

WORLD ORGANIZATION OR WORLD TRUST

Even to mention the idea of world government except with enthusiasm, these days, is to invite comment from readers who will maintain that, after all, the advocates of international organization are at least trying to do something “practical” toward world peace. We have, in fact, already received letters asking that some attention be given to the program for world federation—an appeal that is difficult to ignore. The truth is that we are unable to interest ourselves in a technical investigation of the alternative programs for international government. Probably, at the root of this “apathy” is the persisting conviction that the troubles of the world are not “organizational” at all, despite the fact that conflicts seem to arise from the competitive activities of national organizations. A further reason is that formulation of the means to peace in organizational terms seems to distract people from more fundamental questions.

What we cannot overlook, however, is the great reservoir of good will that the movement for world federation represents, and the very existence of this good will creates an obligation to consider, if not programs for world government, the doubts that may be felt about them. First of all, it is unmistakably clear that a general horror of war is back of the intense interest in international organization on the part of a small but growing minority. World government or federation is conceived as a way of making it possible for a nation to conduct its affairs without fear of war or sudden and unanticipated attack. Just as in a civilized community, ordinarily, a man can walk down the street without expecting anybody to shoot at him out of a doorway, so an entire population ought to be able to feel secure as it goes about its business. It is hoped that it may be possible to create the same sort of respect on the part of nations or peoples for international law

that is felt by individual citizens for the civil authorities of their town or city.

At present, the people of a nation look to their national government to maintain the conditions necessary to security from war. In a federation of states, such as the United States, the people living in Pennsylvania do not expect the state government to protect them from attack by the people of New York. The Civil War, or the War between the States, was not a functioning of the idea of federation, but its break-down, causing a breach of federal union that was imperfectly repaired by resort to violence by the more powerful members of the union. The United States continues to be united, not because of any threat of force by the central government, but primarily because the Union is among states whose people do not think of themselves allied together with the people of other states by any other means than common consent. In regard to war, the people think of themselves as nationals of the United States, not as citizens of separate states.

World federalists argue that a beginning must be made to create this attitude of mind in the peoples of whole nations toward one another. In other words, the “nation” must be thought of as a unit of civil administration, one among several or many, and not as a source of military security. And the world organization or international federation must be conceived, not as an authority established to police the members of the federation, but as a voluntary union founded on the assumption and the fact that the member states have no intention of attacking one another.

This view of a world organization grows from the thesis of Alexander Hamilton, presented in the Federalist Paper XV and XVI—an argument well summarized in 1936 by Dr. L. P. Jacks:

What Hamilton opposed and dismissed as impossible was a *coercive union* of States, endowed, under the terms of the union, with the right to make war *on one or any of its own members*, and armed with a collective preponderance of strength for that purpose. Such a union, he argued, would be a contradiction not only in logic but in fact. It would contain the seed of internal conflict and therefore no union at all. . . . Are these principles applicable to the questions concerning us today? If coercion was a mad project then has it become a sane project now? Is the principle of national sovereignty less deeply rooted among the nations of the modern world than it was among those thirteen States? . . . These questions may all be summed up into one. Are the difficulties of union among the European States today, hard set in the assertion of national sovereignty, and armed to the teeth for asserting it, greater on the whole than those successfully overcome by the American statesmen of 1787?

The answer is—they are immensely greater for those who would base the League of Nations on coercion. . . . But for those who would embark the League on more profitable forms of cooperation, with a view to reducing the likelihood that these nations will “want to fight,” the difficulties are less. Forms of international cooperation, and the means for achieving it, unknown and undreamed of in 1787, are now awaiting a statesmanship wise enough to make the most of them. It will be a tragedy if they are neglected, and the attempt made to restore the principle of coercion into a League of sovereign States each armed and still arming in the determination not to be coerced in any form or from any source. . . . The result is that the British Commonwealth of Nations on the one hand, and the United States on the other, stand before the world today as object lessons revealing the only practicable principle on which an enduring League of Nations can ever be founded. Both have solved the problem which the League of Nations has yet to solve on a greater scale. Both are non coercive Leagues of Nations.

So, the world federalists urge, with considerable reason, that a non-coercive federation of the peoples of the world is the logical path to world peace. They, quite literally, “reason” war out of existence. A national federation like the United States functions for national defense against other nations, but a *world* federation would have no one to fight. The example of the United States Supreme Court is offered as a demonstration that a World Court

might be expected to dispense justice successfully without the use of compulsion to enforce its decisions over a planetary jurisdiction. For more than 100 years, the States of the American Union have voluntarily accepted the decisions of the Supreme Court without question.

In contrast to the federalist ideal is the view of the tough-minded school of internationalists who contend that any future peace will depend upon the overpowering military might of a centralized international authority. The League of Nations failed, we are told, because it lacked sufficient coercive power and did not use effectively what power it had. The United Nations, if strengthened, with or without Russian participation, should serve, it is said, as the nucleus for such a world that now is the time for ruthlessness, because there is no time left for anything else. Viewed objectively, a world government of this sort, backed by the pooled military strength of the UN powers, would be a military despotism controlled by the “peace-loving” nations. It would really be an old-fashioned alliance for military purposes, defining peace as preservation of the status quo and rigidly bound by all the familiar delusions of western nationalism and its thinly disguised imperialism. Whatever the idealistic theories that are being circulated, this is the direction in which twentieth-century “internationalism” is moving, without the slightest attention to the lessons of universal history.

The opposing case, based upon historical experience, was stated some twenty years ago by Senator Borah:

I do not believe that the only commanding power in the world is that of military force. . . . I know . . . how this belief that force must always be in the background, always be subject to call, has come to permeate the beliefs of men everywhere. It is all but universal among those who deal with international questions. Its futility for peace has been proven a thousand times, but it still prevails. There are no words to describe and no philosophy to explain this superstitious idolatry of force. Governments make treaties in which they agree, under certain conditions, to employ force, to send armies and navies, to sacrifice treasure and life, and no one stops to ask:

Will the contracting powers keep their promise; who will see that they execute their pledge? It is all taken for granted.

On the other hand, when governments make treaties, or propose to make treaties, in which they agree to submit their controversies to the decision of a court and abide by the judgment thereof, immediately the question is asked: Who will enforce the judgment; where is your army and navy to carry the decree into effect? As a matter of fact, it is precisely the same thing behind and back of both treaties—the solemn pledge of the nation, only that and nothing more.

There you have the essence of the problem: With or without military sanctions, no world order is possible without international trust. The people who want a world authority based on centralized military power—a world police force, in effect—want the power first and the trust afterward. And this sequence in their program is precisely what is destroying, here and now, the possibility of trust at any time. The pacifically-minded federalists, who see the folly of a world government based on force, nevertheless lay their primary stress on organization as the *means* to trust, when organization can be effective only after the trust is established. That is why, we think, so many thoughtful persons, devoted to the ideal of peace, can rouse in themselves no great enthusiasm for the educational propaganda of the federalists.

The real tragedy of the internationalist movement, today, it seems to us, is that while the need for international trust—trust between *peoples*, that is—becomes greater, attention to this aspect of the problem is increasingly neglected. This tendency, of course, results from the fear-psychology which is back of the uneasiness and suspicion which peoples everywhere are coming to feel toward one another, and which exclusive emphasis on international organization tends to conceal.

There are, for example, vital cultural differences between the peoples of India and China and the peoples of Europe and America. These differences must be effectively bridged before there can be any real equality under a world federation. Westerners regard Indians and

Chinese as “backward peoples” and almost certainly would refuse them representation proportionate to population in an international authority. As Edmond Taylor points out in *Richer by Asia*, with proportionate representation, “India and China would dominate the world-parliament, and hundreds of millions of illiterate, backward Asiatic peasants would have a decisive voice in the affairs of the planet.” But some other scheme, implying the cultural inequality of Asiatics, would be coldly received by any free Eastern nation.

A world organization, to win the faith of the peoples of the world, must be founded on equality and justice. Are Europeans and Americans prepared for equality and justice to Asia?

Further, hardly a single American has given thought to the fact that while the West thinks of the East as “backward,” the East regards the West as barbarous and morally insensitive. The events of the war have struck horror and a kind of loathing for Western methods and attitudes into the peoples of the East. The ethical sense of the people of India, for example, makes them deal more in broad meanings and long-term implications than in immediate “practical” judgments. They ask themselves, What sort of human beings are able, with almost no self-criticism, to drop atom bombs on civilian populations in order to “save lives” and “end war”?

Edmond Taylor suggests the Indian judgment of the military policy of the United States. Our guilt, he says, was not simply the killing of a hundred thousand or more Japanese—“though that was grounds for guilt in itself—but for having invented biological and even chemical crime, as the Nazis perfected social crime. It was for having made ourselves the ancestors of the end of the world, as Cain, the first murderer, made himself the ancestor of all the murders which will ever be committed.”

The Western habit of mind is to measure the morality of an act by comparing it with its provocation, and by considering what *might* have happened if something else were done. The

Easterner looks at the act itself, against the background of his “mystic pantheist philosophy.” In the dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he sees “an irreverence, a blasphemy, a horror, rather than . . . merely another inhumanity of war.” The whole cultural tradition of the Orient revolts against the stark nihilism of the atom bombings; and even the Bikini tests were crimes against nature:

The Indians would have told us [had we asked them] that our blasphemy, like the Nazi ones, arose from an idolatrous worship of the techniques of science divorced from any ethical goals, that the man-made cataclysm of Bikini was a black mass of physics as the German experiments [on human beings] were a black mass of medicine, that it was a mob insurrection against the pantheist sense of citizenship in nature, which we share with the Hindus in our hearts, but consider a childish foible.

We have, indeed, to consider, to brood over, and possibly to accept the extreme judgment of half the world, on the easy immoralities committed during the last war and planned so carefully on a much larger scale for the next. Moral unity with the rest of the world is impossible without such willingness to stand before the bar of universal conscience and hear and heed what the rest of the world is saying, or would say if it dared. We, on our own account, will require many things of other peoples to make them acceptable to us as colleagues in world government. Are we prepared to concede the things that they will require of us? Are we prepared to render social and political justice to Negro Americans, in order to show our good faith to the brown million of India, the yellow millions of China?

These are the real “fronts” of the campaign for world federation. And to fight on these fronts means winning, first, a moral revolution at home.

BAVARIAN LETTER

AUGSBURG.—An English observer has remarked that the sermons in the stones of Germany preach nihilism. Perhaps this English observer has heard this silent, though eloquent, sermon of the stones when seeing the indescribable misery in German towns. For bombs have smashed what hundreds and thousands of years have conserved—what the old Romans built in Germany, what the German nation had erected in times of happiness, and what the armies of all Europe, in the innumerable wars fought on German soil, hitherto had spared. We pass in silence the millions of men, women and children, buried under the ruins. Never in our living days shall we forget the inhuman cries and the terrible aspect of the human forms in flames, hurrying like living torches through the streets till they fell. No wonder if nihilism should find a home in the heart of a nation which has suffered so terribly and is still far from being at the end of her tribulation.

But generalizations as a rule prove false. As far as German character is concerned, it would not be presumptuous to say that the German nation is very much inclined to idealism. The great spiritual currents of the West developed in Germany to a high degree, whether scientific, religious, political, or cultural. The German aims at high goals; he longs for the stars as the child for the blue blossom, and finally is hurled down into the abyss, to begin a new ascension. Such has been the destiny of the German nation, for centuries.

Now, disappointed by twelve years of National Socialism, the German tries to find his way out of this jungle, in accordance with his history, his experiences his intellectual and material means and his faith. Once all his hopes were set on National Socialism; he intended to create paradise on earth—a statement that may seem arrogant, and presumptuous, but is true, nevertheless. He was deceived by his leaders, and the awakening was fearful; in his distress and misery, he looked to Democracy, but met only disappointment, after three years of close

connection with it. We again failed, confiding our hopes in a “system” instead of in men.

Men are everywhere the same. The Europeans are neither better nor worse than the Americans, and every nation has a skeleton in the cupboard. A man may be a democrat and a criminal at the same time, he may be a communist or a national-socialist and be a good man nevertheless. Not the party nor the political faith is decisive, but the character. It is time to make an end to the silly superstition that men belonging to another nation or embracing another political or religious faith are on a lower moral or intellectual level than we, the children of an exceptionally gifted or rich nation. All nations are subject to the same intolerance and egotism. Mankind has been taught to look at men and nations and races, not from a human standpoint, but exclusively with regard to policy, to strategy, to economics or some other reason not less egoistic. Not a single word of brotherhood or of love! In comparison with the states of antiquity, the nations of today, as political constructions, have made no progress whatever. The same principles of violence, hate, vengeance, covetousness, contempt for individual rights and human dignity that the Romans made use of in constructing their empire are still in practice today.

The way of mankind is seamed from the outset with the skeletons of millions and millions of poor human victims; and their cries of woe and despair, their curses and their sighs are our relentless companions and monitors. We have been and still are on the wrong way. But if the stones in Germany preach nihilism, there are hearts that preach brotherhood and love and truth.

BAVARIAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW “OUTCASTS”

To read Isadore Abramowitz’ selections from the literature that has been written in prison is to experience an intrusion of moral power from a source that is commonly supposed to represent the opposite end of the scale of human qualities. *The Great Prisoners* (Dutton, 1946)—65 in all—ought to be a vastly unsettling book for most of its readers. The first sections, of course, dealing with historic figures, will disturb no one. Most people know about and are “adjusted” to the death of Socrates at the hands of the Athenian State. The burning of Huss, the persecution of Galileo, the beheading of Thomas More—these are matters of religious schism with which we are familiar and concerning which the usual expressions of indignation are in order.

But as the distance between the reader and the martyr is reduced, the challenge grows—the moral intrusion becomes “rude.” One learns, for example, that Judge Webster Thayer, of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, asked, in a festive mood at a football game, “Did you see what I did to those anarchistic bastards the other day?”—and then reads the letters of Sacco and Vanzetti whom Thayer condemned to death. The proofs of the innocence of the shoemaker and the fish peddler are hardly necessary. Their letters make it plain that they were not on trial, but the people of Massachusetts. When the ritual of judicial murder presented to Vanzetti the question of whether he had anything to say why sentence of death should not be passed, he replied:

“You see it is seven years that we are in jail. What we have suffered during these seven years no human tongue can say, and yet you see before you, not trembling, you see me looking you in your eyes straight, not blushing not changing color, not ashamed or in fear.”

Sacco and Vanzetti, it seems clear, were two utterly harmless men. They were anarchists, but pacifists. Sacco had been a conscientious objector to war, Vanzetti a student of Proudhon. Both, as Abramowitz points out, were as well equipped to

acknowledge their sudden martyrdom, as respectable New Englanders were to accept, as natural and almost self-evident, a kinship between philosophical anarchism and murder.” After seven years of delay, the State of Massachusetts finally succeeded in executing these men for their “dangerous” opinions. Vanzetti, in his last few days, was reading Beard’s *Rise of American Civilization*, and realizing that this course in “Americanization” would soon be interrupted, he joked: “The only great trouble is that Massachusetts’ hanger may not give me the time to finish the lecture, all the rest is O.K.”

The letters of these simple—but not ignorant—Italian immigrants bear the dignity of men who live by conviction. There are Sacco’s letters to his friends and his children, Vanzetti’s letters to sympathizers—one to a Chinese student, Li Pei Kan, who had written several pamphlets in Chinese on the Sacco-Vanzetti case. Most moving perhaps, and even if familiar, most worth repeating, are the words of Vanzetti:

If it had not been for these things, I might have live out my life talking at street corners to scorning men. I might have die, unmarked, unknown, a failure. Now we are not a failure. This is our career and our triumph. Never in our full life could we hope to do such work for tolerance, for justice, for man’s understanding of man as now we do by accident. Our words—our lives—our pains—nothing! The taking of our lives—lives of a good shoemaker and a poor fish-peddler—all! That last moment belongs to us—that agony is our triumph.

Of other modern men and women, imprisoned for their greatness, the stories of Debs, Gandhi and Nehru are well known. But Francisco Ferrer, founder of the Modern School in Spain, is for many Americans an obscure or unheard-of figure. After his execution in 1909 by a Spanish firing squad, Anatole France wrote: “Everybody knows full well that Ferrer’s crime consists in this: he founded schools.” Distrustful of violence and “egoistic revolutionaries,” Ferrer, helped by a wealthy Frenchwoman, established in Catholic Spain a system of schools that taught the children of workers “that militarism was a crime, that capitalism was bad for the workers, and that

centralization of government was an evil.” A bomb thrown by a librarian friend at the royal carriage led to his arrest and execution, although no connection between him and the crime was established. When his captors came to take him to be shot, he was found writing his final views on the education of the young. This essay begins:

The man was right who, being asked at what age the education of a child should begin, replied, “From the moment of the birth of his grandmother. . . . Let us not forget, as we make a beginning in modern education, that its results can only be relative in the first generation, a day will come when parents and teachers find the soil well tilled from the outset, as the children will have begun to be educated from the birth of their grandparents. . . .

The essay ends: “I cannot continue, they are taking my life.”

From Ernst Toller, the German dramatic poet who died—at his own hand, it is said—in New York in 1939, the reader may gain some understanding of the “fraternity of the damned”—the union of the commonly reduced humanity of men in prison. Toller spent the years between 1919 and 1924 in a Bavarian prison, his punishment for having led the Bavarian revolution after the war. There he wrote plays that he never saw performed. There, as his letters show, he tried to understand the problem of the individual and society: “Must a man of action always be dogged by guilt? . . . Can a man be an individualist and a mass-man at one and the same time?” Of the life in prison, he wrote to Fritz von Unruh:

I shall never get used to “prisoner’s humility”; and, though I am frequently sad and embittered, I am glad of that,—that I can’t get “used.”

There’s one of the most horrible weaknesses of the German character: that “getting used” to all institutions that deny the spirit—the surrender to inhuman rules, the being comfortable in servitude, the shirking of responsibility, the deafness to the call of one’s own conscience.

And to Stefan Zweig:

My fate seldom oppresses me, because I will it, have always willed it—and I believe that I am secure against the danger of leaving the prison-house full of bitterness and resentment.

(That I belong to those who fight ruthlessly against the defilement of the image of humanity—no one outside can have an idea of how dreadful is that defiling—you will understand. Too few feel their responsibility, and that is why such things are possible. But I cannot discuss that problem now.)

You say of Romain Rolland that he “loves humanity because he pities it rather than believes in it.” That is, perhaps, the only constant and unembittered love.

If belief be often disappointed, as it must be, it changes into enmity and bitterness and hatred of humanity. I can imagine fighters for whom it would not be a matter of importance whether they had that belief or no; they fight under the power of an idea—the idea of co-operation for conscious self-development in a society. To go on in this task (economically the most important aspect of Socialism) means the overcoming of social disorder by building up a community life. By that the mysterious, the irrational element in life is not, as even some dogmatic Socialists believe, wholly rationalized; but it is limited, it goes back to its place and stays there in all its incomprehensibility.

Is it not the destiny of European man to be this kind of fighter, this heroic kind?

These men, anarchists, socialists, teachers, who are rejected by modern society—punished as few criminals are punished—maligned, feared, shunned: they, we find, are men of tenderness, of deep compassion, for whom prison and execution were a vindication instead of a condemnation. To each one of them, some measure of Plato’s *Apology* applies, for each had his portion of Socratic truth. But because that truth is not contained between two covers, sedate on a library shelf in a scholarly Jowett translation, it must make its way, alone and unaided, to the human heart. Mr. Abramowitz, however, has done the service of placing it in company with the expressions of quite respectable predecessors, so that the alliance is unmistakable. Even Odell Waller—no “great man,” but only a negro sharecropper who shot his landlord in a quarrel over some wheat—has something to say about the white man’s “justice” that stumbles over truths too big to miss.

A reading of *The Great Prisoners* may accomplish several things. First, it may raise the

possibility that a prison record can be a badge of honor in modern times, just as in past centuries. Second, it may convey an appreciation in *feeling* of the barbarous cruelty of every prison system the world has known, and give understanding of the deep drive which lies behind the apparently quixotic attempts of men who have suffered imprisonment unjustly, not simply to “reform,” but to *abolish*, the prison system as we know it. To have lived with the outcasts of respectable society is actually a precious experience—something that cannot be imagined with any degree of reality except by the very few. It destroys certain barriers effectively and forever. From Ernst Toller, it drew these lines:

On my narrow plank I lie, I listen . . .
 I hear your heart beating.
 The heart of those locked in the prisons of the
 world,
 Yonder . . . yonder . . . yonder . . .
 Brothers of mine: fighters, rebels, I salute you
 It is a world they would deny you,
 It is your world that lives in your wills.
 And I salute you, brothers in the gaols of Africa
 and Asia,
 And you, brothers, in the convict prisons of the
 world,
 Thieves and burglars, homicides, murderers,
 Brothers now of one doom, I salute you.
 What man can say to himself, that he is not a
 prisoner? . . .

COMMENTARY A LAW OF NATURE

SOME readers will probably note, as we did, an “unguarded” quality in this week’s foreign letter, contributed by a Bavarian subscriber. The writer, in mourning the loss of the antiquities of German towns, neglects to balance the ledger of war’s disaster by mentioning also the tragedies of Rotterdam and Lidice. But this means only that the letter lacks the usual journalistic precautions to meet the usual reflexes of memory in American and English readers, just as the writer overlooks, also, that the portrait of the German as a dreamy idealist wickedly “hurled down,” bitterly “deceived” by his leaders, and finally “disappointed” by contact with “Democracy,” is a generalization that may fail to win friends and influence people in other countries.

But it is better, surely to believe oneself an idealist than something else. And these transparent attitudes, to which observers are so sensitive, are, after all, simply evidence that the writer has spoken what is in his heart. What is really important in this letter, giving voice to countless human beings throughout Europe, is its unabashed longing for brotherhood. The greatest delusion of all would be to suppose that any people, anywhere, need fail respond to that cry. Brotherhood is the solvent that makes men rise above the wrongs they have suffered and the wrongs they have done. Only human brotherhood, generous and unqualified, can release the peoples of the world from psychological bondage to the statistics of self-righteousness and the resulting compulsions of national egotism. This, we are persuaded, is a law of Nature, and when it becomes the law of nations, the world will have peace.

It is one of the endeavors of MANAS to set aside the sophistications of the usual press correspondence from other countries and to reflect something of the actual feelings and thinking of their peoples. It will be our policy, therefore, to assume, as frequently as possible, that the barriers created by war and propaganda

for war should be ignored—and that they will be ignored by our readers. There is considerable evidence both from readers and from foreign correspondence that this assumption is justified; that there are numerous persons in all lands who are willing and eager, with Ernst Toller, to reject “all institutions that deny the spirit,” and to found their future hopes on the proposition that human beings are “everywhere the same.” We find great encouragement in this.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

A READER comments on "Children—and Ourselves" in MANAS for March 31:

You say—"Every parental declaration of the noble 'sacrifices' they have endured for the sake of their children is an effort to chain down the child's capacity for love, thus localizing it for the future enjoyment and benefit of parents." This, it seems to me, leaves out the fact that parents *do* make noble sacrifices for their children. Parents in most cases are taken for granted and a great deal of selfish and careless action is indulged in by children who do not realize the extent of the personal sacrifices made for their sake by parents. Would not the teaching of consideration for others be accomplished by pointing out to children that others consider them?

I haven't noticed children doing much "pondering" as to why their parents do want to help them. They don't seem to "ponder" until they have similar responsibilities of their own.

How about the child who has been ill, and whose parents have spent considerable sums of money and many hours of time to bring that child back to health? Sometimes it is necessary to restrain the child from too arduous participation in sports and similar activities, to complete the cure. When the child *resents* this restraint, feeling that the parents are jailers rather than helpers is calling attention to the "sacrifice" using a weapon? Children seem to live only in the present. Because of their experience, parents can see a more complete picture.

The intention in the column quoted was not to argue that parents never sacrifice for the benefit of children's needs, but that the psychology of *claiming* great "sacrifice" is always self-defeating. Those who really consecrate acts to others usually feel that the action is its own reward, because the just or kindly thing to do, and they are not given to calling it to the attention of the recipients. When one does claim to have made "sacrifices" for another, he is disproving his own statement, since the only reason for making such a claim is the hope to receive in return something presently withheld by the other. Sacrifice, if the word has any meaning at all, is not an exchange, but something freely offered and fully given.

It would be interesting for those parents who do feel that they have sacrificed mightily, to enumerate to themselves these acts of selflessness. Many parents, it is true, will do without clothes they would like for themselves in order to dress their children in an especially tasteful fashion. Yet the parent who does this should ask himself or herself how much the desire to have his offspring "look as well or better than Mrs. A's children" figures as a motive. Parents often fear the social criticism which might be directed at them by neighbors because of their children's faulty behaviour or dress, and if better clothes are purchased for a child in order to avoid this criticism—or in order to prove superiority—it can hardly be called "sacrifice."

It is quite a different matter, of course, to point out to a child that his parents are making adjustments in order to give him a fair opportunity in life; yet, even though this may be a natural part of education in the home, it will be difficult for a child to appreciate it unless the parent allows the child to *help* decide how he should be dressed, what things he should be allowed to have in the way of athletic equipment, games, etc. *Participation*, even when almost entirely symbolic, is an important psychological key to the child's understanding of the parents' world.

"Sacrifice" should never be used as a weapon to compel love or respect. In the first place one cannot compel another—even a child—to adopt either of these attitudes or feelings and, in the second place, whatever the sacrifice is, the parent has chosen it of his own free will. If the child is to similarly sacrifice, he must also have an area of free choice. Usually the child, for the reason that he is dependent upon the parents, is *required* to do certain things which for him can be a far more grim "sacrifice" than anything undertaken by the parents.

Our correspondent's second observation is a good one. But here again, it may be that the psychology of the parents is at fault, if children fail to give any conscious thought as to why parents want to help them. It is small wonder that this does not occur in cases where parents do nothing

to demonstrate that they have other horizons and interests than cooking, scrubbing, "economizing," and mowing the lawn. What interests do parents have for exploration in their leisure hours? There is only one way to convince a child that a parent's free time is important, and that is by having enjoyable and creative things to do whenever the opportunity presents itself. If the child can realize that the parent *likes* to do a little housework as possible, even though the necessary is done quite cheerfully, he will begin to think of "time" as having meaning to the parent as well as to himself. The child wants "time" for play, and when he has it he gives indication of enjoying it to the full. But a child is not going to worry about a parent's time if the parent does not seem to enjoy what leisure he has. The fact is that most adults live in tight routines with few creative or stimulating outside interests. Father returns from foreclosing a mortgage or digging a ditch, as the case may be, in a rather wilted condition and vegetates in a chair with a newspaper and a cigar. If this is all that a particular parent ever does with "free time," the child can have no conception of time being either enjoyable or interesting to him. The mother who uses her spare moments principally for leaning over the back-yard fence to discuss Mrs. B with Mrs. C, also fails to impress the child as someone who knows what to do with time. Those families which include sports-lovers, artists, or musicians are in a much more fortunate position, psychologically. The man who plans with considerable enthusiasm for a fishing trip, who brings back the fish and puts them on the table and talks about the invigoration of mountains or ocean, can lay some groundwork for the child's realization that the parent, too, would like to have freedom for "fun," as the child can understand the appeal of this extra-curricular pastime. The same holds true for the music-lover who plays the piano and who likes to attend concerts. Of course, a child will not be able to appreciate every constructive activity of parents, but there are always *some* parental doings that can be understood by the child in its own terms. There, again, the maximum of "sharing" seems important.

As to the final point of our questioner, it may be suggested that to call attention to a set of facts that will clarify a difference of opinion is not the same as labelling that set of facts a "sacrifice." In the instance mentioned, parents are certainly justified in stating matters of fact to the child. The parents have, in this instance, made an investment in the future. Therefore the parent is entitled to impose certain restrictions to prevent a relapse or worse.

In later life, what the child will come to appreciate in parents will be a *just* attitude of mind—and this he will assimilate and learn to value gradually. A child can come to venerate a home and all that his parents have done for him, yet only when this feeling is self-induced, by progressive reflection. A psychological *imposition* on the child should be avoided at all costs. "You should feel devoted to us" is poor educative technique, as is every other exhortation which begins with "should" or "ought."

FRONTIERS THE SPIRAL OF SUSPICION

ENOUGH books by fugitives from totalitarian politics have been published—*Pattern for World Revolution*, written anonymously by two former members of the Comintern, is the most recent—to establish the pattern of government by terror. Terror drives integrity underground, enthrones blind and brutal “loyalty,” and makes mutual suspicion a habit and denunciation of others—the “doubtful ones”—a means to personal security. The end of government by terror is absolute despotism, the abolition of all political life. And it is difficult to see how this end can be avoided, once the spiral of suspicion has begun.

We do not lack for illustrations of how the infection of terror spreads until it becomes all-powerful. From the French Revolution onward, the political use of terrorism exhibits the same basic pattern. Fear is the weapon of rulers who feel that their authority is insecure, that they lack the confidence and support of the people. When a government rules by fear, it must pretend or assert itself to be in possession of the supreme values of human life, in order to justify the methods used to maintain power. Conversely, opponents of the government have to be identified as evil men who threaten the foundations of civilization. They must, therefore, be hunted down and destroyed with religious fervor. In psychological terms, the lesson of history is that when political ideas assume religious authority, suspicion, terror, and finally despotism, ensue. The delusion that leads to this result is the belief that philosophic or religious truth—the highest human good—can be served by force.

It may be that the Western nations will all have to complete this dreary sequence of events in order to learn that government, at best, is an expedient device, and neither the source of all good nor the root of all evil. Least of all can government ever be a source of spiritual authority, although, to function at all, it must be the source of some sort of authority. The genius of the American Republic was that it has seemed to

embody the realization that the authority of government must be limited to its proper functions, and that an exaggeration of its prestige beyond those limits is not to be tolerated. Hence the denial of “infallibility” implied by the American system of checks and balances. Hence the rejection of all glamorous rituals of State and all forms of procedure reminiscent of royal dignity and rule by divine right. Hence the Bill of Rights, specifying those areas of human life to which the authority of government was not extended by its creators, the people.

Today, a sense of moral insecurity pervades the American people. There is an emptiness of religious feeling and a frenzied eagerness to blame the uncertainties of life on some scapegoat, as, for example, the communists. The communists take the position that *they* have the Truth; in other words, they do not believe in the Bill of Rights. This is frightening to people who *say* they believe in the Bill of Rights, but have no real confidence in the idea that the Bill of Rights, releases its own moral authority and needs no other persuasion on its behalf. The desperate search for men who are communists in America—actually very few—betrays the fear that uncoerced human intelligence may choose tyranny instead of freedom, political dogma instead of moral independence.

Responding to this general anxiety, the Government is now investigating the political opinions and personal history of all those persons connected with the military defense of the country. The spiral of suspicion is beginning, the denunciations are becoming common. The conspiratorial atmosphere is being manufactured day by day. The man of whom a “loyalty oath” is required—will he ever feel quite the same after this overt evidence of a universal distrust? Already, men holding jobs in plants connected with the national defense program are being subjected to star chamber proceedings. Those so questioned may not be told of what they are “suspected,” nor why. A relative with libertarian sympathies so strong that he once served with the Spanish loyalists against Franco may be the

ground for suspicion. Or there may be some other reason. One does not know.

Increasingly, Americans are behaving as though the supreme values of human life are matters of political opinion. The theory, of course, is that it is necessary to weed out all those who secretly believe that differences of political opinion are a social evil—apparently the communist conviction. But if, as is so commonly maintained, political freedom is obviously superior to the totalitarian social order, why must the Government attempt a species of thought-control over some of the members of our political society? It is conceivable that only we, the people, still believe in political freedom, while demagogues and officials do not?

The danger, of course, in this is that by using the methods of suspicion and veiled threat, we shall in time ourselves become victims of the totalitarian delusion, and imagine that truth and the highest good can be defined by a national government.

We have seen the process by which two great European nations became alienated from the humane cultural tradition of the Western world. The ultimate causes, doubtless, lie deep in history, but the means by which the alienation was effected should be plain. The people of these countries were by degrees persuaded that their only hope for survival lay in reliance on naked force. They were taught, systematically, to suspect, to fear and to hate. Freedom of thought, of religion, died in those countries. The political religion of the State took their place. How does the religion of the State displace free institutions? By merging the idea of national security with military force, and identifying political authority with religious truth.

The evolution of a form of government which explicitly denied that it contained within its authority the secret of the highest good was the work of centuries. Only a hundred years before the Constitution of the United States was written down, American Colonials were executing witches in New England. A hundred years before that, the Holy Office was delivering its victims to the

secular arm for condign punishment. The American Republic rose from a millennium of righteous enforcement of “the truth” with fire and sword. It turned its back on all that. “The trugh,” it said, does not make itself known to governments, and so rarely to individual human beings that for a government to pretend to any authority at all in the matter of the final good of men is of the essence of tyranny. This much we know from history, and concerning government we know very little more than this.

The truth, in other words, cannot be served by might of arms nor by private and public purges. A blow against communism is a blow against communism. It is not a blow for truth. The only blow a man can strike for truth is the blow which shows that truth is not served by blows. The truth is locked in human hearts. The more open and free those hearts become, the more will truth be manifest. The whole history of the world testifies to this.