

SCIENCE AND SELF-ACTUALIZATION

[This paper by Abraham Maslow, Professor of Psychology at Brandeis University, was prepared for presentation last January at the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, as part of the Caltech Y.M.C.A.'s Leaders of America Program. It will subsequently appear in the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*.—Editors.]

THIS is not an argument *within* orthodox Science; it is a critique (a la Godel) of orthodox Science and of the ground on which it rests, of its unproven articles of faith, and of its taken-for-granted definitions, axioms and concepts. It is an examination of Science-as-one-philosophy-of-knowledge-among-other-philosophies. It rejects at the very beginning the traditional but unexamined conviction that orthodox Science is *the* path to knowledge; or even the *only* reliable path. I consider this conventional view to be philosophically, historically, psychologically and sociologically naïve. As a philosophical doctrine it is ethnocentric, being Western rather than universal. It is unaware that it is a product of the time and the place, passing rather than eternal, unchangeable, inexorably progressing truth. Not only is it relative to time, place and local culture, but it is also characterologically relative, for I believe it to be far more narrowly a reflection of the cautious, safety-need-centered, obsessional *Weltanschauung* than of a more mature, general-human view of life.

In spite of the fact that many of the *great* scientists have escaped these mistakes, and in spite of the fact that they have written much to support their larger view of Science (as nearly synonymous with all knowledge, rather than merely as knowledge-respectably-attained), yet they have not prevailed. As Kuhn has shown, the temper, the style, the atmosphere of "normal science" has been established *not* by the great ones, the paradigm-makers, the discoverers, the revolution-makers, but rather by the great

majority of "normal scientists," who must be likened to coral-reef-makers rather than to eagles. And so it has come about that Science has come to mean primarily patience, caution, carefulness, slowness, and the art of not making mistakes, rather than courage, daring, taking big chances, gambling everything on a single throw, "going for broke." Or to say this in another way: Our orthodox conception of Science (as mechanistic, and ahuman) seems to me one local part-manifestation or expression of the larger, more inclusive *Weltanschauung* of mechanization and dehumanization of which it is a part. (An excellent exposition of this development can be found in the first three chapters of Floyd Matson's *Broken Image*.)

But in this century, and especially in the last decade or two, a counter-philosophy has been developing very rapidly among some intellectuals? along with a very considerable revolt against the mechanistic-dehumanized view of man and the world. It might be called a rediscovery of man and of human capacities, needs-aspirations. These humanly based values are being restored to politics, to industry, to religion, and also to the psychological and social sciences. This is true also for the non-human and impersonal sciences which have been going through a convulsion of what might be called rehumanization. At first, they began by rejecting teleology (human purpose) from the physical universe, which was reasonable enough. But then they wound up by rejecting human purposes in human beings. Now this begins to change.

This change in science reflects, expresses, and is a part of a larger and more inclusive, total *Weltanschauung* that we might call "humanistic."

These two great life-philosophies, which for present purposes we may call mechanistic and

humanistic, both exist simultaneously like some species-wide two party system.¹

I consider that my effort to rehumanize science and knowledge (but most particularly the field of psychology) is part of this larger and intellectual development. It is definitely of the *Zeitgeist*, as Bertalanffy noted in 1949:

The evolution of science is not a movement in an intellectual vacuum; rather it is both an expression and a driving force of the historical process. We have seen how the mechanistic view projected itself through all fields of cultural activity. Its basic conceptions of strict causality, of the summative and random character of natural events of the aloofness of the ultimate elements of reality, governed not only physical theory but also the analytic, summative, and machine-theoretical viewpoints of biology, the atomism of classical psychology, and the sociological *bellum omnium contra omnes*. The acceptance of living beings as machines, the domination of the modern world by technology, and the mechanization of mankind are but the extension and practical application of the mechanistic conception of physics. The recent evolution in science signifies a general change in the intellectual structure which may well be set beside the great revolutions in human thought.

Or if I may quote myself (1943) saying this in another way:

. . . the search for a fundamental datum (in psychology) is itself a reflection of a whole world view, a scientific philosophy which assumes an atomistic world—a world in which complex things are built up out of simple elements. The first task of such a scientist then is to reduce the so-called complex to the so-called simple. This is to be done by analysis, by finer and finer separating until we come to the irreducible. This task has succeeded well enough elsewhere in science, for a time at least. In psychology it has not.

This conclusion exposes the essentially theoretical nature of the entire reductive effort. It must be understood that this effort is *not* of the

essential nature of science in general. It is simply a reflection or implication in science of an atomistic, mechanical world view that we now have good reason to doubt. Attacking such reductive efforts is then not an attack on science in general, but rather on one of the possible attitudes toward science.

And further on in the same paper:

This artificial habit of abstraction, or working with reductive elements, has worked so well and has become so ingrained a habit that the abstractors and reducers are apt to be amazed at anyone who denies the empirical or phenomenal validity of these habits. By smooth stages they convince themselves that this is the way in which the world is actually constructed, and they find it easy to forget that even though it is useful it is still artificial, conventionalized, hypothetical—in a word, that it is a man-made system that is imposed upon an interconnected world in flux. These peculiar hypotheses about the world have the right to fly in the face of common sense but only for the sake of demonstrated convenience. When they are no longer convenient, or when they become hindrances, they must be dropped. It is dangerous to see in the world what we have put into it rather than what is actually there. Let us say that this flatly atomistic mathematics or logic is, in a certain sense, a theory about the world, and any description of it in terms of this theory the psychologist may reject as unsuited to his purposes. It is clearly necessary for methodological thinkers to proceed to the creation of logical and mathematical systems that are more closely in accord with the nature of the world of modern science.

It was the study of more highly evolved or developed individuals, that is, the study of psychologically healthy people, that taught me about the "higher" human possibilities. That phrase is not the most vigorous in the world, and it is hard to specify its meanings in any succinct and non-normative way. It can be operationally and pragmatically defined and I have done so, but it would be too big a job at this point. For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that self-actualizing people have taught us to redefine many of our words into several levels, or stages, of higher and lower meanings. They have taught us to see that *several* levels of meanings are inherent in such words as knowledge, determinism, science, truth, control, prediction, understanding. If I may say it

¹ I do not mean to imply that "rehumanization" as a World-view is necessarily the last word. Even before rehumanization is completed or well established, the shape of a World-view beyond this one is already beginning to be discernible. I shall speak below of "human-transcending values."

in this fuzzy way, there are higher and lower meanings for each of these words.

Perhaps another way of getting this across is to make the parallels with the finding that at different levels there are generated different philosophies of love, of women, of life; different conceptions of society, of happiness, and of Heaven, and even different Utopias. It should not surprise us then that being at a higher level of living generates a higher, more inclusive, more powerful conception of Science, with far wider jurisdictions and with far greater *power*. The taller the person, the greater the conception that he can grasp. Only a big man can grasp big ideas or *generate* big ideas. You have to be *worthy* of a great thought. You have to deserve it. Great thoughts don't come to small people.

Not only does the study of healthier and stronger people generate conceptions of a stronger and healthier science, but it also teaches us that scientific work can itself be a *good* path to self-actualization if science is done correctly. I think the textbook view of orthodox science is *not* such a conception. It is clearly *not* necessarily true that scientific work must be a path toward self-actualization. It can also be a flight from the world, a defence against human emotions and impulses, a monastic renunciation of basic aspects of humanness. It can serve as a kind of bomb-shelter against the vicissitudes of living among people. It can be *either* primarily safe *or* primarily self-actualizing.

Science *can* be a path to the greatest fulfillment and self-actualization of man. It *can* test his highest powers, bring him to his greatest heights, and bring out everything most admirable in him. The true scientist can be a model of the fullest human development, and the life of science can be a path to the greatest joys and satisfactions.

But it can also serve as a retreat from life and from humanness. It can be a flight from a world seen as messy, unpredictable and uncontrollable, a sort of high IQ return to the womb. The scientist can be running away to it, hiding in the laboratory,

fleeing from his tired wife and noisy children, and from messy human contacts in general. Or the scientist can go to his laboratory as to a sacred place, going eagerly and with a sense of privilege and gratitude. He can go in courage and boldness, with zest and anticipation, as to a kind of Olympian wrestling match, where he takes a chance, pits his best powers against a worthy rival, quite aware that he might fail, and yet quite willing to gamble and to commit himself.

This is why so many brilliant students drop out of science. They are asked to give up too much of their human nature, too many of the rewards of living, and even some of the main values that led them to think of science in the first place. In effect, they are asked, like monks, to renounce some very precious aspects of "the world." And this is doubly true of just those students who are most likely to be the creative ones, the innovators. To a certain extent, science education is a training in the obsessional *Weltanschauung*. The young man is rewarded *only* for being patient, cautious, stubborn, controlled, meticulous, suspicious, orderly, neat, and the like. Some effort is made to train *out* of him his wildness, his unconventionality, his rebelliousness against his elders, his poetic and esthetic qualities, his gaiety, his Being-humor, his craziness, his impulsiveness, his "feminine" qualities, his mystical impulses, and much more besides.

In a word, he is asked to become a military policeman rather than a commando raider. But the truth seems to be that few young men dream of being M.P.s.

The non-scientists, the poets, the religious, the artists, and ordinary people in general, may have a point in their fear, and even hatred, of what they see as science. They often feel it to be a threat to everything that they hold marvellous and sacred, to everything beautiful, valuable and awe-inspiring. They see it sometimes as a contaminator, a spoiler, a reducer, an exsanguinator; making life bleak, cold, and

mechanical; robbing it of color, fun and joy. Look into the mind of the average high school student and this is the picture you see. The girls will often shudder at the thought of marrying a scientist, as if he were some sort of respectable monster. Even when we resolve some of the confusions and misinterpretations in the lay mind, for instance between the scientist and the technologist, between the "revolution scientist" and the "normal scientist" and between the physical and the social sciences, some real complaint is left. This complaint which I shall call the "need to desacralize as a defense" has, so far as I know, not been discussed by the scientists themselves at all.

Briefly put, it appears to me that science and everything scientific, can be and often is used as a tool in the service of a distorted, narrowed and de-emotionalized *Weltanschauung*. In the Freudian language, desacralization can be used as a defense against being flooded by emotion, especially the emotions of humility, wonder and awe.

I think I can best make this clear by an example from my experiences in medical school (30 years ago). I didn't consciously realize it then, but in retrospect it seems quite clear that our professors were almost deliberately trying to harden us, to "blood" us, to teach us to confront death, pain, and disease in a cool, objective, unemotional manner. The first operation I ever saw was almost paradigmatic in its effort to desacralize, *i.e.*, to remove the sense of awe, of privacy, of fear, of shyness before the sacred, and of humility before the tremendous. A woman's breast was to be amputated with an electrical scalpel which cut by burning through. As a delicious aroma of grilling steak filled the air, the surgeon made carelessly cool and casual remarks about the pattern of his cutting, paying no attention to the freshmen students rushing out in distress, and finally tossing this object through the air onto the counter where it landed with a plop. It had changed from a sacred object to a lump of fat. There were of course no prayers, rituals or

ceremonies of any kind as there would certainly have been in most preliterate societies (Eliade). This was handled in a purely technological fashion, emotionless, cool, calm, even with a slight tinge of swagger.

The atmosphere was about the same when I was introduced—or rather *not* introduced—to the dead man I was to dissect. I had to find out for myself what his name was, and that he had been a lumberman and was killed in a fight. And I had to learn to treat him as everyone else did, not as a dead person, but as a "cadaver."

So also for the several dogs I had to kill in my physiology classes, when we had finished with our demonstrations and experiments.

The new medics themselves tried to make their deep feelings manageable and controllable, not only by suppressing their fears, their compassion, their tender feelings, their fears as they all identified with the patients and their diseases, their awe before stark life and death. Since they were young men, they did it in adolescent ways, *e.g.*, getting photographed eating a sandwich while seated on a cadaver, casually pulling a human hand out of a brief case at the restaurant table, making standard medic jokes about the private recesses of the body, etc.

This counter-phobic toughness, casualness, unemotionality (covering over their opposites) was thought to be necessary, since tender emotions might interfere with the objectivity and fearlessness of the physician. (I myself have often wondered if this desacralizing was really altogether necessary. It is at least possible that a more priestly and less engineering-like attitude might improve medical training or at least not drive out the "softer" candidates.)

This latter is of course a debatable guess. But there are other situations in which desacralizing can be seen more clearly as a defense.

We are all acquainted with people who can't stand intimacy, nakedness, honesty, defenselessness, those who get uneasy with close

friendship, who can't love or be loved. Running away from this disturbing intimacy or beauty is a usual solution, or it can be "distanced," *i.e.*, held at arm's length. Or, finally, it can be degouted, deprived of its disturbing quality, denatured, that is to say, *desacralized*. For instance, innocence can be redefined as stupidity, honesty can be called gullibility, candor becomes lack of common sense, and generosity is labelled softheadedness. The former disturbs; the latter does not and can be dealt with. (Remember that there really is no way of "dealing with" great beauty or blinding truth or perfection, or with *any of* the ultimate values; all we can do is to contemplate and to "adore.")

In an ongoing investigation of what I am calling "counter-values" (the fear or hatred of truth, goodness, beauty, perfection, order, aliveness, uniqueness, and the other Being-Values) I am finding in general that these highest values tend to make the person more conscious of everything in himself that is the opposite of these values. Many young men feel more comfortable with a girl who isn't too pretty. The beautiful girl is apt to make him feel abashed, sloppy, gawky, stupid, ugly, *unworthy*.

Desacralization can be a defense against this battering of self-esteem in those in whom it is so shaky that it needs to be defended.

Just as obvious and just as well known to the clinician is the inability of some men to have sexual intercourse with a good or beautiful woman unless they degrade her first. It is difficult for the man who identifies his sex with a dirty act of intrusion or of domination to do this to a goddess, to a madonna, to a priestess, in a word, to a sacred, awesome mother. So he must drag her off her pedestal above the world, down into the world of dirty human beings, by making himself master, perhaps, in a gratuitously sadistic way, or by reminding himself that she defecates and sweats and urinates, or that she can be bought, or the like. Then he need no longer respect her; he is freed from feeling awed, tender,

worshipful, profane, or unworthy; from feeling clumsy and inadequate like a little, frightened boy.

Less studied by the dynamic psychologists but probably as frequent a phenomenon is the symbolic castration of the male by his female. Certainly this is known to occur very widely in our society at least, but it is usually given either a straight sociological or else a straight Freudian explanation. Quite as probable, I think, is the possibility that "castration" may also be for the sake of desacralization of the male, and that Xantippe is also fighting against being flooded and overwhelmed by her great respect and awe for her Socrates.

I feel also that, frequently what passes for "explanation" is not so much an effort to understand or to communicate understanding or to enrich it, as it is an effort to abort awe and wonder. The child who is thrilled by a rainbow, may be told in a slightly scornful and debunking way, "Oh, that's only the scattering of white light into colors by droplets acting like prisms." This *can* be a devaluation of the experience in a sort of one-up-manship that laughs at the child and his silly naïveté. And it can have the effect of aborting the experience so that it is less likely to come again or to be openly expressed, or to be taken seriously. It has the effect of taking the awe and wonder out of life. I have found this to be true for peak-experiences. They are very easily and very often "explained away" rather than really explained. One friend of mine during post-surgical relief and contemplation, had a great illumination in the classical style, very profound, very shaking. When I got over being impressed with the revelation, I bethought myself of the wonderful research possibilities that this opened up. I asked the surgeon if other patients had such visions after surgery. He said casually, "Oh, yes! Demerol, you know."

Of course, such "explanations" explain nothing about the content of the experience itself, no more than a trigger explains the effects of an explosion. And then these explanations that

achieve nothing have themselves to be understood and explained and psychoanalyzed.

So also for the reductive effort and the "nothing-but" attitude, *e.g.*, "a human being is really nothing but \$24 worth of chemicals." "A kiss is the juxtaposing of the upper ends of two gastro-intestinal tracts." "A man is what he eats." "Love is the overestimation of the differences between your girl and all other girls." (I've chosen these adolescent-boy examples deliberately because this is where I believe the use of desacralization as a defense is at its height. These boys trying to be tough or cool or "grownup" typically have to fight their awe, humility, love, tenderness and compassion. They do this by dragging the "high" down to the "low," where they are.)

The general atomistic techniques of dissection, etc., may also be used for this same purpose, *e.g.*, of making it unnecessary to feel like prostrating oneself, of making it unnecessary to feel small, humble, unworthy, etc. One can avoid feeling stunned or ignorant before, let us say, a beautiful flower or insect or poem, simply by taking it apart. So also for classifying, taxonomizing, categorizing, in general. These too are ways of making awesome things mundane, secular, manageable, everyday. Any form of abstracting that avoids confronting a comprehensive wholeness may serve this same purpose.

I wish to stress the word "may." Desacralization *may* be a primary gain, or an unconscious purpose of the behavior. But it may also be an epiphenomenon, an unsought for byproduct, a secondary gain. Or it may even be simply expressive and without gain at all. These cautions are especially true in the realm of science. We must remember that for most people, there is only the *one* kind of science. Identifying with science means then "buying" every aspect of it, everything about it, in a kind of package deal, where you take the bad with the good, for the sake of the whole, as in a marriage or a friendship.

So, the question must be asked: Is it in the intrinsic nature of science or of knowledge that it must desacralize? Or is it possible to include in the realm of the actual and existing reality, the mysterious, the awe-inspiring, the emotionally shaking, the beautiful, the sacred? And if they be conceded to exist, how can we get to know and to understand them?

We should point out that laymen are often quite wrong when they feel that the scientist is necessarily desacralizing life. Quite simply, they misunderstand the attitude with which the best scientists approach their work. The "unitive" aspect of their attitude (perceiving simultaneously the sacred and the profane) is too easily overlooked, especially since most such scientists are quite shy about expressing it.

The truth is that the really good scientist often *does* approach his work with love, devotion, and self-abnegation, as if he were entering into a holy of holiest. His self-forgetfulness can certainly be called a transcendence of the ego. His absolute morality of honesty and total truth can certainly be called a semi-religious attitude, and his occasional thrill or peak-experience, the occasional shudder of awe, and of humility and smallness before the great mysteries he deals with, all these can be called sacral. It doesn't happen often, but it *does* happen, and sometimes under circumstances that are difficult for the layman to identify with. He can't understand that a rectal examination may be a pious, even reverent act, that it can be approached in about the same spirit as a priest approaching an altar.

It is quite easy to elicit such secret attitudes from some scientists, if only you assume that they exist, take them seriously, and don't laugh at them. If science could only get rid of this quite unnecessary "taboo on tenderness," it would be less misunderstood by the layman, and, within its own precincts, would find less need for desacralizing.

We have learned much from self-actualizing, highly healthy people. They have higher ceilings.

They can see further. And they can see in a more inclusive and more integrating way. They seem to find it less necessary to dichotomize things into either-ors. So far as science is concerned, they teach us that there is no real opposition between caution and courage, between vigor and speculation, between toughminded and tenderminded. These are all human qualities, and they are all useful in science. The scientist who combines them all in his own person, and who knows when to use which, we may call the self-actualizing scientist.

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REVIEW

THE NOVELIST-PHILOSOPHER AGAIN

THE reach of Colin Wilson's philosophical and psychological thinking since *The Outsiders* (1956) arrives at a fresh synthesis in his latest book, *Beyond the Outsider: The Philosophy of the Future* (Arthur Barker Ltd., London). Mr. Wilson conceives this volume as belonging to a "cycle" of work begun in 1956 and continuing through *Religion and the Rebel*, *The Age of Defeat*, *The Strength to Dream* and *Origins of the Sexual Impulse*. "These books," he says, "are closely linked—so closely that it is impossible for any one of them to be fully understood without the others; each approaches the same problem from a different angle, and attempts to develop the viewpoint outlined in the previous book." The introduction to *The Philosophy of the Future* provides general orientation:

This book argues that a point has arrived in twentieth century thought when a completely new impulse and direction is needed. It may well be that future generations will describe the first half of the twentieth century, as "the age of meaninglessness." The sense of lack of meaning, of purpose, dominates our literature, art and philosophy. There is a general feeling that the certainties provided by religion have been lost, and can never be replaced; science, by solving our practical problems, can only make this inner void more painfully obvious. It seems self-evident that in this sense of purpose, inner-direction, Western culture has been running at a heavy loss for at least a hundred years; it is a matter for speculation how long it can go on before becoming completely bankrupt.

Wilson's approach to Existentialism derives from his analysis of what Viktor Frankl calls the "vacuum." At first, the "problem of meaninglessness" seems merely accentuated and confirmed by most existentialist writers, but Wilson suggests that intimations of purposiveness can be found, once the first problem set by the existentialists is fully faced:

The problem is this: that the basic human relation to existence *seems* to be static. The image that can be found in so many modern novels—of the

hero staring at a cobweb in the corner of the ceiling, and feeling no desire to do anything—is a symbol of a certain aspect of modern consciousness. We examine life; it is poker-faced, apparently meaningless. Modern man lives amid an immense, complex civilisation that he did little to create, it is not surprising if he feels passive, if he feels that he is acted upon rather than an actor. His inclination to act is poisoned at the root by a feeling that anything he does takes place in a vacuum. He is like an orator addressing a sleeping audience, there is no response. The problem of modern man is summarised in the first line of Rilke's *Duino Elegies*: "Who, if I cried, would hear me among the angelic orders?"

"And yet," Wilson points out, "somehow the mind cannot accept that values are completely relative, even allowing that most of our 'value reactions' are emotional rather than intellectual."

But what aspect of the mind is it which rejects the claim—itself made *by* mind—that there are no eternal verities, no authentic basis for the feeling of sharing (empathy) in a continuing process of human evolution? Value *systems* often impose, it must be granted, distortions upon the existential reality of direct experience, so that potentially empathetic confrontations are made meaningless by prejudgment. For many who have recognized this fact, a new phenomenological approach has suggested itself, sometimes involving the use of psychedelic drugs. Aldous Huxley, for example, who experimented with mescaline, felt that such agents provide necessary glimpses of the inwardness of things. Mr. Wilson undertook his own trial with mescaline, but arrived at different conclusions. The following paragraphs, to our way of thinking, offer a fundamental critique of the psychedelic movement which is much in need of consideration and which has seldom been expressed from a background as wide as Colin Wilson's. The personal account begins with his recognition of the effect of mescaline in inducing an emotional sense of "oneness":

When my wife brought me a lamb chop, I found it impossible to eat more than a mouthful. It would have been as difficult as to eat human flesh. Again, I felt overwhelmed by the cruelty of human beings. I

am not a vegetarian, although I am inclined to feel that I should be. But if I took mescaline regularly, I am sure that I would have no alternative. I could no more eat a lamb chop than I could have strangled the lamb with my bare hands and eaten it raw.

This sounds, of course, like a quick trip to the heights of *ahimsa*, but Mr. Wilson thinks that there are good reasons for resisting the hope that genuine spirituality may be obtained from a primarily psychic experience. He continues:

I felt like a radio without a VHF attachment, so that all kinds of stations were interfering at the same time. The capacity to will, which depends on clarity of purpose, was strongly diminished.

I believe this explains my body's strong resistance to mescaline, and the reason that I felt ill for so long. My own mind has a strong mechanism for allowing me to focus all my attention on what absorbs me at the moment, and exclude all other ideas and feelings; this has been developed by a long process of mainly unconscious discipline. Mescaline temporarily put this attachment out of action, and I realised instinctively that this was something I did not want. (On re-reading Huxley's *Doors of Perception* on the evening before taking mescaline I remember feeling strongly: "I don't need to take the stuff," and also experiencing a premonition that it would not give me any glimpse of "the morning of creation.")

In other words, the search for values is not, in Mr. Wilson's opinion, best pursued by shortcut methods—since the strengthening rather than the blurring of individuality should be the key. He summarizes:

I not only disliked the sense of being overwhelmed by "feelings"; I was certain that these feelings somehow lie in the opposite direction from my moments of real insight. Huxley seems to equate the feeling of loss of selfhood, of universal love, with mystical experience. I can only say that this has never held true for me. I should say first of all that I do not believe that mystical experiences are confined to mystics and saints. Professor A. H. Maslow of Brandeis University (USA) has turned his attention to the subject of *extremely healthy* human beings, and has concluded that most healthy people experience what he calls "peak moments," mystical insights, moments of life-affirmation that seem to be based on the sense of universal love. I am certain that a "mystical insight" depends partly on a certain kind of

mental health, partly upon a mental discipline, and partly merely in "looking in the right place." I am inclined to suspect the kind that come through ill-health or physical privation—like Pascal's vision. My own moments of intense insight have always been accompanied by a sense of health and control. They take the form of an intensification of reality, but not in the visual sense of which Huxley speaks; they are the opposite of what Heidegger means by "forgetfulness of existence."

Beyond the Outsider, then, declares the human need for a periodic shattering of the claustrophobic world of petty values. But while chemicals may apparently accomplish the "shattering" and appear to pave the way for a new orientation, a true regeneration must be accomplished by deliberate *thought*, by discipline and conscious confrontation. Philosophy, as an ultimate human activity, is not to be disregarded but encouraged and strengthened—something often accomplished "by forcing the imagination to contemplate some great challenge, or perhaps the idea of death." Further:

It should be recognised that most people never do grow up; they remain fixed in this childish stage of self-contemplation, believing that their emotions are the most important thing in the universe.

It will now be seen why I found myself fighting so hard against the sense of love and trust brought on by the mescaline; it was the reverse of the process of becoming adult; it was sliding back to the beginning again, seeing the universe through great mists of one's own feelings—even though those feelings had no element of cruelty or selfishness. One was further away than ever from Being in Heidegger's sense. The great objection to this "personal" world is that it blocks one's vision exactly as if someone emptied a bucket of glue over the windscreen while one was driving. Therefore, instead of one's inner being responding healthily to challenges, it is bewildered by conflicting voices, like a host of children clamouring for attention.

Mr. Wilson's book will receive further review when occasion permits.

COMMENTARY MAN AS GIVEN

THERE is, in man's quest for self-knowledge, only one thing better than a great philosophical tradition concerning the nature of man—the direct perception of that nature, or of some of its aspects, through the questioning of himself by a human being.

Great philosophical traditions, however, are not external to man's nature. They are as much a part, an endowment, of the life of the mind as the musculature of the back is a part of the physiological equipment of a man who chops wood. While the immediate act of chopping is the essence of the matter, a well-developed back will make the man a *good* chopper of wood, enabling him to hew with skill and to endure in this activity.

In a new McGraw-Hill paperback, *Humanistic Viewpoints in Psychology* (Frank T. Severin, editor), J. F. T. Bugental, one of the contributors, proposes that "a major breakthrough is occurring at the present time in psychology." "I think," he adds, "we are on the verge of a new era in man's concern about man which may—if allowed to run its course—produce as profound changes in the human condition as those we have seen the physical sciences bring about in the last century." This break-through may be described as a resolve to study the nature of man *as immediately given* in experience.

What are the qualities of man, as given in experience, which are now getting attention? Man as a reflective consciousness—man as a self-determining moral agent—man as a self-defining and self-developing intelligence. This week's lead article, by A. H. Maslow, is a characteristic—even an ideal—statement of the stance of the Humanistic psychologists by one of its chief protagonists. The rest of this editorial space will be devoted to other position-declarations by Humanistic psychologists, as found in this book.

First, a kind of "preface" reprinted from Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man*:

From our experimental point of view, reflection is, as the word indicates, the power acquired by a consciousness to turn in upon itself, to take possession of itself *as of an object* endowed with its own particular consistence and value: no longer merely to know, but to know oneself; no longer merely to know, but to know that one knows.

Now the consequences of such a transformation are immense, visible as clearly in nature as any of the facts recorded by physics or astronomy. The being who is the object of his own reflection, in consequence of that very doubling back on himself, becomes in a flash able to raise himself into a new sphere. In reality, another world is born. Abstraction, logic, reasoned choice and inventions, mathematics, art, calculation of space and time, anxieties and dreams of love—all these activities of *inner life* are nothing else than the effervescences of the newly-formed center as it explodes onto itself.

Dr. Maslow's contribution includes the following:

Many psychologists are content to work with but a portion of the human being, indeed making a virtue of such limitation. They forget that ultimately their task is to give us a unified, empirically based concept of the whole human being, *i.e.*, a philosophy of human nature. This takes courage and demands a willingness to step away from the narrow platform of certainty. Such certainty is of necessity narrow, for the reason that our knowledge is insufficient to allow us to be sure of anything but small bits of the complex human problem. . . . The fear seems to be that once we admit creativeness we may involve ourselves with all sorts of poets, artists, musicians and other questionable people who don't have a Ph.D. in psychology and are therefore clearly social climbers without any right or qualification to know anything about human nature.

The contributions (some forty in all) are uniformly excellent, as would be expected from work properly designated as a "break-through." The following, on "freedom," is by Maurice Kahn Temerlin:

Personal responsibility, as a subjective experience rather than as a legal or moral concept, refers to a state of consciousness in which the individual holds himself accountable for his own

actions. Usually, the behavior for which a person holds himself responsible is experienced by him as an expression of himself and his own wishes; he sees himself as the active agent in his own behavior. As contrasted to determinism, which is experienced as a compulsion to behave in a particular way, the experience of personal responsibility means that, in the past, the individual felt himself free to do what he now holds himself responsible for. . . . [In] the extreme case, the man who lacks the experience of being able to choose, as in psychosis has lost a large part of his potentiality for selfhood. The point is that the experience of choice requires a sense of self, reciprocally, the exercise of choice is an affirmation of selfhood. "Man is never more human than at the moment of decision," as Tillich put it.

Finally, from Erich Fromm, there is this on the (promethean) difference between animals and humans:

Self-awareness, reason and imagination disrupt the "harmony" which characterizes animal existence. Their emergence has made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe. He is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends the rest of nature.

One final word: These are all expressions of a science of psychology which makes the vocabulary of the great tradition of philosophy once more accessible to man. *We know what these people mean.*

FRONTIERS Means to Peace

THE Elizabethan world-view, if we could somehow manage to renew a purified version of it, would solve a great many problems for the modern world. How would the Elizabethan world-view do this? Well, it would help us to connect things up. If you can become convinced—really convinced—that there are causal relationships between the various levels of human experience; if you believe that what a man does in his private life has a moral as well as a practical effect on the socio-political community; if you think that the quality of "men of high degree" has far-reaching influence on the fabric of the social life, regardless of the political system which happens to prevail; and if you are persuaded that all these relationships, regarded singly or taken as a whole, are under the subtle governance of an all-pervasive moral law—if these are your opinions, then you are in some sense a subscriber to the Elizabethan world-view.

Take for example the general problem of working for world peace. A quotation from *The Fraternal Society*, by Richard and Hephzibah Hauser, will illustrate one statement of this problem:

The problem of peace must be humanized so that it can be brought within the orbit of every man and woman, each of whom would be helped to find something immediate which they can tackle in their own situation. . . . War is simply the greatest expression of a general condition of social inadequacy growth toward social identification on all levels is the only sure and realistic way of attacking violence from the root upwards. Social inadequacy shows itself in the cruelty of organized violence just as it does in the petty misery caused by the constant daily neglect of individuals. Only by the development of greater social understanding, by constantly stimulating people to identify themselves with one another at all levels personal and communal, national and international and by activating groups so they will endeavor to dispel social ignorance wherever they find it, can progress be made.

Now here, it seems to us, is a plea, on empirical grounds, for the Elizabethan world-view. How does the individual become a member of the whole? He can do so only by being a part of some kind of *order*—and this membership in an order must be something more than a contractual relation: it must be *felt*. How do we feel with, empathize with, others? The modern word is *identification*. The Elizabethan world-view was a conceptual or metaphysical frame for having such feelings. And when the feelings died off—from a variety of causes, including the decay of religion, the impact of science, the celebration of individualism, and the atomization of knowledge—the metaphysical structure blew away in the strong winds of revolution.

A modern, functional restoration of this structure seems to be on the way through a wide sensing of deep need for the kind of feeling that was rationalized by the Elizabethan (originally Platonic and Neoplatonic) world-view. Increasingly, atomistic political manipulation is rejected as a way to overcome basic social problems. In a conversation entitled "The Roots of Violence," participated in by Theodore Roszak, editor of *Peace News*, Richard Hauser, head of the London Center for Group Studies, and Cecil Ballentine, vice-chairman of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (printed in *Peace News* for Feb. 26), Roszak spoke critically of what might be termed the atomistic approach to putting an end to war. One wing of the peace movement in the United States, Roszak said, "sees no need of involving itself in any form of social agitation or reform, because it sees the war problem as something purely international in character, which can be settled even if all the internal relations among people within the societies remain just as wretched and unjust as they often are." Richard Hauser made this comment:

Perhaps an illustration of what you and I are saying here—and I think Cecil will agree with us—is the Quaker attitude. If the Quakers had stuck to their peace testimony, important as it is for them, they would have been just a harmless bunch of pacifists.

But the fact that their witness, individually or in groups, really covered everything from mental patients to slavery—all this helped to give this tiny bunch of people far greater impact. They reached out in many different directions and didn't say, "We are just specialists in war and peace."

Agreeing, as Mr. Hauser anticipated, Cecil Ballentine remarked:

It's become a cliché now to say that almost everybody who marched at Aldermaston also wore an anti-apartheid badge, particularly the young people. There was never any question on their part of seeing the daily ethics of living—the problems which they coped with in their daily life at school or at university or at work—as something separate from their commitment to the Campaign. It's only when we tried to create an ideology for the Campaign that this problem seemed to come into much greater prominence than it perhaps deserved.

This difficulty encountered in devising an "ideology" for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament may be an illustration of the practical problems of people who are trying to "feel" their way to a structured view of the world and their role in it, yet lack any sort of metaphysical schema which relates them to others at various levels of "unity." A workable schema, of course, has to be *felt* all the way, for then there is a general sense of organic participation, so long as each one does what he knows how to do. The need is to see the relationship and contribution of the part to the whole, however minor the work of that part. The metaphysical or conceptual account of all these relationships is important as rational justification for feeling and believing in the universal aspect of one's own activity. Without this justification, there may be a compulsion to act at a superficially "universal" level, without the organic connections which these men are talking about. As Hauser says:

To come back to CND, there was a chance to take on responsibility; but it was a superficial responsibility for "mankind." Well, mankind is too wishy-washy on the level of day-to-day life. However good you felt on Sunday evening after a demonstration, mankind has to be taken care of on Monday mornings too. . . .

Perhaps the peace movement is a movement which is only interested in peace, even if the whole world otherwise goes to hell. If one wants to be holier than thou, or "peace-ier" than thou, then of course one is right to say, "please do not let us get off this particular beaten track." But if one wishes to involve the people themselves, if one wishes to impinge on the mentality of the millions of people who do not understand then one doesn't get into the isolated situation of the peace movement. . . . These distant problems of international conciliation are something we still must learn to solve, so let us practice on the immediacy level; let us grow through our experience and be sure that we take the people with us or that the people take us with them, which may be equally likely. If we are only anti-destructive and not socially constructive, then we will be small people and we still deservedly get nowhere.

I think there is a tremendous hope, because people look for new values. People are sick of living in a vacuum of values. They want to have values they can live by *at once*.

The foregoing is no doubt an accurate analysis of some of the shortcomings of the peace movement. And yet, it seems reasonable to say that in large measure the kind of dialogue pursued by these three men is itself a fruit of the agitations and demonstrations of the peace movement. In the long run, while the peace movement may not bring peace, it may help to bring some of the things that make for peace. And until we get peace, therefore, the peace movement, despite its atomistic concentration on the major evil of war, will have to go on.

Let us return to Richard Hauser's reference to the Quakers. He speaks of the great impact of this "tiny bunch of people" on their times. Why should this be? Well, for one thing, the Quakers have deep faith in a transcendent as well as immanent principle of unity—"There is that of God in every man." This gives them a faith in the individual which works against submission to plausible "historical" or manipulating solutions for human problems. They seek primary causation in individuals. And they don't seem to feel that if the "historical" cause is lost, all is lost. So they don't get hysterical in times of stress. They just keep on

working at whatever they know how to do. Yet they know that war is a dramatic instance of man's inhumanity to man—an introductory course, so to speak, to study of the more general, and possibly more fundamental, question of a truly constructive human life. Without the introduction, the fundamental question may never be asked, so the Quakers are in the peace movement to stay.

We have a letter from a reader which says much the same thing as the foregoing, although in a different vocabulary. We print it as a conclusion, and to provide further illustration of the trend to "organic" thinking. This writer says:

Recent articles in your publication have instilled in me the desire to express a few points in regard to the problems of the people versus the state; to wit:

(1) The people do not constitute an outgrowth of the state, but rather, the state of the people. The problems of the state will not be solved by idealistically looking for solutions *on the outside*, i.e., from the "outside, in." These problems are to be solved by taking a more intelligent view of the situation, becoming concerned with the nature of man in all its ramifications, from the "inside, out."

(2) This will involve depth analysis of institutions and things, as you have attempted. But I believe that the fundamental point of departure will and always must remain the individual in his relation to these things.

(3) Such depth analysis may preclude any specific formulatable remedies for the situation at large. It may, rather, involve specific formulations from the standpoint of the individual.

(4) This will involve a good look at the specific forms of schizophrenia exercised by the populace, in regard to such fundamental problems as race relations in America, foreign aid, and education in schools. These problems you have attempted to analyze, and have succeeded to a large degree [!] We *must concentrate* on these things, for the psychic health of mankind in this present age.

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