

QUESTIONS ABOUT "THE MORAL ORDER"

FOR writers as well as readers, continual discussion of war becomes oppressive. A point is reached where a monotony of horror takes the stage, and there is no use in saying anything more. But then, after a time—after a "rest" from the anxiety and dread—it seems necessary to start all over again.

The compulsion to discuss war has an obvious origin. People who think seriously about the condition of the world and who harbor hopes for its future usually look upon war as virtually the end of everything worth while. Accordingly, it appears that there is nothing else so important to think about. We find it difficult to imagine how things will be after another major war. The losses in culture and civilization will be as great or greater than the losses in life and wealth. Then there is the ominous threat of radiation sickness that seems certain to haunt succeeding generations after another war—for who knows how long?

So even if another war is not the worst thing that can happen to mankind, the fact that many people regard it as the worst thing that can happen makes the subject inescapable. What else can you talk about that they will regard as of urgent importance?

The most recent cause for fright comes from the idea that another all-out war can easily be precipitated by an "accident." Carl Dreher writes on this possibility in the *Nation* for Sept. 6. The idea, of course, is not new. Dr. Schweitzer spoke of it in his April broadcasts and Lewis Mumford wrote at length in his pamphlet, *The Human Way Out* (Pendle Hill), on the various ways in which a nuclear war might come about "by mistake." Yet a certain moral incredibility attaches to these suggestions. Is it possible, we ask ourselves, that an entire world can suffer destruction from the *accident* of some misinterpreted blur on a radar screen?

Mr. Dreher has another sort of "accident" in mind. What about neurotic military men? Dreher devotes several columns to the "mood of the

military" under the strain of remaining poised for the kill. Then, in addition to the category of "accidents," is the category of military "realism." Mr. Dreher writes convincingly about the potential factors of precipitation which grow out of military reasoning:

Still farther within the accepted limits of normality stand other advocates of preventive war who might be impelled to take matters into their own hands. The axiom that the United States will never strike the first blow is axiomatic only as long as it is unexamined. True, the average American would not start a nuclear war, but we are not concerned with him. He is not in a position to start one if he could; his duty is merely to support any embroilment his betters see fit to engage in. The extrapolation from this well-intentioned but impotent civilian and yes-man to the professional military man is hazardous indeed. Nor is it at all necessary to picture the professional as a bloodthirsty enemy of humanity. He has his obligations as a soldier. It is practically official Air Force doctrine that an air-nuclear war between the superpowers is inevitable. If it is inevitable, it had better be fought at a time most favorable to the United States. The time must be determined by experts on the basis of military intelligence, uncomplicated by womanish reluctance to face the facts.

Well, what's wrong with this reasoning? If, in a couple of years, it is going to be much more difficult to beat Russia than it would be now, what do you expect of men who are charged with the responsibility of doing the beating? Why *should* they want to wait? If you send these men to West Point to learn how to fight; if you tell them the defense of all that we hold dear lies in their hands; and if military and scientific intelligence reports that time is on the side of our opponents, what other conclusion can conscientious soldiers reach?

Another bewilderment comes from the fact that technical considerations have shouldered moral questions almost out of the picture entirely. Take for example the information, cited by Mr. Dreher from a published report on ballistic missiles by Col. Harvey

W. C. Sheldon of the Air War College. Col. Sheldon points out that the best way to stop a ballistic missile is to destroy its launching facilities before it is launched. Apparently, we can find out where these launching facilities are without too much difficulty. But, he says:

Many will be quick to point out that this Achilles' heel of a ballistic missile system seems well beyond the reach of a nation committed against aggression. It is too early to decide to ignore this potential vulnerability of the ballistic missile.

In plain language, this means that it may be foolish to wait until we are struck by the enemy, since the only effective defense against the ballistic missile is to strike at its launching facilities first.

Then there is the following choice quotation, produced by Mr. Dreher from the January 1958 issue of *Rockets and Missiles*:

Two years hence . . . it is a safe assumption that the Reds will have both our cities and our bases zeroed in with ICBM's; that they will be able to destroy us and that because of their capability then with anti-aircraft missiles, our retaliatory ability will be seriously diminished.

This is the sort of thing the specialists are saying about the next war. Shorn of euphemisms, what they mean is: "The sooner the better!" From the point of view of the technical facts at their disposal, it would be hypocrisy for them to say anything else.

But even in men of this sort there is probably some deep feeling of the enormity of what they are proposing. They are doing their job, that's all. It is the job the voters, through their selected representatives, hired them to do. The voters hardly advise that these specialists do their job half-heartedly. Half-heartedness is a privilege reserved by the voter for himself. That is, ambivalence on the subject of war is the prerogative enjoyed by the non-specialized citizen. He has some kind of "intuition" that war won't come unless it is "absolutely necessary." He doesn't feel able to make the big decisions and the anomalies and contradictions in the situation only cause him pain. Somehow, he believes, right will triumph.

Perhaps we should be thankful for the reluctance of the average citizen to come out and say what *he* thinks ought to be done. We hire the technologists of destruction to think coldly, accordingly to the logic of their techniques. So, if widespread timidity, indecision, lethargy, and a measure of moral repugnance on the part of the people at large are the only forces which prevent the logic of the technologists of war from being applied, why not be grateful for all this confusion? There may be more actual truth in the confusion than in the sharply lucid judgments of the specialists.

Some kind of moral instinct seems to say that the world will not be brought to ruin by some "accident," or from the lethal bravado of a drunken colonel or a psychopathic major general.

Well, that may be so. At any rate, if it is not so, we have no business talking or thinking about anything but how to stop war from coming—especially if we think that another war will virtually destroy hope of any significant future for civilization.

But what is this "moral instinct" which gives us reassurance? At root, it is the belief that there is a moral order which governs the events which happen in the world. We just don't believe that we *deserve* to have our world wiped out because of some crazy thing that we had nothing to do with.

Well, suppose there is a moral order: how far can you push it by ignoring the crazy things that we are a little bit responsible for? What is a moral order, anyway?

A moral order is an order under which you get what you have coming—what you deserve. Now there is a difference between believing in a moral order and believing in God. Belief in God lays more stress on mercy—on avoiding what is coming to us, through divine forgiveness—than it does upon impartial justice. This permits certain privileges to the believer in the "true" God—the one who has the power to forgive. And since such a God is extremely important to sinners—to people who don't like very well what they have coming to them—this belief has a lot to do with making partisans out of human beings. In an article in the September-

October *Humanist*, Norman Thomas speaks to this point:

. . . The sovereign nation-state clearly holds itself above the moral law, sanctifying to itself what will advance its own ends. Our popular justification is to identify our nation's aims with God's and to accept Harry Lauder's exegesis of Jesus' teaching about forgiveness. "The Bible teaches us to forgive our enemies but not God's. And the Germans [the current enemy in World War I] are God's enemies."

To have the kind of a God who will make an exception in your case—what could be pleasanter? Or more subversive of our grasp of the meaning of *moral law*?

The thing to do, when times get rough, is to have some kind of understanding with God. Our politicians have been busy with this project for the past several years. We have come a long way from the temper of Thomas Jefferson, who said: "The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." We should have to do something about this man, were he engaged in public affairs, today. Such people have a way of spreading the truth about the moral order. This would seem especially pertinent, today, when the governments of the great nation-states are so devotedly planning injuries to "others."

Norman Thomas tells of a distinguished Jewish judge who spoke of what he thought was "the greatest irony in history: the fact that the belligerent tribes of Europe accepted a pacifist Jewish peasant not only as their prophet but their God." It is plain enough why serious thinking about the moral order could easily become a great national disaster! Norman Thomas, himself no pacifist, makes candid admission:

I do not think that the Sermon on the Mount can be the chief guide to an American foreign policy fit for peace with justice. But I do not see how we, Christians or Humanists, can forever give, in varying degree, lip service to the power of love—and in practice so completely contravene it.

Here is a man honestly in a dilemma, and unashamed to admit it. Mr. Thomas, as an American

citizen, has brought his confusion out into the open. It would be well if others of his persuasion would follow his example.

But there is another approach to the moral law—one that has not been seriously considered for generations. If there is a moral law, and if it works, then how does it affect individuals? We don't think it will wipe *us* out, but what about the people whom it has already wiped out? We do not have at hand figures on the total number of people killed in World War II, but thirty million sounds like a conservative figure. If there is a moral law that will protect us, then the same moral law brought *them* some kind of punishment. Some of *them* were children, some were mothers. Some were mere boys, hurried into uniforms—Japanese uniforms, German uniforms, British uniforms and American uniforms. Did the uniform affect the working of the moral law, or has this principle a subtler operation?

Well, you can say that everyone has to die—sooner or later. And you can say that it is not individual life which counts so much, but the continuity of a great civilization with its cultural achievements and ethical values. You can say this, even if it begins to sound a bit hollow, these days. But for *whom* do these things count? They count, surely, for *people*—the people to be born in the future. It is for these, then, our descendants, that the survival of our civilization must be assured. But how, on the basis of a reasonable kind of moral law, do the people of the future become more precious than the people of the past and the present? And why should the people of the present trouble to degrade themselves in behalf of the excellence of the people of the future? What if those people should inherit the degradation instead of the excellence?

But we come back to the countless millions made dead in past wars: what did the moral law do for them?

What we are getting at, with these questions, is the possibility of the immortality of the soul. The discussions of morality which we pursue, these days, are too much limited to social or historical morality. They take their premises from the fortunes of the nation or the breed, as though the individual counted

for little or nothing. But we are compelled to define the good socially and historically, if death means the extinction of the individual. An anxious credo of mortality tends to make human morality into the law of the herd.

You cannot really make any sense out of the idea of moral law as applying to individuals without some idea of the continuity of existence after death. There are too many contradictions, too many gross injustices to individuals to be tolerated, if the single lives of human beings are all that can be considered.

But if, on the other hand, the destruction of the physical body is regarded as the end of a chapter instead of the whole book of life, then the terrible urgency of fending off death and destruction is much reduced. The agony of fear, the sense of crisis, the pressure to do evil in order to avoid the ultimate evil, death—all these emotional drives begin to lose their force.

Rare individuals, it is true, can face death, believing it to be the final end—without a whimper. But such men have come upon timeless values in another way. We are speaking, here, of the attitudes of mind and feelings of an entire culture. The suggestion is that a firm reliance on the moral order becomes a possibility for all men who believe, even falteringly, that goodness, faithfully pursued, will produce good; that kindness is a leaven which *ultimately* will bring a response in kind. It is the dreadful sense of emergency which makes men do such dreadful things, accept the coarsening necessity of being ready, at any moment, to pour death from the sky on countless millions of people in the other half of the world. *We fear that we shall never have another chance, so we are determined to take these last dreadful and irreversible steps to win the battle now.*

Now it is true that an other-worldly view of human existence may be guilty of excesses in an opposite direction. For a generation or so, we have read of the passive, backward, and unprogressive East, where men contemplate their navels instead of getting on with the work of the world. There is nothing attractive about men who are so wound up in their "spiritual progress" that they care little or

nothing for the sufferings and misfortunes of the people around them. There is no point in suggesting an exchange of worldliness for other-worldliness. This would be no more than a repetition of past history. A selfish, isolationist religion has nothing to recommend it over a self-centered materialism.

What we are arguing for, we suppose, is a philosophic basis for the serenity which great men seem to have intuitively, without any sort of "rationalization." That is, we are offering the idea of immortality as such a basis that is worth considering. It is certainly a fact that this is an uncommon suggestion, in our time. But there is at least the possibility that the philosophy of immortality would give men an emotional stability which is greatly needed by nearly all of us. And the promise of emotional stability is enough to justify a careful look at the means other men have found to get it.

REVIEW

ADVENTURES IN ZEN

WE have for review an attractively bound collection of stories and notes put together by Paul Reps, *Zen Flesh, Zen Bones* (published at \$3.00 by Tuttle in Rutland, Vermont, but printed by the Tokyo branch of Tuttle Company). To many "students" of Zen—although almost any term connecting discipleship or studiousness with Zen sounds inept—*Zen Flesh, Zen Bones* will seem a useful introduction to the subject. We chose the heading, "Adventures in Zen," for our review since "adventure" is an aspect of the experience of all who attempt to discover the Zen path. In the first place, it is recognized that the "path" is never the same to any two individuals, thus relieving Zen of any similarity to orthodox religious devotions.

The publishers of *Zen Flesh, Zen Bones* offer their own introduction:

What is Zen?

One could say it is one of the most profound religious philosophies ever discovered in this dark world. This is true, but this is not what Zen is.

One could say it is one of the most far-reaching systems of aesthetics ever devised, leading directly to the great landscape paintings of China, to Japanese flower arrangement and tea ceremony, to the inner rhythm of the Orient. This too is all true, but this is not what Zen is.

One could turn to the last page of this book, which might well be the first, and find a blank paragraph answering the question. But even this is not the actual is of Zen.

The question can never be answered, because in the answering Zen would cease to exist. And Zen *does* exist, triumphantly and under many names, wherever man looks for a way of life, for a religion, for an aesthetic—as this book makes abundantly clear.

This is actually four books in one, books that would surely rank high in the canon if Zen were so non-Zen as to have scriptures. 101 Zen Stories recounts actual Zen experiences over a period of five centuries. The Gateless Gate is a 13th-century

collection of the mind problems used in attaining Zen. 10 Bulls is a 10th-century commentary upon the stages of awareness leading to Zen, magnificently illustrated. And Centering presents a 4,000-year-old teaching of India which may well have been the roots of Zen.

Read these four books and *then* ask: What is Zen? Because that is what this book is about.

So far as is made evident, Mr. Reps belongs to no particular Zen school. He has apparently derived much of his inspiration from Nyogen Senzaki, a Buddhist scholar of international scope who once wandered Japan as a "homeless monk," travelling from Buddhist monastery to Buddhist monastery, and finally settling in California. He made no effort to establish any sect or "school." Zen attempts to solve the problem of the human mind, which Reps states to be that of "relating conscious to preconscious awareness," without reference to any preconceived formulas.

Buddha himself often represented what is now called the "Zen" point of view. As George Grimm has pointed out in his *Doctrine of Buddha*, Gautama taught that only *internal* evidence is real, and that one must pass beyond what one Zen teacher has called "the barrier of the patriarchs." In the *Dhammapada*, Buddha differentiates between the traditional forms of devotion and traditional doctrine and genuine illumination—which, in turn, is an echo of Krishna's statement in the *Bhagavad-Gita* to the effect that it is necessary "to grow beyond all doctrines which are taught or yet to be taught." This is the mood characteristic of all Zen stories. Mr. Reps selects one of these stories as characteristic of the Zen tradition, and to explain his title:

The first Zen patriarch, Bodhidharma, brought Zen to China from India in the sixth century. According to his biography recorded in the year 1004 by the Chinese teacher Dogen, after nine years in China Bodhidharma wished to go home and gathered his disciples about him to test their apperception.

Dofuku said: "In my opinion, truth is beyond affirmation or negation, for this is the way it moves."

Bodhidharma replied: "You have my skin."

The nun Soji said: "In my view, it is like Ananda's sight of the Buddhahood—seen once and for ever."

Bodhidharma answered: "You have my flesh."

Doju said. "The four elements of light, airiness, fluidity and solidity are empty (*i.e.*, inclusive) and the five skandhas are no-things. In my opinion, no-thing (*i.e.*, spirit) is reality."

Bodhidharma commented: "You have my bones."

Finally, Eka bowed before the master—and remained silent.

Bodhidharma said: "You have my marrow."

Zen may also be described as the attainment of indifference to events, to give greater awareness of the opportunities of living. The Zen disciple is not trying to "get away from anything" except his own tendency to categorize experiences and worry over their outcome. In Buddha's words in the *Dhammapada*, he is "the gardener who culls the choicest blooms," because he no longer allows possessive tendencies to dominate him. One of the Zen "short-stories" concerned with this point is titled, "Is That So?":

The Zen master Hakuin was praised by his neighbors as one living a pure life.

A beautiful Japanese girl whose parents owned a food store lived near him. Suddenly, without any warning, her parents discovered she was with child.

This made her parents angry. She would not confess who the man was, but after much harassment at last named Hakuin.

In great anger the parents went to the master. "Is that so?" was all he would say.

After the child was born it was brought to Hakuin. By this time he had lost his reputation, which did not trouble him, but he took very good care of the child. He obtained milk from his neighbors and everything else the little one needed.

A year later the girl-mother could stand it no longer. She told her parents the truth—that the real father of the child was a young man who worked in the fish-market.

The mother and father of the girl at once went to Hakuin to ask his forgiveness, to apologize at length, and to get the child back again.

Hakuin was willing. In yielding the child, all he said was: "Is that so?"

Prof. Edwin Burtt informs us that Zen is a true derivative of Mahayana Buddhism—not as a revolt against the complexity of metaphysics which differentiates Northern from Southern Buddhism, but as an emphasis upon the fact, taught by the Buddha, that immediate individual perception is the end and aim of all doctrine and all discipline. The first Zen masters asserted that intuition is operative only when it is realized that every topic, as every person, has its literally unfathomable aspect. With characteristic Zen brevity, Mr. Reps resists the impulse to "explain" the psychology of the Zen approach. So, to say that Zen is too "complicated" to grasp is not quite true. Zen is not to be "grasped," nor theorized about, but somehow absorbed in such a way that one becomes himself absorbed:

Try if you wish. But Zen comes of itself. True Zen shows in everyday living, CONSCIOUSNESS in action. More than any limited awareness, it opens every inner door to our infinite nature.

Instantly mind frees. How it frees! False Zen wracks brains as a fiction concocted by priests and salesmen to peddle their own wares.

Look at it this way, inside out and outside in CONSCIOUSNESS everywhere, inclusive, through you. Then you can't help living humbly, in wonder.

"What *is* Zen?"

One answer: Inayat Kahn tells a Hindu story of a fish who went to a queen fish and asked: "I have always heard about the sea, but what is this sea? Where is it?"

The queen fish explained. "You live, move, and have your being in the sea. The sea is within you and without you, and you are made of sea, and you will end in sea. The sea surrounds you as your own being."

COMMENTARY

NO BARGAIN

Now and then, when MANAS prints an article which suggests—as this week's lead suggests—that a philosophy of life which includes the idea of the immortality of the soul gives greater opportunity for hope and a sense of meaning, we get a letter or two from people who are filled with a fine humanist indignation.

They insist that since the present life is so packed with rich possibilities, a hope of immortality is hardly necessary to anyone who accepts the challenge of the here-and-now. Why, they ask, long after another life, when there is so much to do in this one?

We cannot quarrel with the letter of this comment. Actually, in a world of moral order, the man who longs for immortality the least would probably be best fitted to enjoy it. There is the high ethical philosophy of the Stoics to support this view. The Stoics spoke and behaved as though they had eternal life, yet displayed calm philosophical indifference toward the question of whether there was a life after death. They refused, in short, to be "bargainers" in matters transcendental. Their sense of the quality of being human was sufficient to support the highest principles of conduct, without promise of reward or fear of punishment.

So, when a reader objects to the suggestion that the idea of immortality may have a pragmatic value in human life, we are obliged to concede the point, when it is made as the Stoics made it. The strongest morality is the morality which stands alone.

Yet there is another way of looking at these matters. It is possible to consider the idea of the continuity of consciousness without allowing it to be degraded into a scheme for the purchase of everlasting bliss. You don't *have* to take the idea personally, replying, "Immortality! Who needs it?" You can also regard it simply as a proposition concerning the possible nature of things.

It is not unreasonable, for example, to wonder why the most precious things in life—the moral values for which we claim ultimate importance—should be held to be the most ephemeral. Nothing in Nature is lost; her riches are stored in the memory of germ cells, in the patterning instincts of the species, in the very

habit of the crystalline forms which delight our eye. And in a thousand ways, the fruit of human genius is preserved—in books, manuscripts, monuments, in great documents of history, and in the humane temper of civilized people. But these forms of social memory—these are but the mark and the shadow of the living intelligence which produced them, and why should they have a greater capacity for survival than the individual creative essence in each man, from which they came?

Oddly enough, there are those who want their philosophy to contain all the high themes which are consistent with the idea of immortality, yet turn away from this conception as though it represented some kind of compromise with sentimentality, or a weakness of the spirit.

There is a good enough historical explanation for this reaction. The idea of immortality has for so long been connected with some kind of celestial bargaining that a man of self-respect often supposes that to consider it at all will involve him in some vulgar transaction which places a price upon his allegiance to principle. But the man of self-respect ought also to be able to dissociate himself from this kind of intellectual prejudice. He does not, after all, turn against the ideal of sharing, or find cooperation hateful by contrast with competition, simply because the Communists have transformed the ideas of sharing and cooperation into political slogans and caricatured them almost beyond recognition. He knows that sharing and cooperation have still a vital role in human relations, regardless of their perversions in the politics of totalitarian statecraft. So it is, or might be, with the idea of immortality. It may be a sign of immaturity to let the creeds and dogmas get away with spoiling a great philosophical idea.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves ISSUES AND NOTES

A NEW and lively chapter in the history of Church and State controversy is now being prepared for the voters of California. A total of 450,000 citizens recently signed a petition for an Initiative Constitutional Amendment—Proposition No. 16—designed to eliminate State subsidies to private and parochial schools. In 1952 the voters granted subsidy to parochial schools by the slim margin of 1.7 per cent, and in the intervening years Protestant churchmen have become increasingly convinced that state subsidy for religious instruction is dangerous to both the non-sectarian state and the Protestant churches. An organization called "Californians for Public Schools" has effectively aroused public opinion in support of the petition and is now working for passage of the amendment.

Dr. Ira L. Ketcham, Chairman Clergy Advisory for California Public Schools, expresses the basic concern of his colleagues by saying that members of his organization "fight no man's personal religion, nor the right to private schools." He continues: "But we rise to repel from whatever quarter it may come, any attempt to break down a constitutional policy that since 1787 in our nation has provided room for all religions and special favors for none. We rise to demand that the wonderful wholeness of American life shall not be split into social and religious fragments."

A good statement on this issue has been released by a committee of the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Pacific Southwest, indicating that the additional financial burdens which Protestant churches would have to assume for their own private institutions would be a price worth paying:

We are trying to preserve the Christian Church as a free agent supported by voluntary stewardship gifts so that it can serve and speak for its Lord. The Church, if it follows the teachings and spirit of its

Lord, *will not want favor or subsidy* from any general public fund, tax or otherwise. The Church will be supported by gifts freely given out of gratitude by those who believe in its Lord and in the mission of His Church on earth. The other side of the coin has been well stated—"No man should be required to pay for another man's religion."

We are trying to preserve the Christian Church from the *pattern of tax supported and established churches which have been tried and found wanting in Europe*. History seems to say that this type of church fails to fulfill its true mission to its people. Rather, it loses the love, respect and support of those whom it should serve.

Lutheran pastors from a number of countries in Europe are coming to the United States to study how to use Evangelism and Stewardship Programs as developed here, that *by their use they may keep their church free, active, alert and in vital contact with its people*. Many of those who come feel that the very future of the church in their lands depends upon developing voluntary Christian Stewardship.

We are trying to preserve the right of every religious group to have their own schools if they desire them. But this right will soon disappear if every religious group depends upon Government favor and support for the existence of their schools. Not only is "the power to tax the power to destroy." The *"power not to tax is the power to give special favor and subsidy which is also the power which controls and corrupts."* Tax favors can and doubtless will lead to all kinds of bickering and maneuvering on the part of religious groups which receive them. We wish to preserve the right of religious freedom for ourselves and all others.

As various representatives of Californians for Public Schools have remarked, it is easy to misconstrue their movement against state subsidy as an attack on the Roman Catholic Church. It is true that, according to all known expressions of Catholic representatives, the Roman Church seeks to parallel the public school system with its own form of instruction, yet would not be willing, if able to control policy, for any other kind of instruction to take place. But the principle involved in denying tax exemption to a school providing partisan religious instruction is that the state must not underwrite partisanship and thereby lose its capacity to allow an "open hearing and a

fair chance to all," since powerful financial and political interests have much to do with the amount and nature of benefits gained from the state.

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A Tolstoian parent has called our attention to the essays of Leo Tolstoi written while he was engaged in the founding and administration of his Yasnaya Polyana School. And it must be admitted that, however naïve Tolstoi's initial enthusiasms may sometimes seem, we have here the benefit of a mind attuned to the meaning of radicalism. For while the founder of Yasnaya Polyana continually found himself enmeshed in the weakness of his own theories, he was honest enough to revise and redirect the energies of his teaching staff. Two of Tolstoi's maxims seem to us to cut through the mental attitudes of many "traditionalists" as well as new "educationists":

The teacher is always involuntarily impelled to select for himself the most convenient method of teaching.

The more convenient this method is for the teacher, the more unsuitable it is for the scholar.

As one might expect, Tolstoi is long on speculative philosophy in regard to children, and in the following quotation throws light on a position chiefly associated with Rousseau:

The majority of educators lose from sight the fact that childhood is the prototype of harmony, and they take as an end the child's development, which goes on according to unchangeable laws. Development is mistakenly taken as an end because with educators happens what takes place with poor sculptors.

Instead of trying to establish a local exaggerated development, or to establish a general development, in order to wait the new opportunity which puts an end to the previous irregularity, like the poor sculptor, instead of scratching off the superfluity, they keep sticking on more and more; so also educators apparently strive for only one thing,—how the process of development may not cease; and if they think of harmony at all, then they always strive to attain it, approaching the unknown prototype in the future, receding from the prototype in the past and

present. However irregular the education of a child has been, there still remain in it the primitive features of harmony. Still modifying, at least not helping, the development, we may hope to attain some nearness to regularity and harmony.

But we are so self-confident, so dreamily given over to the false ideal of mature perfection, so impatient are we toward the anomalies near us, and so firmly confident in our power of correcting them, so little are able to understand and appreciate the primitive beauty of a child, that we make all possible haste to rouse the child, to correct all the irregularities that come under our observation; we regulate, we educate: First, we must bring up one side even with the other, then the other with the first. They keep developing the child more and more, and removing it farther and farther from the old and abolished prototype, and ever more and more impossible becomes the attainment of the imaginary ideal of the perfectibility of the adult man.

Our ideal is behind us and not before us.

Education spoils and does not improve a man.

FRONTIERS

An Amiable Anarchist Speaks

I MYSELF have never denied that I am what MANAS recently called an "anarcho-pacifist." I cannot see why it should be detestable to be called an anarchist. There was certainly a time, I admit, when anarchists killed kings, like Umberto I of Italy, or empresses, like Elisabeth of Austria. That time is long since gone. Anarchists today are mostly of the Tolstoian type, belonging to the slowly growing non-violent front of the modern world.

Anarchists are people who do not like the State, nor authority at large. Nothing would be more wrong than to suppose them to be near to Communists, who are pledged to the totalitarian State. For anarchists, even the so-called democratic State is too totalitarian. They would like to abolish the State entirely, and to substitute cooperative organisms, and if they tolerate certain institutions of the State, they do so unwillingly. The State, for them, is at best an evil, it being an open question whether it is a necessary one.

We close our eyes to the fact that, in this century, in spite of ferocious propaganda against the evils of the totalitarian State, we are sliding faster and faster into its arms. Even in countries where private enterprise is praised and worshipped, as in the United States, the State itself is without any doubt the strongest capitalist of all, and I am afraid the most ruthless. The U.S. is able to spend the fantastic sum of 38 billion dollars every year—more than any other competitor—for the sole purpose of building up the weapons thought to be necessary to maintain, defend, even expand its power. Who else could do that?

The way in which the State dominates the people is by its apparatus, growing from day to day, which we call "Bureaucracy." Look at the city hall of a community which had say, 100,000 inhabitants in 1850, and compare it with the many big buildings needed for the administration of a

modern city of 100,000. There is no doubt: bureaucracy's grip on the human race is tightening, and although many people used to complain about bureaucracy on days when they had to pay taxes, or to wait hours to get an affidavit, most people have not even noticed that a new world power has slowly and often inadvertently obtained a hold on mankind.

Many people claim to be "law-abiding," some even to "love" the law. I am sorry, I confess not to love the law as such.

Some twenty years ago I read in a French paper, *Le Journal*, that all the laws and decrees actually in force in France would, if printed on the paper of the *Bulletin Officiel*, cover a distance of about 30,000 km.—once round the globe. Consequently a man who undertook to read 100 meters of legal text a day—Sundays included—would need 821 years to take notice of all French laws! This is a good illustration of the well-known slogan that ignorance of the law does not protect against punishment.

That was France, twenty years ago. There are other countries claiming to be civilized. I wonder whether the United States, with federal laws and local laws in each of the forty-eight States, would not perhaps lead them all!

The law-making industry is the best business in the world. I have lived through two complete break-downs of the German State and through periods of appalling unemployment. But the law-making machinery never pauses, and in times of emergency its output grows to fantastic mountains of printed paper, each law ending with the menace of what you will have to suffer if you trespass it.

Laws do not die by themselves, out of old age. They have to be killed, each separately. In the twentieth century, an American ambassador in Berlin wanted to marry a young woman who was of an old noble family. This family protested against the alliance of their offspring with a man whose father might have been a shoemaker. The family claimed that, according to a decree issued

by the German Emperor Charles VI, they had a right to refuse their consent. The matter went to the Supreme Court at Leipzig. It grew more complicated when it appeared to be doubtful whether Charles VI had been legally emperor at all. He had been elected against Maria Theresa of Austria, but the legality of that election had been challenged, and Charles died during the dispute. The Supreme Court, after weeks of serious study, decided that Charles VI had been legally emperor of Germany on the day he issued the decree, and that it was therefore valid. So in Germany they could not marry. They were obliged to go to the United States and be married there, where Emperor Charles VI was utterly unknown.

Offices, strongholds of Bureaucracy, don't die, either. When Erich Zeigner, a friend of mine, became prime minister of Saxony in 1921, he was amazed to learn that at the same time he was also Saxony's foreign minister. He had thought that there could be no foreign ministry in a State which surrendered its sovereignty in 1871 to the German Empire, of which it then became a member State. He was mistaken. There still were six high officers in Saxony's foreign office. How they spent their time, I do not know. That they got their salary on the first of each month, I do know.

In 1928 we had a pacifist play which was performed in a good many little towns of Westphalia. Only at Oeventrop the mayor prohibited the performance, claiming that he was authorized to do so according to the Prussian legal code of 1799. We appealed to the Court, but were defeated, since that code was still in force. It contained, besides, a chapter dealing with the procedure of how to burn witches—which apparently also was valid in 1928, and perhaps even today.

I have been in other countries and know that this is pretty much the same everywhere. Do you understand why I am unable to love "The Law"?

As long as there are too many laws, which often conflict with each other, the consequence is a practically lawless state. Even the government

employees do not know all the laws and decrees, although each one has good knowledge of that small sector of laws belonging to his special branch of the administration. He cannot be familiar with them all, but if there is a man he seriously dislikes, he will always be able to discover an old decree against which the man has sinned, and which on a thousand similar occasions has been ignored as being silly.

The Austrians are known to the world as being people who know how to live and who generally let others live, also. Old Austria had laws of exceptional ferocity, but as the Austrians are gentle people, they did not make much use of them. But toward the end of last century, a situation arose in which they could make use of their voluminous body of laws. As the railways were state-owned, and the postal service as well, the railway workers and postmen were employees of the State and not allowed to strike. When they had reason to do so, they started a "cold strike." All went to their work, but from a certain hour on they began to apply all laws and decrees that had been issued and not cancelled, since the railway existed.

A rule had been made that, following an accident, the station-master, before letting a train go, had to convince himself that no axles were running hot. So, at 6 o'clock in the morning, when a train which had been at the station all night was to depart, the station-master could be seen creeping underneath all the cars, from the engine to the luggage van, touching all the axles to see whether they were hot or not. After a delay of twenty minutes, the train finally started. Ten minutes later, it had to stop at another station, where the station-master proceeded to the same operation. Within six hours the whole railway system of Austria had completely disintegrated. No train was moving, while all the railwaymen were extremely busy according to the intricate jungle of old decrees, orders, laws. Nobody could punish them, they were doing their duty meticulously, and the strike was won.

Any one who has been to one of the so-called underdeveloped countries will have noticed how speedily Bureaucracy takes charge. These countries do not yet have as many laws as we have, but they are doing their best!

Where has this led us—and where will it end?

One effect is visible: human relations, when entrusted to Bureaucracy, are different from what they had been in old times, and from what they are in countries where only a tiny minority of the people are literate. There is more willingness to help a neighbor or even a passing vagrant, when there is not the possibility of sending him to the "competent authority" of the Welfare State. Under the Welfare State people rely on "the Law," in which the human heart plays no part.

The public itself is responsible for having so many laws. Gandhi, one of the few individuals who shine out of the darkness of our century, always hammered at the country folk of India: "Help yourself, begin the work now, do not wait until the government comes to help you. Suppose it does not come—what then?" But the public at large has acquired the habit of crying, on every possible occasion, for government help. People are not aware that, the more the administration is called to help, the more our society will slide into conditions where it is indeed impossible to live without government interference in every corner of personal life.

Not very many have as yet realised what is happening. But I see before my eyes the development that forcibly will come one day, although I shall not live to see it.

It was Jean Jacques Rousseau who, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, became the spiritual leader in that enormous struggle by which mankind liberated itself from the prejudice that people of "noble birth" are superior beings who have the right to do what their servants can never hope to do. Though there are still remnants of the dominion of noble families, the problem has been

practically solved, after a struggle of about a hundred years.

It was Karl Marx who, nearly one hundred years after Rousseau, began his struggle for economic equality, trying to free those who had been liberated from the bondage of the nobles, from the exploitation of Capitalism, which had been growing meanwhile. The struggle is not yet over, but one has to admit that even in capitalist countries there is a degree of equal or nearly equal opportunity for everybody—something unknown at the time of primitive capitalism as Marx saw it.

But we dimly feel that after two heads of the Hydra have been lopped off, a new one has grown. Nearly free from the, in its time, horrible exploitation by princes and knights, and less in bondage to the equally horrible exploitation by ruthless and avaricious capitalists, men are still not free. Only the master has changed. We know that in countries where capitalism and feudalism have both been overcome, the State has become predominant. His Majesty the questionnaire—an American invention—is slowly conquering the world. More and more human relations are controlled by laws, decrees, lawyers, State officials—a sort of paper tyranny is strangling us, by a process of which we are not yet quite aware.

The day will come, when, on a world-wide scale, the struggle of free men—or, I should say, freedom-loving men, for free men will by then no longer exist—will begin against the tight network that is slowly suffocating us now. That struggle will surely last generations. Let us hope that, afterward, the human heart will be reinstated in the role which it undertakes spontaneously.

Berlin

HEINZ KRASCHUTZKI