

## THE FAR HORIZON

IF, somehow, we could get away from the immediacy of the threat of war, we might be able to consider it more intelligently, even if we found ourselves unable to solve the problem with any finality. War is a collective problem, a problem, moreover, which becomes urgent only when the pressure of anxiety and fear have taken away the emotional balance of the population. Individuals may on occasion solve their problems under pressure, but this requires a discipline and a courage which are practically inconceivable for a mass society. An individual can decide to take his life in his hands and sorely risk it, or sacrifice it, for the sake of an ideal, but how can an entire society do this?

Perhaps it can be done—can be done, that is, if you allow that the word "sacrifice" may be properly used in relation to a corporate decision. In other words, there are kinds of "sacrifice" which most of the members of an organized society are quite ready to impose on themselves. A general in the army, for example, often has to sacrifice men to win battles. The general takes a calculated risk. When bomber missions went over the European continent to attack German cities, the commanding officer who sent them knew from the record of past missions that a certain number of the planes could be expected to be shot down. When the Congress decides upon a war, it assumes that men will be lost, that a portion of the wealth of the country will be dissipated in activities bent on destruction. This, quite plainly, is sacrifice, but it is a sacrifice acknowledged to be necessary by the people of the country. It is "acknowledged" to be necessary, that is, according to the theory of democracy, for if a measure is passed in conformity to democratic processes, it is said to represent the "will of the people," even though "the people" may in this instance be indifferent,

secretly reluctant, or only half-informed as to what is at stake.

It is unfortunate that a decision so important as going to war should be made in this way, but you cannot use this limitation of the democratic process as an argument against the democratic process itself. No one has ever claimed perfection for the democratic process. What is claimed for the democratic process is that it has proved to be the best means of self-government that we know, despite its faults. So far as we know, only fools and tyrants reject this claim. If we do not like the way the democratic process is made to work in particular instances, we have the option, as citizens, of trying to put into office men who will make it work better, or differently.

So, we are permitted to say that there is a kind of "sacrifice" which a society may undertake with apparent reason and apparent justice.

We should add, however, that the rule for identification of a permissible corporate sacrifice is that it must be a sacrifice sanctioned by familiar moral ideas. It need not be, on the other hand, a sacrifice by means of which people expect to purchase a "sure thing." No believer in corporate sacrifices, for instance, could object in principle to the decision of the legitimate Hungarian government under the leadership of Imre Nagy to oppose the onslaught of the invading Red Army. This sacrifice was justified by the righteousness of the cause to which it was devoted. That the cause was lost has not made anyone within our hearing say that the sacrifice should not have been made. Instead, the free world, so-called, marvels at the courage and the integrity of the Hungarian people. No one dreams of saying that their lack of might in any way reduced their right to resist.

So, we may add that the primary justification for a corporate sacrifice is that it be performed in behalf of a commonly conceived right. "Victory," that is, is not the primary issue. Although victory is desirable, it is not *supremely* desirable, such that the conditions of victory are permitted to *define* what is right.

There are two arguments against corporate sacrifice, one political, one religious or philosophical. The political argument represents the anarchist position, in which it is maintained that no one has the right to order another man to go to war to kill or be killed. The religious argument is that the deliberate taking of life is outside the pale of moral behavior and that the State can have no authority to demand that a man kill another man. Functionally, there is not a great difference between the anarchist view and the religious view of this question, although the anarchist view issues from a philosophy of man, while the religious view may result from the idea of obedience to God. The philosophic version of the religious view may be the outcome of thinking about man and the universe, without dependence upon any familiar or popular revelation.

We are now ready, perhaps, to listen to a subscriber who comments on a lead article of several weeks ago (MANAS, Aug. 27):

"Arms and the Man" contains a letter from a medical pathologist in which he says: "We should remember that people learn by what you do, not by what you say." A little later, he says: "When we talk about an end to the military, but continue to support it and pay lip service to it, others somehow develop the feeling that the military has a place." And he says at the beginning of his letter, that "Something built upon fear, even in trying to solve the fears, seems to me no beginning."

I disagree in all three instances.

People learn by what we say as well as learning by what we do. This is obvious when applied to the past. I am not too familiar, unfortunately, with what Plutarch did, but his saying that "If we live as we ought, we shall see things as they are," made a deep difference to me.

It taught me that the good life, if pursued, would pay dividends in clearer, perception, over and above the "material" rewards of good health, etc. Does this correspondent understand Lord Byron's, "Words are things"?

On this question of whether or not the military "has a place": Let's assume for a short time that the military (of the United States) has no place. Dismiss the Army. Also the Navy and the Air Force.

I plead guilty for the moment to the feeling that the military has a very definite place, unless we want to be ruled by the Communists. This may be put to the test very shortly. Must we really talk utter nonsense? . . .

Now, concerning "Fear": The *beginning* of man's "trying to solve" problems is almost always fear. Man's solutions in this sense are certainly built upon fear. It was fear of Nature's eternal war against us that made our ancestors think how to avoid a countless series of disasters; and therefore, as a result of fear-stimulation, record advances were achieved. Life is not meant to be lived without fear. Apart from the beautiful thought of the Greeks that life is partly made up of "pity and terror," there is that ever pressing urgency to avoid annihilation. . . . and a host of other entirely genuine fears that will drive men forward to achievement after achievement. Fear is a long thread in the loom of Clotho; and Lachesis will see that every man gets a generous measurement.

For the moment, our medical pathologist may be "well-fed, unhounded by sordid cares, and at ease in Zion; but when he starts to talk; about "others somehow" developing the feeling that the military has a place, I would suggest for his physical safety that he write out, pin up over his bed, and memorize the following lines by an old-fashioned imperialist who saw the issues more clearly:

It's Tommy this, and Tommy that,  
and chuck him out, the brute;  
He's the Saviour of his Country when the guns  
begin to shoot!

The comment of this reader needing the most attention is obviously the matter of the "place" of the military. As for the question of "saying and doing," his response seems out of context. The medical pathologist had reference, it seems to us, to the kind of "saying" which

amounts to moralistic pretense, unbacked by action. He can hardly be charged with ruling out the wisdom of philosophers like Plutarch. Then, as to the role of "fear" in motivating behavior, only a long discussion could clarify this subject. It may be easily admitted that some kind of "fear" has led to a great deal of practical provision for safety of one sort or another. Fear of falling makes a man wear a certain kind of shoe when climbing mountains, etc. Obviously, there is a difference between intelligent anticipation of danger and the desperation which drives men to commit terrible crimes in the name of survival. When you say fear, do you mean "panic"? The medical pathologist, it seems to us, was objecting to the kind of fear which results in sudden madness. Take the wild reaction of peoples who suffered constricting pressure from tile aggressive inroads of white civilization, and struck out blindly to preserve their "way of life": the Sepoy riflemen who feared that the British were betraying them into unutterable offense against their religion by making them taste the fat of pigs which they believed was being used on their cartridges; the Oglalla Sioux who concluded that the white Americans were determined to destroy their culture and their lives; the Kikuyu tribesmen who joined the Mau Mau to drive the white man from Kenya—their reason being, as Jomo Kenyatta, their spokesman, said: "the European invasion destroys the very basis of their old tribal way of life, and yet offers them no place in the new society except as serfs." For a more recent instance, one might turn to Ralph Lapp's *Voyage of the Lucky Dragon* to see what the government of the United States has done, or allowed to be done, out of "fear" that an aggressor might some day disturb or abolish the American "way of life."

This question needs to be argued at length and with some thoroughness, before any important conclusions are drawn.

We come, finally, to the Jekyll-Hyde image

of Tommy Atkins, and the question of whether we "need" him or not. Is the answer to this question a matter of "facing facts"? No doubt, since the answers to all questions come only from finding and facing the relevant facts. But what are the *relevant* facts? There are at least two levels of facts to be considered. Our correspondent seems quite convinced that the Communists stand ready to invade, conquer, and rule any country which has no military establishment. Is this a "fact"? It may be. There is certainly plenty of material in the literature of the Communist movement to indicate that many Communist theorists have insisted that the world will have no peace or justice until there is world socialism. Do the communist leaders have their tongues in their cheeks when they blandly speak of the practicability of peaceful "coexistence" of Communism and Capitalism? It seems likely that they do—some of them, at any rate—for why should they abandon this foundation stone of Marxist political philosophy?

So it is a fact that it is *possible* that the Communists would invade a militarily defenseless people or nation; and it is another kind of fact that large numbers of people in the West believe that, were they defenseless, such an invasion would be a certainty. And it follows that our correspondent, being one of the latter people, regards adequate military establishments for defense against the Communists as absolutely essential. "Must we really talk utter nonsense?"

Where can we go from here? There is only one place to go, and for the time being we can go there only in theory—that is, somewhere outside the reach of the "we-they" point of view. This is a bad place to go without sufficient emotional capital. Can we *afford* to think as though we had no private, personal stake in the Present "war-is-threatening-us" situation?

Well, that is a chance we have to take, if we are to go anywhere at all. Three kinds of people are able to get out of the "we-they" situation in theory, and one of these three kinds of people

sometimes gets out of the "we-they" situation in fact as well as in theory. The three kinds of people are (1) historians, (2) pacifists like Gandhi, and (3) hypothetical visitors from Mars, the literary creations who look upon the conflicts of earth with a sage and dispassionate objectivity.

It has been the historians who have made the so-called "liberal" case against war and, in some instances, against preparation for war. The good historian tends to forget nationality. He writes as a scholar and as something of a scientist. He does research and comes up with dramatic comparisons between what men have hoped would come from the wars they fought, and what the wars actually brought.

The weakness of the historical case against war is of course the fact that it is a *general* case. If you read such writers as Sidney Bradshaw Fay (on World War I), you gradually become convinced that wars begin as a result of deceit, misconception, and fear, and that they invariably end in moral disaster. This is a general conclusion. Part of that general conclusion is that many of the measures adopted by the nations as preventives of war are actually *causes* of war. People are able to admit the force of this analysis so long as the conclusion remains general, but when such thinking is directed at a contemporary situation, they almost always insist that *this* war or "tense situation" is different.

The liberal, who has carefully schooled himself in the historical case against war, is now in a difficult moral position. He has to turn against the popular tide of fear of war and the anxious determination to be better prepared for war than any other nation, or he has to convince himself that this war *is* different. Often the liberal comes up with a *Götterdämmerung* psychology as a means of justifying his position. "If we have to go to war," he says to himself, "and it seems that we must—then let us have a *glorious* war, a war to end all wars!" He decides that the time has come to "Make this the last

war," in the words of the title of a wartime book by Michael Straight. The professional soldiers and the diplomats know better, of course. They know that wars do not end from fighting them. But the liberals, once they decide that war has become a "bitter necessity," turn the argument into a big moral issue. If you don't want war, they say, you don't want to save the world. Sometimes there seems to be considerable sense in this claim. A war against Hitler was not easy to oppose on humanitarian grounds. But the neurotic and finally psychotic *Führer* was himself the product of an earlier war. No one has ever claimed that making an end to war is going to be easy or painless. What has been claimed is that, sooner or later, it must be done. There are some impressive reasons for trying to do it sooner.

But what about "Tommy Atkins," Rudyard Kipling's nineteenth-century symbol of human ambivalence concerning the right and wrong of war?

What is Tommy Atkins doing, these days?

An article in the *Christian Century* (Sept. 3) by Leo Seren, an atomic physicist at Argonne National Laboratories, throws some light on the twentieth-century activities of Tommy Atkins:

People are puzzled when they glean bits of information about the Strategic Air Command of the United States Air Force. If the three words "Activate plan A" are ever spoken into a certain crimson telephone at S.A.C. headquarters, the public recently learned, over three hundred B-52 bombers will take to the sky, carrying 20-megaton nuclear bombs to the enemy. In a matter of hours, boasts the S.A.C., 50 million Russians will be killed. And when the tumult subsides this planet of ours will be an irrevocable inferno of radioactive debris. But this last the public learns from other sources.

The public timidly asks if it is not inhuman to prepare for war and destruction on a global scale. In answer the leaders of our scientific effort for national security proudly point to the record. During the past twelve years, they say, peace on earth has been maintained only because they had

the foresight to develop the 20-billion-dollar nuclear striking force of the S.A.C. It is hard to argue with 20-billion dollar facts and entrenched authorities; and John Q. Public, with an air of resignation, surrenders the management of national security to the leaders of the scientific effort.

It is questionable whether, in a situation of this sort, very many people will be inclined to sneer at Tommy Atkins even in "peacetime." He is too important a party. When you can doom fifty million Russians, just by saying three magic words, Tommy has grown into a more formidable character than the one Kipling knew about. In fact, one may doubt that Kipling could have become whimsical at all about our kind of Tommy Atkins.

The Russians, of course, know about America's "Plan A." We wonder if our correspondent thinks the Russians are "justified" in having a "Plan A" of their own.

It may be that massive rejection of war will not come until men in large numbers decide that war itself would be worse than any conceivable alternative. A few people have already reached this decision.

## *REVIEW*

### IN DEFENSE OF COLONIALISM?

NICHOLAS MONSARRAT, gifted author of *The Cruel Sea*, *Depends What You Mean by Love* and *The Story of Esther Costello*, has shown remarkable versatility throughout his career and his latest story, *The Tribe that Lost its Head* (now available as a Cardinal Giant), is indication that Mr. Monsarrat is ready with the background and insights needed for any sort of story in any sort of setting. Apart from the usual virtues of a Monsarrat novel, *The Tribe that Lost its Head* is likely to interest MANAS readers because of its suggestion that British Colonialism, however bumbling, and even inhumane, actually benefited many of the regions chosen for economic exploitation.

The setting for this story is an imaginary island off the coast of Africa, the "principality of Pharamaul." Although Monsarrat does not try to make Britain's colonial administrators into selfless apostles who actually believe in the philosophy of "the white man's burden," he does indulge a reaction against the "liberal" dogma that British Colonial administrators were invariably a conscienceless lot. But for Great Britain, Monsarrat affirms, Pharamaul would "have remained a global nonentity, eternally torn by strife, weakened by disease and indolence, and condemned to remain in the jungle shadows for another three or four hundred years." The improvements in Pharamaul, however, Monsarrat grants, were a matter of historical accident. Tribal warfare interfered with profitable trade, so that the inevitable British regiment arrived to pacify and discipline. Then came an administration to consolidate the gains, and it became, in its plodding way, genuinely interested in the education of the principality. Monsarrat writes:

It cost her [Britain] the lives of innumerable younger sons of clergymen and merchants, as well as adventurous types unemployable in any other sphere; it paid (again, like India) a very small

tribute in terms of trade and treasure. It was just another part of the British Empire, annexed haphazardly, and remaining under guard ever afterwards. For since the tribal feuds continued, authority moved north, intent on extending the safety of its frontiers; soon, the whole of Pharamaul had come under the loose dominion of Britain, whose dedicated exiles moved in to work, sweat, rule, exist, and die, generation by generation, little knowing that they were fulfilling an historic role, even as they cursed their fate, and stared biliously at their wives.

Pharamaul, under the British wing, had prospered wonderfully, when compared with the savagery and chaos from which it had sprung. In the last hundred years, pacification had brought trade, trade had brought settlers, settlers had geared up the whole economy of the island, to something like a European level.

Such was the present pattern, built up over the years. The Principality of Pharamaul was the end-result of contribution—contribution for a variety of reasons. Britain had come to annex, and remained to administer. Farmers and traders had opened the country up, and taken their substantial cut; other devoted men had served out their time, with no cut at all. It was one of many such patterns that encircled and enriched the globe.

For the natives themselves, of course, the process of advancement had been slow. Intellectual opinion in London always saw Pharamaul as a product of reactionary and oppressive rule from Whitehall, and called fiercely for progress in all directions, like the valiant strategists who had demanded a "second front" so early in 1942. But progress, measurable progress, had in fact reared its pretty head. Health, agriculture, water conservation, the general standard of living—all had improved under a century of British rule. . . . Fewer children died in infancy, fewer mothers, their loins smeared with cow dung, their ears assailed by incantations, succumbed to childbirth. Drought, held in check by careful water conservation, struck once every ten years, instead of every other year. Soil clung to the earth, instead of washing seawards in the muddy supuration that meant ruin to men and animals alike.

The philosophy of the British administration is expressed by a soon-to-retire Governor as he briefs a young assistant recently sent from England. The new man, David Bracken, has

stoutly announced his belief in "self-determination":

"Self-determination?" The Governor sniffed at the word like an amiable inquisitor. "It depends what you mean by that very elastic term."

"I meant, like the Gold Coast, or perhaps parts of the Rhodesias, progress towards independence."

"My dear fellow " said the Governor, leaning back again "that is *not* what self-determination means to me."

"But, sir, you said they're part of the same pattern."

"Certainly. But the pattern is the most varied one in the world. The whole of Africa is a pattern—a pattern of change, variety, frequent anomaly. What is appropriate in one part is unthinkable in another. What is appropriate for one *man* would be laughable for his brother across the street. Self-determination means, to *me*, that a particular people, like the Maulas, will be encouraged to do the very best they can with their own resources and at their own level of development. You can't hurry the thing up, and you certainly can't apply a different set of rules or an advanced programme just because somewhere else, in a totally different part of Africa, there are some Negroes who could knock spots off most lawyers or politicians in the outside world." He drew breath. "Africa contains eleven million square miles and a hundred and fifty million people. Pharamaul is an infinitesimal part of it—say, point one per cent. It *has* self-determination—together with the continuing help it needs from us. But to give it the same self-determination . . . as a country like Nigeria, would ruin it overnight."

Mr. Monsarrat's novel comes equipped with evil-doers, but they are never the hard-working—if often misguided—servants of British interests. The bloody and senseless revolt which constitutes the dramatic climax of *The Tribe that Lost its Head* is fomented by irresponsible newsmen who seize upon, twist, and distort information given them in such a way as to render inevitable a conflict embarrassing to the government. To realize that Mr. Monsarrat's apology for typical colonial officials is more than a bit of sentiment, one must, of course, read the entire story, and follow the intricate character

developments of which he is a master.

Someone lately suggested that we read a horrifying and mostly unpleasant recent novel on pre-Civil War slavery in the deep South—a 640-page paperback titled *Mandingo*, by Kyle Onstott. Even if the book were considerably briefer, we would not recommend it, since, after sufficient repetition, unpleasantness no longer seems instructive. But a reading of *Mandingo* following *The Tribe that Lost its Head* serves as reminder that, whatever our opinion of "British Colonialism," colonialism is still not slavery, and never as pernicious.

Mr. Onstott focuses on the "human breeding farms" which prove, after a time, to be much more profitable than the plantations. The slaves were bought and sold, very often, according to their breeding potential, and mating was managed in much the same fashion as the breeding of livestock.

The "realism" of this book is so thoroughgoing that an oppressive moral darkness pervades its pages, produced by characters who see nothing wrong in the production of human beings as articles of commerce. The mood of these people, only a few short years before the outbreak of the Civil War, is conveyed by some conversation between slave-breeding plantation owners:

"Course, Falconhurst is played out fer cotton; but who needs cotton with riggers goin' up and up?"

" 'Lessen them abolitionists at the North sets all the niggers free," Brownlee interposed, at once derisive and skeptical.

"Triflin' loafers, interferin' in others folks' business. Slavery was ordained by God, by God, and there ain't nothin' they ken do about it, except talk and stir up trouble between slavery territory and free territory, between South and North. Cain't they understand you got to have niggers to grow cotton, and you got to grow cotton to feed them Northern spindles? They tryin to 'bolish they own jobs and they own profits?" Maxwell rose to his feet in the excitement of his own eloquence.

"They dangerous, howsumever," said

Brownlee. "Take them Quakers, and take that Garrison and that newspaper he started to print last year, that *Liberator*, as he calls it. Seen any o' them papers?"

"Don't want to see none. To read about em in *The New Orleans Advertiser* turns me sick. Better not nobody fetch one of them *Liberators* to Falconhurst; they ain't decent, ain't fitten to wipe a nigger with."

"Better not let the riggers see 'em, anyway. Puts idees in they heads," Brownlee warned.

"My niggers cain't read. Best law ever passed, that law again learnin' niggers to read."

"Some does it even agin the law," Brownlee said.

"An' they liable to have a risin' to fight, too. No nigger readin', no nigger risin'. Why that Garrison hadn't printed that *Liberator* of his six months when that nigger risin' up in Virginia happened last year. Wonder they never could ketch that Nat Turner nigger."

"They ketched him. Didn't you know? They ketched him and hung him along about harvest time."

"Hung him?" Maxwell was incredulous.

"Hung him."

"Jest hung him? Didn't burn him or nothin' after killin' all them white folks? Had ought to of burned him. Ought to of made a sample of him."

This is a chapter of human history which does not seem to belong to our world at all. It is not only that these people were traffickers in slaves, but that they had no perception of the debasement brought to them by this practice. By comparison, Mr. Monsarrat's colonial administrators seem the salt of the earth!

## *COMMENTARY*

### MALAISE OF INDECISION

THERE is a sickness of civilization from which the West may suffer, along with its famous "decadence" and its "nervous tension." Raoul de Roussy de Sales wrote of this sickness after the fall of France to the Nazis. Above all, he said, the French did not want war. They were too civilized to want it or like it. This made them indecisive.

Actually, the entire West suffers from this ill, and possibly the East as well, although the lack of free public expression in the Communist countries cloaks from view the actual temper of the people.

We might think of the wars of the future, if they come—and if there can be more than one!—as wars that will come only because of the grip of a bad habit, and not because the people want war or hope that war will do them any good, or protect them from any evil. It is the dreadful compulsion of diplomacy and of outworn theories of the "national interest" that will produce the war. War has become entirely hateful, a degrading barbarism in which we cannot believe. It may even be that we shall be unable to be good at war, because of this growing repugnance for it.

Meanwhile, nervously awaiting the moment of decision, we ponder the implications of the new knowledge of psychology—as, for example, revealed in the studies of delinquency, and of neurotic and psychotic adults—and wonder if a world bristling with hostilities which should be found only in a psychiatrist's case book, instead of the pages of current history, can be accounted in any way "sane."

Realizations of this sort are debilitating and weakening to the national strength, even as de Sales—and before him, Hitler, with quite other purposes—pointed out.

The plain truth is that we cannot be civilized

and barbarian at the same time. We cannot continue to penetrate the mysteries of human behavior and revert to the gross egotism of war in the same epoch of history.

It is a difficult situation. It would not be so bad, except for the fact that we have forgotten the ancient truth that human life is essentially made up of difficult situations. So, instead of striving to understand our difficulty—instead of recognizing our confusion as a sign of growth, as marking a time of necessary moral decision—we load ourselves with self-pity and claim that, with all our good intentions, we are being abused by our contemporaries! The fact is that we are haunted by our unclaimed maturity. We carry it around like a satellite; we can't get rid of it, yet we give it no place to land.

## CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

### EDUCATIONAL DEBATE, CONTINUED

IN defense of Robert Hutchins' stringent criticisms of American teacher-training, it is necessary to point out a glaring error on the part of those who accuse Hutchins of being a "reactionary." Except for a few members of the educational fraternity, Hutchins is generally considered to be a dangerous "radical," since his activities as head of the Fund for the Republic have often led him to defend the right of any individual to hold communistic opinions. Hutchins' point is that we must educate ourselves to realize that ideas ultimately rule the world, and that the only way to overcome a bad idea is to out-grapple it on the plane of thought.

Another well-known liberal, Herbert Lehman, a former governor of New York and formerly a United States senator, whose voice has long been one of the most progressive in the Democratic Party, similarly calls attention to the need for basic revision of our educational thinking. Writing for the July 11 *Progressive*, Mr. Lehman states:

We need to find the necessary ways to liberate the mind and spirit of Americans from the imprisoning requirements of conformity.

We need to encourage, especially among the young, total intellectual freedom and the right of the mind to soar to the highest levels and widest ranges of capacity, without fear of reprisal or reproof.

We need to attack on a broad front the many social problems which manifest themselves today in the form of juvenile delinquency. This is not a single or a simple problem. It is a complex combination of them, radiating from deep in the body, bone, and sinew of our society.

We need to revitalize and reorganize our entire educational system and plant, from top to bottom.

The New York *Herald Tribune* for May 21 reported on research by the National Council of

Independent Schools, dealing with the need of teachers to have sound liberal arts training. The committee conducting the research for the National Council remarked that "teaching is a highly individual affair. We know of no conclusive proof that any one ever became a more effective teacher by formal training in the principles and methods of teachers . . . in the view (of the teachers interviewed) courses in education are usually trivial, thin, repetitious, and badly taught." The committee also concluded that the good quality of a teacher will be exhibited by his knowledge of his subject, for which there "can be no substitute." The committee spoke of the "frosty" relations between the liberal arts faction and the professional educators, though the report also pointed to indication of recent cooperation between the two.

Those who are engaged in teacher-training would probably remind the critics of our schools that there are simply not enough candidates for teacher-training who have philosophical proclivities or a rich background in the liberal arts. Schools of education face staggering problems of primary and secondary education in a country which takes the world's lead in the number of children taught, and the number of years per capita, spent by children in public schooling. Again, the Rockefeller Report is to the point:

In the past seventy-five years we have heaped upon our educators one of the most heroic assignments a society could have invented. We have taken into the school system a greater proportion of our youngsters than has any other nation, and we have kept more of them in the system longer than any other nation. Between 1870 and 1955, while our population was increasing four times, our highschool population was increasing approximately a hundredfold. At the same time that we have forced this expansion upon the system, we have pressed our educators to include in the curriculum an incredible variety of subjects, to take over more and more of the functions of the home, and to accept a sense of responsibility for every psychic or civic crisis involving individuals below

the age of consent.

That our educators did not founder completely under these chaotic pressures is impressive. That they may be credited with heroic achievements in creating a system of universal education is a simple fact. But the task ahead will challenge those past achievements in every respect. For not only must our educators offer higher quality in education, they must handle a huge increase in the numbers of new students. And, as we have said, we cannot choose between quality and quantity.

It seems to us, as it does to Hutchins, that a plan of education must be a plan for excellence—must begin with emphasis upon quality. We need teachers who have pride in their knowledge and in their capacity to formulate it. Even at the level of adolescent distrust for the high-school teacher, it is possible to see what genuine pride in intellectual accomplishment can mean. *Time* for May 19 picks as a human interest story a revealing interview with a thirty-six-year-old Turk, an art teacher who also teaches "Refresher Math" without a teaching certificate and on a provisional basis. But Tanju Ergil made it clear that he would not teach unless he could take pride in his work. According to *Time*, Ergil's capacity to produce good art himself was the clue to his immediate success as an art teacher. His success in mathematics is explained in his own words:

First, Ergil proved to be a relative rarity among high school art teachers—an able artist. Said one student: "We never had an art teacher who could really draw before." Next, he roused the slow learners in his math course from their vegetable torpor. His method: "I told them that they had to work hard because in order for me to feel a dignity in my work I had to accomplish something, and that something was to teach them math. I said I was very interested in not wasting my time. At first they didn't believe me. They were accustomed to not doing their homework. . . . But I made an issue out of it."

Perhaps much of cultural failure lies in the inability of present educational institutions to revitalize the image of excellence. And yet, as

the increasing sale of intellectually provocative material in pocketbook editions indicates, there is today perhaps as great a yearning for genuine culture as any large population has ever displayed. The social and economic factors which encourage this development are clear enough, and are aptly summarized by Peregrine Worsthorne in *Encounter* (August) in an article, "Conservative Thoughts Out of Season." As Worsthorne puts it, "This popular search for culture constitutes far less a challenge to the middle class than an opportunity. Knowing how to open that rich store of culture which the masses now seek to share, the middle class appears to-day, not as the barrier to popular satisfactions but as the indispensable key. At long last science has begun to solve the problems of work and to pose the problem of leisure. We are, as Denis de Rougemont has put it, 'on the threshold of an era in which culture will be the serious thing in life.' Hitherto it was work which filled the essence of our days, and upon which our fate depended: pay, food, and lodging. If technics tomorrow, at a very low price, allow society to meet these elementary requirements, the empty hours of leisure will become the real time of our daily lives. But this search for culture, in the widest sense, illustrates most forcibly the almost pathetic dependence of the many on the few for guidance and example."

All these factors, we feel, have an intimate and hopeful bearing on the problems of education. Above all, this is not a time for allowing the language of factionalism to blind us to "the image of excellence." To fall short of the ideal is inevitable because of a host of conditions which no one can control. But the rock on which our republic is founded is, in James Madison's words, the resolve to increase the number of those who hold "enlightened views." We are not apt to obtain them with future generations unless the meaning of culture is revitalized and a sense of history gained. This may mean curtailment of a program of highly diversified electives during the high school years.

## *FRONTIERS* The Need for Love

FROM the many years of hard work and numerous research projects which have been devoted to the problems of the young, one luminous conclusion is emerging—that the greatest single need of children and young people is for love. Love may not be, as Bruno Bettelheim has suggested, a universal panacea for the difficulties of disturbed or delinquent children, but it is so plainly the solvent and catalyzer which makes other therapeutic measures work, that the discovery and admission of its importance is surely a major realization of our time.

An article in *This Week* for Aug. 31, by Dr. Marie Robinson, is concerned with young girls cared for in the El Retiro school for delinquents in San Fernando, Calif. The accompanying photographs show teen-age girls in postures of desolation—or seeking compensation for loneliness with dolls, toys or a phonograph. Dr. Robinson writes:

The law says they [these girls] are delinquents. Their offenses: stealing, truancy, running away, drinking or sexual delinquency. But the staff at El Retiro knows these outward actions are but the reflections of an inner emptiness which has led them to search for the food of love in the most unlikely places. Their anguished gestures, their haunted faces, testify to the desperation of their unappeased hunger.

Such emotional malnutrition stunts a child's personality as physical malnutrition stunts his body. The young person deprived of love will seek it in tortured, twisted and anti-social ways, turning against a family and society which, he has come to feel, refuse him his birthright. . .

Group therapy is used to help these rebels-without-a-cause let out their pent-up hostilities and fears, and to learn for the first time that grownups can be patient and full of loving kindness. Under such conditions it does not take long for lost girls to begin the long trek back to normalcy, for love can heal, as want of it can wound.

Lovelessness is no respecter of social class, or

of intellectual intelligence either. These children come from every stratum of society and many of them are classed as "exceptionally bright." Lovelessness and lovelessness alone is at the root of their problem.

This is good material in itself and good to have appear in large, metropolitan newspapers throughout the country (*This Week* is a syndicated Sunday supplement). We may be proud of the fact that our time, with so many grave shortcomings, has nevertheless been able to penetrate to a chief cause of the moral and emotional disorders suffered by the young, and to take such preliminary remedial steps as are represented by El Retiro School and by similar institutions elsewhere.

It is one thing, however, to declare the need, and quite another to meet it on any significant scale. The question which must follow, close on the heels of the findings of the psychotherapists, is whether or not adults are *capable* of the love that is required to help the young re-order their lives. How did the therapists discover the need for love? They discovered it by feeling love themselves. As doctors, they were deeply affected by the tragic unhappiness of the delinquent, the mentally disordered and the emotionally ill. They observed the healing effects of warm, outgoing affection on the part of foster parents, nurses, teachers, and physicians. Compassionate love itself brought the discovery.

Now it is obvious that adults in general are not richly endowed with the feeling of compassion. What they may understand about the needs of children, as a result of the many books and articles written on the subject, does not equip them with the love that is needed. How does one give "more love"? Well, to learn that love is needed should help people to bring their attention to others, and attention is itself a means to the development of sympathy. Just the effort to try to love is bound to help. Some of the efforts may be abortive, reflecting mechanically dutiful demonstrations of affection,

or leading to the gifts of "things," along the lines of the "too much, too soon," errors explored last week in "Children . . . and Ourselves," but a serious attempt to create better human relationships should also bring some self-discovery.

The point we are getting to is that love, like peace, is indivisible. You cannot give constructive love in a partisan way. If you love because people suffer, and you want to assuage their pain, the love cannot be doled out to "favorites." It is true, of course, that spontaneous love for people near to us is natural and good. There can be genuine love at all degrees of maturity, and it is the quality of honesty, no doubt, which gives the love its healing power. But a love which is attempted in neglect of responsibilities in other directions—this is the love which is bound to fail of its purpose, since it is tainted by partisanship at the source.

The complexities of the human heart make generalizations difficult on this subject, since we know that people who are heavily weighted with personal limitations may still love and give something of benefit to others. The very narrowness of their outlook makes possible an integrity in certain of their feelings—feelings which, in persons of wider view, would be quite unworthy. The thing that we have to remember, here, is that love, however curtailed, is itself the principle of growth in the capacity for love, and that an honest or spontaneous love need not be selfishly partisan because it is limited. The constructive influence of love is not lost until people consciously turn away from loving those whom they are able to see are *in need* of love.

One thing that has to be recognized is that adults are as much in need of love as children. Whatever the practical difficulties presented, it must be seen that the pathology of adult behavior has much the same diagnosis as the disorders common among children. We cannot properly love the children without learning to

love, also, those grown-up children, the adults.

There is the obvious comment: What is the capacity for love of a people who corporately devote so much of their common resources and energies to projects of preparation devote for the annihilation of millions of human beings and the destruction of the fruits of civilization all over the world? How can we love our own children, with this overwhelming evidence of potential hatred of the children of other men in other parts of the world? Only a sick love is possible to us, in these circumstances, and a sick love can never heal.

It is questionable that we can do anything at all about the needs of the young for love, so long as this hideous contradiction in our emotional lives remains. Many people, it is true, do not yet *feel* the contradiction, yet the contradiction exists, and, being human, they are bound to feel it if they begin to grow at all in the capacity for love.

A report in the *New York Times* (Aug. 3) illuminates the situation with the light of a UN study of the handling of delinquents in the United States. Their treatment, the report states, is characterized by "a welter of unsystematic and uncorrelated" measures—"without any over-all philosophy." The report was prepared by Paul W. Tappan, professor of sociology and law at New York University, for the UN Economic and Social Council. Recognition of the psychological factors at work in juvenile delinquency may have played some part in bringing on this confusion. Dr. Tappan reports:

Delinquency has become extremely imprecise, and courts have come to handle emotionally disturbed and socially maladjusted children with little regard to any standard criteria of social behavior.

The *Times* account continues:

Closely associated with this confusion, Dr. Tappan found, is the wide use of pre-hearing investigations. This, he said, constitutes "a wide departure from traditional concepts of due process."

The children's courts are tending increasingly to operate like administrative and social agencies rather than as judicial tribunals, he said, and "irrelevant, prejudicial and hearsay testimony has become the rule."

Meanwhile, the impact of psychological discovery has broadened the base of all these difficulties by disclosing some of the elements of causation in delinquency:

There is increasing awareness, too, of the emotional problems of juvenile delinquents. "A growing number of youngsters cannot relate to others and are therefore very difficult cases to treat, effectively. Their conduct is commonly so serious that they must be segregated in institutions, but they do not respond easily to treatment there."

In contrast to youth crime in other countries, Dr. Tappan said, delinquency in the United States thrives in communities and families where standards of living are relatively high.

"The roots of delinquency," he declared, "run deeply into the soil of American culture—with its materialism, its intense competition, its repugnance to political authority and regulation, its conflicts of values and of institutional norms, and its deterioration of standards of behavior."

Many, many factors of importance lie hidden in this closing paragraph—factors which, if examined in detail, would doubtless disclose the revolutionary meaning of what Dr. Tappan says.

Yet we may conclude, also, that the awakening to the emotional needs of children, leading to dozens of half-measures in connection with police and court procedures, has itself created serious complexities. It is difficult, if not impossible, to integrate the therapy of "love" with the methods and instruments of the legal code. A half-baked invasion of the area in the charge of the police and the courts by therapeutic techniques which originate in the clinic and the analyst's couch is bound to weaken the traditional mechanisms which secure the rights of the individual. Thus, as Dr. Tappan says, the meaning of "delinquency" has become "extremely imprecise," leading to "a wide

departure from traditional concepts of due process."

In short, our dealings with delinquency are beginning to suffer from a serious ambivalence, involving the conflict between legalistic and educational methods of treating moral disorder. It seems likely that this ambivalence, and the confusion it creates, will continue to increase, until clear thinking is able to stabilize the policies of government and the law enforcement agencies.

It seems worth while to consider the possibility that this ambivalence may be extended from the field of juvenile delinquency to the larger area of world affairs. The wisdom of the therapists in regard to the need of the young for love, is fundamentally akin to the teaching of Gandhi regarding the need of all the world for love. What the therapists find to be a prime necessity for healing the wounds in the minds and hearts of children, Gandhi found to be the key to healing the wounds in peoples and nations. There is no essential difference between these teachings, and if one is true and to be accepted, so is the other.

So, we are fated to suffer ambivalence in world affairs. Already we see the sad fruit of the beginning of this ambivalence, in the brutal prosecution and punishment of pacifists, the world over, for their attempt to live by their principles. We are saved, perhaps, from immediate moral disaster in connection with both these ambivalences only by our cultural immaturity, which alone makes moral inconsistency possible for men who believe themselves to be honest and that they are acting as best they know how.

One wonders if, as the impacts of current history bring us the ingredients of maturity, we shall have the moral strength to put our new understanding into practice.