

THE INTERIOR MAN

THOSE who are looking, in these ominous days, for some ground of optimism, some reason for believing that the future which history holds for human beings may be brighter than the present and the immediate past, are invited to consider the proposition that this is the age—or the beginning of the age—of the rediscovery of interior man. There is much, we think, to support this proposition.

First of all, there has been a kind of psychological disillusionment in theories which proclaim that progress lies with the practice of the sciences of exterior man and exterior nature. This is not to say that "science has failed," but only that more was asked of science than it could give. For some centuries, now, men have supposed that science, properly developed, could perform the functions once allotted to religion. This plan has not worked out. Whether its failure is due to the intrinsic limitations of the scientific method, or to what modern man has conceived to be the "real" aspect of life, to which scientific inquiry should be addressed, is probably a semantic question depending upon definitions of both science and religion. But really workable definitions of science and religion will come only when we have a better understanding of man himself, so that there is no point in attempting to settle this question now.

One way to characterize the new interest in the interior man is to say that it is non-political in origin. This interest, we think, is the true opposite of the outlook which is today called "communistic," for communism is the faith that all important questions, all important issues, are essentially political, to be answered and decided by political means. And since political action is not possible without power—the power to compel the behavior of men in one or another direction—the morality of communism is defined wholly in

political terms. Political "anti-communism" is not the opposite of communism, but more like its twin, since anti-communism very largely accepts the methods, and therefore certain basic assumptions, of communism itself.

The rediscovery of the interior man has many aspects in our culture. The most obvious one is found in the psychological researches and philosophizing of several psychiatrists and psychoanalysts and of others who have come under the broad influence of this kind of thinking. The history of the modern psychological movement shows that it began as an effort to get at the causes of human behavior. These psychologists were and are physicians; they are interested in understanding what men do for the reason that so many men make themselves sick and miserable from what they do. They discover that the motives men give for their actions are often not the real motives at all, but attempts to conceal the real motives. To make a big generalization about a vastly complicated subject, the psychologist-physicians have found that serene human life is closely related to a deep respect for the interior side of human existence. In effect, empirical psychological medicine has been led by clinical experience to become a new kind of moral philosophy, in which the concept of human egoity plays an increasingly important role. (Thus, if psychology can be called a science, we have at least the beginnings of an answer to the question about whether science is able to perform a religious function. But there will be those who maintain that psychology is more of an art than a science.)

Another aspect of the interest in interior man has grown out of the slow spread in the West of knowledge of Oriental philosophy. The religious philosophies of the East are largely concerned with the metaphysics of motive and exhibit

practically no interest in politics. Gandhi, it might be argued, was both a religious man and a politician, but it seems reasonable to say that Gandhi's part in politics represented only the expedient side of his career. That is, he never permitted a political objective to obscure the larger goals of human life, which were represented by his ethical convictions. When politics seemed able to serve an ethical purpose, he acted politically, but unless political power was only a momentary embodiment of moral power, he would have none of it. Political power without moral power seemed to him to be a betrayal of human purpose. While the way Gandhi brought moral power into relation with political power may have been the means of calling the attention of the West to Eastern philosophy, Gandhi's long-term influence is certainly philosophical and moral rather than anything else.

In Europe, the consciousness of Eastern thought probably began many years ago with its influence on German scholarship—on Schopenhauer in particular, and on other thinkers who translated the Indian classics. In the United States, Emerson and Thoreau effectively transplanted the mood of interior philosophy to the New World. Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia* opened the door to Western study and appreciation of Buddhism. Then, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Theosophical Movement launched in New York by H. P. Blavatsky and others rooted tendencies of thought in the West whose influence has been incalculably wide and is still very much in evidence. In the present century, all these currents of thought have been reworked and multiplied by scores of writers and thinkers, until, today, the conception of the human being as a unit of moral intelligence seems quite literally on the cultural threshold of modern thought, awaiting actual entry into our lives.

It is in the arts, more than anywhere else, that such tendencies make themselves apparent. Hence the attention in these pages to modern

novels in which philosophies of exterior man are slowly being replaced by themes of inwardness. There are also various evidences that this transition is proceeding with an element of self-consciousness. The Books for our Time series of articles printed in MANAS drew attention to a kind of convergence of thought in this direction (see MANAS for Dec. 9, 1953, for a list of these articles). In literature, naturally enough, the trend to a new evaluation of man's interior life becomes most clearly manifest, for the writer or novelist, presumably, shapes his art to express what seem to him the key ideas of his time. A good illustration of this is found in Richard Wright's latest novel, *The Outsider*.

Wright is a Negro who has risen to eminence in the literary world by sheer capacity. His books are powerful rather than pleasant, although his autobiographical *Black Boy* is so disciplined an expression that it creates its own beauty as the story develops. *The Outsider* is perhaps a more "symbolic" work, in which Wright attempts, while writing about the life, and death, of a young Negro intellectual, to deal with essential issues, leaving out special attention to the problem of "race." As he says: "My hero could have been of any race . . . I have tried to depict my sense of our contemporary living as I see it and feel it. . . ." We are by no means sure that *The Outsider* is a "successful" novel. The hero, Cross Damon, who kills three or four people before being killed himself, does not, in our opinion, make enough sense as a human being to justify what Wright makes him do. The heart of the book, however, is a brilliant monologue by Damon in which he tells a Communist Party official what he thinks of modern society, Capitalism, and Communism.

Superficially, Wright shares some of the judgments made by communists of modern industrial society. This, however, makes all the more forceful his indictment of the political absolutism which communism involves. We should add that the reader may feel that the advocacy of the "interior man" is here somewhat

buried under social commentary, but this is a natural approach for an "ex"political thinker. It illustrates, we think, the processes of thought by which a humanitarian of intellectual integrity may reach the view that no "reform" is worth anything unless the inner life of human beings is given the highest value. Cross Damon first describes the industrial society:

“. . . Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, London, Manchester Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and the rest. These cities are, for the most part, vast pools of human misery, networks of raw human nerves exposed without benefit of illusion or hope to the new, godless world wrought by industrial man. Industrial life plus a rampant capitalism have blasted the lives of men in these cities; those who are lucky enough not to be hungry are ridden with exquisite psychological sufferings. . . .

"Now, Mr. Blimin, above these so-called toiling masses,; for whom I have some sympathy but not as much as you'd expect, are the few industrialists and politicians who yell night and day about freedom, democracy, high wages, etc. These are the exploiters of the millions of rats caught in the industrial trap. That they make great profits out of the exercise of their lordship is perhaps the least of their crimes—"

"Oh, you're showing your true colors," Blimin snorted. "Are you defending *exploitation* now? Next you're going to tell me what wonderful philanthropists these capitalists are—"

"Not at all. It just so happens, Mr. Blimin," Goss explained, "that I think their crime is a blacker one than mere exploitation. The end result of their rule is that they keep the lives of their rats pitched to a mean, sordid level of consciousness. It's right here where you and I disagree deeply. Your wonderful trade unions for a quarter of a century have been fighting for so-called standards of living for workers, fighting for higher wages. Had I anything to say about the goals of those trade unions, I'd have insisted that their fight be to escape completely the domination of the capitalists. Not that the workers become richer, but that they become more human. You don't want that, Mr. Blimin, and the capitalists don't want it. Why? Because you cannot dupe free men who can think and know.

"Now back to my theme. . . .The point is not so much that these capitalists despise their rats, but that they despise themselves and all mankind. To keep their rats contented, they strive to convince them that

their rats' lives are more glorious, better, richer than at any time in history, and, in the end, they come to believe in their own lies. Consequently today the content of human life on earth is what these cheap-minded men say it is. . . ."

Cross Damon asserts that the communists are not true revolutionists; they do not really care about the quality of people's lives, but think they can be more efficient managers of the industrial society than the capitalists. This enrages Blimin, who shouts that the communists "love people." Cross denies this.

"Mr. Blimin, *please*, be honest," Cross begged. "You must assume that I know what this is all about. Don't tell me about the nobility of labor, the glorious future. You don't believe in that. That's for others and you damn well know it. . . .That absolute power is absolutely corrupting, a la Lord Acton, is something revolutionaries laugh at. These Jealous Rebels would much rather be corrupted with absolute power than live under the heels of men whom they despise.

"In order to test themselves, to make life a meaningful game, these Jealous Rebels proceed to organize political parties, Communist parties, Nazi parties, Fascist parties, all kind of parties—"

"No!" Blimin roared. "You equate or confound communism with fascism. They are *different!*"

"I admit they are different," Cross conceded. "But the degree of difference is not worth arguing about. Fascists operate from a narrow, limited basis; they preach nationality, race, soil, blood, folk feeling and other rot to capture men's hearts. What makes one man a Fascist and another a Communist might be found in the degree in which they are integrated with their culture. The more alienated a man is, the more he'd lean to communism.

"Toward rationality," Blimin stated.

"No," Cross corrected him. "Communists *use* rationality. I admit that the Communists are more intelligent, more general in their approach, but the same power-hungry heart beats behind the desire to rule! . . ."

Years ago, during a Great Books seminar in which a labor leader protested that he "believed" in the principles represented in the book under discussion, another member of the seminar—who happened to be Robert M. Hutchins—asked: "Do you believe in these principles, or do you just

want to *win* with them?" This is Damon's point, also, in his judgment of the communists. He finds them guilty of exploiting the terms of rational discourse, which has the effect of debasing the minds of all whom they influence. He continues:

"Now, where do these Jealous Rebels get their programs. . . ? Out of books? From Plato's *Republic*? No! Their programs are but the crude translations of the daydreams of the man in the street, daydreams in which the Jealous Rebels do *not* believe! . . .

"Their aims? Direct and naked power! They know as few others that there is no valid, functioning religion to take the place of the values and creeds of yesterday; and they know that political power, if it is to perform in the minds and emotions of men the role that the idea of God once performed, must be total and absolute. . . .

"I'm not so naïve as to believe that these men want to *change* the world! Why, they love human nature just as it is! They simply want their chance to show what they can do with that world and the people in it. To their minds human life on this earth is a process that is transparently *known*! They are out to grab the entire body of mankind and they will replace faith and habit with organization and discipline. . . ."

This is Richard Wright's version of the chapter on the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevsky's *Brothers Karamazov*. Cross is no returning Christ, however, but a tortured man who rises to these heights of critical brilliance and then falls to final disaster. But his vision remains, and the essential message is that the claim that human life is "transparently known" must be rejected as the root evil of modern times. Wright himself seems to be doing what he has Damon Cross advocate at the end of this passage:

". . . there is one little thing, it seems to me, that a man owes to himself. He can look bravely at this horrible totalitarian reptile and, while doing so, discipline his dread, his fear, and study it coolly . . . and he may be able to call the attention of others to the presence and meaning of this reptile and its multitudinous writhings. . . .That's all, Mr. Blumin. I'm not really anti anything."

REVIEW

BIGAMY AND PHILOSOPHY

OUR review of Ida Lupino's "social significance" movie, *The Bigamist*, has stirred up a fair amount of discussion. We are, as readers know, not in the habit of treating motion pictures, generally, nor do we claim to possess the background which would make dramatic reviews competent. *The Bigamist* received attention solely because of questions it raised in regard to the legal enforcement of conventional morality. This Department is not exactly an implacable enemy of convention—nor, we judge, is Miss Lupino—but this plot *was* intended to show that we don't help people to become ethical by punishing them for the violation of social codes. What made *The Bigamist* most interesting to us was its forthright application, to a touchy problem, of conclusions reached by many of our best psychiatrists. Most everyone *is* inclined to agree that punitive laws are not constructive, yet when this abstract judgment is applied to the subject of marriage and personal morality, some discomfiture is usually experienced. Philosophy, however, gives no heed to discomfiture, but only to a continuing search for truth.

A correspondent who, alas, did not personally view *The Bigamist*, writes:

From your synopsis, I would judge that "The Bigamist" suffers from two defects—both of which seem prevalent in modern literature. As far as I know, it is not news that a person can get into trouble by being weak as well as by being maliciously intentioned, so to this extent the movie is flogging a dead horse. Also the problem with which our hero is confronted seems puny. After all, Brutus and Hamlet, two conspicuous tragic weaklings, had real conflicts to contend with, but Harry Green could have stayed out of trouble by obeying the maxims which are everywhere taught in this country.

What I particularly object to, is the criticism of the law against bigamy. As I see it, there are two motives for laws. One of these is to protect society against those who do not accept the prevailing mores. I have a theory that the more firmly those mores are held, the greater divergence is tolerated, and view

with some envy the freedom of victorian England, but this is beside the point. The other reason for a law is to provide some measure of discipline for the citizens who are assumed to have an insufficient quantity of self-discipline. I will agree with you that this is insulting to the individual and should not be necessary, but every newspaper seems more strongly to demonstrate its necessity. Having had to live with weaklings and having observed the consequences of their actions, and of some of my own acts of weakness, I will reserve my sympathy and liking for lawbreakers of type I, some of whom seem very nice fellows.

You may have a point when you say that if Mr. Green had not married the girl he would not have got into trouble with the law (although he could have been sued for support of the child) but there is a certain logic in this too. I agree with the critic in your "Concerning Deception" that Green's basic crime was deception of everyone concerned including himself ("love genuinely"—I doubt it) and by compounding this crime, he eventually came within the purview of the law. Even if you do not accept this view, I can think of no laws which are not occasionally unjust, including the law of gravitation. .

Re the polygamous Mormons, irrespective of the sanctimonious remarks of public officials (and how often are official utterances other than asinine?) the action taken seems appropriate to the main complaint which was, in the reports I read, that the children were forced without choice to adopt the practices of their fathers. This action seems to me analogous to that taken when fundamentalist parents object to a blood transfusion for a sick child, etc. There was a case of this last year in New York. This may have some relevance to your "Frontiers" article, but I do not think that our indigenous cults have demonstrated enough merit or permanence to warrant their immunity to our laws.

We can sympathize with some of the thoughts which motivated this communication, but imagined we had not left so obscure the point that "Harry Green," in the movie, was neither "maliciously intentioned" nor "weak"—at least according to the usual connotation of these terms. Green was confused by very complicated circumstances; he didn't *decide* to defy convention either, but rather discovered himself in a position where legally enforced conventions made the

working out of two human relationships inordinately difficult. (We are not quite sure what our correspondent means by his aside about "Victorian England," but would grant that those who do a good job of living up to their own standards are not so apt to demand punishment of others for deviation.)

In any case, the argument seems to go back to the question of absolute prohibition. Here one can maintain, as we do, that absolute prohibition has always been ineffective, and is now an outmoded means for improving conduct. The laws which make no allowance for "deviation from the norm" under exceptional circumstances, automatically turn a number of people into enemies of the law—even though they are not, by nature, anti-social.

India's attempt to control alcoholic consumption by partial prohibition—alcohol may be purchased or consumed only on certain days—is very much more effective than an abortive U.S. attempt called the Volstead Act, and perhaps this is because the Indians who make laws are apt to be better philosophers than their Western brethren. The difference between laws aimed at encouraging restraint and laws aimed at total regulation of conduct is indeed very great! Sweden's legalization of extra-marital childbearing at a time when the male population was seriously reduced made it possible for men who would have found themselves in "plural" relationships in any event to maintain respect for their country's laws, and at the same time be encouraged to take on only such responsibilities as could be practically assumed. This was, of course, an emergency measure, but "emergency situations" sometimes occur in every society, for certain individuals who live in them, and should receive some kind of unprejudiced evaluation.

It seems to us that the greatest tragedies of interpersonal relationships revolve around current attitudes towards divorce. A divorce, which may be fully legal and fully "accepted" by nearly all the population, may also be used as a convenient

excuse for abdicating mutual responsibilities incurred by marital partners. It is certainly necessary for the law to "allow" men and women to separate when a considered decision has been reached to do so, but, in a very important sense, parents who have brought children into the world can never be released from mutual psychological responsibilities—and it is likely a very bad thing for the law to imply that they may be so released by merely making agreeable financial arrangements. Viewed in this light, at least, every divorced person who has played a part in the procreation of children in more than one marriage is in exactly the same position as Miss Lupino's "Harry Green." One might, in other words, prefer a set of social mores wherein "separation" is accepted, but "divorce" recognized as an *impossibility*, than a society where bigamy is punished by jail sentence. (It goes without saying that the joint maintenance of responsibility for children throughout a lifetime could not be compelled by law either. Acceptance of such a point of view could only result from long-term education in attitudes of responsibility.)

Turning to our correspondent's remarks in regard to the polygamist Mormons of Short Creek, we would have to agree that children of such a community, if "forced without choice to adopt the practices of their fathers," are being imposed upon—just like Harry Green, but according to an opposite standard. Yet a lot can be said for these obstreperous polygamists, much of which was offered to the *Collier's* reading audience by one of the members of the community. In an article entitled, "A Mormon Fundamentalist Tells His Story" (*Collier's*, Nov. 13, 1953), Edson Jessop presents his side of the picture. Mr. Jessop has five wives and twenty children; and it appears to be their opinion, as well as his, that he has been kind and fair in these relationships, which is, after all, about as fundamental a criterion as one can find for a "good marriage." While few share Mr. Jessop's convictions, his ambitions—or his courage in undertaking such a complicated pattern of family

life—the following passage certainly indicates his right to be heard as a decent man:

At this stage of my story I can anticipate your question: Can a man love five woman at once? I've heard the question before; always I answer: Can a man love five children at once, or five friends, or five brothers and sisters? Show me the monogamous outsider who has not had a mistress—at least in his heart. Here in Short Creek we do not love in secret disgrace, we love in honor; we do not have abortions, we have children.

My wives trust me. A man of our faith never walks the chalk line as does the man with only one wife. I spend my time where I'm most needed, perhaps where there is sickness or trouble. My wives trust me to do whatever is best for the family as a whole.

The religious text upon which the Short Creek polygamists based their polygamy is from Section 132 of Mormon "Doctrine and Covenants," and reads: "If any man espouse a virgin and desire to espouse another, and the first give her consent. . . then is he justified." From this we would judge that plural marriage is officially regarded as being *permissible* under certain conditions, rather than the only way in which a man may properly live. Of course, Mormon cultists, like some others, have probably developed rigidities of social habit and finally mistaken that which was at first "permissive" to be a virtual command. But so far we have seen little evidence that the children of Short Creek were to be "forced" into plural marriage.

It is of interest to read an account by a *Collier's* reporter of the way in which the prosecution of the Mormons came about. Some readers, moreover, along with MANAS editors, may be apt to feel more in sympathy with the Short Creekers than with the righteous officials who descended upon the peaceful community. Wiley Maloney summarizes the story in this way:

To Judge Faulkner, plural marriage was lawless, immoral and, if allowed to continue, dangerous—no matter how sincerely religious in intent. He was concerned about the children—might they not become the victims of this archaic doctrine?

Aroused, the governor asked the state legislature for funds to conduct an investigation. The state lawmakers appropriated \$10,000, and the Burns Detective Agency in Los Angeles was hired for the job. For several months after that, the people of Short Creek always hard pressed for cash, were cheered by the prospect of finding work as movie extras: film scouts had appeared in town, asking questions, taking photographs and talking of using the region as the scene of a Western thriller.

The movie scouts were Burns agents, quietly gathering evidence.

Early this year {1953}, Governor Pyle and Attorney General Ross F. Jones felt that the time had come for action. In the two years that had elapsed since Judge Faulkner had spoken to them, Short Creek's population had risen to 368. The community was fast becoming the second largest in Mohave County; residents were predicting a population of 2,000 in another couple of years—which would put Short Creek almost in a class with Kingman the county seat. And the larger the village grew, the harder it would be to break up the cult.

The Short Creek raid was planned for months—in strictest secrecy, lest the families of the community learn about it and thwart arrest by drifting across the state line to Utah (they learned anyhow, but did nothing). The \$50,000 appropriation required to finance the operation was embodied in an omnibus appropriation bill and listed as part of the governor's emergency fund; only a few leaders of the legislature knew what the money was for. At one point, a bill actually was drafted appropriating the money for "grasshopper control."

The governor and attorney general of Utah were informed of Arizona's plan, and so were the leaders of the Mormon Church in Salt Lake City, which had long been embarrassed by the activities of the fundamentalists.

Last July 1st, Arizona's governor transferred the \$50,000 fund to the attorney general's office and declared that a state of insurrection existed in Short Creek—the necessary legal step to justify taking action.

There was one big problem: there is no legal penalty for polygamy in Arizona. Both Arizona and Utah had been specifically required to outlaw multiple marriage as a condition of statehood, back around the turn of the century—but when Arizona's code of laws was written, a statute covering penalties for polygamy was somehow omitted. Attorney

General Jones had to find other grounds for prosecuting the Short Creek group. After some study, he concluded that the community constituted a conspiracy against the state.

The officials decided to move the women and kids to Phoenix, where it would be easier to care for them—and watch them.

On August 1st, in Kingman, bonds totaling \$43,000 were posted for the release of the fundamentalist Mormons and they were freed from jail. They headed back to Short Creek. When they got there, their wives and children were gone.

Turning back to Jessop's personal account, we learn that the authorities who raided Short Creek looked in vain for a local jail in which to incarcerate the fathers; Short Creek had no jail. The "criminals" had to be locked up in the Church! Jessop continues:

We could laugh at that. But being shamed before our children was another matter. I admit it hurt when the embarrassed deputy entered my home and read the warrant for my arrest before my family. It hit hard to have my children hear their father accused of "unlawful and notorious cohabitation," "bastardy," "rebellion" and "insurrection"—I, Edson Jessop, who in all my life have never lifted a finger in violence. It hurt until I had to blink tears when my little girls, scared and bewildered, clung to my legs and cried and kissed me goodbye as I climbed into the deputy's car to go to jail.

But nothing hurt like the home-coming to an empty hearth—our discovery that the state of Arizona had spirited 154 innocent women and children away to Phoenix just to keep us husbands and fathers from our families.

What will be the outcome?

We shall never give up. We have taken our wives in good faith. Before we abandon them as concubines and our children as illegitimates we shall fight the state of Arizona with all our strength. We shall commit no violence; we'll passively resist, as Gandhi did.

At this point we rest our case, and Miss Lupino's, holding that "The Law" did no one any good at Short Creek, and many gentle people and their children a lot of harm.

COMMENTARY **STRANGE CONTRAST**

THERE are mysteries enough in the world, but one at which we shall never cease from marvelling is in the extraordinary difference between the kind of people described in this week's Review—the Mormons who believe in plural marriage and other odd doctrines of the Fundamentalist type of faith—and the sophisticated materialists with whom Richard Wright deals in his novel, *The Outsider* (see lead article). These people seem to have almost nothing in common, save the fact that both groups are born into the same world, and support their physical lives with the same necessities. Otherwise, the differences between them are so great as to seem to establish separate sub-species of mankind. So far as thought and values are concerned, they live in worlds apart. Some might say that the Mormon group is typical of the culture which belonged to the Middle Ages, with its childlike faith in supernatural revelation, but this would imply that the cynical materialism of the communist leaders portrayed by Richard Wright is somehow representative of progress since the Middle Ages—hardly, we think, the case.

The contrast is rather between primitive or rudimentary intellectuality and decadent intellectuality—if a judgment of this sort is possible. But after we have described this difference, how account for it? The important thing, of course, in respect to human beings, is never to attempt to explain them wholly in terms of the things that "happen" to them, but rather as the result of a rather complicated interrelationship of experience and choice more or less as we might explain what we ourselves have become, combining circumstances and how we have met them as the principal causes.

But only ages of experience and almost countless inclinations of choice seem sufficient to provide the basis for so great a gap between types of human beings. And to make any sense at all

out of this problem, we are obliged to fall back on a Platonic explanation—the theory of Anamnesis, expounded by Plato in the *Meno*—to supply the range of life required to accumulate these differences. Plato, in short, held that the soul has an ancient history which it brings with it to birth, and that this is primarily the reason for the striking differences among men, even among the members of the same family.

There may be other theories to account for this particular *human* mystery, but we have encountered none so reasonable as this one.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

HARPER has recently published a collection of rambling, philosophical messages from the pen of J. Krishnamurti, erstwhile Theosophist and internationally known Indian lecturer, entitled *Education and the Significance of Life*. The reading public, it appears, has finally accepted the thought that a man may derive valuable educative perspectives from the mystic tradition generally, and from Eastern religion and philosophy in particular. There was a time, though, not so long ago, we are sure, when Harper would not have touched Mr. Krishnamurti with a ten-foot pole.

About a year ago, MANAS published Ridgely Cummings' on-the-spot evaluation of a Krishnamurti lecture and we then felt it necessary to say editorially a few contrasting kind words in behalf of this well-poised modern swami. We now have opportunity to say a little more. At the outset, though, it must be admitted that there is nothing new in *Education and the Significance of Life* for those who are at all familiar with the anarchist tradition. Yet anarchism is more often associated with belligerence than with education—a fact which gives Krishnamurti's book special interest. His argument, phrased in uncomplicated language, again puts the case for individual "autonomy," and, except for marked differences in terminology, thus echoes Riesman's *Lonely Crowd*. Because of his simplicity of style, moreover, the theme will reach some readers who might have difficulty in wading through a sociologist's complicated maneuverings.

However gentle, Krishnamurti is outspoken enough. "Education," he writes, "should not encourage the individual to conform to society or to be negatively harmonious with it, but help him to discover the true values which come with unbiased investigation and self-awareness. Systems, whether educational or political, are not changed mysteriously; they are transformed when there is a fundamental change in ourselves. The

individual is of first importance, not the system; and as long as the individual does not understand the total process of himself, no system, whether of the left or of the right, can bring order and peace to the world."

The following paragraphs seem to us to be well put, and to complement much that has been written in *Children . . . and Ourselves*:

The child is the result of both the past and the present and is therefore already conditioned. If we transmit our background to the child, we perpetuate both his and our own conditioning. There is radical transformation only when we understand our own conditioning and are free of it. To discuss what should be the right kind of education while we ourselves are conditioned is utterly futile.

Neither conformity to the present society nor the promise of a future Utopia can ever give to the individual that insight without which he is constantly creating problems.

The right kind of educator, seeing the inward nature of freedom, helps each individual student to observe and understand his own self-projected values and impositions; he helps him to become aware of the conditioning influences about him.

Surely, it is possible to help the individual to perceive the enduring values of life, without conditioning. Some may say that this full development of the individual will lead to chaos; but will it? There is already confusion in the world, and it has arisen because the individual has not been educated to understand himself. While he has been given some superficial freedom, he has also been taught to conform, to accept the existing values.

Against this regimentation, many are revolting; but unfortunately their revolt is a mere self-seeking reaction, which only further darkens our existence. The right kind of educator, aware of the mind's tendency to reaction, helps the student to alter present values, not out of reaction against them, but through understanding the total process of life.

It is intelligence that brings order, not discipline. Conformity and obedience have no place in the right kind of education. Co-operation between teacher and student is impossible if there is no mutual affection, mutual respect. When the showing of respect to elders is required of children, it generally becomes a habit, a mere outward performance, and fear assumes the form of veneration. Without respect

and consideration, no vital relationship is possible, especially when the teacher is merely an instrument of his knowledge.

Here is Krishnamurti's opinion on comparative religions, in this case repeating much that Erich Fromm has said, though failing to make some of the crucial distinctions highlighted in *Psychoanalysis and Religion*:

Each religion has its own sacred book, its mediator, its priests and its ways of threatening and holding people. Most of us have been conditioned to all this, which is considered religious education; but this conditioning sets man against man, it creates antagonism, not only among the believers, but also against those of other beliefs. Though all religions assert that they worship God and say that we must love one another, they instill fear through their doctrines of reward and punishment, and through their competitive dogmas they perpetuate suspicion and antagonism. Dogmas, mysteries and rituals are not conducive to a spiritual life.

Our so-called religious training discourages questioning and doubt, yet it is only when we inquire into the significance of the values which society and religion have placed about us that we begin to find out what is true. It is the function of the educator to examine deeply his own thoughts and feelings and to put aside those values which have given him security and comfort, for only then can he help his students to be self-aware and to understand their own urges and fears.

Another correlation between Krishnamurti's themes and the ideas of some of our more philosophical psychologists and educators is a proposed distinction, in man, between "personality" and "individuality." Arthur Jersild's *In Search of Self* also spoke of an "inner self" which lives above social conditionings, and Karen Homey's *Neurosis and Human Growth* elaborated the same thought. Likewise, Fromm's *The Forgotten Language*. Krishnamurti puts it this way:

We must distinguish between the personal and the individual. The personal is the accidental; and by the accidental I mean the circumstances of birth, the environment in which we happen to have been brought up, with its nationalism, superstitions, class distinctions and prejudices. The personal or

accidental is but momentary, though that moment may last a lifetime; and as the present system of education is based on the personal, the accidental, the momentary, it leads to perversion of thought and the inculcation of self-defensive fears.

All of us have been trained by education and environment to seek personal gain and security, and to fight for ourselves. Though we cover it over with pleasant phrases, we have been educated for various professions within a system which is based on exploitation and acquisitive fear. Such a training must inevitably bring confusion and misery to ourselves and to the world, for it creates in each individual those psychological barriers which separate and hold him apart from others.

We do not suggest that *Education and the Significance of Life* is in any way a truly remarkable book. It is extremely repetitious and, as the reader will note, its points are discussed in a manner more reminiscent of preachments than of carefully reasoned analysis. Nevertheless, this writer's basic conclusions indicate that mystics and deductive philosophers, while following a quite different approach from that illustrated by painstaking induction of psychologists and sociologists, may come to the same essential conclusions in respect to the nature of man. Here, too, is an example of a successful blending between progressive elements in both Eastern and Western thought, both aimed at reformation of conventional social attitudes.

FRONTIER

Einstein—Natural Philosopher

PUBLICATION by the Philosophical Library of a small volume, *Essays in Science*, by Albert Einstein, again draws attention of the general reader to the paradox of genius. For here is a man who is reputed to think at a level of complexity so difficult to understand that only a few specialists in theoretical physics are able to deal effectively with Einstein's contributions to science, while, at the same time, there is a quality in his life and thought which has made him respected and even beloved by millions who have no notion of the meaning of his scientific achievements beyond a vague reference to the word "relativity."

A colleague and friend of Einstein's, the Czech-born Dr. Kurt Gödel, has this to say:

The reason why Einstein appeals to the imagination of so many people in the world is that his theories don't have an interest only for specialists. They also concern very general philosophical problems: for instance, the essence of time, of the fundamental concepts which occur in science and in everyday life. Partly because of his personality—his . . . well-meaning toward everybody—people feel this influence without knowing him directly. (New York *Times Magazine*, March 14, 1954.)

There are passages in *Essays in Science* which throw a further light on the appeal of Dr. Einstein. First, perhaps, in importance, is his uncompromising idealism in respect to the practice of science itself. Years ago, in Berlin, on the occasion of the sixtieth birthday of Max Planck, Einstein spoke before the Physical Society of that city on the "Principles of Research." He began by referring to the reasons for the choice of science as a career:

Many take to science out of a joyful sense of superior intellectual power; science is their own special sport to which they look for vivid experience and the satisfaction of ambition; many others are to be found in the temple who have offered the products of their brains on this altar for purely utilitarian purposes. Were an angel of the Lord to come and drive all the people belonging to these two categories out of the temple, it would be noticeably emptier, but there would still be some men, of both present and past times, left inside. Our Planck is one of them, and that is why we love him.

I am quite aware that we have just now lightheartedly expelled in imagination many excellent men who are largely, perhaps chiefly, responsible for the building of the temple of Science; and in many cases our angel would find it a pretty ticklish job to decide. But of one thing I feel sure: if the types we have just expelled were the only types there were, the temple would never have existed, any more than one can have a wood consisting of nothing but creepers. For these people any sphere of human activity will do, if it comes to a point; whether they become officers, tradesmen or scientists depends on circumstances.

Authentic science, Einstein feels, comes from the same inspiration as that which animates the painter, the poet, and the speculative philosopher—it is at once a flight from the pettiness of personal existence and a determination to wrest a sense of meaning from the cosmos.

Einstein is one of the few modern thinkers who retain faith in the possibility of genuine knowledge. Unlike the Positivists, who hold either that there is no "essential reality" behind the phenomena of life, or that it is undiscoverable, which is the same as not existing, so far as man is concerned, Einstein is convinced that human thought may be able to parallel the structure of nature. As he puts it in an essay on "Theoretical Physics":

Our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can discover by means of purely mathematical constructions the concepts and the laws connecting them with each other, which furnish the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced from it. Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction. But the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.

Dr. Einstein is a scientist in the classical sense, that of a "Natural Philosopher." For this reason, if for no other, he belongs, as few others belong, to the "man in the street." It is the ordinary man who still accepts the traditional idea of the role of science in human life to add to the sum total of human knowledge concerning the nature of things. Einstein seems to be, in all ways, the sort of thinker who might be expected to add to

human knowledge. The sophistication of the Positivist is lost alike on Dr. Einstein and the common man. The closing essay speaks to this point:

. . . the question, What is the purpose and meaning of science? receives quite different answers at different times and from different sorts of people.

It is, of course, universally agreed that science has to establish connections between the facts of experience, of such a kind that we can predict further occurrences from those already experienced. Indeed, according to the opinion of many positivists the completest possible accomplishment of this task is the only end of science.

I do not believe, however, that so elementary an ideal could do much to kindle the investigator's passion from which really great achievements have arisen. Behind the tireless efforts of the investigator there lurks a stronger, more mysterious drive: it is existence and reality that one wishes to comprehend. But one shirks from the use of such words, for one soon gets into difficulties when one has to explain what is really meant by "reality" and by "comprehend" in such a general statement.

When we strip the statement of its mystical elements we mean that we are seeking for the simplest possible system of thought which will bind together the observed facts. By the "simplest" system we do not mean the one which the student will have the least trouble in assimilating, but the one which contains the fewest possible mutually independent postulates or axioms; since the content of these logical, mutually independent axioms represents that remainder which is not comprehended.

It is not surprising that Dr. Einstein should also have gained eminence as a humanist and a defender of the civil rights of citizens of the United States. His attitude toward the possibility of human knowledge and his insistence upon respect for the rights of individuals are closely related, for the right to think and to speak as one desires is important only if it is acknowledged that men are *capable* of great thoughts. One could argue, by a parity of reasoning, that positivism in philosophy is consistent with opportunism in politics, although, fortunately, it is not possible to make this observation into a "rule," since human beings do not always behave in the way they might be expected to.

But what is impressive about Dr. Einstein is the larger consistency of his life and thought. We have one

more quotation to submit, and this is the entirety of the essay entitled "On Scientific Truth":

(1) It is difficult even to attach a precise meaning to the term "scientific truth." So different is the meaning of the word "truth" according to whether we are dealing with a fact of experience, a mathematical proposition or a scientific theory. "Religious truth" conveys nothing clear to me at all.

(2) Scientific research can reduce superstition by encouraging people to think and survey things in terms of cause and effect. Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality or intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order.

(3) This firm belief, a belief bound up with deep feeling, in a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of experience, represents my conception of God. In common parlance this may be described as "pantheistic" (Spinoza).

(4) Denominational traditions I can only consider historically and psychologically; they have no other significance for me.

It does not seem too much to say that in Albert Einstein the Western world has gained at least a personal fulfillment of all its best ideals. Here is a man who has demonstrated what the great founders of the scientific movement hoped for—that the mind of man, laboriously applied to the mysteries of nature, would bring about great discoveries, instructing his fellows in the actual workings of natural law. At the same time, he has preserved in his life a genuine reverence for the wonder of life and of the universe, uniting a profound quality of religious reflection with respect for human beings and their potentialities. Einstein has also made come true what the rationalists of the eighteenth century said was possible—that the rejection of sectarianism in religion might lead to the universal morality of a reasoned life; yet in exhibiting this attitude, the great physicist has given the highest place to the creative faculties of the mind, as supplying the raw materials which intellectuality must have in order to go to work constructively. For all these reasons, perhaps, Dr. Einstein is loved and appreciated by his fellow men.