

SYNTHESIS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

SEVERAL weeks ago, on the editorial page, MANAS invited suggestions concerning the synthesis of science and religion, proposing, as a start, that the suggestions deal with "the absolutely indispensable elements of both." One reader has responded with a communication which we print in condensed form:

The first thing to do is to discard the belief that scientific principle and religious principle must be compromised to make an understandable relationship of science and religion. My suggestion is that the idea of totality of truth be examined to find the basic conception with which to form the ideas of reality in each of the departments of thought. Basic truth is to be found in the common origin of the elements of the universe and, in particular, the origin of the individuality of the members of the human race. Whatever the individual idea of the cause of creation, and of the reason for the supply of life-sustaining and life-expanding forces and substances, we can agree that life and substance are the results of the existence of primal intelligence which directs the coordination of the universal forces. . . .

In material science, principles are discovered, correlated and made available to mankind for use in forming the physical elements of living. But because living contains elements of spiritual value, which must be apprehended and worked into the pattern of human life, there is a body of truth that is to be brought into man's consciousness and comprehension, to become the directive element of man's thought and feeling. This directive element is religion.

Thus, material and spiritual concepts are inseparable within the totality of truth. The principles of science and religion are in intermingling partnership in forming the pattern of righteous, abundant living. Our salvation lies in the apprehension and the understanding of basic truth and derivative principle, and in the growth of integrity of thought and action.

At the outset, let us see if we are able to assume that science and religion can be united without mortal hurt to either. How, in other words, do they seem to be opposed at the present

time? (This inquiry will proceed from an "ideal" point of view, taking into account only the legitimate ends of science and religion, with no more than incidental attention to the partisan interests of institutional religion, and similar interests, if any, of science.)

What is science? Fundamentally, it is prediction. A scientific formulation graduates from theory to law when it has been shown to establish the conditions of reliable prediction. Truly unpredictable phenomena—if such exist—are not data for scientific investigation, except that it may fall to the scientist to announce their unpredictability. This does not, of course, exclude from scientific study the happenings which are not yet on a predictable basis, but which may be put there in the course of scientific progress. But if there is any process in the universe which will not submit to prediction because of its intrinsic nature, and that process can be pointed out, we have found a limit to the application of science.

What is religion? Ultimately, it is that cluster of values and assumptions about the nature of things to which men have reference when making moral decisions. The one indispensable assumption of religion is that men do in fact *choose*. All the rest of religion has to do with the criteria of choice. But if men have no choice, they are not individuals at all. If men have no choice, all doctrines of moral responsibility are meaningless. A religion which has nothing to say about moral responsibility is not a religion in the common meaning of the term. Accordingly, religious thinking is thinking about the use of human freedom. Thinking about those aspects of human life which are not free may illumine our understanding of freedom, and therefore contribute to religious understanding, and here, perhaps, we have a practical union between science and religion.

It can hardly be questioned that scientific thought has been responsible for great reforms in religious thinking and practice. A nineteenth-century Unitarian, O. B. Frothingham, exclaimed: "Talk of Science as being irreligious, atheistic! . . . Science is creating a new idea of God. It is due to Science that we have any conception at all of a *living* God. If we do not become atheists one of these days under the maddening effects of Protestantism, it will be due to Science, because it is disabusing us of hideous illusions that tease and embarrass us, and putting us in the way of knowing how to reason about the things we see. . .

How did science accomplish this reform? By gradually eliminating the power of choice from religion's principal Personage other than man—God. Whenever science was able to put another of nature's functions on a predictable basis, God lost another job. It eventually became apparent that it was the role of science to deny or disprove or ignore the existence of God as a being who plays a particular part in natural events. There have always been plenty of scientists who would admit the existence of God so long as he could be left out of their scientific formulas, or allowed to participate as a wholly invariant principle which need not be "counted" since it never interferes with the calculations of scientific prediction. A scientist, in other words, might allow you to say that God is the *principle* of causation, but he could not remain a scientist and permit the assumption that God acts as a *particular* cause in a particular event. If he did, he could not practice his science.

Except as a generalized idea of cause, then, the will of God was eliminated from the world of processes by the progress of science. It now became the tendency of science to eliminate the will of man. Naturally enough, scientists undertook the study of man in much the same way that they had studied the world. As scientists, they were interested in successful prediction. But if a man's behavior can be absolutely predicted,

then he has no choice. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the body of scientific theory concerning man that allows the idea of choice. There are plenty of scientists who will grant or even insist that the intuitive feeling of freedom possessed by all men is authentic evidence of freedom; who will say that the neglect of this freedom in scientific theory and experiment is the result of a methodological postulate, and not a philosophical judgment. For the most part, however, scientific investigation of man proceeds without theoretical provision for human freedom, and reaches conclusions, therefore, which exhibit a similar indifference to the matter.

Ultimately, the issue between science and religion is a question of sovereignty. Which one is entitled to make the primary definitions to which human thought ought to conform? What, in other words, is man?

If we allow science to make the definition, we shall have an account of human beings which takes no notice of the religious essential of moral freedom. If we ask the scientist what he means by this, he can answer in two ways. He can say, first, that freedom is a fiction designed by theologians and metaphysicians, that his method cannot accommodate "free" activities and that he will not put them in his definition of man. That is one answer—the answer of the determinists, the mechanists, and the materialists. It is also the answer of the scientist who demands complete intellectual sovereignty for the scientific description of nature and man.

But determinism is not as prevalent as it used to be. More commonly, the scientist asks for only limited sovereignty—the sovereignty he deems necessary for the practice of his discipline. This second answer is that man is an object of science up to but not including the region of human freedom. That region, the scientist says, does not belong to him, although he may make statistical studies of human decision and try to form some conclusions as to how men make choices. He may say that it is his business to encroach in this way

on the region of freedom until it disappears altogether, or the boundaries between free and unfree processes can be clearly marked.

The religious definition of man is more difficult to examine, since it is not subject to the considerations of rigor which the scientist is obliged to observe. Religious definitions, also, however, may be made to fit into two broad categories. Religion can insist on the real existence of both man and God as choosing entities with the capacity for freedom. This is religion's first answer, an answer which suffers from an internal dualism we had best leave to the theologians to work out as best they can. (The problem is one of deciding how much free will God has, and how much will be left to man, if God is allowed to have an infinite supply.) But if religion makes this demand, it is bound to have trouble with science. The one thing that science cannot do without is the idea of impersonal law as the governing principle in all the operations of nature. If the rule of law can be disturbed in order to suit the doctrinal necessities of theology, the scientists will have to retire from the field. If the theologians are willing to stipulate that divine activities in the world invariably take the form of natural law, then there is no difficulty, but few believers in the traditional forms of religion will submit to this depersonalization of the deity. For the result of an agreement of this sort would be either the abandonment or the complete redefinition of the idea of prayer.

Fundamental to all conceptions of religion is the idea of power. Prayer means access to the religious version of power. It may be prayer by the individual religionist, or prayer by a priest with special qualifications to appeal to the deity, or it may be the supremely qualified personage of God's regent on earth who makes the appeal: in each case the crucial value is the capacity to draw on God's power. What happens to the familiar source of power when God is reduced to impersonal process?

One great issue, then, on which science and religion must find agreement is the concept of deity, conceived as a source of power.

The second answer of religion amounts to the simple requirement of moral freedom for human beings. We say "simple" requirement, since the idea of freedom is simple enough, but the implications of an assumption of this sort are not simple at all. This is soon discovered by examining critical discussions of the subject. The idea of freedom, one finds, is dependent upon the idea of a self—a unitary being—which is an enduring causal agent, not itself the "effect" or "result" of other or prior causes. Freedom, in short, is a metaphysical concept, directly related to another metaphysical concept—that of the self or the soul. There is a sense in which the self, in order to be free, must also be self-existent, not the creature of time and space. It must also be admitted, however, that this self or ego enjoys only a qualified freedom—a freedom circumscribed by all the material and psychological conditions of its natural and cultural and physiological environment.

To vindicate a claim of this sort in behalf of human freedom, we have only the intuitive sense of freedom, the obscure writings of the mystics, the speculations of the philosophers, and a large body of tradition, so that we can hardly expect the scientists to assent to anything more than the bare admission of the fact of freedom. Yet this assent they must give, if the one indispensable element of religion is to be retained. Some scientists may take encouragement in this direction from the work of the parapsychologists, who have been able to establish evidence that some part of man may be in a measure independent of time and space. The communications of extra-sensory perception do not rely upon the known laws of physics for their transmission, and the impediments of time are somehow set aside in other types of psychological phenomena. It goes without saying that only a small beginning has been made in the endeavor to study scientifically

the operations of the human psyche in partial independence of physical surroundings and organic sense apparatus, but the fact of that independence, for many, is already undeniable.

We have, then, in these two necessities—one for science, the other for religion—a tentative basis for the synthesis of science and religion. The survival of science requires the inviolable retention of the idea of universal, impersonal law, and the survival of religion requires guarantee of a range, however limited, of moral freedom to man.

Religion may have the right to propose and theorize at will, so long as it does not impinge upon the scientific rule of an orderly, impersonal explanation of all natural events and processes; while science may continue to interpret events in terms of natural cause and effect, so long as the reduction of man to an impotent atom of the cosmic process does not result.

Nevertheless, a synthesis at this level has elements of seeming compromise, if they are not compromises in fact. Why, for example, should science refuse freedom to the will of God, while admitting it for man? An answer to this might be: Because there is immediate evidence given in the experience of human consciousness for human freedom. All men will testify to having some degree of freedom. The reconciliation of the fact of this freedom—assuming it to be a fact—with the human capacity for self-deception and rationalization is a problem for science to deal with, not a disproof of freedom. The idea of human freedom does not involve the notion of miracle. The idea of the will of God does. The will of God, unless it be assimilated to the laws of nature, must be defined as a separate force from the laws of nature. If it is separate from the laws of nature, it is miraculous.

There is also strong pragmatic justification for the idea of freedom, in that all appeals to human idealism, all arguments for moral responsibility, depend upon it. Little in history suggests a like support for belief in a personal God. The greater the responsibility attributed to

God for what happens, the less responsibility can attach to man. Pressed to an extreme, this equation ends with God having all the power, and man none. Then, to restore to religion the appearance of common sense, it becomes necessary to allow men to obtain *some* of God's power through the mysterious and inexplicable endowment known as "grace." But care is taken to preserve the essentially irrational character of religions of this sort by insisting that grace cannot be earned or won—it *is always* a gift. Maintaining that grace is a gift prevents any invasion of religion by the scientific spirit, which would always be possible if any of God's actions were described in terms of cause and effect.

But how can so prevalent an idea as that of "God" be sacrificed to synthesis of religion and science? This question is natural to ask, since the notion of the "highest" plays a part in all human tradition. Surely a religion which gives up this idea will be a decapitated affair, without the substance of moral inspiration!

This brings us to the only kind of God-idea which seems possible for the intellectually consistent scientist. It is the God-idea of pantheism. The practical meaning of this proposal is that the most terrible schism which ever overtook any religion is the schism between God and man and God and nature. But if we restore God to both man and nature, we shall have a difficult time with our traditional conceptions, since nearly all of them have grown up in the presence of this schism.

Take the idea of nature. The scientific conception of natural phenomena has been built up in complete divorce from the idea of intelligence. Intelligence, as an ultimate factor in the processes of nature, has long been anathema to scientists, since it suggests a wily device of theology to get back into the drama. The scientists, however, being men of plain common sense, saw the need for admitting the fact of intelligence throughout nature, and admitting it on a rising scale throughout the processes of

evolution; consequently, when they came to philosophize, they adopted the doctrine of *emergent* evolution—deriving intelligence where none existed before, as the product of evolution. But the beginnings of things—the birth of planets and suns—they left to the blind forces of matter. This refusal to see intelligence in the origins of worlds and life was a kind of insurance policy against having God on their hands again. They were willing to admit intelligence in nature only so long as they could stage-manage its production.

For a synthesis of science and religion, this account of nature will have to be reconsidered. Even more difficult, perhaps, will be the consideration of intelligence in impersonal terms. Yet if we are to avoid a return to polytheism, theism, and finally atheism, all over again, we shall have to work out some reasonable identification of intelligence and nature.

The effect of pantheism on the idea of man has similar complications. At once we shall be obliged to explain the presence of evil in the world and its extraordinary pre-eminence in the affairs of men. To be God, or at least a half-god, requires a man to think about these things for himself. He can no longer accept the contradictory and even immoral explanations of priests. The theological explanation of evil has always been intellectually intolerable, and when a man becomes a pantheist, he can no longer tolerate the intellectually intolerable. (Since no one ought to try to deal with this question in a paragraph, we leave it as one of the remaining problems that will confront even the best possible synthesis of science and religion.)

But, on the positive side, a pantheistic philosophy or religion should accomplish much in behalf of the dignity of man. Who can tell to what extent the idea of man as a miserable sinner, impotent creature of an almighty God, has unhinged the determination of human beings to do their best, to continue the honorable strivings of the human race to be just, compassionate, and good? That there is in man something that is

beyond good and evil, however capable he may be of either one, is an ancient conception which may hold the secret we need to fathom. A god is a creative being. Man, in his full stature of man, may be both.

Remains the question of power. What will take the place of prayer in a religion which is capable of synthesis with science? The answer to a question of this sort could easily range across the entire field of psychical phenomena, ending, perhaps, with speculations about yoga and gymnosophist mysteries. But to meet the question simply, we have only to admit that if God is within, then power is there also. Prayer then becomes invocation, not petition. It becomes a practical investigation of the potentialities of man. Prayer may also be rapport with the rest of life. Men have felt and written of these things. Poets and artists make similar report. Prayer may be above all a deep participation in the flow of the highest intentions of which men are capable, and a renewal, therefore, of energies which can come to us only when we feel ourselves to be one with both nature and man.

REVIEW

THE BUSINESS OF LITTLE MINDS

Two articles recently appearing in the *Saturday Review* seem worthy of special attention.

In the Dec. 24 issue, Henry Steele Commager takes note of the recent decision by Providence, Rhode Island, to refuse the gift of a statue of Thomas Paine. The reason given was that Paine still is a "controversial figure." Dr. Commager takes the matter up by apt quotations from Paine's own writings, appended to the queries from an imaginary chairman of a Board of Inquiry:

Chairman: You are, in short, a professional agitator. I am not surprised when I consider your associations. We have evidence here that you have a peculiar affinity for association with subversives of one kind or another. It is charged that you maintained close sympathetic association with such radicals as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Samuel Adams in this country, and with men like William Godwin and Joseph Priestley in England and—horrors—with revolutionaries like Danton, Mirabeau, and Condorcet in France. Would you say, Mr. Paine, that birds of a feather flock together, and that a man is known by the company he keeps?

Paine: When facts are sufficient, arguments are useless. . . . 'Tis surprising to see how rapidly a panic will sometimes run through a country, but I try always to remember that Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it.

Chairman: Now, Mr. Paine, your file seems to be an unusually large one; in fact it is bulging with charges of one kind or another. That in itself is pretty suspicious, wouldn't you say?

Paine: Sir, he who dares not offend cannot be honest.

Chairman: It appears, Mr. Paine, that not content with citizenship in three countries you tried to become a citizen of the world, whatever that means. There is evidence here that you were heard proposing a toast to "The Republic of the World." And that you wrote on something called "The Republic of Man." Would you say, Mr. Paine, that you were a One-Worlder?

Paine: Quite right, sir. My country is the world, and my religion is to do good.

Chairman: By your own admission, then, you are an internationalist and a One-Worlder. Of course that is your privilege, Mr. Paine, but you will understand that one who willingly serves a foreign nation and who regards himself as a citizen of the world can not claim true loyalty to the United States. Under the terms of our McCarran Act you would be subject to deportation on the ground that you associated with revolutionary organizations after you became an American citizen and that you took an oath of loyalty with mental reservations about other countries and that you were actually in the service of other countries. But why talk of deportation? With a record like yours we would never let you in at all. You seem to have quite a criminal record, Mr. Paine. You were dismissed from your post in England; you were indicted for criminal libel in the British courts, and it was held that "your writings tended to excite tumult and disorder"—a good description, I gather. Then you were jailed in France as well. How do you explain this propensity for getting in trouble and landing in jail, Mr. Paine?

Paine: 'Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death. . . .

With characteristic confusion the chairman decides that Mr. Paine is propounding Communist doctrines. The clincher in his argument is that in Paine's *Age of Reason* he attacks "The Church," calls much of Christianity a "fable," and insists that "religion is a private affair."

At this point one is led naturally to reflect upon "what Thomas Paine would be doing, were he alive today." Well, as Dr. Commager indicates, he would be in for a lot of trouble, but he encountered plenty of that in his own time. So it is necessary, if depressing, to wonder, also if Paine's "dream of Man" is not more difficult to dramatize in the twentieth century than it was in the eighteenth, since the latter period was characterized by great expectations of man.

Elmer Rice's "American Theatre and the Human Spirit" (Dec. 17 *Saturday Review*) offers some good commentary upon what has happened

to the "vision of man" as noble protagonist. "This," writes Mr. Rice, "is a day of pessimism, reinforced by anti-intellectualism. For, the tragic hero, as protagonist, has almost ceased to exist. The figure of noble stature, charged with high destiny, impelled by profound passions, has become obsolete. The heroes of the drama of today, if they can be called heroes, are bewildered creatures, floundering in a morass of self-delusion, self-pity, and frustration; drugging themselves with wishful fantasies; destroying those closest to them with a surfeit or dearth of love." Mr. Rice continues:

What was fifty years ago an esoteric scientific theory has seeped down to the popular level. We are all, it seems, ridden by fears and anxieties, tortured by feelings of guilt and of inferiority, remorselessly driven by morbid compulsions. We spend our lives in a frantic effort to compensate for our inadequacies and frustrations. Actions that once seemed noble now appear to be merely protective coloration for destructive or shameful desires. Moral values are illusory; a mask for the true amorality of our natures. Basically we are all insecure and, to make matters worse, our insecurity more often than not springs from infantile or even parental misadventures, beyond awareness of the range of memory. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in the work of our playwrights—those weathervanes of the popular climate—unmistakable indications of which way the wind is blowing. The prevailing tone is not so much pessimism as disillusionment, despair, and even disgust. T. S. Eliot, Nobel Prizewinner and the most influential contemporary poet—as well as a brilliant playwright—has summed it up in these words: "This is the way the world ends; not with a bang, but a whimper."

Students of literature may be stimulated by some of Mr. Rice's further remarks on the psychological history of drama. In the sixteenth century, for instance, Shakespeare's plays may end with the death of the hero—"but the lifecycle and the continuity of law and order are unbroken. It has always seemed significant to me that Hamlet does not end with the heaping up of corpses at the court of Elsinore, but is carried on a beat farther to the triumphal entry of Fortinbras."

And if we go back to the beginnings of tragedy, we discover here, too, that man, however unable to trust himself, could still trust his faith that the world is full of wondrous and imposing possibilities:

To the Greeks man was an exalted, even a semi-divine being, the chief preoccupation of the gods on Olympus, and often on extremely intimate terms with them. His life's course was determined by inevitable destiny and inexorable moral laws. When the fallible protagonist of the Greek play came to his tragic end it was not defeat that was signaled, but rather the affirmation and vindication of universal principles of human behavior.

In other words, we have lost faith in the existence of a "spiritual universe," and what is left is, both politically and personally, "sound and fury signifying nothing." One important feature of both Dr. Commager's and Mr. Rice's articles is the dissociation of the word "spiritual" from orthodox religion. It is in high drama and in high courage, truly, that the "spirit" of man is to be discovered.

Mr. Rice concludes:

If, at present, the drama is at a lower spiritual and intellectual level than we would wish it to be it is because we live in a time of anti-intellectualism and spiritual negation. We have taken the human mechanism apart in an effort to find out why it does not tick, but we have not yet discovered the formula for reassembling it so that its triumphant carillon may ring out to heaven. In splitting the atom and splitting the ego we have unleashed forces that may destroy us, unless we find a synthesis that will employ atomic energy for peaceful uses, and psychic energy for restoring to man a belief in his own dignity and creative potentialities. If that happy time ever comes I think that the dramatists of the world, including those of America, will know how to celebrate the renaissance of the human spirit.

COMMENTARY ANCIENT RELIGION

WHAT Elmer Rice writes of the ancient Greek view of man, as disclosed in Greek drama, belongs with and fills a lack in our lead article on science and religion. Religion is not the public utility and national resource that some of our present-day statesmen seem to regard it. Religion is a touch with the infinite, the reconciliation of man with the momentary present and with his entire life. Only that which is both infinite and eternal can reach and uphold men throughout vicissitudes, and restrain them in triumph.

Reading in the *Katha Upanishad*, we found a passage that seemed to typify the quality of ancient philosophical religion—the religion which is not a thing of priests and believers, but of men striving to know. In this *Upanishad*, Death speaks to Nachiketas, the seeker, saying:

Know that the Self is the lord of the chariot, the body verily is the chariot; know that the soul is the charioteer, and emotion the reins.

They say that the bodily powers are the horses, and that the external world is their field.

He whose charioteer is wisdom, who grasps the reins—emotion—firmly, he indeed gains the end of the path, the supreme resting place of the emanating Power.

The impulses are higher than the bodily powers; emotion is higher than the impulses; soul is higher than emotion; higher than soul is the Self, the great one.

Higher than this great one is the unmanifest; higher than the unmanifest is spirit. Than spirit nothing is higher, for it is the goal, and the supreme way.

This is the hidden self; in all beings it shines not forth, but is perceived by the piercing subtle soul of the subtle-sighted. . . .

This is the immemorial teaching of Nachiketas, declared by Death. Speaking it and hearing it, the sage is mighty in the eternal world. Whosoever, being pure, shall cause this supreme secret to be heard, in the assembly of those who seek the Eternal, or at the time of the union with those who have gone

forth, he indeed builds for endlessness, he builds for endlessness.

This is ancient Indian religion, but it is also ancient Greek religion. Indeed, one hesitates to give *locale* to thought which is without the mark of separate and particular historical tradition. Except for the intuitive few, the West has not known nor felt religion of this sort for thousands of years.

Here are qualities essential to religion, yet of a sort which no judicious synthesis of our divided cultural inheritance—divided into science and religion—can provide. There is an irrepressible longing in the human breast "to build for endlessness," and the invocation which feeds that longing is never a contrived doctrine, but neither is it a religious dithyramb of undisciplined enthusiasm.

True religion requires the free play of the imagination, yet it must exercise the kind of freedom of which the artist is master—the creative faculty led by authentic vision.

CHILDREN and Ourselves

A NUMBER of amusing pieces have been written to give a child's-eye view of the adult world. *Grown-ups Are People*, actually authored by a twelve-year old, is one and there are frequent stories by adults in the *Saturday Evening Post* and similar magazines often broadly imitative of Mark Twain's knack of making the world of the young seem more real than the world of the elders. Booth Tarkington's *Penrod* is another classic, and both Twain and Tarkington help us to see that the foibles of early youth are considerably more straightforward than the foibles of V.I.P.'s.

On the serious side, the psychiatrists keep pointing out that children understand a great deal more about their parents than the parents ever suspect. This is because the child, as yet unencumbered by the habit of rationalizing, often penetrates to the heart of *attitudes* without stumbling over the clever verbalizations which so easily conceal them. It appears, therefore, that the heart of "child psychology" lies in the realm of motives and intentions. Through these, rather than in words, we communicate benefits or heartaches to our young. As evidence, we have only to note that children usually learn more from the technically poor teacher who truly desires to teach than from the technically perfect pedagogue who is at bottom a time-server.

The child has one unspoken question to ask of parent or teacher: "What are your intentions? What are you *trying* to do?"

Who cares whether you are particularly good at what you are trying to do or not? Children do not tend to discriminate against each other on the basis of poor technical performance until their elders "teach" them to, in the course of years. Similarly, the child is most interested in your imagination, much less interested in your proficiency in cataloguing the benefits you claim you are bestowing. If a child becomes spontaneously interested in what you are trying to do, whether or not he would be able to describe just what that is, he will learn; he will learn because he is in sympathy with you. This explains

why "ignorant" frontier folk brought so many responsible youths along, while modern schools with high academic standing, if peopled by uninterested teachers, awaken no sense of responsibility in even the most brilliant and fortunately endowed of their students. In familiar summary:

Thinking and living are synonymous for good teachers and worth-while parents, while poor teachers and poor parents divide living and thinking into separate activities.

Children, like the proverbial Indian, have a genius for picking out those who speak with a forked tongue—not because they try, but because they cannot do anything else. There are numerous classes of "forked tongues." First, let's look at the parent who announces her constant willingness to "sacrifice" for her children, but who demonstrates no more than a capacity to complain about inconveniences. If there is anything a self-respecting child dislikes, it is having someone "sacrifice" for him. He didn't ask it, doesn't want it, and senses that in some peculiar fashion a situation over which he has no control will for years be turned to blackmail. Phillip Wylie's "Momism" originates, we suspect, at this point—the religion of pious blackmail to which so many parents subscribe. In practicing the rites of this religion, the devotee loses no opportunity to throw in phrases like, "Well, of course, in a few years I'll be dead and gone." Unfortunately, parents of this description last on into infinity, parasitically existing upon a form of "gratitude" which they forcibly extract from their grown children.

"Now, when I was your age. . . ." What follows this introduction is usually a masterpiece of hypocrisy. The idea is for the child to realize that he has far more advantages, but is of inferior moral caliber. At this point the proper rejoinder is one which a cartoonist placed below a drawing showing a child tendering a bad report card: "What do you think is the trouble," he asks his disapproving father, "heredity or environment?"

"I want you to learn to make your own decisions, but. . . ." This is usually double-talk, even though many parents recognize the desirability of

self-reliance, and despite the fact that children need a certain amount of firm authority.

But firm authority is one thing and the learning of independent judgment is something else again; one doesn't get far with either by attempting a hopelessly confused mixture. The parent should know that he must exercise firm authority at some times and at some stages, yet give *genuine* freedom at other times and stages. And an important thing to remember, here, we think, is that one doesn't talk about the freedom one is "allowing" someone else—not if the gift is genuine.

When we discuss this matter in terms of its supposed pros and cons, it is almost impossible not to project our own judgment—and nearly as unlikely, too, that we shall be uninfluenced by thoughts of our own comfort and convenience. The fact is that we don't intend, and shouldn't intend, adolescents to have full freedom of choice; and because this is so, it is hypocritical to imply that they are completely on their own. There are *areas* of choice we can leave strictly alone, and this should be done without fanfare. When we tell someone that we "trust" him we usually mean, unfortunately, that we don't *quite*. The adolescent who hears a lot about "trust" and who never feels inwardly that he has it, is not likely to find either the word or the concept meaning much to him in later life.

Most of all, perhaps, young children suffer from the psychological atmosphere of parents whose own lives and minds are not in order. Depending upon the parent for so much, the child senses that the inwardly troubled parent is not altogether "there." The child's instinctive response to this, of course, is to withdraw, to withhold his own spontaneous attempts at communication, and the child who has had to learn "withdrawal" at an early age may never quite get over it. How many marriages, in their turn, go awry simply because one or both marital partners developed habits of protective withdrawal when they were children!

The chief reason for suggesting review of instances in which the child knows more about what we are doing to him than we know ourselves, is that we cannot "see through" to the child until we can see

through to ourselves. Since the young cannot view us as we view ourselves, it becomes a matter of no small importance to look through their eyes as much as we can—and resolve to improve in this sort of looking every day.

One of the best ways to begin this humble task, we suspect, is to recognize that the child's natural psychological state is one of acceptance—at least as to persons. Situations not to his liking annoy him considerably, but *people* he takes as he finds them. Now most of us have an opposite orientation; we are always wanting our friends to be a bit different. Our suggestions as to improvements of personality-traits in our families would make a rather long list, should we ever be asked to compile one. And our children do not escape the psychological pressure of our meddling, reforming proclivities. *This* is something which the young don't grasp at all, because they haven't begun to think about what someone else "ought" to be like.

So, when we fondly imagine that we have created an atmosphere of "love" and understanding for our children, it is well to remember that they may sense a basic discrepancy between what we profess and what we practice. The urge to get others to transform themselves into what we would like them to be, is, in one important respect, at odds with love and understanding. For love and understanding prove themselves through a capacity to enjoy communication in the present, and the communication must cut through difficult vagaries of personality in either child or adult. These, we may relegate to the category of "unfinished business"—but not really *our* business. The mark of a great man seems to be his capacity for universal communication, something he achieves because he easily looks beyond and behind superficial character traits. The trouble is that every parent, to fulfill the obligations of his high calling, is required to be a great man. Anything less will make him seem a bit hypocritical to his children. Perhaps they sense the qualities of greatness while we only reason about them—and desert to pettiness in moments of stress.

FRONTIERS

Unrepresentative Views

MOST people find themselves able to adjust to situations which are not personally difficult or discouraging. This is the advantage the status quo always has over any and all proposals for change. Personally comfortable people have no personal reason to want a change; very often, they eye with suspicion those who do. The world at large, therefore, owes a special debt of gratitude to those who refuse to be satisfied with a personal adjustment, who speak for change, when and where it is needed, on the basis of principle. Following are some notes on the "unrepresentative views" of dissatisfied people who seek constructive change.

Eight years and one month ago, William Zukerman, a newspaper man of long experience in the field of Jewish journalism, began publishing the *Jewish Newsletter*. The time was 1948—the same year in which MANAS started publishing. It was, Mr. Zukerman reminds his readers in the Jan. 2, 1956, issue, "the year which will be known as the year when a section of Jews, after one of the most harassing chapters in Jewish and human history, resumed Jewish political life, which had been interrupted for two thousand years, by the establishment of the State of Israel."

Since that day, the *Jewish Newsletter* has been an example of courageous journalism to all the world. It has also been impersonal journalism, committed to principles rather than parties, to justice rather than special interest. Mr. Zukerman and his handful of contributors write about Jewish affairs and in particular Israeli affairs from the viewpoint of civilized human beings. They have found much to object to, much to condemn, in the policies of Israel and in the fanatical response of a large section of American Jewry to the partisan champions of Israel. The candor of the *Jewish Newsletter* is evident in the following:

A people which had the distinction of being the most individualistic and the most ardent defender of social justice, has become the most vociferous yes-

men group in the Western world and the most self-righteous defender of force and of the *status quo*. Criticism and self-criticism—the spiritual foundation of the Jewish Enlightenment which opened the gates of the Ghetto and started the modern Jew on the road to equality with other people—have become the most discredited functions. To doubt, to question, or to criticize Israel or the Zionist ideology which had brought the State into existence, has become equivalent to disloyalty to Jews. Almost the entire American Jewish press, platform and public opinion have become instruments of witch-hunting, and the whole of organized Jewish communal life has been turned into a machine for fund-raising and political lobbying for the new state. A people which had the distinction of being intellectually the freest in the modern world, has become the most abject satellite in the age of spiritual enslavement to a leader or a dominant ideology.

For eight years, the *Jewish Newsletter* has been a humane, reasonable, although uncompromising, voice of protest against this trend. Naturally, there has been bitter criticism of Mr. Zukerman. Doubtless a very common objection to *JN* is the claim that it supplies the anti-semites with "ammunition." But the publisher is firm in his view that honest impartiality can never serve partisan ends—that the final result of the impartial spirit must be a drying up of partisan energies.

Politicians, even good politicians, may fear this kind of honesty, or be unwilling to wait for its fruits. But the intellectual, the writer, the scholar, the teacher—these are the members of society who have no business with anything else. Mr. Zukerman is keeping faith with human intelligence, believing that any lesser faith would be not only anti-semitic, but anti-human as well.

"Owlglass," the completely delightful humorist who has helped to make the London *Peace News* an achievement in distinguished journalism, has a piece in the Dec. 16 issue which pursues the quest for progress by looking up British history of a century ago. He found British arms ingloriously involved in the Crimean War—a conflict which gained nothing for anybody, unless Alfred Tennyson's "Charge of the Light Brigade" can be counted as an

accomplishment of the war. "Owlglass," at any rate, is bound to make something of it. He comments:

When Tennyson wrote those immortal words—"Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die . . . Someone had blundered"—I doubt if he realized their full import. Indeed, if I know Alfred, I bet he didn't.

To emphasise the historic significance of those three short sentences, let me quote from another reliable authority, to wit, my encyclopædia:—

"Although originating in a blunder, it {the Charge} furnished an imperishable tradition of obedience to orders."

Imperishable? That is what I wish to know. For this is the vital question on which our destiny depends: Can Englishmen still be counted on to go and get killed anywhere at any time any blundering nitwits in authority tell them to, *without asking why?*

There are, Owlglass discovers, some exceptions to this discouraging rule, today.

Casting my eye, recently, over a subversive rag called *Peace News*, I noticed prominently displayed on the front page the names and temporary addresses of a number of condemned criminals.

Reading further to ascertain for what crime these enemies of society had been put out of harm's way (for I am not averse to a spot of horror in my lighter literary relaxation), I found that in every case the offence was the same.

Namely: that on being ordered by their respective governments to stop whatever they were doing and spend two years learning how to kill any foreigners whose extermination their government may at any time find advantageous for reasons unspecified, THESE MEN HAD ASKED WHY.

And not receiving what they regarded as a satisfactory answer, they had refused to go.

Anticipating the alarm of his readers, Owlglass at once reassures them:

Is our glorious tradition of unquestioning obedience to blunderers' orders, hitherto regarded as imperishable, showing signs of wear and tear?

The answer is a doughty and heroic "No!"

At Balaclava there were only 600 men who wouldn't reason why. Today in England there are millions. And their authorities are still blundering.

And never was obedience so sublime. The Government says, "Stop learning how to earn a living, and spend the next two years learning how to kill Russians." And the millions reply, "Yes, sir."

Then the Government says, "And meanwhile go to Cyprus and stop them trying to govern their own country." And the millions reply, "Yes, sir. Certainly, sir."

And off they go—rich, poor, brilliant, stupid, artist, craftsman, tradesman, student, dunce, university graduate and gangster, in one vast, mentally identical herd. And, except now and then when the grub's bad, never a bleat.

And speaking as a Colonel of the Hussars (retd.) who fought at the Khyber Pass (I think it was), I can only say, "What a beautiful sight!"

A fellow named Huxley once said that it's not the ape and the tiger in man that makes him dangerous, it's the sheep.

I don't know what regiment this Huxley commanded, but he knew the secret of military efficiency and imperial greatness.

So—stands England where she did? Thanks to the sheep, yes.

But by Gad, sir—I never knew before how many sheep we had. Nor how woolly.

Some incidental intelligence which may find a place here, although it is wholly unrelated to high matters of principle and great issues of war and peace, concerns the progress of the labor movement in Ahmedabad, India. The formation of the Ahmedabad Jain Temple Monks Trade Union illustrates a curious mingling of the mores of East and West. "The monks have announced," says a story in *Thought*, a Delhi weekly, that "since intercession with the Gods is industrial employment like any other," they now demand a higher minimum wage and a modest list of "fringe benefits" which include a day off a week, paid vacations, the right to be sick with pay for seven days of the year, and a lump payment upon retirement. Meanwhile, the temple management is raising questions about the monks' supposed "dedication to poverty." *Thought* thoughtfully remarks: "As the cost of religion rises, investors may have to think of other possibilities."