossi? As if the problem was not big enough, they had further succeeded in balancing an extra giant block of red stone like a colossal wig on the top of several of the heads, thirty-six feet above the ground. What did it all mean, and what kind of mechanical knowledge had the vanished architects who had mastered problems great enough for the foremost engineers of today?

If we put all this puzzling information together with the unsolved problem of the construction of the pyramids, we may be led to speculate that there may once have existed a universal diffusion of one common culture among ancient peoples. Finally, we *could* arrive at what has been called the too-incredible thought—that highly developed civilizations may have lived on now sunken continents.

What is the value of such speculations? Simply that, whether true or not, they extend our perspective on human history, stretching our minds in such a way as to suggest the possibility that all of our trials and tribulations may be relative to some great cycle of human evolution, itself perhaps but one chapter in a longer history. And if there be such a "longer history," we can easily understand why its meaning has been sought in all ages by religion and philosophy.



## *COMMENTARY*

### FOR THE WRONG REASONS

BY this time, readers of the newspapers have probably noticed a sudden frequency of attacks on the idea of "socialized medicine," both in the news columns and in advertisements. For, as the October *Progressive* points out, "October is the month of the Big Operation, when the AMA [American Medical Association] hopes to remove that last lurking doubt you may have that our present system of medical economics isn't perfect and foolproof."

A total of \$1,100,000 of advertising has been contracted for, to run in 11,000 newspapers, and radio time has been purchased on 1,000 stations. There will be "tie-ins" with local businessmen, who are invited to participate in this struggle to preserve "Americanism."

Obviously, the *Progressive* doesn't think much of this campaign, and neither do we. But at this writing, we don't think much of socialized medicine, either. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that we don't think much of *compulsory* orthodox medicine, or of orthodox medicine without easily accessible unorthodox alternatives.

Socialized medicine could easily become political medicine, and then, compulsory medicine. If, over the opposition of the AMA, Congress should establish socialized medicine in the United States, we should soon have bureaucratic administrators of medicine. The theories which happen to prevail in the major medical schools of the land would probably provide the definitions for what is proper or "legal" in medical treatment, and what is not. And the AMA, as its second choice, might be glad to recommend the personnel for administering legal, national, or "social" medicine.

Theories of medicine have a close resemblance to theories of salvation, and are almost as personal. Suppose you want an

osteopath or a chiropractor instead of an allopath; or suppose you know from personal experience that the Bates method is sound for improving eyesight, even though the medical authorities do not admit it. Suppose the current vogue for "shots" does not attract you at all. Socialized medicine will do you no good, and it may do you harm, in one way or another, by freezing out the unorthodox practitioners.

There are other arguments about socialized medicine, but the argument on behalf of medical freedom, on behalf of free unorthodoxy in health, seems the most important argument of all.

## CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

WE find this the first occasion for doing something which sounds simple enough—recommending a motion picture for all parents and children to see. We would, of course, like to do this frequently, for a motion picture which is genuinely instructive can become the basis for supplementary home reading, discussion, and speculation of an intriguing sort. But while excellent points can sometimes be discovered in the more noteworthy film productions, there usually seems to be one or many things wrong with the total psychological impact. Although dramatization of important happenings, for instance, can be both informative and interesting, the history is often distorted in "historical" movies, even more than in historical novels; further, the psychological subtleties of well-known personages are commonly pared down to fit "mass appeal." But now we have found an exception, and invite readers to check our judgment.

Our picture is called *The Broken Arrow*, and features a virtually unknown cast, except for veteran James Stewart. It is one of the "other side" stories of the relationship of Western settlers and the U. S. Government to American Indians. Here, we think, is the most inspiring portrayal, to date, of the greatness and nobility to be found in Indian tradition. But it is also something more, for we see the absorbing drama of two men, one the Apache Chief, Cochise, and the other an American, who rise above the hatreds of their warring peoples to friendship, trust, and understanding.

*The Broken Arrow* is not primarily an artistic creation, but instead one of the greatest true stories of the Southwest. Cochise, the renowned Apache warrior, once betrayed and maltreated by the U. S. Cavalry when an earlier peaceful settlement of Apache affairs had been supposedly established, was waging a war to the death against further encroachment on his ancestral lands.

Thomas Jeffords was the resourceful young superintendent of the Tucson mail, formerly a riverboat captain and subsequently a cavalry scout. Jeffords was also a man who could sense the dignity and greatness of the Indians he had fought against beneath all of the differences of weapons, culture and language. Above all, he knew fair play when he saw it, and began to realize that fair play was the one thing Americans had never furnished the Apaches.

Among the bold men of Tucson, Jeffords alone was willing to risk his life to try to parley for understanding with Cochise's Chiricahua tribe. He learned the Apache language, planned and thought, and finally rode into Cochise's great mountain stronghold to talk over the problem of mail seizures. Long before this attempt, he had felt that a man might trust the word of an Apache far more than the Indians could ever trust most of his own white acquaintances, and he staked his life on Cochise's respect for courage and straight speaking. Jeffords didn't know what to do with his respect, or how to try to change the boiling hatreds which separated red man from white—beyond showing that he considered Cochise a rational and honorable human being who would listen to a proposal for letting non-military mail pass unmolested. But this in itself was enough to change history. The seed of Respect for Dignity had been planted, and the friendship of Jeffords and Cochise became, first, legendary, and, finally, symbolic.

However, Jeffords was also for a time an object of suspicion in Tucson, since, while his mail runs were successfully passed by the Apaches, settlers were simultaneously being attacked. Jeffords' "peace" was a peace for the mail alone. Yet this was not his final objective. He hoped that success in coming to *one* workable understanding with Cochise would conclusively prove that an Indian's word could be trusted—and that a deliberated peace rather than extinction of the tribes could become the objective of the Governments of Arizona and the United States.

At last Jeffords did conclude a peace settlement between Cochise and one General Howard, who was sent by the special authority of President Grant to find a man who could make parley possible. Faith in an "enemy" as being primarily a reasonable and honorable human being had saved untold lives. We need look no further in justifying the "psychological impact" of this motion picture.

We have never seen a cinema portrayal of human dignity under duress more inspiring. In the light of the integrity which radiated from the personalities of both Cochise and Jeffords, walls of hate and misunderstanding crumbled. *The Broken Arrow* also affords illumination on "white supremacy." Jeffords saw into the heart of the proud Apaches, correctly evaluated their religious and tribal customs as essentially superior to those brought by ambitious Christian missionaries, and found a peace of mind in Cochise's stronghold he had never known in Tucson—or anywhere else in the "white manis" country.

Also, to American people who have been raised on the notion of inevitable bloody fighting between settlers, cavalrymen and Indians, *The Broken Arrow* brings the realization that the most stirring story of all was written in history by two fighters of great repute who raised themselves *above* the level of the psychology of battle. Jeffords assumes the greatest stature when he turns all of his strength to winning the war against war, and so also does Cochise.

The original "Broken Arrow" story is told in a novel entitled *Blood Brother*, by Elliot Arnold (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York). In 1947, Arnold concluded years of research on the story of Cochise and Jeffords, bringing into his novel every known fact of historical importance, even to the recording of many of the actual conversations reported by the major figures in the drama. Those who turn from *The Broken Arrow* to *Blood Brother* may find, as Jeffords found, that the American Indians have a great deal to teach the representatives of our civilization. Their religion was a mystical religion of nature, based upon the

birthright obligation of every man to establish both a personal and tribal integrity as inflexible as the seasonal laws of nature. The Chiricahua Apaches, as many other tribes, were Stoics. They were also lovers of beauty, but the sort of beauty first sought was complete veracity between men, and next, a sense of individual composure which made fear and cowardice almost impossible.

As an aside, we wonder how many who see *The Broken Arrow* will be enormously impressed by the marriage ceremony introduced when Jeffords takes an Indian bride. The simplicity and profundity of the words, an accurate rendition of the Apache sacrament, may be regarded as symbolic of the many fine things Americans have for so long overlooked in the customs of "the primitives."

The story of *The Broken Arrow*, complex in terms of personal, religious, and political problems, is too big to have a "moral." Its essential *meaning*, though, has application wherever men are divided from men by political circumstance, whatever the occasion or historical situation.

## FRONTIERS

### "Self-Awareness" in Science

AFTER two or three generations of strenuous effort to diminate the "personal viewpoint" from scientific investigations, an interesting attempt is now being made to restore it—at least in the social sciences. The study of human beings, George F. F. Lombard points out in *Science* for Sept. 15, is considerably different from the study of the "inert" materials of the physical sciences. He is concerned with the development of the quality of "self-awareness" in researchers, which seems to mean, as he defines it, an appreciation of how the investigating scientist's activities or even attitudes of mind may affect the people or group he is studying; and an appreciation, also, of the circumstances under which scientific discoveries are made.

It has often happened that important advances in science have resulted from apparently accidental events. In the development of penicillin and radar, for example, the crucial steps of discovery came, we are told, from "an accidental observation," "a hunch," and "chance." Mr. Lombard remarks: "These words make me curious. Just what do they mean?"

Pursuing this inquiry, he finds James B. Conant saying in *On Understanding Science*:

The history of science . . . fails to demonstrate any uniform way in which new experimental facts and observations generate the fruitful notions in the minds of great investigators.

Claude Bernard, quoted by Conant, has this to say:

Apropos of a given observation, no rules can be given for bringing to birth in the brain a correct and fruitful idea that may be a sort of intuitive anticipation of successful research.

Modern psychology is of very little help to Mr. Lombard in solving this problem. Psychology, one might say, in its effort to be "objective," has paid little attention to the unusual in human experience, so that, on the subject of

creative inspiration, the available psychological theories offer mostly "gaps," obliging Mr. Lombard to offer his own conclusion:

Let me say only that a new idea worthy of serious attention seems always to spring from reflection. Consequently, balanced awareness involves an effective alternation between reflective thinking and concentrated attention. This fact is important in linking the general conditions of training of which I have been speaking with this inner process of mind; for it follows that training must supply adequate material—that is, experience—for reflection, as well as an opportunity for the two kinds of thinking to develop in effective alternation with each other.

The importance of self-awareness becomes especially evident in the social sciences. The social scientist, Mr. Lombard suggests, must be well aware of the ideas and values "from which he draws the meaningfulness of his own life." A failure in this will mean that the investigator will fail "to separate what he brings to the situation from the data he is studying." The positive values of self-awareness in social science are these:

On the one hand, awareness of self increases our capacity for handling ourselves in relation to our data by forcing on us continuous and critical inner appraisal and reappraisal of what we are doing in relation to an external reality. On the other hand, it reinforces our capacity for accurate observation by making us conscious of the difference between that which we see (perceived reality) and reality. This awareness is as necessary in the training of social scientists as it is in general education for citizenship.

In other words, the profession of scientist—of social scientist, at any rate—has profoundly important moral qualifications. The scientific method is not an ingenious hopper into which at one end is fed a judicious blend of facts, figures and hypotheses, in order to produce at the other end a procession of scientifically demonstrated conclusions. The scientific method does not eliminate the human equation, but requires, for its successful use, a sensitive and morally alert human being who is conscious of his responsibility to work out for himself a reasonable philosophy of

life. More important than the method is the man who uses the method.

Speaking of the application of techniques of research developed in studies of "primitive tribes and cultures" to our own social situations, Mr. Lombard says:

. . . their methods leave us with a sense of something missing when we focus them on the problems of modern life. Too often, sensing "the shadow but not the substance" of our relationship to our data, we retreat into a pseudo-objectivity that defeats itself. By attempting to make our questionnaires, tests, and laboratory-type experiments completely objective, we arrive at a typical norm so far removed from the uniqueness of the particular instance that the knowledge gained is all but useless in application.

From the subject of self-awareness in social scientists, Mr. Lombard passes to a consideration of its importance in the wider field of international relations:

. . . now that destruction for one may mean destruction for all, whole nations are called on for an awareness of self in relation to others such as has never before been required. At these levels the problems are of an entirely different order than any I have discussed up to this point. Yet, in peace and in war, citizen awareness of the effects of national policy is imperative. For example, however disastrous bombing may be to lives and property, it may also arouse to action a will to resist. The stubborn "happening of events" will then bring it about that this living resistance will replace both lives and property. If this should happen, bombing becomes a boomerang of a kind no primitive ever wished to possess. Even the *threat* of bombing may arouse such resistance.

And the threat is today a reality in the lives of all of us. Surely general education's responsibility to address the problems of communication between peoples cannot neglect these aspects of understanding: understanding of how what I myself do, of how what we as a nation do, affects and is affected by, the social realities of the divided world in which we live.

Many noted students of the social scene—Toynbee, Fromm, Rogers, Liebman, Whitehead—point to something closely akin to what I have been calling a conscious awareness of self in relation to the

external world, as the chief need of civilization today. Our ignorance of what is required at these more complex levels is appalling; yet conditions today make it necessary to face the problems of research and education that are involved.

There is a curious appropriateness in the fact that Mr. Lombard, while he writes as a social scientist, is professionally associated with the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard University. While much criticism may be justly directed at American business and American businessmen, it is also true that comments of remarkable social intelligence often arise from the business community. It was, for example, *Fortune* magazine which, some ten years ago, indicted the churches for failing to give the country any genuine moral leadership. What the *Fortune* editors may have had in mind as the right sort of moral leadership is another question, but it is difficult to dispute their claim that, "so long as the Church pretends, or assumes to preach, absolute values, but actually preaches relative and secondary values, it will merely hasten . . . [the] process of disintegration." Now a scholar and social scientist of the leading business school of the country presses what amounts to the moral viewpoint in social science upon his colleagues, describing as "appalling" our general ignorance of the psychological effects of national policies. And while the *Fortune* editorial may be explained as perhaps in some measure a flourish of editorial rhetoric, Mr. Lombard is evidently quite serious in what he says. Conceivably, in his article, we may recognize a part of the genesis of a new sort of social science—a sort that will be based upon philosophical first principles, instead of relying upon morally indifferent techniques.