

## ACCESS FOR PEACE-MAKERS

WHAT is the structure of mass decision? By what means can people be led to act for peace—or for justice, or for freedom—against what has seemed, until now, their own immediate interest? It is a matter of showing them, we say, that peace, justice, and freedom *are in* their own interest. But this, we find, is difficult. They do not agree. Or not enough of them agree. Or we are not able to give reasons persuasive enough to make them agree.

To state the problem in this way makes it comparatively simple. Actually, other factors are involved. Men have the habit of adhering to the names of good things without understanding or paying much attention to their substance. Sometimes we call this "hypocrisy," but it is probably much more complicated than simple moral pretense. For an example of this complication, we quote an account of an incident in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, based on the *Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens*:

Clemenceau, the Tiger of France, usually seen as villain of that conference, was speaking. "One moment, gentlemen," he said. "I have been hearing much talk about a permanent peace. There has been a great deal of talk about a peace to end war forever, and I am interested in that. But I would like to know whether you mean it, this permanent peace."

He looked at his colleagues, and they nodded. "And you have counted the cost of such peace?" he asked. Then there was some hesitation.

"Well," continued Clemenceau, "if we give up all future wars, we must give up our empires and all hope of empire. You, Mr. Lloyd George, will have to come out of India, we French will have to come out of Africa; you Americans, Mr. President, must get out of the Philippines and Puerto Rico and leave Cuba alone, and Mexico. We shall have to tear down our tariff walls and open the whole world to free trade and traffic. These are some of the costs of permanent peace, there are other sacrifices we, the dominant powers; will have to make. It is very expensive,

peace. We French are willing, but are you willing, to pay the price, all these costs of no more war in the world?"

The President and the premiers began to protest that they did not mean all that, that it was not necessary, not all at once. No, they had not meant exactly that.

"Then," said Clemenceau, sitting up straight and striking the table sharply, "talk as you may, you don't mean peace. You mean war!"

A Machiavellian interruption might come at this point: "You see! You have set a false question. There is no such thing as 'mass decision'! The people are manipulated by their rulers; you must face this fact!"

There is so much truth in this comment that, were it not for its defeatism, we should have to agree. But distrust of rulers, if it is not to mean failure, has to imply faith in man. Distrust of rulers *and* faith in man are the foundation of all modern theories of self-government, all democratic philosophy. So we are forced to return to our original inquiry: What is the structure of mass decision? We cannot admit that it has no validity. This question must have a workable answer, a reasonable meaning, *in some sense*, or the dialogue about the good of man, conceived as a social goal, must end right here.

It follows, then, that if there is a way to peace, justice, and freedom, it is a way through faith in man. Very nearly everyone will go a certain distance in adopting this faith. The members of democratic societies have a measurable faith in their fellow citizens. Not many Americans feel it necessary to carry arms or to take violent means of defending themselves against other Americans. And they feel more or less the same way when they visit other countries which have a social compact similar to their own. The feeling of community of interest is strong

enough to provide such travelers with a substantial sense of enjoying peace, freedom, and justice.

So that, the argument runs, and quite reasonably, for world peace we need some kind of world social compact or federation of states in order to extend the psychological sense of security everywhere.

There are two arguments against this view, one of them nationalist, the other revolutionary. The nationalist argument is that the people of the United States have had long experience of one another and that trust arises naturally in this way; it further contends that our security abroad rests at least partly on respect for American military power, which will punish people who treat us badly when we go visiting; and that, finally, people in far-off places don't think as we do, have objectives we do not admire, and are likely to take advantage of our trust if we disarm. After all, we enjoy a desirable life, having worked hard for what we've got, and no doubt those people envy us. This latter view, you might say, embodies a conception of justice, which may be extended into an argument to the effect that in order to preserve this kind of justice, and the freedom (resulting from the threat of power) which makes it possible, a successful nation finds it necessary to risk war. A great many people have no difficulty in defending this outlook, as founded on common sense informed by history, and on the sturdy, self-reliant morality that made our country great.

The other argument against a world federation of states has two sides which may be made contradictory. One side is cynical, the other utopian. The cynical argument claims that existing governments are all corrupt and cannot be trusted to join in a world federation, since they now maintain power over the people, instead of representing them, and that they use their power to keep clever manipulators of the people in strategic positions, even while exploiting in propaganda all the slogans, devices, and banners of democracy. The utopian argument proposes

some version of "total revolution" to give power to the Good People, who would thereafter create a world society guaranteeing justice for all. The cynical argument is quite impressive by itself, and it gains negative strength from the rejection of the utopian argument, which no one but complete political innocents or paranoiacs are able to believe any more. This may also be a way of saying that even if the problem of choosing the Good People could be solved, no one is smart enough to know how to organize world power for justice to all, and it is better to deal with the problems of social organization on a smaller scale where there is some hope of control and partial solution—a form of the nationalist argument.

The worker for peace must get past these arguments in a way that first engages and then persuades. His resources are various. You could start listing them by saying that he can make himself into what C. Wright Mills called "a moral center of responsible decision" by personally refusing to go to war. Well, what good does this do? He is one in three billion! This statistical discouragement is partly reduced by considering the possible implications of war rejection. Almost inevitably, the war resister is making some kind of declaration of faith in man. Even if he starts out with the simplest of religious motivations—no more than a literal obedience to the sixth commandment—he can hardly ignore the humanitarian aspect of his position. He is implicitly saying something about the worth of the human beings he will not kill—a view which most conscientious objectors expand in many directions. Then there is the stark social principle of the War Resisters League, Wars will cease when men refuse to fight them—an obvious truism. As Milton Mayer put it, a few years ago: "I know that one man is ineffective. . . . But one of us can try to do the right thing. The United Nations has not been able to disarm the world by one man; I, all by myself, can be more effective than it has been."

Yet the statistical discouragements, though reduced, remain almost overwhelming. The war resistance movement, while growing, is tiny in comparison to the population of the world and hardly large enough to influence, although it may annoy, and occasionally harass, the modern power state. What more can be done to get by the "practical" claim that war—or the kind of poised readiness for war which now prevails—is necessary?

Is there another solvent that, put to practical use, might increase the scope of man's faith in man, helping to make genuine peace-making possible? This solvent is held to exist; it is no secret—the power of Love. Christian pacifists, going back into history, found in the patient endurance of cruelty of the early Christians a testament to the power of love. There is "a power within us," Cabeza de Vaca later affirmed, which can dissolve antagonisms, allay suspicions, and dissipate alienating hostility. To this conception has been added the enormously influential testimony of the Gandhian movement, and more recently the demonstrations of what may be called an authentic Christian revival in the American South.

The quality of the Negro movement at its best was well expressed by Charles McDew, a sit-in leader active in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in Mississippi, in a speech at the Antioch College Conference on Human Rights in October, 1960. In one portion of his address (quoted from *The New Student Left*, Cohen and Hale, Beacon, 1966) he said:

In our section half-truth is taken as truth, patronage masquerades as friendship, chauvinism is called democracy, and God is thought of as a Southern white man.

This is the situation—the system which we feel obligated to correct not only because it disadvantages Negroes, but because it blights everything it touches; it stunts the growth of a third of the States of this nation, it prevents realization of the American dream for millions of our citizens, it jeopardizes the good name of America around the world, and it causes the

Southern white man to lose his soul—for he says something bad about God. . . .

*What is the nature of our fight?*

It may be stated in many ways. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., ... calls it "the withdrawal of support from evil." In other terms it is called "seizing the moral initiative," "The use of moral force against immoral force," and "The attempt to create the beloved community" or "build the city of God." . . .

At this point I'm reminded that a minister friend told me recently that the "sit-in" dates at least as far back as the times of Christ, for, one day he sat down beside a well in Samaria and when a woman came to draw, he said: "Please give me a drink of water" and this simple request shook both her life and her society to the very foundations. "How is it that you, being a Jew, and a man, say to me, who am a Samaritan and a woman, 'Give me to drink'? Don't you know that Jews and Samaritans have no dealings?" And Jesus saw immediately the evil of this situation, and its potential explosiveness, and spoke these redeeming words: "If you knew the gift of God you could not feel this way." And what is this "gift of God?" The gift of eyes that see life as others see it. The gift of ears that hear the hidden rebuff as the underprivileged hear it. The gift of heart that feels another's care. "If you knew the gift of God, you'd know that there is enough water in this well for both of us, and that God blesses us with blessings which would enrich us both if we shared them."

Jesus asked for a drink of water, and all the old antagonisms of the centuries came to the surface. Negro students in our South can walk into a drug store and ask for a cup of coffee—and the entire fabric of our Southern civilization trembles to the foundations.

Now it is axiomatic that you cannot draw a man to you by striking him a blow. Neither a left uppercut nor a right cross nor even a haymaker can win a man's love or admiration or cooperation. On the other hand, we go along with the Book when it says, "A soft answer turneth away wrath; but grievous words stir up anger." The story is told of an officer who once faced a personal enemy who, in an impulsive moment of anger, spat in his face. . . . But instead of striking back, the officer calmly reached into his pocket for his handkerchief, wiped off the spittle, and said, "If I could wipe your blood off my soul as easily as I can wipe your spit off my face, I'd kill you." The angry one repented and the two became fast friends. . . .

The nonviolent approach is designed to leave our opponent a facesaving device so that there will be little bitterness when the fight is over.

The nonviolent struggle challenges us to live out the Golden Rule.

It has given us a new perspective and a new purpose—a sense of mission, as it were.

And I can promise you, in the name of the militant Negro students of the South, that we shall not be satisfied until every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination is erased from the face of the earth.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that SNCC staff members are uniformly of this nonviolent view. While no SNCC workers are armed, there are many who believe that "love and moral confrontations have no place in front of a brute who beats you until you cry Nigger." There is this comment by a volunteer, found in *Letters from Mississippi*:

My feelings, and I think these are common, are that nonviolence is a perverted way of life, but a necessary tactic and technique. It is harmful to a human person to feel that he must love a man who has a foot in his face. The only reason I will not hit back is because I will be in the hospital two weeks instead of one, and will be useless during that extra week.

At the same time, the following expression from another volunteer seems a frequent discovery:

When I came I thought Martin Luther King and his "love your enemy" was a lot of Christian mysticism. Now I can see it as a force and support, helping those who understand it.

In sum, there can be no doubt but that the Civil Rights movement is making a deeply felt impact on Western thought, and especially on peace-makers, as demonstrating the sustaining power of nonviolence and love in a conflict situation in which the struggle for justice is pitted against blindly self-righteous hate and uncompromising, unforgiving prejudice. Evidences of the moral strength generated by the Negro movement, added to the historic achievements of Gandhian nonviolence, give a

new sense of *means* to the peace movement, the problem now being to generate and focus this means effectively in relation to the forces which make war and which make for war.

This problem is far from simple. One important question is: How can the circumstances of the confrontation of Gandhi's cadres with the British, or the Negroes with the stubborn forces of white supremacy in the South, be duplicated in an anti-war campaign? In both these cases, it must be recognized, the encounter has been *direct*—between the British, who were imperialist invaders far from home, governing as representatives of a colonial power, and the Indian masses, who were determined to have self-rule, and to put a final end to any control by the British; again, between the white supremacists and authorities in the South, and the Negroes, who are *all* directly the victims of white injustice.

In the case of the war in Vietnam, however, for the peace-makers hoping to lessen antagonisms with the nonviolent power of love the confrontation is nothing if not oblique. Who, in this case, are the "enemy"? By any conceivable explanation or apologetic, the enemy are the Chinese. The Vietnamese are not much more than bystanders who happen by historical accident to be (with a great many others) in a politically unpredictable relationship to the power struggle between the United States and the Chinese. How could we make the solvent of love work in relation to Chinese attitudes? Not, at any rate, by direct confrontation, as was the case with the Indian people, and is the case for the Negroes. And these, let us note, have not been "symbol" or "token" confrontations undertaken by a very small pacifist minority which has differentiated itself within a powerful, war-minded and war-making nation. In short, for lack of direct confrontation with an imperialist invader or a color-class oppressor, activist peace-makers in the United States are obliged to generalize the problem of violence and to assume that *any* war-making institution is the enemy—which may indeed be the

fact, but which has the effect of attenuating or diffusing the role of "love." For now the expression of love does not confront directly anyone who "hates" the lover, or means to harm him. It seems inevitable that military men who are doing their duty as they see it, or are paid to do it, feel a certain artificiality in the demonstrations of pacifists who are practicing nonviolence on *them*—instead of, say, on the Chinese! The situation is so confused that a much greater burden is placed on the peace-makers; their love is called upon to perform characteristic tasks far more difficult than those which have been attended by success in the past or recent history.

The Chinese, of course, are inaccessible. And the politicalized exploitation in the Communist press of American pacifist action is simply another way in which the Chinese are shown to be inaccessible to such demonstrations.

Going back to our original question—What is the structure of mass decision?—it seems obvious that reaching people in a way that affects their opinions and eventually their behavior means reaching them in terms of values in which they believe—and are willing to acknowledge—and demonstrating, by whatever means available, that these values are served only by turning away from violence. This, at any rate, is one simple statement of the equation upon which persuasion depends. The chief difficulty of the peace movement, so far as its effect on mass decision is concerned, lies in deciding on the values which can be legitimately and effectually used in this way—that is, in "getting at" them in commonly understandable terms and showing that their survival depends upon replacing war and methods of violence with reconciling, peaceful means.

This brings us to a book we have for review—*Democracy and Nonviolence* (Porter Sargent, 1965, \$4.00), by Ralph Templin. The author is a sociologist, teacher, a civil rights pioneer, a man who years ago went to India as a missionary and became a co-worker with Gandhi in India's struggle for independence. He has been

a leader in various humanitarian causes, including the Civil Rights Movement. He was director of the School for Living in Suffern, New York (founded by Ralph Borsodi), and has been a staff lecturer for Community Service, Inc., founded by Arthur Morgan, and he seems peculiarly equipped in both theory and practice to write about the relation between democracy and nonviolence. While within the 332 pages of this volume many important aspects of nonviolence receive attention, the author's central contention is that, in the modern age, only nonviolent methods are compatible with democratic ends and means.

The book gains importance as a contribution to peacemaking theory by reason of this emphasis and argument. You might say that, searching for a theme which would reach into and take hold of the living values of the American people, Dr. Templin decided that the idea of democracy, of self-government through freedom, is the sensitive area of human hope and idealism in the United States, offering the best access to the minds and hearts of his countrymen. Accordingly, he starts with a study of American history, laying the ground for his future development with a synthesizing reminder of the American Dream. Again and again, he shows how the use of coercive force restricts and mutilates the processes of democratic self-determination. He helps the reader to see that very nearly all distinguished citizens who have given attention to the question have recognized that continual resort to violence must ultimately bring ignominious failure to the American enterprise. Reliance on force cannot work for a society which began as a pioneering demonstration of the capacity of human beings to live in freedom and at peace.

This argument touches an open nerve in public-spirited Americans. Dr. Templin quotes a speech by the late Justice Robert H. Jackson (in Chicago in 1953) in which he declared, in a spirit of deep warning, that "no nation is more force-minded than our own," adding that the unique or special function of democratic law is to "put

rational restraints upon the use of coercive power by those in authority." Interestingly enough, a recent speech by Secretary of Defense McNamara in Montreal pressed the view that the security of the United States does not depend entirely on "a vast, awesome arsenal of weaponry," and he asked that the United States "build bridges" to end the isolation of Red China, in an effort to arrest what he called "potentially catastrophic misunderstandings and increase the incentive on both sides to resolve disputes by reason rather than by force." However this appeal be regarded, it would not have been made except for the fact that it draws on a capital of moral ideas shared by all Americans who know the inspiration of their social compact.

To his searching and persuasive account of the folly of democratic reliance on military supremacy, Dr. Templin adds a hard-headed analysis of the centralized power of the modern technological and welfare state, showing that it undermines the very freedoms we cherish most. As he says:

The present competition for a "place in the sun" forces the Western nation . . . to try to be at once the war state, the production state and the social welfare state; such pressures have put citizens under greater and greater demands with less and less regard for individual liberties. The modern state at its best merely tends toward modern forms of the very evils which democracy first set itself against.

This book is the ripe fruit of a mature mind and is written in the grain of a lifetime of scholarship and of action in the grain of decentralist community effort and social reform. It is the kind of a book which, in a truly democratic society, would be chosen for use in the schools. It is filled with the kind of thinking that generates moral awareness in the young and it helps dialogue to gain depth and altruistic purpose. It is an important means of engaging the attention of Americans in terms of their deepest values and of demonstrating the relevance of nonviolence to any conceivable future for their own society.

*Democracy and Nonviolence* has a moving Introduction by James Farmer and an important Foreword by A. J. Muste. The latter stresses a central conviction put into practice by Gandhi:

He [Gandhi] did not think that the quality of human beings who form a society is a minor matter. Nonviolence was his operative concept, the idea, as Joan Bondurant has set forth so clearly in *Conquest of Violence*, and as Professor Templin has so passionately elaborated in this volume, that the means which men employ in dealing with actual problems, if they be sound or nonviolent or democratic, will shape the society to creative ends, as against the concept of an end, an "ism" which society sets itself and then resorts to such means as it thinks will achieve the end. Gandhi looked at the problem of modern war in this framework. If people were self-centered and acquisitive and the economic and social base organized on class distinction, injustice and power over others, then you would have centralization at the top or center, states based on power and the technique of war. It was, therefore, all-important to develop genuinely democratic and fraternal relationships at the base. Such a society would not need a huge powerful officialdom at the center. It would not have the instruments with which to wage modern war, nor would it need them, largely because it would meet other peoples in the same noncompetitive and fraternal spirit that was characteristic of its own life.

It is here, perhaps, in these ideas, that the most essential values of the nonviolent society appear. Yet these are not ideas which are immediately understood or willingly inquired into by most Americans. Their importance can hardly be demonstrated save by arduous devotion to what Gandhi called "constructive work." This long-term project, requiring much inventiveness by lovers of peace, may prove at last the only access to the deeper interests and needs of the American people. Only time, daring, extensive experiment, and the as yet unforeseen precipitations of history, can answer such questions as these.

## *REVIEW*

### THE POWER OF ATTITUDES

THE Beacon paperback, *Taoism—The Parting of the Way*, by Holmes Welch (1966, \$1.95), may be the best introduction to the thought of Lao Tsu available to Western readers. While the author provides no text of the *Tao Te Ching*—as he points out, there are already thirty-six renditions available—it is a delight to return to this little book after having mused over Welch's discussion of its contents.

For all the warnings by scholars of the uncertainty of Lao Tsu's meaning, it seems impossible for anyone to read the *Tao Te Ching* without feeling its impact. Even with this uncertainty, and perhaps in part because of it, luminous meanings come through, and often what seems the inescapable sense of the book is embraced as an act of faith, with complete indifference toward arguments about textual interpretation. (Mr. Welch is very good at showing the reader the possibilities of ambiguity in rendering Lao Tsu and gives a number of illustrations of radically different readings by translators, but the fact is that they do not seem to matter!)

The interest, today, in the *Tao Te Ching* is a striking sign of the times. From about the beginning of this century to 1934, translations appeared at the rate of one every six years. In 1934, Arthur Waley published his version, *The Way and Its Power*, to which Mr. Welch inclines and mainly uses, and thereafter new translations began to come out every sixteen months, but the influence of Waley's work, he says, cannot be the only reason for the increasing popularity of Lao Tsu:

In the last two decades the West has seen a growing interest in Buddhism, especially in Zen, which owes much to Taoism. New tools have developed, such as semantics, psychoanalysis, and parapsychology, all of them, possible approaches to a reappraisal of the *Tao Te Ching*. Lao Tsu is in tune with our relativism. He wrote in a time of troubles

not unlike our own. For all these reasons it is natural that the book should again attract translators and attention.

In his reading of Lao Tsu, Mr. Welch makes clear his view that "the interplay of attitudes" is the key to the conception of human relationships found in the *Tao Te Ching*. The Chinese sage's ideas about government are often puzzling to Westerners:

Lao Tsu recommends government by non-interference. Governments must by-pass the dilemma of action, recognizing in particular the futility of trying to control so complex a thing as a nation. . . . Government controls defeat themselves, for "they may allay the main discontent, but only in a manner which produces further discontents." Therefore, "rule a big country as you would fry small fish," *i.e.*, do not keep stirring them or they will turn into a paste.

Government controls—and these include laws—defeat themselves for another reason. They are a form of aggression on the nature of man. . . . "The more laws you make, the more thieves there will be." This is like the American Indian dictum: "In the old days there were no fights about hunting grounds and fishing territories. There were no laws then, so everyone did what was right." Lao Tsu believes that man's original nature was kind and mild, and that it has become aggressive as a reaction to the force of legal and moral codes. This is the basis for some surprising statements. . . . "Banish human kindness, discard morality, and the people will become dutiful and compassionate"; "It was when the great Tao declined that human kindness and morality arose. . . . It was after the six family relationships disintegrated, there was 'filial piety' and 'parental love.' Not until the country fell into chaos and misrule did we hear of 'loyal ministers'." Thus Lao Tsu reverses the causal relationship which most of us would read into such events. It was not that people began preaching about "loyal ministers" because ministers were no longer loyal: rather, ministers were no longer loyal because of the preaching, *i.e.*, because society was trying to *make* them loyal.

Elsewhere Mr. Welch remarks that "when anyone, ruler or subject, tries to *act* upon humans individually or collectively, the ultimate result is the opposite of what he is aiming at. He has invoked what we might call the Law of Aggression." And the author adds:

The Taoist understands the Law of Aggression and the indirect ways that it can operate. He knows that virtuousness or non-conformity can be as aggressive as insults or silence. He knows that even to be non-aggressive can be aggression, if by one's non-aggressiveness one makes others feel inferior. It is to make another person inferior that is the essence of aggression.

When Confucius visited Lao Tsu—so the story goes—the old man ended the encounter with these words: "Abandon your arrogant ways and countless desires, your suave demeanor and unbridled ambition, for they do not promote your welfare. That is all I have to say to you." The point, here, is that virtue has little value if it does not "come naturally." Right conduct is rooted in what Lao Tsu calls man's "original nature." The sage finds his way back to this, and reaches compassion and humility:

Humility and compassion work like gravity between man and man. They bring into play the power of example, so that the Taoist "becomes the model for the world." Lao Tsu recognized that we intuitively sense one another's feelings, and that my attitude, rather than my acts, is the determining factor in your attitudes and your acts.

The strength of the doctrine of *wu wei*, which means "inaction"—not avoiding all action, but rather hostile, aggressive action—lies in the *naturalness* of the Taoist's compassion for others:

He sees spreading all about him the vicious circles of lying, hatred, and violence. His aim is not merely to avoid starting new circles, but to interrupt those that have already been started. Through his peculiar behavior he hopes to save the world.

The Taoist well understands that *wu wei* is ineffectual if his compassion and humility are worn like a hat. These attitudes, to have their effect, must come from the roots of his nature. It is not easy for him to find these roots. . . .

Mr. Welch seems a fairly tough-minded scholar who sees the hard sense of Taoist thought and has written a tough-minded book to help others recognize it, too. He is at his ironic best in the final section, giving several pages of comment on modern Western civilization as Lao Tsu might have written them. He takes in his stride all the

typical Western objections to Lao Tsu, pointing out that while *his* metaphysics may be verbally nonsense, "at a non-verbal level they may not be nonsense at all." The author continues:

He [Lao Tsu] is endeavoring to tell us about something that leaves him at a loss for words . . . It is neither light nor sound nor mass nor motion nor form nor anything that is. So, rather naturally, he refers to it as what is not. So far as we have any conception of Being, this something is Non-Being. So far as we have any conception of anything, this something is nothing. Nevertheless we can know it, each of us, directly. When we do we will understand in what way it is useful, perceptible and a first cause. In the meantime we have only Lao Tsu's word to go on. This is because there is no way to validate objectively the wholly subjective experience. . . .

Lao Tsu, himself, I think, would not have been troubled by this problem. He considered that each human being inhabits his autonomous private world, and that these worlds are very different. . . . This autonomy of consciousness is, I think, the final secret that Lao Tsu had in mind when he urged us to believe the truthful man and the liar. It permits the Sage to have complete respect for his fellow man. In fact, one might go so far to say that *only* by recognizing the autonomy of the consciousness can he have complete respect for his fellow man, just as *only* thus can he be certain that he deserves theirs in return—though he understands why often he does not get it. That is why the Sage is a person who "has room in him for everything," who has faith in his own world, but is never going to use a weapon in defense of his faith or in an attack on anyone else's. He is a peaceful person.

This seems an unusual and important book. As a final note, we might draw attention to the parallel between this "autonomy of the consciousness" and what in a recent paper Michael Polanyi calls the "personal coefficient" of knowledge "which endows our explicit statements with meaning and conviction"; and also to the fact that Abraham Maslow, in his recent book, *The Psychology of Science*, has a chapter entitled "Taoistic Science and Controlling Science."

## *COMMENTARY* STUDENT SCAPEGOATS?

THINKING over Mr. Raimi's Harper's article (see *Children*"), it seems, if not beside the point, at least unfair to pillory the students for cheating while ignoring all the encouragements they have to do it. Of course, Mr. Raimi doesn't really "pillory" them. He looks at the matter quizzically, as a practical affair, and no big moral issue.

Someone ought to ask why students shouldn't cheat if it is all right for diplomats to lie, for the national interest to have no truck with "morality," and for governments to misrepresent the facts of foreign affairs to the people whenever politically expedient.

As for morality in business, the Federal Trade Commission is a very busy group which must continually tell commercial operators to "cease and desist" what they are doing, and the Food and Drug Administration has similar troubles because of so much deception in packaging and on labels, to say nothing of adulterants, preservatives, and unhealthy chemicals in food and cosmetics.

No wonder the artists, while they can't cheat in art school, feel free to do confusing things later on. In *The Anxious Object*, Harold Rosenberg notes the present uncertainty concerning what is good art, or even just "art." He quotes an exhibition catalogue foreword by Thomas M. Messer, director of the Guggenheim Museum:

"The relationship between the *good* and the *new* in contemporary art," wrote Mr. Messer, "is intriguing and baffling. The realization that art and invention are akin is balanced by the suspicion of eccentricity. Out of this conflict arises the question: *Is it art?* And the answer: Yes and no. *Yes, it could be*, since the expansion of artistic boundaries is inherent in the creative process. *No, it need not be*, for no mode in itself assures us of artistic validity" (his italics). In this remarkably compressed dissertation on possibility and necessity, Mr. Messer advised the visitors to his museum that the new work they saw there might not be art now but that it might turn into art by the time their grandchildren came to see it. . . .

Specifically, Mr. Messer was referring to a show of Pop Art organized by his curator. He knew what Pop was and that it was pop or popular, but he wondered, was it art? Mr. Messer might have solved his problem by inventing a new noun for the not-quite-definite product. Since he overlooked this escape route for the historian, I shall attempt to provide it. The art of ice-cream sodas, seven-foot toothpaste tubes, movie marquees, is hereby dubbed Gagart. Pop is art in being gag; art gag, that is—but whether Gagart is art need not concern the historian once he has the bin to put it in.

We're not suggesting Gagart is a cheat; it may be just fun, or the younger artists' way of having us on, or saying that until the culture sobers up or straightens out, they'll just paint soup cans, dollar bills, and other symbols of our Great Society. Why not? What are our Leaders doing, these days, to inspire them to better things?

## CHILDREN

### . . . and Ourselves

#### WHO'S CHEATING WHOM?

THE special section, "The Changing Campus," in *Harper's* for May, includes an article on "Cheating in College" by Ralph A. Raimi, a professor of mathematics. Prof. Raimi starts out by declaring "Almost everyone I know remembers having cheated in school," and qualifies himself as an expert by admitting that he had been "punished in 1942 for writing freshman English papers" for his dormitory neighbors at the University of Michigan.

There are various ways to react to this general problem. One might be termed the hoity-toity view, for which much may be said. You could claim, for example, that the higher learning is for *serious* people, and if students want to defeat the educational process by cheating, why bother to spy on them? They just won't learn, and will eventually be found out by Life. Teachers are not policemen.

But the students have a comment on this. They might say that, getting really "serious," the rank they need in grades and graduation is for many of the world's purposes no more than a "symbol" honored by the corporations which have the jobs. The piece of paper is what counts. You have to learn the business, anyway, and the rules in this kind of learning are very different. You combine certain practical skills with certain kinds of phyness. The *adult* forms of cheating are respectable and pay off.

This answer isn't good enough, of course; it doesn't consider at all the subjective matters of work habits and personal integrity; but the fact is, as Prof. Raimi says, that the honor system seems to work only in small schools which have "a long tradition of gentlemanly behavior dating from a time when life and wealth did not depend on the honors bestowed by the school, and when the university code was only an extension of the

aristocratic code these college men had already been bred to." Today, however, many of the students "have fought their way up from anything but a hereditary aristocracy."

Meanwhile, as Prof. Raimi points out, times have changed. Knowledge *does* count in present-day industry. Although, a hundred years ago, "a college graduate was no better fitted to build railroads or grow wheat than his less-educated brothers,"—

today knowledge is wealth, and college degrees represent knowledge. We professors are the guardians of the integrity of those degrees. We cannot ignore the fact that they become devalued if some students receive them by stealth.

This is the Knowledge-Industry view of the problem, of importance to the Establishment.

Prof. Raimi has some very practical suggestions, such as assigning examination papers on subjects which require use of the imagination instead of memory, and other commonsense solutions. Here, it is more interesting to wonder about the kinds of learning in which cheating is either silly or meaningless—in the arts, for example. How would a budding violinist "cheat"? Or a young artist crib the secrets of figure drawing? Is there any way to transfer the immediacy and self-evidence of such achievements to other areas of learning? Probably not. The arts are by nature ends in themselves and the skills achieved for practicing them more or less transparent.

The ideal situation would be to have a culture in which fakery and pretense pay no dividends to anyone and are recognized at the outset as completely silly. We are a long way, obviously, from such a society. Yet isn't practicing otherwise unattainable ideals the principal function of the higher learning, of universities? Isn't a university a place where people are supposed to be free of the compulsions to pretense and compromise? Where faculty and students together rehearse and put on plays which attempt to show how things *ought* to be, or might be? Isn't this the sole or chief

justification of academic freedom? As Jerome Byrne observed in his report on the student revolt at Berkeley, a wise society creates the university to be "its continuing critic."

Perhaps these are the inevitable polarities in typical university education today—cheating by the young who understand and work with the system, and revolt by those who understand it and won't work with it.

This is not to ignore the middle ground occupied by "moderates" who go through school without much cheating or much protesting. These students either really know what they want and go after it, or they don't quite realize how much aimless confusion surrounds them.

Incidentally, another discussion about today's "changing campus" in the May *Harper's* is made up of letters from readers arguing about the quality of the Humanities as taught in the country's graduate schools. One contributor, Allen Tate, says:

It has always seemed to me absurd for a student to take four to seven years to produce a badly written dissertation on a subject that he is not even interested in. The servile imitation of the scientific method is doubtless to blame, but method can always be institutionalized. Intelligence cannot, and that is why the Establishment is afraid of it.

This raises the level of the argument about cheating. Intelligence can hardly be copied, while the *forms* of method are little else. Even an "honest" copying of method, if that is all that is done, is a cheat, so far as real education is concerned. So the larger question must be: Who's cheating whom?

Perhaps the only sound course for the teacher who wants to stop student cheating is to refuse to give examinations; or, if this means he can't teach, to give examinations which render cheating impossible; or, if this is impractical, to embody in his relations with students a lucid and comprehensive honesty of his own, helping them to grasp the meaning of personal integrity in a very imperfect world, controlled, today, by very

imperfect as well as morally and intellectually mixed-up institutions. Honesty and integrity can have fresh existential meanings only in situations which are recognized for what they are—where the moral façades are admitted to be antiquated if not two-faced, and where the authorities are known to be often wrong and unable to question themselves. It is easy for admirers of façades and authorities to cheat; they know perfectly well that "everybody" is doing it, and see their own small-time offenses as a kind of apprenticeship in playing the game.

## *FRONTIERS*

### The "Luddite" Protest

IN the May 7 *Saturday Review*, marking the tenth anniversary of *SR's* Science and Humanity Supplement, Norman Cousins, the editor, recalls the themes of C. P. Snow's Rede Lecture, *The Two Cultures*, commenting that even if, as Snow demanded, communication between scientists and non-scientists has been improved, and even if there is wider agreement and appreciation that applied science can close the gap between the rich and the poor, a still more important problem has been left untouched. Mr. Cousins writes:

The scholars or artists and the scientists are talking to each other but not about the right things. Here we come to the failure of the two cultures. Creative brainpower and advanced skills are not being directed to the largest need of the human species. The common and tragic failure of both the arts and the sciences is that they have given most of their energy and focus to immediates and intermediates and very little to the ultimates. They have advanced the human condition without necessarily safeguarding the human estate. . . . If the two cultures don't understand the requirements of world peace, in the most fundamental sense, they become detached from their most important function—no matter how firmly they may be attached to everything else. . . .

No fundamental progress against poverty is possible so long as a large proportion of the world's energies and reserves goes into things that can be used only for destructive purposes. . . . the central significance of the Industrial Revolution transcends economic change or the possibilities for good. The central significance of the Industrial Revolution is that it created engines for world destruction without creating instruments for control. The reach of science and engineering has superseded the capacity for social and political organization. . . . The need today is for a Third Culture—one concerned with the total connection between total cause and total effect, one which recognizes that human destiny cannot be served or assured till tribalism, however elevated its station or sophisticated its language, gives way to a world view.

While Norman Cousins' account of the contentions of C. P. Snow seems fair enough,

Snow's "second look" at the two cultures, included in the 1964 Mentor edition of the Rede Lecture, adds his hope that a "third culture" will arise to solve the problems he describes. But what he has in mind is not Mr. Cousins' idea. Sir Charles names the "social historians" as possible agents of the hoped-for reform, and as having supplied the basis of many of his statements in the Lecture. He says in one place:

Some social historians, as well as being on speaking terms with scientists, have felt bound to turn their attention to the literary intellectuals, or more exactly to some manifestations of the literary culture at its extreme. Concepts such as the "organic community" or the nature of pre-industrial society or the scientific revolution are being dealt with, under the illumination of the knowledge of the last ten years. These new examinations are of great importance for our intellectual and moral health.

Mr. Snow adds that since he has deep feelings about these investigations he will discuss them further, but he returns to such questions only briefly after a review of the famine and starvation which were common in Europe before the industrial revolution, saying:

There is a mass of other evidence, from many kinds of provenance, all pointing in the same direction. In the light of it, no one should feel it seriously possible to talk about a pre-industrial Eden, from which our ancestors were, by the wicked machinations of applied science, brutally expelled. Will someone who hankers after this myth tell us where he believes it was located, not in terms of wishful fancy, but in place and time? in historical and geographical fact? Then the social historians can examine the case and there can be a respectable discussion.

This passage, whatever else it does, makes plain that C. P. Snow is not inclined to learn the language, say, of Carlyle, nor of any of the other and later artist critics of the psychological and moral effects of industrialism and technology. He wants these people to learn *his* language, so that there can be "respectable" discussion. Thus are the important voices on the question refused a hearing. These voices are not defenders of brutality (D. H. Lawrence is condemned by Snow

for this, along with his anti-industrialism, and Dostoevsky is found to be "the supreme reactionary" because he opposed "progress" on the ground that the common people were "ennobled" by suffering), but speak at a level which, one can only suppose, C. P. Snow does not acknowledge as "real."

One supposes, also, that the Gandhian analysis of industrialism is beneath notice, although Gandhi, at any rate, cannot be accused of caring nothing for the masses. One must assume that Eric Gill never came to Mr. Snow's attention; that Ralph Borsodi he has never heard of; that Friedrich Juenger's *The Failure of Technology* cannot be taken seriously, that Edward J. O'Brien's *The Dance of the Machines* is too Dionysian, Erich Kahler's *The Tower and the Abyss* not factual on the subject. Perhaps he would regard Ellul's *The Technological Society* as only a theological diatribe and Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* as otherwise irrelevant. Lewis Mumford is doubtless a passionate man blinded by emotional concern for the quality of life and the human spirit. Wilfred Wellock is of course beyond the pale, and also, we must assume, the Gandhi-inclining E. F. Schumacher, who has the cheek to be economic adviser to Britain's Coal Board.

It is not that C. P. Snow is not entitled to his opinions. But to ignore the only serious criticism of science and technology that exists and then to accuse artists and *literateurs* of being know-nothings and cruel sentimentalists would seem a complete misfire for anyone but a "respectable" champion of science.

Part II of Mr. Snow's Lecture is titled "Intellectuals as Natural Luddites." This is a wide spectrum of indictment. At one end are the actual Luddites, men who at night attacked and destroyed the machines that, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, had taken away their jobs. But there was also Leonardo, who concealed drawings for machines which, he realized, would be used to take away peoples' lives. Is it *ever*

right to oppose "scientific progress"? "Respectable" men would no doubt declare only that progress must not be opposed *blindly*. Well, the reverse is also true. Progress ought not to be blindly defended. This is mainly what the critics we have named, from Gandhi on, have been saying. And this is what Mr. Cousins is saying, too, although in another key. Luddites are no more to be made fun of than any other people who resist as a matter of survival—whether it be survival through having enough to eat, like the American Indians who were deprived of lands where they hunted their food, or survival in terms of the vital moral and humanistic feelings of artists and thinkers able to recognize deteriorations and debasements not plain to everyone else. Luddites need to be understood, not held up as horrible examples. There is bound to be an important sense in which they are right. For a humanity-loving man like Mr. Snow, that should be enough to make him listen to every word they say.