

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

OTHERS, doubtless, besides ourselves have been puzzled concerning the moral issues involved in present-day use of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We, along with others, have read and thought about it, but not until we came across John Walter Caughey's discussion in *Frontier* for August have we regarded the subject with much clarity of opinion. Mr. Caughey is a historian—a University of California historian, moreover, who refused to sign the "loyalty oath" or its equivalent insisted upon by the California Board of Regents—and he writes about the Fifth Amendment in historical perspective.

The point of his article is that Americans are allowing the Fifth Amendment to lose its importance, and that this is a great mistake. He begins with a statement of the Amendment's meaning:

As is well known, the amendment is a simple, forthright ban against forced self-incrimination. "No single person," it says ". . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The courts have ruled, further, that the amendment also forbids making anyone testify against himself before a grand jury, congressional committee, or other official investigations which might lead to criminal proceedings.

Pointing out that while the Amendment is a part of Constitutional law, restraining only the Federal Government, most states have adopted similar safeguards, Mr. Caughey continues:

It all adds up to a reasonably comprehensive enactment of the principle that no one shall be required to convict himself. Instead, the burden of proof is to rest upon the government as prosecutor. To the best of my knowledge no one has seriously undertaken to argue against this principle, but there is a marked tendency to clamor for exceptions and a considerable ingenuity in working around the prohibition.

But why, after all, should not a man be obliged to testify against himself? If he is innocent, his own testimony should help to prove it; if not, then his testimony is still important in order that justice may be

done. Only after reading Caughey's brief summary of the history of the principle behind the Fifth Amendment does its importance become clear. He writes:

We have this doctrine as a legacy from the Founding Fathers—Washington, Madison, Franklin and their associates in the Constitutional Convention and the First Congress, which submitted the amendments comprising the Bill of Rights. These first ten amendments were approved with quick unanimity. All agreed that their function was to make explicit certain principles that had been taken for granted in the original drafting of the Constitution. It is accurate to think of them as integral elements in that basic body of law.

The American of 1787 and 1790 in turn had this principle of barring forcible extraction of incriminating testimony as a heritage from England. In medieval times witnesses were forced to answer. If they were slow about it, there was no hesitancy about applying torture as a means of squeezing out a confession. This was the technique of the third degree applied in open court and by the court.

The Fifth Amendment, in other words, is a legal expedient, but a necessary one, which anticipates and corrects for the abuse of authority and the coercive power of authority. If the processes of justice are made intricate and obscure by such expedients, there is no help for it except through the gradual development of absolute integrity among those in authority. In Plato's ideal State, perhaps, with philosophers for kings, we could abandon the Fifth Amendment, but this sort of utopia is presently so far distant as to be not worth talking about.

Caughey continues with his history:

As early as the twelfth century there were protests in England about making witnesses answer. The protests seemed to be of no avail, but they continued, and particularly against forcible inquiry into religious beliefs and associations. These protestants were heartened by the conviction that it was not right that the state should force them into conformity. Finally, in the 1640's the Puritans won acceptance of the principle, which ever since has

prevailed in English common law, that no man shall be forced to be his own accuser.

By that time the context had come to be as much political as religious. Probes into religious beliefs and membership were still the problem, but the tie-in with political thoughts and affiliations was clear and important. Enactment of the Fifth Amendment was a direct carryover from this Puritan achievement in seventeenth-century England. The American authors knew the menace of forced conformity that the amendment sought to ward off.

The account now reaches the present:

For more than a century and a half the Fifth Amendment had thorough respect. Americans both Federalist and Republican, Whig and Democrat, North and South, Populist and Old Guard, New Deal and Anti-New Deal were all for it. In public opinion now, however, this respect has only limited survival. Furthermore, the strongest popular acceptance of the Fifth Amendment is based on what seems to me a misconception. Today the amendment is regarded as a proper refuge for the guilty, but not for the innocent. . . . The peculiar temper of our times . . . is that the plea of the Fifth Amendment is regarded as natural and proper if made by someone caught almost red-handed or against whom a great weight of evidence exists. On the contrary, if the likelihood of conviction seems remote, we are prone to say that the Fifth Amendment is out of bounds. This popular attitude injects a sporting attitude that is utterly inappropriate. If any selection is to be applied, it would be better morality to do just the opposite and favor those least tainted with indications of guilt.

We are not sure of Mr. Caughey's last point, but the general analysis sounds excellent. And since, here, he has thrown the discussion into a moral frame of reference, this seems a good time to consider specific problems.

There have been instances recently of men who, asked if they were Communists, have claimed the protection of the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer. The fact of the matter, however, is that there is no statute on the law books making it a crime to be a Communist or to belong to the Communist Party. Why, then, should they refuse to answer? They cannot be prosecuted if they admit being Communists (unless vulnerable to perjury or conspiracy charges), nor can they be prosecuted if they are not, and say that they are not.

The trouble is that this simple equation does not cover all the facts. A man can be ruined if he admits to being a Communist. No one will give him a job. He can look forward to an exciting career in dish-washing or some similar pursuit, at least until the tumult dies down. But is this justification for not admitting to being Communist? He could argue, on the other hand, that it is legal to be a Communist, but that his political opinions are his own affair, and that the First Amendment by broad interpretation covers his right to refuse to identify his political beliefs and affiliations. Morally, we think, this argument is sound, but it doesn't seem to have much relation to the precise meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Perhaps we should say that if a man wants to be a Communist, he should be willing to take his chances with the judicial system of a Capitalist State, and not cry to high heaven about civil rights when the Capitalist State pushes him around. But, being an avowed enemy of the Capitalist State, and adopting a Leninist view of "bourgeois morality," our communist may quite logically insist upon exploiting "capitalist" civil rights while he is doing his best to bring about their downfall.

But this is the Communist's moral problem, and he will have to work that out for himself. The problem of the American citizen devoted to the Constitution and the government formed under its provisions is quite different. He must decide about the morality of public proceedings which treat Communists as criminals when there is no law declaring them to be such. The practice, now become a habit, of using extra-legal means to make it tough for communists is a practice that could eventually be turned against some other minority. And then, since we will have become used to such methods, we may not see anything wrong with that, either, until, finally, the Fifth Amendment, our safeguard against enforced conformity in political opinion, will have lost its meaning and its power to protect. Already, as Mr. Caughey says, "The drop in prestige [of the Fifth Amendment] is so drastic that it seems possible that it may be amended or nullified right out of the Constitution."

Let us take another illustration. This time our victim is not a Communist at all, and never has been one, but is a man of liberal convictions who recognizes the importance of freedom in political thought and is resolved to do his part to preserve it. Let us suppose, further, that he has a position in the public eye and

may be made the target of attack for ulterior purposes. In a recent case which answers approximately to this description, the central figure refused to answer an investigating committee's question as to whether or not he was a communist. He invoked the Fifth Amendment. His personal career in civil service ended, of course, at that moment.

But why didn't he answer the question? He refused to answer, we learned, not because he had been or was then a communist, but because if he had answered that question, he would have been legally obliged to answer all manner of questions concerning all the people he knew. This was completely impossible for him. It would have meant dragging the names of these people into a shadowy world of innuendo, blackening their reputations by exposing them to hints and slurs. Even if some of them were communists, and were thus brought to light, numerous others would have been tarred by the same brush. So, he reasoned, the Fifth Amendment afforded the only protection against this kind of situation.

Well, what would *you* have done? The Fifth Amendment, taken in its strict meaning, doesn't seem to apply to this case. He could have answered the question and said he was not a communist. He would probably have been ruined, anyhow, for as a character in Irwin-Shaw's *The Troubled Air* is made to say, "*No one can stand investigation,*" and to be asked the question is almost as much of a crime as answering or refusing to answer it. But at least, in this case, he protected some of his friends from similar disaster.

It might be contended that the Fifth Amendment was intended by the Founding Fathers to protect the citizens of the United States from authoritarian pressure insisting upon political conformity, and that this is the way it is being used. It might be contended that the public authority, in the form of investigating committees, is using or rather misusing the law in order to secure conformity of opinion, and that those who invoke the Fifth Amendment, not so much to avoid self-incrimination as to prevent investigating committees from doing further injustice, are obliged to do so in self-defense. Are these arguments morally acceptable? This is a hard question. The only answer we can think of is that the entire situation illustrates a decline in appreciation of and respect for the processes of self-government in the United States. And,

unfortunately, the principal offenders seem to be those who have been elected to offices which they hold in public trust.

As to what to do about the Fifth Amendment, we don't know the answer. It is manifestly inadequate, today, as a protection against authoritarian measures for conformity. Yet we don't see how a new amendment could protect people against the methods now being applied by investigating committees to witnesses called before them. The primary responsibility lies with the committees themselves, and so long as the public continues to elect to Congress men who will use such methods, there is not very much anyone can do about it, beyond the efforts at general education pursued by Mr. Caughey and a few others.

What we should like to point out, finally, however, is that the neglect of the original *spirit* of the Fifth Amendment—a neglect of which both legislatures and private citizens seem equally guilty—and the "sporting attitude" toward it deplored by Mr. Caughey are both symptoms of precisely the disintegration of democratic processes which makes people vulnerable to Communist or some other form of totalitarian propaganda. The Communists are openly contemptuous of civil rights. Americans are becoming carelessly indifferent to them.

We happen to be among those who believe—or would like to believe—that the Constitution of the United States is a document of such foresight and breadth that it is adequate for meeting all such emergencies. At present, however, we do not see how the Fifth Amendment is really enough to protect the integrity of those charged with political unorthodoxy and who are subjected to extra-legal persecution for this reason. Perhaps no Constitution is good enough to survive a slack season in conscientious citizenship, and perhaps we are in the midst of such a season.

One hesitates, in any event, to propose new laws, or even the need for them. Perhaps someone endowed with legal background and similar interests can be persuaded to contribute an article on this subject. At present, the legal remedies available to those harried by Congressional investigations, so far as we can see, no longer perform the functions they were intended to perform by the Founding Fathers.

Letter from **South Africa**

ALICE, CAPE PROVINCE.—The utilitarian and esthetic aspects of education are the ones that usually appear prominently in the discussion of educational problems, and society determines the role that its various members will play according to the emphasis it lays on one or other of these aspects.

It is perhaps of some interest to examine the educational programs that have been introduced in South Africa—a country noted for its race attitudes and problems. The first point to note is that, consonant with established social and political tradition, there is strict separation in the matter of schooling. Not-only are schools for whites separate from those for non-white, but also there are Afrikaner schools as distinct from English, and separate schools for the three main non-white groups, *viz.*, African, Indian and Coloured (*i e.*, Mulatto). This separation reaches up to even university level. Of eight universities, four are Afrikaner and four are English in tone, tradition and medium of instruction. In addition to these there is one college which caters specifically to the non-white section. It should be stated that there is a percentage of Afrikaner students to be found in the English universities and vice versa, but not to the extent of obscuring their main characteristics. In the English universities are also some non-white students, particularly at Witwatersrand, Cape Town and Natal. These are in the main medical students. The numbers of such students are, however, small, being of the order of some two hundred odd in an enrolment of say three to four thousand. No such situation exists at the Afrikaner universities. In the schools, separation is complete.

Control of all schools, both primary and secondary, has so far been vested in the four provincial administrations, whilst university training has been the direct charge of the Minister of Education. School syllabuses and curricula at

the primary level have been differentiated as between the African on the one hand and the other groups on the other. At the secondary stage syllabuses are the same for the reason that this is the stage next before university, and all prospective university students must pass the "Matriculation" or equivalent examination to qualify for entrance to a university. There are also institutions for the training of teachers, and there are technical institutions. The same separation holds, and in the case of the last mentioned type of school, training in skills as would qualify the candidate to set up practice as an engineer and all allied trades is debarred to non-whites. Added to the fact of differentiation is the further fact of inferior equipment, inadequate and poorly paid and trained staff, poorer housing, and lower per capita grants to schools, as we descend the scale from white to coloured, through Indian and then to African. This perhaps supports the view held in the United States of America that separate facilities can hardly ever be equal.

This situation is of course directly in line with the thesis that some have been born to serve, others to be master. For those who must provide only the muscle power, those who must be classified as common labourer, it is reasonable that they need not be given any instruction further than the rudiments which will make them understand orders given by their masters. For those who shall direct the affairs of state, in whose hands shall be vested the reins of government, it stands to reason that these shall benefit by refinements in education. In case readers feel that this is farfetched, it is sufficient to quote a member of the Union Parliament who a few weeks ago said that he had never been in favour of higher education for the non-white, particularly the African. And he is not alone in such attitudes. To the average white South African, education "spoils" the African, makes him lose respect for the white man, makes him lose contact with his own people, engenders in him feelings of dissatisfaction by making him aspire to heights barred to him by law or by tradition, creates an

agitator class of the intelligentsia among the African. These arguments are also applied in varying degree to the other nonwhite groups. The Nationalist government in particular has been concerned about the type of "education" given to the Africans till now. They now propose transferring "Native Education" to the Native Affairs Department—one of the government departments. In other words, education of the Africans will no longer be under the control of education departments as such, but under that department whose job it is to handle Native Affairs. In short, the department which sees to the enforcement of the government's racial policies in so far as they affect the African. This proposed transfer was foreshadowed in the establishing of a special commission, in 1949, to enquire into and make recommendations concerning the conduct of education for Africans.

Under the new control envisaged, the Minister of Native Affairs will have the power to decide what schools may continue to operate, what schools may be opened in particular areas—in fact, when all schools have been registered with the Department of Native Affairs, the Minister may cancel the registration of such schools as he feels are not in the best interests of the community in which they exist. With the establishment in 1951 of a Coloured Affairs Department, and with the appointment this year of a commission on coloured education, it hardly needs a fertile imagination to see the direction along which the education of the Coloured people will be made to go. So far, there has been no mention made of Indian education, but it is probably a mere matter of time before activity is set in motion in that quarter. It seems that the aim is to deprive the non-white peoples of those vital aspects of a true education which will enable them to play the part that any section of a democratic society is expected to do in the affairs of the nation.

The foregoing description would be incomplete without noting what has been happening in the white group itself. Shortly

before the death of General Smuts there had been initiated the scheme of encouraging bilingualism in white schools. The idea was that by a better knowledge of each other's language, the two white groups would be led to a healthier respect of each other's culture, traditions and aspirations as members of the European community in South Africa. The idea caught on well at the beginning. This happened to be the time, however, when certain intellectuals at one of the Afrikaner universities were originating the concept of what they termed "Christian National Education," a system in which they envisaged an education in line with the teachings of the Bible. If one considers that the majority of the Afrikaners are dyed-in-the-wool adherents of the "Purified" Dutch Reformed Church, in which tenets of "a chosen people," and "hewers of wood and drawers of water" are firmly espoused, and if it is remembered that the Nationalists have strong feelings against the British connection, it will be seen just what this new concept would mean for any non-Nationalist. Already, since the coming to power of the present government, the Transvaal provincial administration has enacted measures denying to parents the right to decide what school their children shall attend, in case the authorities have a wish contrary to that of the parents. So, the bilingual scheme has been killed in its infancy.

This almost complete separation of white from black, and the division of one white group from the other will certainly make easier the task of those who will set themselves to perpetuating the present tendencies and characteristics which make South Africa the land of racial problems.

SOUTH AFRICAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW

MECHANICAL MORALS

OUR latest foray into the field of science-fiction turned up an odd tale by Robert Sheckley—"Watchbird," which appears in the Permabook collection of science-fiction, *Shadow of Tomorrow*. The watchbird is the supreme achievement of mechanics—a thing of coils and timing which hovers in the air over great cities and swoops down to arrest all acts of murder. Moreover, the cunning inventors of this device have installed in the watchbirds a "learning mechanism" by which they improve their functions through experience.

At the outset, watchbirds promise to be an almost incredible blessing to a society plagued by crimes of violence. Sensitive to murderous intent, the watchbirds begin by saving life after life. The scientists are jubilant. Then, one morning, an interesting report comes to the director of a watchbird factory. It seems that, expanding on their initial directions, watchbirds now take the view that the slaughter of cattle for meat is a form of murder. What could be more reasonable to a mechanical brain? Next a state penitentiary finds it impossible to conduct executions of condemned criminals. The watchbirds won't stand for it, descending with impersonal retribution upon the man who tries to pull the switch. A hunter in the forest is not permitted to take a shot at a deer. Finally, an old man expires after a watchbird knocks him flat for trying to swat a fly.

What to do? Sheckley has the scientists get together and design another sort of mechanical guardian of the peace to kill off all the watchbirds. This starts out well, but then someone asks how the new tribe of avenging mechanical furies will be controlled, since their efficiency, like that of the watchbirds, depends upon the "learning process" installed in them to make them semi-independent. Here the moody Mr. Sheckley leaves the reader, ending his story on this unpleasant note.

The moral is pretty obvious, and would get across even if Sheckley had not provided a skeptical factory manager who objects to the transfer to machines of functions of moral control. Unfortunately, however, he does not linger very long at the point where the story might do the most good—say, on the subject of executions. Judicial killing is sanctioned by society, but a survey of capital punishment from a watchbird's eye view of the matter might have been interesting. Then, of course, there is war. Sheckley had splendid opportunities for satire, here, which he entirely neglected. The watchbird's militant suppression of fly-swatting tends to make the situation farcical, and when an aluminum-bodied monitor sweeps out of the sky to prevent a man from turning off the ignition of his car—a motor is "alive" only when it is running—the moral point of the story drops completely out of sight.

Of course, it's only "science-fiction," and we mustn't ask too much of these authors. Yet in the hands of a man like Edward Bellamy, this theme might have had profound development, leading, perhaps, to something like the Gandhian doctrine of *Ahimsa*, or Harmlessness. Incredible as it may seem, there are those in India who will not swat a fly or a mosquito. Further, American Point Four specialists who have gone there to help the Indians develop their breeds of cattle have been stumped by Hindu unwillingness to eliminate stunted or unhealthy specimens from the breed. The cow is a sacred animal to the Hindus, and must never be harmed on any account.

But whether or not we regard such extremes as forms of religious folly, the important thing to recognize is that such traditions do have the effect of instructing millions of people in what Albert Sweitzer calls "reverence for life"; and, quite conceivably, certain rather opposite traditions which color American thinking may be equally "extreme" in another direction. The Westerner is typically eager to "eliminate" those who seem to menace him—whether it is a mosquito or an entire

nation which is regarded as a threat. This eagerness to kill may get us into as many awkward situations as the practice of harmlessness would, to which must be added the psychological factor of an almost endless belligerence and habit of "declaring war" on practically anything that gets in our way. The deadly monotony of war and war readiness in Europe and America may already be a kind of drug which obscures to us how unnatural our lives are as a result of this uncurbed penchant for killing as a solution for problems which seem difficult.

Meanwhile, there are some minor illustrations of how misleading supposedly "scientific" counsel can be in this matter. The United States Government, for example, for years waged a destructive war against coyotes on the western plains because they occasionally preyed upon sheep, cattle and poultry. But as the coyotes dwindled, the principal check on the propagation of wild rabbits and other small animals was removed. Soon the depredations of these animals on crops made the farmers worse off than before. The Government then tried destroying the rabbits, rats, and mice with trapping, shooting and poison. But since these animals also consume numberless insects, their extermination in turn removed the natural check on the multiplication of grasshoppers. And now, the arsenic compounds sometimes used against the "hoppers" often result in toxic soil. (Recent Food and Drug Administration hearings in Washington have made clear the extent of food poisoning and deterioration which may follow from the use of poison sprays to control insect pests.)

It is well known that the common rabbit has become a serious pest in Australia. When the rabbit was first brought to Australia by the early white settlers, none of its natural enemies was present in this environment, with the result that only periodic famines and pestilences set limits to its rapid multiplication. Hoping to develop a "natural" predator to control the rabbit population, cats were imported to Australia.

When the cats became too numerous, dogs were imported to eat the cats, and eventually they, too, became a pest!

These are small matters, perhaps, yet they illustrate what may result from the habitual hostility and aggression of Westerners in relation to the living world around them. Except for an occasional naturalist, we of the West have no instinctive friendship and respect for Nature. *Ahimsa* may seem ridiculous to us, likewise the custom of the American Indian hunter who, before killing for food, said a little prayer of apology to his "brother, the deer," so that it would be clear that he killed only to provide food for his family—yet these traditions of respect for life, so alien to the West, may represent precisely what is most needed by Western civilization.

There is no suggestion, here, of "imitating" the East or the American Indian, but of studying the deeply laid cultural foundations for the attitudes of these peoples. We might discover, by comparison, that our own cultural outlook, product of Western religion and Western imperialism and industrialism, displays a terrible egotism for which Nature will in time exact a terrible price.

COMMENTARY THE ACT OF A MAN

REPORTING Vinoba Bhave's recent difficulty—eventually overcome—with some angry Brahman priests of Bihar (India), *Time* (Oct. 5) persists in calling Bhave a Holy Man. Doubtless he is. And doubtless the general feeling that Bhave has justly inherited Gandhi's cause and mission, as Elisha took upon himself the robe and responsibility of Elijah, is correct. But we wish *Time* and others would stop labelling him a "holy man."

Why can't simply a *man* do these things? We don't know too much about the Indian reaction to such honorific titles, but in the West, to call a man "holy" is the practical equivalent of suggesting that you don't have to measure his behavior by any rational standard. A holy man is really a little queer and we sensible folk are not obligated to take seriously what he says or does. He's just something to talk about.

A holy man, in other words, does not quite belong to the human race.

But what Vinoba did at Bihar, and what he has been doing throughout India, seems to us to be what might be expected of a real man. As several times reported in these pages, Vinoba has been appealing to wealthy Indian landowners to give their land to those without fields for planting. His peaceful crusade has opened the hearts and understanding of many Indians and the news of his enterprise in brotherhood has traveled around the world.

A little less than a month ago, Bhave visited a region in Bihar where the Brahman priests have never recognized the fact that the Indian Constitution abolished untouchability. At dusk, together with some followers, among them several former "Untouchables," Bhave entered the precincts of a place from which the outcastes had been barred for centuries. He and his party were set upon and beaten by some fifty angry *pandas* (priests). Bhave and his disciples sat down and

took their beating, the younger men protecting Bhave's 86-pound body with their own.

A wave of protest swept India. Prime Minister Nehru referred to the degradation of religion which caters to "vested interest" and the President of India, who had given his Bihar estates to Bhave's campaign, expressed shame at the *pandas'* behavior. The Bihar police arrested twelve *pandas* for assault—a somewhat historic event, for this was the first time priests of India have been prosecuted for defiance of this provision of the Constitution. Soon, at the place where Bhave was attacked, untouchables were flocking into the temple to pray. Bhave left the scene, remarking: "This is an age of science, and every faith is being tested. If our society keeps this in view, and behaves accordingly, all will go well."

Let us say that this reform was accomplished by a man who had won the hearts of his countrymen—which is, to be sure, a kind of holiness; perhaps the best kind.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

WE have often heard it said that the psychologists, for all their talk about the desirability of "freedom from fear," are apt to make great worriers of parents by over-emphasizing the emotional pits into which children may fall, or into which they may be pushed by mothers and fathers. There is no doubt that many adults display "anxiety symptoms" after reading a text on childhood neuroses, but perhaps those who do were inclined to be congenital worriers in the first place. If this is true, it isn't the book which causes family hypochondria, for without it some other focus for worry would be found.

If we understand the aim of most psychologists aright, they *are* interested in encouraging people to do a little *intelligent* worrying about the right things at the right time, so that the problems of our culture can be comprehended. Perhaps the alternative to intelligent worrying at the "right" time, which promises a way out of anxiety, is to have unintelligent worrying become a chronic condition.

Karen Horney's *Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, recently discussed in MANAS "Books for Our Time" series, provides a good example of a book which suggests that men, and children, may master anxiety. She accomplishes this by implication, though, and not by patented formulas. Of course, she does start out by worrying us, inciting a little confusion to boot. First of all, it seems, we are to realize that every child begins life surrounded by numerous potential causes for neuroses. A neurosis most often originates in a prolonged and exaggerated anxiety, and anxieties are seen to emerge from suppressed hostilities. And a child can easily imagine himself surrounded by hostile forces. Any real or imagined threat to his emotional security—a brother or sister who seems to be usurping his place in the parents' affection, or a parent whose affections are inconstant—is apt to be regarded with a form of hostility. The child, it seems, needs to feel that it *belongs*, that it knows what it is here for. It would like to be needed, or at least appreciated. The brother who competes successfully for a major share of the parents' affection, or a parent who shows plainly that he would just as soon the child not be around at all, will be deeply resented. But the resentment cannot be

shown, since to show it would endanger the lingering chance that more affection may somehow be forthcoming. A repressed hostility becomes an anxiety, and when an anxiety reaches sufficient proportions it will blight every human relationship the child or youth tries to form. Then we have the dreaded "neurosis," and it is conceded that most neuroses grow from roots in childhood.

Here, indeed, is something for parents to "worry" about. But this is simply a description, and a rather generalized one, of some of the complicated facts of life. From this point on the parent should himself seek ways of assisting the child to find a place for himself outside of the hostility-anxiety pattern. What the child most needs, it seems clear, is the *sense* of "belonging" itself. This "sense of belonging," may be the natural birthright of most children—all who have emotionally disturbed or inconstant parents do not grow up to be neurotics, and the "sense of belonging" may be encouraged by means which do not demand more than the parent is able to give. Any encouragement to self-reliance, for instance, is a bulwark against insecurity. The oft-mentioned child who "grew up on the farm," who learned to take care of plants and animals, knew that he "belonged" to the world of plants and animals and that they, in a sense, belonged to anyone who could take care of them, even if the caretaker were only a boy. The main point is that the "sense of belonging" is achieved by different individuals in different ways; while a universally felt need, it requires specific fulfillments in specific instances, and cannot be depended upon to result from a specific formula.

In a chapter entitled, "The Basic Structure of Neuroses," Miss Horney develops the interesting view that there is a "basic anxiety" to which all men are exposed. "Is not the attitude of basic anxiety and hostility towards people," she asks, "described as an essential constituent of neuroses, a 'normal' attitude which secretly all of us have, though perhaps in a lesser degree?" She continues:

If "normal" is used in the sense of a general human attitude, one could say that the basic anxiety has indeed a normal corollary in what German philosophical and religious language has termed the *Angst der Kreatur*. What the phrase expresses is that factually all of us are helpless toward forces more powerful than ourselves, such as death, illness, old age, catastrophes of nature, political events,

accidents. The first time we recognize this is in the helplessness of childhood, but the knowledge remains with us for our entire life. This anxiety of the *Kreatar* has in common with the basic anxiety the element of the helplessness toward greater powers.

The "God-fearing" man, in other words, as well as the parent-fearing child, may be on his way toward the paralyzing helplessness of neurosis. But if there is a basic anxiety may there not also be a "basic security"? And if the "basic anxiety" is increased by certain theological opinions, may not a "basic security" be represented by certain philosophically mature attitudes? Of course, as many would immediately point out, a young child is not an immediate candidate for a Ph.D. He has little capacity for formulating abstract ideas, or for assessing values beyond those of the moment. *But the child lives in the intellectual and emotional atmosphere of his parents, and this atmosphere may be constructively philosophical instead of religiously "anxious" or superstitious.*

Parents whose basic attitudes offer natural resistance to worry provide philosophical companionship for the child, and even such indirect philosophy will benefit the child's inner self just as much as good food will benefit his body. Anthropological studies reveal that the fear of death is not universal. There are cultures in which death is viewed as but another incident of life, a time of departure, but not a time for weeping, despair, or fear. And, as we come to think of it, we must realize that the child who has no fear of death, for either his parents or himself, has escaped much of the poor psychological heritage which Dr. Horney sees as the source of "basic anxiety." Moreover, parents who manage to approximate the attitude of a Socrates or a Lincoln toward death are not parents who will have a morbid anticipation of accidents or illnesses. The things which we fear are often the things which fascinate us—perhaps the secret of why fifth-class drama involving sudden death has always found a market.

But when we speak of the need for philosophizing which protects young or old alike against anxiety and hostility, we do not mean, by "philosophy," a series of aphorisms. Whatever its inverted meaning in much of the modern world, philosophy is supposed to involve a diligent probing and questing for *specific* truths as well as general ones. The study of neuroticism is a part of philosophy, and a very vital part, for, as we come to

understand our emotional disabilities, that understanding provides the first and most vital step in their cure. As for the child, everyone thinks that "self-reliance" is a good thing. But to recognize the many ways in which the child's full development demands that he *be* self-reliant—on penalty of being "anxious" because of emotional dependence on others—should tend to make us wiser in our dealings with the young.

The child who feels he can justify his existence only by showing more than average ability in some direction will invariably react with hostility toward others who give indications of surpassing him in that particular field. Thus an unhealthy competitiveness often results from a child's effort to demonstrate that he "belongs"—in the sense of having something rather special to offer to those around him. But the child needs to feel that he can justify his existence, if need be, on no other ground than that he and he alone has the capacity to think his own thoughts! And when the child realizes, too, that he, in his small way, can be something of a philosopher and a psychologist, he is no longer a likely candidate for neurosis.

If we have here often emphasized the advantages of encouraging the child to spend some time alone with himself, preferably surrounded by something more conducive to reflections on "truth, goodness and beauty" than the clatter of urban existence, it is because in such an atmosphere the calm of philosophic thought may be more easily achieved.

FRONTIERS

Disarmament Discussion

FOR the benefit of readers who have not heard about the latest "Universal Guaranteed Disarmament" proposal of Senator Ralph E. Flanders (reported in the *Congressional Record* for June 3, 1953), we wish to reproduce from it some rather impressive paragraphs. In 1951, Sen. Flanders offered his first resolution calling for universal guaranteed disarmament, and the support accorded the 1953 resolution (Senate Concurrent Resolution 32) has quite evidently grown from thought stimulated on the earlier occasion. It is also Sen. Flanders' view that the reading of the earlier resolution: "played a deciding part in having a committee on disarmament set up in the United Nations."

A portion of the present Resolution reads:

Whereas the peoples of the earth are plunged into an accelerating armament race, which imposes crushing burdens on their economic well-being, threatens their lives, and impinges on their basic freedoms . . . *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring)*, That it continues to be the declared purpose of the United States to obtain, within the United Nations, agreements by all nations for enforceable universal disarmament, down to those arms and forces needed for the maintenance of domestic order, under a continuing system of United Nations inspection, control, and international police protection; to this end, be it further

Resolved, (1) That the President continue to search for a practical program for complete enforceable world disarmament, including efforts to solve the scientific and technical problems involved in the effective control and elimination of atomic and other weapons capable of mass destruction, and also to explore whether or not changes in the United Nations Charter may; be required for the achievement and enforcement of world disarmament, and whether existing United Nations agencies, such as the Disarmament Commission, could be more fully utilized.

(2) That the President (a) develop a plan for the transfer of resources and manpower now being used for arms to constructive ends at home and abroad; and (b) recommend similar action to the United

Nations and member states, such plans to give due consideration to the possibilities for vastly increased trade with other nations, and to the vital share which the United States and other nations should undertake in helping: to overcome hunger, disease, illiteracy, and despair which have been among the prime causes of most wars.

Such a document may be little more than a declaration of good intentions, but it is heartening to see these intentions persistently voiced by a man of Sen. Flanders' caliber. While support for the 1951 Resolution was relatively meager, the co-sponsors of Concurrent Resolution 32 include Senators Sparkman, Bricker, Butler of Maryland, Case, Cooper, Douglas, Duff, Ferguson, Gillette, Hendrickson, Hill, Humphrey, Johnson of Colorado, Kefauver, Kennedy, Langer, Lehman, Mansfield, Martin, Morse, Mundt, Murray, Neely, Payne, Purtell, Saltonstall, Mrs. Smith of Maine, Smith of New Jersey, Thyne, Tobey, Jackson, Fulbright and Monroney.

We recall that, curiously enough, one of the most far-reaching disarmament proposals ever formulated was the Litvinov proposal submitted in behalf of the Russian government in 1927. Then, at the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference for Disarmament at Geneva, Litvinov proposed *complete* disarmament of all nations, and the obliteration of all military agencies and ministries within the governments of the world. Diplomats of the Western powers, reasoning only that Russia had nothing to lose by such a proposal (she seemed hopelessly outdistanced in the arms race), brushed the idea aside. Yet it may still be wondered if there was not as much idealism as rhetoric in Litvinov's dramatic recommendation. In any case, the effort should not be forgotten, since the peremptory way in which Litvinov's efforts were discounted is symbolic of the arrogance which seems to accompany most military thinking.

Returning to Senator Flanders' proposal and its discussion by legislators, we note some interesting comments from the supporting Senators. Sen. Martin, for instance, said:

I have supported and worked for a strong military organization all my life, and I have sincerely felt that great military power on the part of the United States would result in peace for the world. However, the last two World Wars, and the possibility of a third, have convinced me that it is impossible for us to become sufficiently strong to achieve that goal; indeed, it is almost impossible to provide sufficient money to assure an adequate defense. The defense of a people, Mr. President, must be within the minds of the people.

Sen. Sparkman expressed his feeling that the United States presented a far more belligerent appearance to the world than was consistent with our lofty ideals and peaceful traditions. "I have never subscribed to the idea," said Senator Sparkman, "that the United States as a nation was warlike or wanted war. I know we want peace. Yet, Mr. President, Russia and her satellites have succeeded in instilling in the minds of people in many areas of the world the idea that we are warlike. I have sometimes thought that in the great program and undertaking of building up the defenses of the free world it is likely to be forgotten that the ultimate objective which we are always seeking is a peaceful world."

Appended to the Congressional Record report of the Flanders resolution is a Gallup poll survey, reprinted at the suggestion of Sen. Sparkman as being very pertinent to the subject. "A substantial majority of Americans," according to Gallup, approved a "proposal to devote a substantial part of any savings achieved by real disarmament to worldwide human betterment." Of those polled, 65 per cent responded in favor of spending their own savings in this fashion with no immediate thought of return. Sounds rather good.

Ultimately, the support of such measures as "the Universal Guaranteed Disarmament" proposal depends upon the psychological orientation of the population. For instance, the man whose fear of domination by a "foreign power" has approached paranoid proportions is literally not *free* to make a choice in favor of disarmament. A panel of psychiatrists reporting to

the Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation (New York) declared recently:

The whole business of choosing depends on whether one suspects or trusts. Modern man is handicapped with respect to choice. He has been so saturated with propaganda that his perception is jeopardized. Unable to tell what is propaganda and what is not, he distrusts everything. Suspicion is also reinforced by clichés and stereotypes. A systematic study of stereotypes in different cultures would be helpful.

Supporters of Sen. Flanders, at any rate, are immune to the paranoid stereotype of suspicion. And while Litvinov was probably considerably above the average of representatives of Russia, and his 1927 proposals for total disarmament came at the optimum time for peace gestures, such events help us to realize that the Russians, after all, are human beings, too.