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COLONIALISM AT HOME

A WHITE man may study what other white men, in their habitual pride of race and conquest, have called "the Indian Problem," and if he is an honest man, a man with an instinct for justice, while he may not be able to say that he has gained very much in understanding "what ought to be done," he will most certainly acquire a permanent heartache and an abiding sense of shame.

Perhaps the worst thing about the treatment of the American Indians by the people of the United States—the Indian Bureau, after all, can do little more than reflect the views of the people—is its psychology of proprietorship over the lives and the "welfare" of these original inhabitants of the North American Continent. We may mean well, or we may mean ill, but either way, so long as we imagine ourselves competent to make for the Indians the choices which any self-respecting group of people normally make for themselves, we shall do almost nothing but ill. Felix Cohen, a Washington attorney, author of the *Handbook of Federal Indian Law,* and a man who has long served the interests and rights of the Indians, summed up the issue in the February *Progressive*, saying:

> The great thing about American democracy is that most of us have an unprecedented power to shape our own lives, make our own mistakes, and attain new understanding and strength from the mistakes we make. To extend such democracy to Indians—to let Indians spend their own money, run their own schools, use or lease their own lands, and hire their own lawyers to defend their rights, just as neighboring white communities do, would not establish utopias on our 200 Indian reservations, but at least it would remove from our democratic professions, in our dealings with non-white peoples, the taint of hypocrisy.
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> If to this simple measure of justice were added a full and prompt settlement of all Federal debts to our Indian fellow-citizens, we would have no need to worry about how they would fare under the self-determination we have so long promised and so long withheld.

Mr. Cohen's article is called "Colonialism: U. S. Style." His point is that, ever since 1884, Indian Bureau Commissioners have been announcing their intention of restoring to the tribes their independence of decision in the management of their own affairs—but that, today, many of the tribes "have far less control over their own affairs than they had in 1884, and less in 1950 than in 1949." This article is mostly an indictment of the bureaucracy of the Indian Bureau. Fortunately, the fault, speaking in terms of fundamental analysis, lies elsewhere, for we know by now that there is little hope of solving a problem of this sort through administrative reforms or manipulation. The Indian Problem is a problem of human attitudes—white men's attitudes. It has always been this kind of problem, from the days of the Spanish conquistadors and the New England Puritans and Pilgrims to the present-day rule of Mr. Dillon Meyer over the activities of the Indian Bureau. John Collier, who was Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1933 to 1945, probably accomplished as much as was possible at the administrative level in behalf of the Indians, yet Mr. Collier, who is now professor of anthropology at City College, New York, recently felt obliged to write to the New York *Times* (Dec. 3, 1950) to charge that the gains made for Indian freedom during his administration "are now under attack—they are, in fact, being silently torn to shreds."

> The disheartening events to which he called public attention are matters for study—in fact, the entire subject calls for much study and reflection on the part of American citizens; here we can only say that a recent ruling by the Secretary of the Interior enabled Commissioner Meyer to remove the right of the Indians to select their own attorneys in all legal actions of a certain class, thus effectively destroying

> for the Indians the autonomy of the client-attorney relationship. Mr. Collier also details the implications of such measures as the Bosone Indian bill, which, he says, in the guise of aiming at "assimilation" of the Indians and "liquidation" of the Indian Bureau, contemplated "the hurried liquidation of federal responsibility to Indians, hence the destruction of that whole complex of structures built up since 1929 toward Indian self-development and dignified, high-level, true assimilation into the American stream." (Fortunately, the Bosone bill did not pass the Senate, although it was introduced again during the present session of Congress.)

Before becoming too deeply involved in a review of the moral tangle of present-day administration of Indian Affairs, it would be well for interested readers to investigate some of the history of the relationships between white men and Indians. *Saints and Strangers,* by George Willison, gives an excellent perspective on how our Calvinist New England forebears treated the Indians. Then, skipping to the Southwest, there is *Blood Brother,* by Elliott Arnold, and *Apache Agent,* by Woodworth Clum. Mr. Collier's *The Indians of the Americas* is excellent for an over-all picture as well as for an analysis of the basic problem. We suggest, also, Helen Hunt Jackson's *A Century of Dishonor* for a documentary account of crimes and injustices to the Indians. This reading ought to be supplemented by particular studies, such as *The Hopi Way* by Laura Thompson and Alice Joseph, and *Culture in Crisis* by Miss Thompson. Finally, for a scholarly study of what happened to the Indians of California, there is Dr. S. F. Cook's four-volume work, *The Conflict Between the California Indian and White Civilization.*

Of these books, only *Blood Brother* has elements of "fiction" in it, and if anyone should doubt its substantial accuracy, *Apache Agent,* which is virtually the autobiography of John P. Clum, who was in charge of the Apache reservation during the epoch which followed the drama of Cochise, will soon convince the reader that the case against the white man, if anything, is *under*stated by Mr. Arnold. *Apache Agent* is not merely the record of broken promises and betrayal of the Indians—it is the account of how peaceful and friendly Indians, their women and children, were murdered in cold blood, not once, as the moving climax of a frontier tragedy, but again and again, until it seems that the story has become a hideous burlesque of human suffering. It *cannot,* we think, happen again—and then, as we read on, this thing of unimaginable heartlessness and cruelty does happen again.

Those who suppose that Howard Fast's *The Last Frontier* is an exaggeration of the nobility of the Red Man and a kind of literary slander of the Army and the Indian policy of the United States will soon be reconciled to even the most idyllic versions of Indian life and character, by reaction to reading *Apache Agent.* The Indians had their bad men, of course, of whom Geronimo, the Apache renegade, was probably the worst, but the white men contributed something to Geronimo's evil ways, and here we are concerned with the crimes of "good" white men against the Indians. Clum, incidentally, was no sentimentalist, but a practical leader who managed the Apache reservation on condition that he be permitted to allow the Indians the freedom and respect their character and courage deserted. He was the only white man who ever outwitted and captured Geronimo, and he did it with his Apache reservation police, without help from the Army.

Death from combat or through treachery was bad enough, but the living death which came to the Indians by dispossession of their lands was the worst of all. The "problem," and its "solution," as seen by the nineteenth-century administrators of the U. S. Indian policy is described by Mr. Collier:

> The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1868 officially estimated that the cost per Indian killed was running at $1,000,000. Yet the Indian lands must be taken away, the Indian societies must be destroyed. How? . . . A number of converging methods were adopted, and the Cherokee record shows one of them in action. It was the most universal and fatal of all the methods.

The Cherokees, according to the "land allotment" system of the early 1880's, were forced to accept as individuals small parcels of land. Thus the tribal lands was divided up and the "surplus" which was left was sold by the government to the whites. The "social theory" justifying this action was this:

> The tribal societies were barriers to civilization, spiritual prisons of their members, insuring hellfire for most of them after death. The de-tribalized Indian on his individual parcel of land would become thrifty, a go-getter; and if he did not, then it would be right to have created the situation wherein his sins would overwhelm him. The most eminent of the rationalizers of Indian allotment, and of forced individualization generally, was Carl Schurz when he was Secretary of the Interior in the early 1880's.

Mr. Collier recognizes in the present policies and apparent intentions of the Indian Bureau a return to the practice, if not the logic, of the 1880's. "Assimilation" and "liquidation" he says, "are officially in the saddle again, now, in 1950." Even the mild-mannered Association on American Indian Affairs has called Commissioner Meyer's action "A totally unwarranted interference with the enfranchisement toward which the Indian communities in this country have long and successfully worked. . . . So clearly improper, and so plainly repugnant to minimal standards of non-interference with attorney-client relations, as to be outside the realm of the debatable. . . . The pernicious paternalistic trend [in Indian affairs] . . . has set in in the last year or two." The Indians, unlike most white men, are not economic individualists. Their traditions endowed them with the idea that lands are to be held in common—in common and in trust. "What," the great Tecumseh exclaimed, "Sell land! As well sell air and water. The Great Spirit gave them in common to all." Few Indians want to be "assimilated" into the commercial and competitive struggle for acquisition, and many of them are wholly unable to take part in this sort of life. They want to practice their own form of freedom and economic independence. As the Cherokees told the U. S. Government in 1838, on the eve of their enforced departure from the ancestral Cherokee lands in Georgia:

> The title of the Cherokee people to their lands is the most ancient, pure and absolute known to man, its date is beyond the reach of human record; its validity confirmed by possession and enjoyment antecedent to all pretense of claim by any portion of the human race. . . . These attributes have never been relinquished by the Cherokee people, and cannot be dissolved by the expulsion of the Nation from its territory by the power of the United States government.

We think highly of our Declaration of Independence; it is the principle, we say, as much or more than the fact of our independence, which we honor. Today, on reservations in many parts of the United States, are men who cherish the principle of independence, but lack its substance. A reading of the books and articles on the American Indians makes one wonder if we are really able to give their independence back to the Indians. We knew what freedom meant, in 1776; but do we know now? Are we ready to concede that freedom for the Indians means the right to define it in their own terms? That it means the right to remain "unassimilated," if that seems most desirable to them?

Letter from NORWAY

OSLO.—Despite a frontier on which the Russian government has claimed a small but militarily vulnerable trans-river beach-head—because of a Russian monastery (!) located at this point—Norway, like Finland, remains frankly anti-Russian without hysteria. The nearest equivalent to the U. S. witch-hunting orgy is a "Preparedness Law" which sets up certain controls over public expression, but which goes into effect only if a national .emergency should be declared. The wide protest among Norwegians against this law is evidence of a respect for civil liberties so fundamental that no special defensive group such as a "civil liberties union" seems to be needed.

Even the "Rightist" party in Norway is, in terms of its program, to the "left" of the U. S. Democratic Party. What most Americans have to unlearn is the myth that measures such as health insurance, which is universally accepted here by public and profession alike, in no way impair the basic liberties, the individualism of attitude or the independence of character found among most Norwegians. Outstanding Norwegian physicians find the current behavior of the AMA in opposing plans for health insurance and socialized medicine incredible and incomprehensible. Nobody here objects to the welfare state. Businessmen grumble over economic controls, but if placed in power they would, as they probably realize, be forced by world events to maintain similar controls. So why not let the labor party take the onus?

Active cooperation between Scandinavians and between their governments is a cultural and utilitarian actuality. But in part it is a deliberately compensatory offset to deep and persistent prejudices, notably between most Norwegians and Swedes. Spontaneously, independently, repeatedly, Norwegians complain, not of the wealth and efficiency of the Swedes, which they undoubtedly envy, but of their (doubtless unwitting) snobbish behavior toward things Norwegian. One is reminded of the way certain British visitors of the nineteenth century (Dickens, Arnold, Kipling) treated all things and persons American. Some Norwegians who visit Sweden sometimes speak English in order to get "decent service." They do not enjoy being ignored as "poor relations." They still resent bitterly the help given the Germans by Sweden, though they are aware of Swedish help given secretly to refugees and to the allies.

Sweden's two-sided "neutrality" looked like double-dealing to Norwegians, and the sympathies of Sweden's king were often questioned. Distrust of "Sweden" may derive in part from the period of joint control (nearly the entire nineteenth century), during precisely the period when ideals of liberty and nationalism were stirring the ferment of all Europe. Though "occupied" for hundreds of years by Denmark, Norway retains no grudge against the Danes. On the contrary, Danes are universally welcomed; things Danish are envied, but also admired and imitated. Norwegians find the Finns and their culture more congenial than Sweden, despite the language disparity and the fact that for a time Finland actually fought with Germany. Norwegian linguists are chronically pushing the government and public to modify the language (which is in a bewildering flux) *away* from its official Danish roots and toward its polyglot Norwegian roots, but Norwegian is still very close to Danish both orally and in print.

The number of prosperous bookstores is incredible to newcomers, and the *per capita* book publication and circulation is comparable only to Iceland. Major statues are with one or two exceptions not military but cultural heroes. Arts and artists are publicly subsidized, despite austerity in the imports of autos, refrigerators, and plumbing, and the shortages of sugar, coffee, clothing, chocolate, fruit, coal, and even electricity. With half the population, Norway is said to have twice as many university students as Sweden; too many, some think.

The Norwegian temper is further shown by the daily and yearly calendars. By cutting down their holidays and summer vacations, or lengthening the work-day by two hours, Norwegians could overcome the "dollar gap" which is the European Bogeyman, if such a cut were possible or if it would add proportionately to production. But such measures are improbable: habits and values are too strong, and living is so much more worth while than making. Norwegians are not idle or lazy—they are busy with other affairs. They live long and well. The visitor soon gets used to the minor discomforts and inefficiencies. Other things are so much more important.

NORWAY CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
THE IMPENITENTS

PSYCHOLOGIST Donald Wilson's My Six *Convicts* (Rinehart, 1951), an account of his experiences at Leavenworth Prison during the conduct of a lengthy research project, makes an excellent review sequel to Warden Duffy's *San Quentin Story* (discussed here two weeks ago). Numerous readers are assured for Wilson's book, since it is one of a "dual selection" by the Book-of-the-Month club, and for this choice crusading penologists should be very glad, since the need for public education in regard to both the motivations of crime and the most effective methods of rehabilitation offered by penology is still very great.

As Dr. Wilson points out, the United States, unfortunately, is known as having the longest sentences for criminals, the most reactionary conceptions of criminal rehabilitation, and the greatest amount of crime of any major country in the world. It is good, and even necessary, for an intelligent reading public to be thoroughly aware of these facts. But Dr. Wilson's primary intent in writing about his experiences at Leavenworth is to clarify a certain viewpoint on human personality and its relation to prevailing social attitudes. The viewpoint is the "we are all a part of one another" theme, but in a very impressive form, for Wilson furnishes a number of specific correlations. Also, he sees that the effects of our inadequate treatment of crime and the criminal have extended far beyond the suffering caused to those who are indicted and sentenced: the whole of society becomes involved in confusions, prejudices, hates and fears which are inevitable accompaniments of the attitudes made explicit by criminal law and prosecution.

The following passage is a concise summary of the most progressive sociological views on "the criminal" and leaves us in no doubt of Dr. Wilson's opinion that it is less the lawbreaker's "personality" which is responsible for his incarceration than the arbitrary categories of crime that society has decided upon:

> The convict thinks very little better of our conscience on the outside than we do of his. Sanitaria, hospitals doctors' and psychologists' offices, pastors' studies and institutions for the insane are full of maladjusted individuals, but *their* outward manifestations of neurosis have social approval. We have no legislation outlawing them. The manifestations of neuroses in the man who tangles with the law instead of with religion do not have social approval, although the criminal may not wreak any greater misery on any more people through his crimes than does the tyranny of the chronic invalid in your home—who would find her legs soon enough if a pot of gold lay at the end of a brisk walk.
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> One is said to be neurotic, the other is said to be criminal.
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> Sometimes a neurotic is salvageable, sometimes he is not. This is true of the hypochondriac and the drunkard; it is also true of the criminal. Yet the criminal in discharging his debt to society is often given no aid. He is thrown in prison upon his own pathological resources for recovery, and is expected to emerge from isolation, filth, and brutality, hunger, idleness, loneliness and monotony, a changed man.
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> He may be changed. He will not be cured.
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> Crime is with us always, on many levels, in many forms. The proportion of the problem it poses is not reflected in the number of crimes on our books or convictions on our police blotters or prisoners in our penitentiaries. *It is reflected in the attitude of our people toward what crime is. For what a nation comes to agree upon as being the nature of crime is what determines the nature of her criminals.*

Dr. Wilson's argument involves a rather equal distribution of human interest stories—featuring the six convicts who volunteered as his laboratory assistants in studying the correlation of drug addiction to "criminal tendencies"—and useful conjectures as well as documented judgments concerning the psychology of crime. The former will keep all of the Book-of-the-Month club readers going, while, in the process of reading a tale which is generously seasoned with bizarre humor, they will pick up a number of ideas that need to be known and pondered.

It is apparent that Dr. Wilson was enormously impressed by the integrity and friendliness of his cooperating lawbreakers when these qualities finally emerged under the auspices of a congenial and constructive relationship on the research project. The culmination of his association with the men, shortly before his work was finished, came when he walked to his garage in a nearby town and discovered that his old car had been replaced by a brand new Hudson, complete with pink slip—the mark of his criminals' appreciation for the fair deal he had always tried to give them and the equalitarian friendliness he had allowed to develop. (Dr. Wilson did not accept the present, although he was properly impressed by the way in which his secluded associates were still able to manipulate "deals" on the outside. Incidentally, it was *not* a stolen car.)

The average prison inmate, according to Dr. Wilson, is thoroughly convinced that he is just as honest as "society," and resents the excessive moral opprobrium accompanying his isolation:

> There were three specific and violent reasons why most of the convicts I knew in the penitentiary were *not* penitent:
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> The capriciousness of the written law and its interpretation.
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> The corruption of law enforcement.
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> The respectability of the white-collar criminal.
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> My men illuminated these reasons for me during our frequent round table sessions, when they would take voluble exception to popular concepts of criminology. Some of their reasoning was warped by rationalization and projection. Some of it was devastatingly true and shocking. They quoted recognized authorities on legal abuses and injustices, and recited volumes of statistics and cases to clinch their arguments. Prison life develops a large corps of "attorneys" and "judges" among the men, who study law with a vengeance in their cells, reversing practically every decision handed down by our courts. Other men, like my encyclopaedic Gibbs, carried long tables of statistics and cases at their finger-tips.
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> The convict in a penitentiary watches the three-ring show of the white-collar criminal and the big-time criminal, with the lawless police wedged between the two, and asks himself why he is more criminal than these? Why he should absorb the most sustained impact of law and justice while the serious offenders are so rarely prosecuted and so frequently escape punishment if, for political expediency, they are occasionally prosecuted? Why, he asks, is the written law so inconstant and unequable?
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> He is not disposed in prison to contemplate his own sins, but the larger sins that go unpunished in a free society. It is not repentance that occupies him; it is reprisal.

While Dr. Wilson is fully aware of and glad to note the extensive prison reforms of the last twenty years, he is also convinced that they are by no means enough. Our pompous and bombastic J. E. Hoover of the FBI—whose "be tough on criminals" philosophy is responsible for continuance of some of the worst features of an old tradition in his favorite prison, Alcatraz—finds himself outspokenly identified as a remnant of the dark ages:

> His [Hoover's] statement that "the only way to make a lawbreaker obey the statutes of our country is to make him fear punishment" was precisely the premise of the Church and Government in the Dark Ages when they mutilated men and women and children in the name of God. Treat 'em rough penology isn't new. It is old, threadbare, and, Mr. Hoover's Uniform Crime Reports indicate, ineffectual.

Without making any apology for the lengthiness of the quotation selected, we now present what seems to us the most important passage in Dr. Wilson's entire volume. While it is often popular to indict society for encouraging crime through the lack of decent work-opportunities for crowded and impoverished city dwellers, Dr. Wilson's charge is more philosophical and more basic. A little private reflection will bolster his statement that a thousand years of western history has witnessed the "moral" elevation of brutality, in peace as well as in war—first at the hands of both Church and State, and subsequently by the State alone. *Our continued acceptance of vengeance, and punishment through brutality and fear,* emerges as the great subterranean cause of crime. This, it appears, can also be statistically proven:

The adults of this generation have lived through two world wars. Contemporary memory and literature is full of instances of man's inhumanity to man in time of war. Unfortunately torture and brutality are not the issue of war, uniforms, patriotism, forms of government, flags, ideologies, morals or justice. They are the issue of man himself. They have been espoused by the two most influential forces in human destiny: government and church.

Between the twelfth and twentieth centuries these two forces in Western civilization legally took the lives of human beings, even children, by over forty different tortures.

Nor was death always the end in view. More often it was simply legal disfigurement: amputation of hands, ears, tongue, eyes.

These were done in the name of human conscience and Divine justice. Perhaps it follows logically in our culture, the conscience of which is inured by a God who burns His erring children in eternal fires.

If punishment is to escape the stigma *of* sadistic brutality, it must have some end bigger than avenging society ant placating gods. Civilization's past five hundred years of legalized sadism have illuminated neither the problem of crime nor the nature of the criminal.

The rule has always been that the greater the number and severity of punishments, the more lawlessness increases. Punishment is no deterrent to crime. As the number and severity of punishments on the statute books of a nation decline, lawlessness also declines.

COMMENTARY
"I DON'T KNOW—DO YOU?"

NOT long ago, the New York *Times* printed a "human interest" story concerning the executive of a large company that needed a messenger boy. As men of "messenger-boy" age are nearly all being taken by the draft, he advertised for a man between 45 and 65 years of age, preferably retired. The job was five days a week, with wages of $34.

Within a day or so after the notice appeared, the company had received a total of 245 applications. The bulk of the replies came from men between 45 and 55 who were having difficulty in supporting themselves. There were dozens of retired policemen, firemen, postmen, and ex-civil service employees. Some applicants once owned their own businesses.

"I'm hanging on to their applications," the disturbed executive told the reporter, "because we may need to fall back on older men later." He also said, "There ought to be some organization that could do something about these men. I don't know. Do you?"

This is a typically American problem, and the businessman proposed a typically "American" solution. By contrast, it reminds us of the respect and consideration shown by American Indians to the oldest members of the tribe. But this comparison is inaccurate in that men of 45 or 55 are not really old at all. Men of that age are usually more dependable and more competent than youngsters, and their time of life should represent the most productive years of human intelligence. But at that age, nobody, or almost nobody, wants them.

We are not suggesting that these men do have a special sort of wisdom and maturity simply because of their age. Probably, as a group, they reflect the same sort of mistakes and weaknesses that might be suspected of a society which as a whole has little use for unattached men after they reach 45 or 50. What we are suggesting is that such a society, which offers the alternatives of either exceptional commercial success or the scrap-heap and "charity" to its maturing citizens, is a society which is probably on the way to the scrap-heap itself. Fortunately, a society can go to the scrap-heap without involving the human beings which make it up. The latter, if they are intelligent enough, can always evolve a new way of doing things; the question is, will they? "We don't know; do you?"

CHILDREN
. . and Ourselves

WE have at hand a printed copy of a letter written by a New York high school teacher of economics—the printing and mailing being furnished by The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., Irvington-on-Hudson, New York. The title of this letter is "A Lesson in Socialism," both the title and the mailing indicating once again the extent to which political and social issues intrude themselves at the Secondary School level. The letter is as follows:

> As a teacher in the public schools, I find that the socialist-communist idea of taking "from each according to his ability," and giving "to each according to his need" is now generally accepted without question by most of our pupils. In an effort to explain the fallacy in this theory, I sometimes try this approach with my pupils:
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> When one of the brighter or harder-working pupils makes a grade of 95 on a test, I suggest that I take away 20 points and give them to a student who has made only 55 points on his test. Thus each would contribute according to his ability and—since both would have a passing mark—each would receive according to his need. After I have juggled the grades of all the other pupils in this fashion, the result is usually a "common ownership" grade of between 75 and 80—the minimum needed for passing, or for survival. Then I speculate with the pupils as to the probable results if I actually used the socialistic theory for grading papers.
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> First, the highly productive pupils—and they are always a minority in school as well as in life—would soon lose all incentive for producing. Why strive to make a high grade if part of it is taken from you by "authority" and given to someone else?
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> Second, the less productive pupils—a majority in school as elsewhere—would, for a time, be relieved of the necessity to study or to produce. This socialist-communist system would continue until the high producers had sunk—or had been driven down—to the level of the low producers. At that point, in order for anyone to survive, the "authority" would have no alternative but to begin a system of compulsory labor and punishments against even the low producers. They, of course, would then complain bitterly, but without understanding.
>
> Finally I return the discussion to the ideas of freedom and enterprise—the market economy—where each person has freedom of choice, and is responsible for his own decisions and welfare.
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> Gratifyingly enough, most of my pupils then understood what I mean when I explain that socialism—even in a democracy—will eventually result in a living death for all except the "authorities" and a few of their favorite lackeys.

How does this letter strike you? As for us, we feel that it is a typical example of meeting an issue halfway, and while we have no desire to defend any straight Socialist doctrine, either politically or educationally, and while we are willing to grant the point that "authority" of a tyrannical sort inevitably seems to arise—complete with favored castes—in a rigid Socialist state, the economics teacher's conclusions seem wide of the mark.

First, we are apparently supposed to assume that an educational institution is "democratic." This has never been so. The structure of education is always hierarchical, although there are levels within the total structure upon which a form of democracy can work. In need of correction, also, is the assumption that a valid analogy can be made between material goods and the grades given in a classroom. Taking away twenty points from the smart student and giving them to a duller one would be the same thing as proposing to take one person's I. Q. and paste it inside his neighbor's brain. Not even the Communist has ever been so carried away with fanatic enthusiasm as to believe this possible.

Mr. T. J. Shelly, the writer of the letter, states that most of his pupils can understand, on the basis of this analogy, why Socialism, "even in a democracy—will eventually result in a living death." Here we would refer our readers to passages quoted from Russell Kirk's *Measure* article, "Beyond the Dreams of Avarice," in last week's Review. According to Mr. Kirk, and according to us, we arrive at the state of "a living death" when materialistic philosophy dominates. *This can happen under any system of government.*

True enough, Socialists captivated by the oversimplified generalizations of Marxism have often professed a formal materialism which calls special attention to their skepticism about abstract ideas and ideals. Yet many Socialists, and, for all we know, more than a few Communists, have lived according to some abstract humanitarian ideal themselves, and have been less concerned with possessions than some of the wealthy conservatives who oppose "Marxist materialism" so strenuously.

It is a good thing, of course, for differing opinions on controversial issues to be circulated, but the extraordinary naïveté of such "political criticism" at the secondary school level inspires us to examine very thoroughly the examples of methods in use that come our way. It would be our opinion, for instance, that Mr. Shelly's pupils would need several hours of stimulating home discussion to clear up the points raised and only superficially and incorrectly dealt with in class.

Although Mr. Shelly did not intend this, he has at least confirmed our belief that the grading system in schools is entirely unnecessary, for he implies that the grading system should be recognized as the primary impetus to study, the supreme incentive being to get a higher mark than someone else's. This indicates, too, that Mr. Shelly does not share Mr. Kirk's feeling that it is necessary to get "Beyond the Dreams of Avarice."

All criticism of Mr. Shelly aside, however, there are certainly some respects in which the dangers of autocratic socialism need to be highlighted for high school students. The political slanting of science, literature and the arts, as it has taken place under the Soviets, is both idiotic and macabre. Informed readers are well aware of the stifling effect which ideological "science" has had upon independent research in biology, anthropology, etc. Further, musicians, artists, and authors have often had to choose between becoming yes-men or hacks and giving up their calling. But this type of criticism of Soviet culture boomerangs on oversimplified rhetoric of loyalty to "capitalism." Mr. Shelly's conscientious dogmas also provide a party line: (*a*) Socialism of any type results "in a living death"; (*b*) the only real incentive for human endeavor which we can approve is that of private advance, based on the dream of getting more of something than someone else has; and (*c*) the equality of goods and opportunities is identical with standardization of intellects and therefore an inevitable obstacle to creativity.

These propositions, as set forth by Mr. Shelly, may be true or they may be false, but so long as they are set forth as facts instead of theories, dogmas instead of purely personal convictions, they will help us to become unthinking in the same sense as have so many Russians whom we criticize with great righteousness. The "either-or" technique of discussion is famous in politics, infamous in education.

The Socialism of well-meaning experimental communities, the partial socialization of England and of India, provide truly valuable material for study of the apparently hopeless conflict between Russia and America. *These* are "lessons in Socialism," as well as the frightening example of the Soviets, and it seems to us that the Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., would do well to mention the fact.

FRONTIERS

"Science and Human Affairs"

IF E. C. Stakman's article of this title in *Science* for Feb. 9 may be taken as representative, the self-examination which scientists have been pursuing for the past ten or fifteen years has reached a degree of candor and maturity which makes either "attacks" or "defenses" of Science wholly irrelevant and unnecessary. The problem is no longer, "What to do about the scientists?" but, What shall men do about themselves?

This is a basic step of progress. Especially since the atom bomb, scientists have been on the defensive. They have been charged with revealing facts and forces which they cannot control They have been accused of being ivory-tower isolationists. Their "theory of knowledge" has been pilloried and ridiculed by articulate intellectuals schooled in the philosophical tradition. Prof. Stakman's discussion, rather than refutation, of these criticisms seems just and conclusive:

> Scientists often are charged with being sociologically irresponsible. They are criticized for giving society new knowledge and tools without guaranteeing that society will use them wisely. The charge is true, but the criticism is unfair. Too often society demands service from scientists, then criticizes them for having complied with the demand. "Food will win the war" was one of the principal slogans in World War I. Science and technology went to work to help meet the demand; the record of achievement was good. But a few years later there was "agricultural overproduction," when millions of people in the United States were hungry and the specter of starvation stalked in many areas of the world. The farmer was "a beggar sitting on a bag of gold"—or wheat. Then scientists were condemned for "having shown how to produce more and more without considering how the increased amount could be consumed." Is it necessary to remind ourselves of a similar experience with atomic energy? Scientists now are being asked to help increase agricultural and industrial production in underdeveloped countries. And already their wisdom is questioned because they are "merely helping to aggravate the evils of overpopulation."
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> Does society expect too much of science? Are scientists to be investigators, inventors, social pastors, and spiritual guides? They are citizens; they are relatively few in number. Do they accept the morals of the society of which they are a part, or do they set their own standards? Presumably most of them do what is required of citizens in times of national emergency. They may try to contribute wisdom, but they are neither numerous nor noisy enough to determine social decisions. If they are to be blamed for mistakes, they should be given commensurate authority. It would be an interesting experiment.

Thus one conclusion of Prof. Stakman's article is that scientists are not supermen. Nor do the findings of science constitute a special sort of revelation, capable of wiping out the difficulties and sorrows of the human race. It has taken several hundred years for the modern world to find this out. Through part of the eighteenth and all of the nineteenth century, it was the natural assumption of many thinkers that Science held all the important keys to human progress. We now know that this was a false assumption. At least, the kind of "progress" that science has brought is so largely the unmanageable sort described by Prof. Stakman—the adjustment of our technology to a program of follies—that we hesitate to name it progress any more. And he, surely, would not so name it. Instead, he asks basic questions:

> . . . like other groups, scientists should periodically practice introspection. They should evaluate their contributions, acknowledge their shortcomings, and improve as much as possible. Has science contributed more to the comforts of civilization than to civilization as a whole; have scientists contributed more to science than to society? Is it true that civilization is on trial, is science at least partly to blame, should there be a partial or complete moratorium on science until ethics overtakes intelligence?
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> Science has solved many problems of man in relation to his physical environment, but it has not succeeded in emancipating man from his baser self, from man's cruelty to man. Can science contribute to better human relations?... Is man really capable of understanding and mastering himself? Can he be objective regarding himself and the group of which he is a part? And does he want to; do men still thrive on their prejudices? Can the social sciences discover,

> organize, and apply facts and principles in social affairs? . . . In social affairs man encounters his presuppositions, preconceptions, prejudices, selfishness, greed, group consciousness, and narrow nationalism. The social scientist has a difficult time: is he to be investigator, advocate, and guide? What penalties does he pay for unorthodoxy? What influence can he exert on courses of action?

Naturally, Prof. Stakman has more questions than replies. As one hope of finding answers, he calls for a reunion between science and the humanities—between scientists and humanists, for, as he puts it, "all are humanists and their joint contributions can accelerate man's evolution toward intellectual enlightenment and spiritual refinement."

Supposing that the humanities do have a key which the sciences lack, what is that key? What, in short, is the wisdom of which we have such desperate need? Evidently, it is not in the sciences as we know and practice them.

As usual, we have maneuvered this subject around to a discussion of the nature of man. It seems, however, a necessary maneuver, and one to which Prof. Stakman's article points directly. Wisdom, we could say, is a kind of *measure,* a sense of fitness, in human behavior. It is this, at any rate, which the study of the humanities is supposed to provide. If we do not get it from the humanities, then perhaps we know as little about the study of the humanities as we do about the wise use of technology. This wisdom is certainly not something to be obtained merely from the reading of many books, or from accumulations of facts. It has rather to do with what a man thinks of himself and his place and part in this world. It involves a delicate attunement to the requirements of justice and honesty, and all the other qualities of human excellence that the mind-world of the humanities speaks of and reveres.

It seems a very simple thing to realize that if we are to have wisdom—this sort of wisdom—we must learn to feel that these qualities are substantially real. We must learn to believe in them as much as we believe in our own existence. And this means that we must have a science of man which takes cognizance of these qualities. Here, then, is the place for the scientists to begin, in seeking a new alliance with the humanities. How shall we gain, or regain, a conviction of the dignity and potential greatness of human beings?

Prof. Stakman's essay leads up to this question, but does not ask it. We have asked it, for the reason that it seems an inescapable educational problem, if we are to join science with wisdom. We shall not become wise by talking about the desirability of wisdom. Wisdom is an acquisition. It is something that grows. It does not come from attending "a church of your faith every Sunday," as the billboards exhort.

At present, mankind is the victim of what someone has called "the anonymous forces" of history. We are "pushed" from one dilemma to another. Our disasters are massively collectivist, but education remains an individual affair. The light which leaps up in a child's or a man's mind is not something that can be beamed at multitudes of people by a radiating propaganda machine. Wisdom is like courage—it has to be your own, or it is not much good at all.

Prof. Stakman notes: "When we profess the brotherhood of man and cannot act the part, and do not know why, we should at least make the attempt to put science to work in studying human relations." Well, how *would* you put science to work to get a definition of practical brotherhood? What would a *wise* scientist have said, when told, during World War I, that "Food will win the war"? And what would you do to get people to listen to him?

The ancients—those conveniently available "ancients"—believed that a man's life on earth is in some sense a mission. He has a work to do. It is *his* work, and no one can do it for him. And because it is his, it is more important for him to do than any other single thing. He has to forge out of the recalcitrant materials of life a worthy existence. He is, of necessity, "isolationist" to all that would make his existence unworthy in his

own eyes. He can say to others that he is about "his father's business." He has dragons to slay, treasure to unearth, or a grail to discover. He has an engagement in Gethsemane, or under the Bo Tree. His search for knowledge is a ceaseless dialogue with the voice that is within—his *daimon* or his conscience.

This, we should like to suggest—this, or some more contemporary version of the same essential values—is the necessary psychological environment for education in wisdom. A man's wisdom *is* his sense of personal destiny. He cannot think of himself as a leaf flying before the blast and be wise. He cannot be a "subject," whether of Authoritarian Church or Omnipotent State, and be an autonomous moral agent, a self-governed man. To be wise, he must tryst with the stars, and feel the minerals, the plants, the animals, and all the peoples of the earth to be the companions of his heart.

Out of this feeling for life as a venture and a voyage may grow the balance, the measure, and the stability of purpose that we recognize as wisdom. It is necessary to realize that our term on earth was not "intended" to be one long, unslaked thirst for "experience" and "expression" and "acquisition." The scientific idea of "progress" is lacking in a sense of rhythmic proportion. It is a parabolic curve which shoots off into space. We need to capture this curve and humanize it—bend it to the *educational* welfare of mankind. Scientific discovery, perhaps, is but the amoral shadow of the inner discoveries we should be making in our own hearts—the neutral analogue of that individual moral evolution which we have so long neglected.