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A PRE-POLITICAL PROGRAM

FROM time to time MANAS receives letters from correspondents who wish to engage the interest of the editors in some large political solution for the problems of the world, such as the balancing and reconciliation of conflicting interests through world law. When this happens, we are obliged to reconsider our assumptions concerning politics, since such proposals have so much reason in them, but our conclusion, so far, has always been the same. It is that one big power system, supposing it could be made psychologically acceptable, is not the prime solution for the problems of a lot of little power systems. The kind of a society we should like to play a part in bringing about would be a society in which the resort to power is thought of last, instead of first. But since fear of aggression, and questions about the means to prevent it, are always in the foreground of the anxieties of present-day political thinking, you barely get started on the idea of world law before the matter of police power claims the discussion. So, from our point of view, you are drawn into an argument which insists upon taking up last things first. This is the politicalization of social philosophy—a process to which we do not intend to contribute.

But, some one will say, you have to be *practical!* Indeed yes, but being practical is a matter of definitions and of values. The social contract is a means by which individuals bring an organized community into being, under terms which define the rights and obligations of all its members. The purpose of the contract is to create conditions which permit an optimum flow of the good and which restrain or hold to a minimum the expression of evil. The contract does not *create* the good, it only regulates or facilitates its flow. It follows that the terms of the contract will vary with the ideas of the good and the capacity of the people to give their ideas expression. The terms of the contract are a source of endless controversy, since questions about the good and its embodiment in human beings are ultimate philosophical questions which have never been settled.

Usually, in a political argument, the man who insists upon being practical is a man who wants you to *ignore* the unsettled questions. This means, really, that he wants you to pay no attention to the values which the social contract came into being to protect.

In the literature of the social contract adopted by the people of the United States there are two direct and clear references to the unsettled questions. The first is in the Declaration of Independence, which speaks of the unalienable right of every citizen to the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness. The American social contract does not define happiness, but establishes as an expression of the good the right of the individual to make his own definition of happiness. The Bill of Rights, incorporated in the first ten amendments to the Constitution, is intended to give that right absolute political security. It denies to the Government the power to settle the unsettled questions. In effect, therefore, the Constitution sets these questions aside as being beyond the scope of political decision. It is of the essence of the politics of free men to refuse to politicalize questions which, in the nature of things, cannot be dealt with by the political process. This is the meaning of the Secular State.

It may happen, and does happen, in a society of this sort, that many men in their personal activities and inclinations vulgarize the idea of the good and introduce into the common parlance of the time definitions of the good which corrupt manners, morals, and the law. Then other men, in an effort to restrain or control the resulting evils, begin to make new laws. One of the consequences of this practice is that creation of the good is thought to be a specialty of legal minds. The vital distinction between the creation of the good, which takes place in individual human beings, and the opening of channels for its flow, which is a political process, is

lost in the complexity of the total situation. The apparent dependence of the good upon the political structure of the community (including, of course, all economic relations which are shaped by political decision) in time completes the politicalization of the idea of the good. After this has happened, the social community is psychologically prepared to abandon its ancient prohibition of political answers to the unsettled questions. It will not abandon the prohibition openly, since this would be a break with hallowed tradition, but it will nullify the tradition by establishing a series of taboos which *in effect* settle the unsettled questions. The ground for justifying this tendency is a statistical resolution of the questions. The People, we are told, want to survive and be "free." Therefore, the children of the people must be taught to believe in God (an unsettled question), and to believe that their nation's intentions have the interest and sanction of God (a quite unsettled question), and the vague, contradictory, and grossly expedient policies of the nation in foreign affairs are linked by rhetorical implication with preservation not merely of our bodies, but our souls.

The net of this trend is a tacit acknowledgement—acknowledgement by default of any other view—that the coercive power of military violence is the ultimate guarantor of the good of human beings. This is a mood resisted by some, accepted reluctantly by others, but sanctioned by the apathy and fear of the majority. It is not a mood which prepares the people for the solution of their problems by application of a theory of world law which, of itself, in no way exposes delusion of reliance on the social contract for the production of the good.

By the magnificence of its all-inclusiveness, and by its cleanly abstract neglect of the countless delegations of primary individual responsibility for the good to the political process, the proposal of a system of world law promises that one big system will do what many little ones have not been able to do. This analysis assumes, on the evidence that the crisis in world affairs has arisen from the conflict of interest of sovereign power states, that the defects which need correction are in the forms of political organization, and not in the people who formed the political organizations. The assumption, we think, is manifestly false. It proposes to eliminate the effects of a delusion—the delusion of reliance on the social contract as the prime source of the good—by multiplying the delusion by a factor of infinity.

William Saroyan has a short story with a whimsical parallel to this situation. In it a high school boy determines that he will win a foot race. He secures a book on the psychology of victory. Nightly, he submits to the emotional splendor of crossing the tape first. He does not train. Why should he? He has the secret of success. That hard muscles and skill in running are needed to win never occurs to him. The vision—and there is nothing wrong with the vision—sustains him until the day of the race, in which he falls flat on his face.

World law is a wonderful idea—an obvious idea, one might say—but it won't work without the development of qualities and skills which are the endowment of people in whom the good rises as a natural expression of their lives, so that when they turn to politics, they expect of whatever form of social contract they devise only what it is capable of doing for them, and no more. If these qualities and skills are not present, world law will fall flat on its face.

Where do such qualities and skills come from? They come from deliberate and unrelieved concentration upon the unanswered questions. For human beings, this is the real business of life.

We have stated this proposition in absolute form, disliking the paternalism of the claim that the search for philosophic truth must be compromised in behalf of the billions who are not interested. We leave to Aristotle the view that philosophy is for retired country gentlemen.

Politics is the region of natural compromise in human affairs. There should be no compromise on questions of meaning. The political compromises will come soon enough from the frailties of human nature and ought not to be built into the conception of ideal ends. All the evils of totalitarianism, of the omnipotent state, grow out of the presumption of planners who are willing to tell you who or how many of the people are interested in studying

unanswered questions. These planners are the people who believe in statistical (political) resolutions of philosophical issues and who, before they get through, make legislative formulas which transform men from subjects into objects. If you resist what they propose, they tell you that philosophy is a fine thing, but that we are faced with an emergency and must be *practical*. So it goes, and the management of our affairs continues to be entrusted to the tinkerers with the political machine.

A reader writes to ask:

> What have you written in past issues about the political theory of Pluralism as a system to realize your manifest ideal of individual freedom and self-realization? (There is a problem of unusual proportions in labeling this "ism." It goes by so many names: Co-opism, Anarchism, Utopian Socialism, Associationism, even Federalism—but all have in common social organization based on voluntary association.)
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> Writers associated with this kind of thought include Harold Laski (in his earlier work), G. D. H. Cole, Herbert Read, Martin Buber *(Paths in Utopia)*, Rudolf Rocker, and the anarchists of the turn of the century—Kropotkin, Goldman, etc.
>
> But in general there is no contemporary formulation of pluralism that I know of. It preaches devolution instead of revolution, or evolution—that the individual need not be forced into the hopeless (and immoral) necessity of having to change the way of life of 180 millions in order to live in a society whose norms approximate his own personal values.

The answer to the question which begins this letter, asking what we have said about political pluralism, is—not much. The fact is that the United States is already a pluralistic society. The functions, at any rate, of very nearly every form of political economy can be found in the loosely knit organizations of American society. These differentiations have been practical developments to meet perceived need, rather than applications of political theory or ideological doctrine. Today, the large commercial corporation operates as a modified corporate state, responding to the leadership of the president or the chairman of the board. Socialism is represented in a broad spectrum of fields, including protection of person and property, transport of the mails, construction and maintenance of highways and of harbors and waterways. Land reclamation and flood control are state functions, also forestry, while education, electric power, low-rent housing, and banking and credit are largely the responsibility of the government and becoming more so.

It is obvious, however, that the pluralism of the American society is not moving in the direction of Guild Socialism—under which groups of producers would freely cooperate without any central coercive authority—but rather toward a mammoth welfare state in which the individual loses his role and his independence almost entirely. We like to read about the dreams of the Kropotkin anarchists as much as anyone else, just as we like to read about the Hopi Indian society and about the decentralized society of Burma in the late nineteenth century, but we try to remember, at the same time, that we are attracted by the values implicit in these social arrangements rather than by the political conceptions which give the values a frame. We see absolutely no possibility of getting arrangements of that sort until war is abolished as an instrument of national policy, and we are not able to conceive of the precise political arrangements that will come along with the abolition of war. We think it must be taken for granted that the outlawing of war will represent the most far-reaching revolution in human history and it seems to us silly to attempt to chart the political forms to follow this revolution.

So far as we can see, Jayaprakash Narayan has touched the heart of the matter when he said that what is called for is the "construction of a new type of human being." He continues:

> The importance of such human reconstruction is admitted on all sides, but I am afraid no sooner is the admission made than it is forgotten and everyone joins in the race to get on the State wagon. Clearly, if human reconstruction is the key to socialist reconstruction, and if that is beyond the scope of the State, the emphasis in the socialist movement must change from political action to such work of reconstruction.
>
> What will be the dynamics of such a movement? So far the dynamic of social change has been the conflict of self-interests. The self-interest of labor has been juxtaposed to the self-interest of capital, the

> intermediary interests choosing their sides according to their own view of the main conflict. Labor actuated by self-interest wishes to create a different social order in which it is assumed that selfishness will not rule the lives of men. Here you have a fundamental contradiction. . . . Equality and freedom of the individual has been such that he voluntarily is prepared to limit his wants and his freedom in the interest of his fellow human beings. . . .

Mr. Narayan is talking about exactly the same thing that we were talking about when we spoke of the production of the good being beyond the scope of politics. And, it seems to us, to give much time to the question of the political forms that would be suitable for an ideal society would be to distract attention from the main issue. We need to get back to the pre-political community of human beings. We can't get back there actually, of course; we can do it only hypothetically, by an act of the imagination; or, in Horace Alexander's summary of Gandhi's working philosophy:

> The best way to begin working for the freedom of your country is to act as if it were free today; in other words, begin to build up all the useful mutual services that will give true dignity to the country when it does achieve its freedom. . . .

If you like the idea of the voluntary, anarchist community, in other words, you can start living as if you were in one. It is difficult, of course; especially at first. But the revolutionists of the past were willing to sleep under bridges and die before firing squads. They warped their lives out of commitment to an ideal which involved extreme self-sacrifice. What the present revolution, Gandhi-style, calls for is refusing to warp yourself any more than you must. It calls for trying to live like a whole man in a socially mutilated community. So live as though you had no State, and needed none. How else will the functions of the State ever get reduced?

It goes without saying that the individual or family which moves in this direction will find itself tangled in a whole mess of theoretical and even practical contradictions, but what of that? The contradictions are not as bad as those which haunt the people who are being herded along to their ruin by the great military powers of the world.

Participate *directly* in no joint undertaking the success of which depends in any decisive way upon the coercion of other human beings. You are born as a party to an existing social contract which may have features you don't like. You have comparatively little control over the terms of that contract. But tomorrow's social contract is as yet unwritten, and the most important feature of that contract will be the latitude it allows to the individual for the production of human good. This is a practical, not a theoretical question. Tomorrow's social contract will not make room for good that is not *being expressed*—already in production, that is. Free social forms cannot be created except by men who are already free.

What sort of men are these? Well, they are the men we like to write about and quote in these pages, men such as Tolstoy, Thoreau, Gandhi, Paine, Whitman, and some others. These were men who had their freedom regardless of their time and circumstances. They were men of enormous intensity in their lives and their work. They created regions of freedom by moving around and gaining room for freedom by using it. If we can get enough men of this sort, we shall easily find the pattern of social organization which fits the activities to which they are devoted. But whatever the men we get, the pattern of society will either spread out or close in to fit their activities.

REVIEW
YUGEN ON STAGE

"TRYING to shape foreign plays into English so that they will be serviceable works for the theatre rather than exercises in philology is a perilous undertaking." This statement by Earle Ernst occurs in the preface to his *Three Japanese Plays from the Traditional Theatre* (Oxford University Press, $6.00). It suggests the constant resolution of conflicting demands, the sustained empathy for another culture, and the "fearful joy" in attempting the unlikely which must have gone into this book. Earle Ernst is professor of drama and theatre at the University of Hawaii. He is probably best known to MANAS readers as the author of *Kabuki Theatre,* which, since its publication in 1956, has become one of the few definitive works in English on its subject.

Three Japanese Plays is remarkable in several respects. First, it brings together three plays never before published in English translation. Each play represents a traditional form of Japanese theatre: the Noh, the Joruri (Doll Theatre), and the Kabuki. Each play, moreover, has an introductory essay in which Ernst discusses in detail the history of the form, its stage conventions, and its particular theatrical appeal. Of special interest to the student of Asian culture is the essay on the Doll Theatre, the form so largely and (because of its persistent historical influence) unjustly neglected in the West. But it is the plays themselves—their liveliness, their humor, their pathos, their omnicultural pertinence to the human situation—which will recommend the book to most readers.

The first play, "The Maple Viewing," represents the Noh tradition. The time is autumn, in the 11th century; the place is Mount Togakushi in Shinano Province. As the curtains part, a Gentlewoman and her Ladies-in-Waiting walk slowly onto a small bridge. In unison they chant their intention to "hasten deep into the mountains,/ Excursion bent,/ To view the scarlet leaves." The Gentlewoman, apparently a lady of rank, describes herself as merely "a person who lives in this vicinity." Lonely and disenchanted, she explains how she has organized the maple viewing in order to reestablish connections with the source of all life. When she and her entourage reach a mountain glade, she orders curtains and folding screens set about, sees that rice wine is served, and conducts the maple viewing party as a ritual. In the meantime another group walks onto the bridge: the young general Koremochi and his Gentleman Attendants. Koremochi has been sent by imperial command to annihilate the demons dwelling on Mount Togakushi and harassing the countryside. He has been enjoying himself greatly along the way, viewing the autumn colors and hunting deer. Now he and his men come upon the Gentlewoman and her party. After an exchange of formal courtesies, Koremochi and the Gentlewoman share wine. As the Chorus, commenting on the feelings of both, makes clear, Koremochi has become smitten with the Gentlewoman and she seems on the point of returning his interest. Koremochi, who has hitherto lived like a monk, grows more and more confused with wine and emotion. Speaking for him, the Chorus says:

> Even without the temptings of such earthly beauty,
> Still there is the thing called wine
> To corrupt man's heart
> Even as a bamboo
> May force its way between the rocks.
> At the very moment of thinking
> I would not so much as sip the dew
> That falls from that bamboo
> There the wine was before me—
> And lo!
> How inconsistent is man's will.

Koremochi continues to reproach himself until at last he falls into a drunken sleep. Then the Gentlewoman begins her formal dance, gradually mounting in intensity with the music. Her Ladies-in-Waiting join the dance as the Chorus speaks for all of them:

> And so he slumbers here,

Deep in the mountain cove
Beset by night and frightful storm,
Dreaming of the rising of the moon.
Even the sleeve on which he rests his head
In lone sleep
Is wet as though with heavy dew . . .
Oh,
Waken not from dreaming.
Oh,
Waken not from dreaming.

At this point there is an interlude. Takenouchi, a minor Shinto deity (and a stock character in Noh), addresses the audience. He explains that the Gentlewoman and her Ladies-in-Waiting are really the demons Koremochi has been sent to destroy. Learning of his approach, the demons turned themselves into lovely maidens in order to lure Koremochi to his death. But Hachiman, patron saint of brave warriors, has heard of Koremochi's peril and sent Takenouchi to warn him and to give him an invincible sword so that he may fulfill his mission.

In Act II Koremochi awakes much the worse for drink, but remembers the warning Takenouchi gave him in a dream. The Gentlewoman now abandons her disguise and appears as a ferocious red and gold demon. After a violent struggle (depicted in a symbolic dance) she is finally killed by Koremochi.

Though "The Maple Viewing" is short for a Noh play, it exemplifies the essentials of the tradition. Some of the more important ways in which Noh contrasts with Western dramatic traditions are suggested by Ernst:

> The area of dramatic activity of the Noh play shows the same distance and remoteness from the world of actuality as the physical techniques with which it is performed. In this respect the Noh script also shows the influence of Zen, for Zen concerns itself basically with escape from the exigencies of time and place, and the Noh play moves in a shadowy realm at the edge of life and death. . . . It is difficult to think of Western plays which take place in a comparable region. Yeats experimented in the form of the Noh, and Maeterlinck in such plays as *The Intruder* and in his essays suggested a like theatre. The Western theatre has concerned itself almost wholly with the here and now, and its fearsome ghosts and apparitions are not figures of central interest; they appear only to influence action in the world of actuality. . . . Western drama shows human activity in the complex, ambiguous movement of the character, rarely in the reduction of the life of man to a single fulcrum, poised at the point where the now and the hereafter touch and where the problem of the tortured spirit has a single solution. Western tragedy establishes a focal point in actual time, and its hero is caught up in life's fitful fever. . . . When Oedipus is at last received by the gods, when Macbeth's head is brought on the stage by Macduff, the drama is finished. In the context of the Noh it has just begun. If the entire past of the Noh is reconstructed, it frequently reveals all the conflict, struggle, pain, and bloodshed of the most agitated and lurid melodrama. But none of this appears in the theatre. The actual events are faded and distant; only the essence of the experience of living remains If the spirit of Oedipus were to come again to Colonus and tell of his great moment of horror, or if the ghost of Macbeth were to recount his sufferings in hell and to relive in stylized dance the murder of Duncan, the nature of the piece would be close to the Noh and to the sphere of theatrical activity which Maeterlinck describes as "the truly tragic in life [which] begins only at the moment when what are called adventures, sorrows, and dangers have passed."

The second play, "The House of Sugawara," represents the Joruri tradition. Unlike "The Maple Viewing," it has many major and minor characters, an involved but compelling double-plot, and frequent comic upsets. Ernst calls it "an ingenious blend of legend, history, and contemporary event"—in short, typical Doll Theatre material. It involves the following historical background. Sugawara Michizane was a famous provincial governor born in 845. Because of his scholarly attainments, especially his skill in calligraphy, he rose rapidly to eminence. Eventually he became the favorite of the Emperor Uda who installed him at the court in Kyoto, consulted him on all important matters, and finally made him a secret offer of the post of Prime Minister. Word of this offer came to the powerful Fujiwara clan which promptly began to plot against Sugawara and forced him into exile. From then till his death in 903 Sugawara occupied himself with poetry and

calligraphy. (In Japan there was and still is a close relationship among poetry, painting, and calligraphy since, as Ernst puts it, "the writing of the language becomes a graphic art in its own right.")

From this background the action of the play develops. It concerns, on the one hand, Sugawara's search for his most deserving pupil, and on the other a struggle for power among three brothers—the triplets Sakuramaru, Umeomaru, and Matsuomaru—who are Sugawara's retainers. Despite the length of the original, which, says Ernst, is never performed today in its entirety, "The House of Sugawara" has genuine audience-appeal:

> It established its rapport with the audience, one might say, in depth, glamorizing commonly-known history and giving it a contemporary feeling, using a touch of the supernatural, which seems always to delight Japanese audiences, romanticizing the behavior of the commoner, and providing, towards the end of the play, scenes of the utmost pathos, which then and now wring tears from the most hard-hearted in the audience. The curious aspect of all this, to the Westerner, is that this effect was and is achieved through the highly stylized medium of the doll theatre, with the manipulators in sight of the audience, the lines of the characters spoken by the *joruri* performer, their thoughts also revealed by him.

Ernst's last point deserves comment. Of the three plays he gives us, it is, paradoxically, "The House of Sugawara"—the marionette play—which shows the most resemblances in character, situation, and dialogue to Western dramatic conventions. These resemblances may, of course, be primarily qualities of the translation. But they seem to be integral parts of the play itself—so much so that without them, either we would have no play or the play would be radically different. They make "The House of Sugawara" what Westerners like to call "realistic." Yet (and here is the paradox again) isn't it true that Westerners tend to down-grade puppet and marionette theatre generally as "artificial," "childish," and irremediably deficient in dramatic value? We can, if we wish, name some notable exceptions—Gordon Craig, Miles Lee, Paul Claudel—but they are exceptions. Ernst sums up the paradox:

> . . . it is not unusual to see a foreign couple in Japan taking their small children to the Bunraku Theatre, having heard, doubtless, about the marionette plays, and determined to give their children a jolly afternoon. After an hour or so they leave in bewilderment, if not in anger, at not having seen the Japanese version of a Punch and Judy show.

The third play, "Benten the Thief," represents the Kabuki tradition. It depicts the last days in the lurid career of a professional thief. Blackmailer, burglar, master of disguise, Benten is a wonderfully conceived character: a role any actor would love. His criminal excesses give him a kind of comic-pathetic stature much like that of the notorious highwayman in Henry Fielding's *Jonathan Wild the Great.* At the end of the play, after a violent fight in which Benten drives off his pursuers, he stands on a temple roof, strikes an attitude of flamboyant despair, and says:

> This is the end of Benten the thief. I strangled Kotaro, I drove Princess Senju to her death. And all the while, I did not know that Kotaro's father was my father's lord. In truth, I am the murderer of my own master. The treasure of his House has fallen into the torrent, it has disappeared in the whirling waters. My body, too, will plunge into the waves of hell. My pursuers, look upon the death of Benten Kozo!

And with those words Benten holds his sword before him, drives it into his belly, and falls to the roof. The climax, like that of many another Kabuki play, is melodramatic. As we read it or see it performed, we may say to ourselves, incredulously and in an effort to dissociate ourselves from Benten, "No, it can't be . . . it's just another of Benten's tricks." Then, a few minutes later, we are shocked into belief. One of Benten's followers, Daemon, finds Benten dead and, giving vent to his grief, informs us of an astounding fact:

> Seventeen short years! Scarcely grown to manhood, Benten has fallen in the flower of his youth. It's a great pity!

At that moment we feel the pity as an undertone of the entire play. We sense it mingling

with the terror we have grown to identify with Benten. We experience, within the conventions of Kabuki, something like a tragic catharsis. We can understand why, in an anticlimax, the grieving Daemon suddenly gives himself up to his pursuers.

As we have seen, *Three Japanese Plays* is more than an anthology. It is also more than an informal history of three Japanese dramatic traditions—though this feature alone ought to place it on the reading lists of the general reader, the amateur or professional actor, and the producer interested in presenting an authentic Japanese play. It is a demonstration-in-three-parts of the dramatic power of *Yugen.* One of the pioneer dramatist-producers of Noh, Zeami (1363-1443) referred to *yugen* as "the sense of what lies beneath the surface." Arthur Waley, in his study of Noh, attempted to define *yugen* as "the subtle as opposed to the obvious; the hint as opposed to the statement." On the other hand, the fifth-century Indian dramatist Kalidasa probably never attempted to define *yugen*, but his "Shakuntala" shows he understood its power as well as Zeami. In our own time and culture, Pound, Brecht, Yeats, and Stevens have each sought with varying success to "translate" *yugen* into dramatic form.

Now if some obliging time-machine made it possible to bring together Zeami, Kalidasa, Pound, Brecht, Yeats, Stevens, and one or two other qualified spirits, they would no doubt tell us that *yugen*, of all things under the sun, need not be defined in order to be known. Why try to define something known so well by its effects upon the responsive mind? One characteristic of yugen is that it carries you to a realm beyond definition and even (and they would whisper or shout this) to a realm beyond art. It is "subjective," true enough. But you do not respond to it, and should not respond to it, as a device, pattern, or private nuance of an individual artist. It is no holiday from reality. If you want to call your total response to it an aesthetic experience, then, you may—but you do so gratuitously. For the effects of yugen are binding and unbinding, revealing and releasing: they are effects not of Making but of Being.

Davis, California RALPH S. POMEROY

COMMENTARY
SOME TURNS TOWARD PEACE

ABOUT the best brief description of the Turn Toward Peace movement that has appeared in current magazines is an editorial in the *Progressive* for February, which says:

> The near-range goal of the movement is—no less—to turn the nation away from "the threat of war as the central thrust of American foreign policy," and to direct it toward "alternatives which are not based on willingness to surrender either freedom or democratic values." Its long-range goal is "universal agreement on a disarmed world under law, safe for free societies." This is heady wine, but what impresses us is that while Turn Toward Peace reaches toward the stars, it seems to have roots deep in the reality of our own perilous time.

The Student Union demonstration (8,000 strong) in Washington last month was one evidence of the gathering strength of the turn toward peace. We need now to hear from some of the parents of such students.

This is not so unimaginable as it sounds. The *Nation* for Feb. 10 has a story on Eugene, Oregon, with the title, "A City Chooses Peace." The story, which is by Robert Martinson, begins:

> On December 19, 1961, a terse proclamation was issued in the city of Eugene, Oregon, signed Edwin F. Cone, Mayor. It began simply, "WHEREAS" and then proceeded with laconic brevity to the blunt and rather startling conclusion that "the United States must take the initiative for peace."

Eugene is not a big city, but it is not small, either, being the fifth largest commercial center of the Pacific Northwest (population 52,000). Eugene happens to have a remarkable mayor, a Eugene Peace Information Center (EPIC), and enough people in town responsive to the appeal and promise of the Turn Toward Peace movement ("more in the nature of a miracle than an organization," Mr. Martinson remarks) to "make a complete break with the politics of Armageddon, a modern equivalent of the medieval belief that the end of the world is just around the corner." A piddling attempt to smear Turn Toward Peace leaders brought an editorial in the Eugene newspaper:

> It is folly to think that one can't be for both America and peace. Indeed, how can one be for America, for the healthy America we know and love, without being for peace also?

This is not exactly a step toward the anarcho-pacifist beloved community, but it marks a sanity which still exists in many American communities, and it is in the sanity of the people, and not in blueprints for a political utopia, that our hope for the future lies. By deepening and strengthening the sanity we have now, we may generate the resources for growing a social organism that expresses the good of the kind of people we are, or by then will have become.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

FOR PARENTS OF THE COLLEGE-BOUND

THE phrase, "exposed to education," fairly summarizes the encounter between young people and the most august of those institutions which undertake to provide knowledge and intellectual discipline. Parents of students who are soon to spend the traditional four years at a university will probably want to become familiar with trends in attitude and teaching-practice which are characteristic of the enormously complex collegiate scene. As a serious study of this scene, we recommend *The American College*, a 1000-page compilation edited by Nevitt Sanford, of Stanford University (Wiley & Sons, New York). The subtitle is "A Psychological and Social Interpretation of the Higher Learning."

Dr. Sanford introduces this vast—though not diffuse—work with the following words:

> We, the authors, regard higher education—its policies and processes and the determinants of them—as a field of intellectual inquiry. We have undertaken here a mapping of this field; and we have sought to indicate for its areas what has been done and what needs to be done. At the same time we have tried to construct a basis in theory for the interpretation of existing research and existing observations of the "case" variety, and for the analysis and criticism of current practices. It has been our hope not only that we might contribute to a better understanding of higher education but that, by encouraging more systematic study of what goes on in our colleges, we might also contribute to the general advancement of knowledge of social organizations and of personality development.
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> Practice in higher education, as in politics, remains largely untouched by the facts and principles of science. What our colleges do, tends either to be governed by tradition or to be improvised in the face of diverse—usually unanticipated—pressures. In the literature of the field there is much partisan argument, and little evidence on the basis of which conflicting claims might be evaluated. Very little is known of what effects, if any, the experience of going to college has on students and less of what particular features of the college environment determine such effects as have been observed. The empirical studies that have been done in the past have been mainly of the *ad hoc* variety, separated from systematic theory and so local in their orientation as to make generalization impossible. This state of affairs has persisted despite the fact that during the past twenty-five or thirty years psychology and the newer social sciences have advanced rapidly, producing concepts and theories, methods of investigation and much factual knowledge, all of immediate relevance to problems of education.

This book is not dull reading. For example, the contribution by Dr. Joseph Adelson, titled "The Teacher as a Model," illustrates the prevailing forms of psychological orientation in teacher-student relationships at the university level. The college entrant, he points out, is "exposed" to widely varying influences which originate, not in the subject being taught, but in the personalities of the instructors. Just as there may be considered to be several distinct modes of healing—"shamanism, magic, religion, mysticism"—so in teaching there is the shamanistic or charming, the magical, the religious, and the empirical approach. "This typology," says Dr. Adelson, "may be useful for treating other such forms of interaction as those that obtain between teacher and student." He adds that "those teachers who define themselves primarily as experts in subject matter are roughly equivalent to naturalistic healers, in that the relationship to the client is in both cases impersonal and task-oriented." He illustrates the other categories:

> *The teacher as shaman.* Here the teacher's orientation is narcissistic. The public manner does not matter; this type of teacher is not necessarily vain or exhibitionistic; he may in fact appear to be withdrawn, diffident, even humble. Essentially, however, he keeps the audience's attention focused on himself. He invites us to observe the personality in its encounter with the subject matter. He stresses charm, skill, mane, in the self's entanglement with ideas. When this orientation is combined with unusual gifts, we have a *charismatic* teacher, one of those outstanding and memorable personalities who seem more than life-size. This tells us only part of the

story. In that group of teachers whom we term narcissistic, we find considerable variation in the degree of impact on the student. In some cases, the narcissistic teacher's impression on us is strong but transient; they move us, but the spell does not survive the moment. We admire them as we admire a great performer; in their presence we dream of doing as well ourselves. But when the occasion is past, we return to our mundane selves, out of the spell, unchanged, uninfluenced.

The teacher as priest. The priestly healer claims his power not through personal endowment, but through his office; he is the agent of an omnipotent authority. The teacher's personal authority depends in some part on his position on the ladder of authority. Although the teacher is superordinate to the student, he is in turn subordinate to more elevated figures. The student internalizes the group's system of hierarchy, and learns that he is beholden not only to his teacher but to other members of the hierarchy. One of the distinctive features of this mode of teaching is that both teacher and student may share a common model or group of models, either exalted contemporaries or great ancestors.

The teacher as mystic healer. The mystic healer finds the source of illness in the patient's personality. He rids his patient of disease by helping him to correct an inner flaw or to realize a hidden strength. The analogy here—perhaps it is a remote one—is to the teacher I will term *altruistic.* He concentrates neither on himself, nor the subject matter, nor the discipline, but on the student, saying: "I will help you become what you are." We may recall Michelangelo's approach to sculpture; looking at the raw block of marble, he tried to uncover the statue within it. So does the altruistic teacher regard his unformed student; this type of teacher keeps his own achievement and personality secondary; he works to help the student find what is best and most essential within himself.

At this point we are uncomfortably close to the rhetoric of the college brochure. This is what the colleges tell us they do; and yet we know how very rarely we find altruistic teaching. Why is it so rare? For one thing, it is a model-less approach to teaching; the teacher points neither to himself nor to some immediately visible figure, but chooses to work with his student's potential and toward an intrinsically abstract or remote ideal. For another, this mode of teaching demands great acumen, great sensitivity—the ability to vary one's attack according to the student and to the phase of teaching, now lenient, now stern, now encouraging, now critical.

From even these partial descriptions it may be seen that there are pitfalls in every type of approach to students. Concluding, Dr. Adelson points up the involvement of teachers as well as pupils with the moral decisions of our times by recalling his own reactions as an undergraduate at the University of California during the initial loyalty oath plague:

> Those of us who were at the University of California during the loyalty oath troubles had a unique opportunity to observe how the moral qualities of our teachers, ordinarily taken for granted and so overlooked, could assume overweening importance in a moment of moral crisis. It was an uncanny time for us: with one part of ourselves we lived in the routine of things, concerned with courses, prelims, dissertations; and all the while our inner, central attention was elsewhere, held in a fretful preoccupation with the morality play in which our teachers were involved. We wondered how things would turn out, of course, but beyond and deeper than that, the intimate, compelling question was whether our models would behave honorably. They did not, not most of them, though for a time we kept ourselves from recognizing this, largely by allying ourselves psychically with the very few who acted heroically while ignoring the very many who did not. It taught us, on the one hand, that moral courage is possible, and on the other, that it is uncommon. All in all, it was a quick and unpleasant education. Perhaps it is just as well for all of us, teachers and students alike, that serious moral examinations occur so rarely.

These various forms of interaction between students and teachers at the university level merit considerable attention on the part of parents. For if there is genuine communication between parent and youth, there will be a sense in which the parents, too, "go to school" all over again in an era separated from their own by only one generation.

FRONTIERS

"New Knowledge in Human Values"

WHENEVER possible, we seek out and read the writings of that unusual psychologist, A. H. Maslow, and thus were recently led to a volume of the above title published in 1959 by the Research Society for Creative Altruism. Dr. Maslow was an ideal choice for writing the preface of this book, for, as many MANAS readers know, he is manifestly convinced that what Viktor Frankl calls the "noëtic" element is a primary, rather than a secondary aspect of the human being. In other words, Dr. Maslow respects the capacity for "altruism," not because a Christian-inspired society has given it a praiseworthy status, but because it is basic in man's nature to honor unselfishness above selfishness, justice above self-aggrandizement. And Maslow has been for years attempting experiments to show that, while we are conditioned by society in the arrangements of our psychic constituents, we still have the capacity to define ourselves inwardly in quite other terms. This theme is reminiscent of Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, yet built upon a psycho-philosophical rather than a religious foundation. Dr. Maslow's Preface begins:

> This volume springs from the belief, first, that the ultimate disease of our time is valuelessness, second, that this state is more crucially dangerous than ever before in history; and finally, that something can be done about it by man's own rational efforts.
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> The state of valuelessness has been variously described as anomie, amorality, anhedonia, rootlessness, emptiness, hopelessness, the lack of something to believe in and to be devoted to. It has come to its present dangerous point because all the traditional value systems ever offered to mankind have in effect proved to be failures (our present state proves this to be so). Furthermore, wealth and prosperity, technological advance, widespread education, democratic political forms, even honestly good intentions and avowals of good will have, by their failure to produce peace, brotherhood, serenity, and happiness, confronted us even more nakedly and unavoidably with the profundities that mankind has been avoiding by its busy-ness with the superficial.
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> We are reminded here of the "neuroses of success." People can struggle on hopefully, and even happily, for false panaceas so long as these are not attained. Once attained, however, they are soon discovered to be false hopes. Collapse and hopelessness ensue and continue until new hopes become possible.
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> We too are in an interregnum between old value systems that have not worked and new ones not yet born, an empty period which could be borne more patiently were it not for the great and unique dangers that beset mankind. We are faced with the real possibility of annihilation, and with the certainty of "small" wars, of racial hostilities, and of widespread exploitation. Specieshood is far in the future.
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> The cure for this disease is obvious. We need a validated, usable system of human values, values that we can believe in and devote ourselves to because "they are true rather than because we are *exhorted to* "believe and have faith."
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> And for the first time in history, many of us feel, such a system—based squarely upon valid knowledge of the nature of man, of his society, and of his works—may be possible.

Dr. Maslow's approach, while essentially philosophical, tends in the direction of the interests long pursued by the Research Society for Creative Altruism under the direction of Pitirim Sorokin. Dr. Sorokin has sought to support with scientific evidence a central conviction of his life—that "altruism," "unselfishness" or "selflessness," are not abnormalities of an innately regressive ego, but express the greatest natural powers in human life. Psychoanalysts and psychiatrists have certainly been right in assuming that the mannered or prideful altruist—who insists on being recognized and admired for his good works—involves himself in self-delusion, and it is clear, also, that the general public can easily be deluded as to the attitudes and motives of the supposed altruist. But when such instances have been disposed of, there remain vast resources of evidence available regarding genuine altruism. But how do you "study" such a problem, and how demonstrate a "higher self" in man? The best

approaches have perhaps not yet been found, and Dr. Sorokin's research group still regards its work as a preparation of the soil for future plantings. In the meantime, he remarks: "The Society is prepared to move steadfastly ahead in carrying out a program which may be described briefly as organizing high-level research in 'moral phenomena and values' and methods of application and dissemination of the results of such research in the most efficient manner possible. Most existing organizations which are pursuing somewhat similar purposes are doing so on the basis of existing knowledge and techniques. It is the determination of this Society to concentrate first and foremost on the development of *new knowledge* and *new methods* for its application."

As readers of MANAS might suspect, a clear statement of the problems involved in the search for new values is supplied by Erich Fromm, whose contribution to *New Knowledge in Human Values* is titled "Value, Psychology, and Human Existence." (Here, too, one may see why Dr. Fromm rejects some of the Freudian absolutes while accepting *other* ideas which were the mark of Freud's greatness.)

Dr. Fromm endeavors to show that the weakness of all psychotherapy is that it is therapy-conscious or therapy-based—whereas an ideal psychological science would begin with satisfactory definition of what mental *health* is, of what "well-being" is, of what human fulfillment is. Fromm writes:

> The answer to life that corresponds to the reality of human existence is conducive to mental health. What is generally understood by mental health, however, is negative, rather than positive; the *absence of sickness, rather than the presence of well-being.*
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> Well-being I would describe as the *ability to be creative, to be aware, and to respond;* to be independent and fully active, and by this very fact to be one with the world. To be concerned with *being,* not with *having;* to experience joy in the very act of living—and to consider living creatively as the only meaning of life. Well-being is not an assumption in the mind of a person. It is expressed in his whole body, in the way he walks, talks, in the tonus of his muscles. Certainly, anyone who wants to achieve this aim must struggle against many basic trends of modern culture.

According to Dr. Fromm, modern man is constrained by his heritage of sin-conscious theology and by current emphasis on the many distortions of the human mind treated in psychoanalysis, to live convinced that there is an inevitable "split between affect and thought, body and mind." It is difficult, therefore, to "achieve the aim of well-being unless we overcome the idea of this split, restore to man his original unity"; for the split "is nothing but a product of our own thought and does not correspond to the reality of man. Dr. Fromm concludes:

> The other obstacle to the achievement of well-being, deeply rooted in the spirit of modern society, is the fact of man's dethronement from his supreme place. The nineteenth century said: God is dead; the twentieth century could say: man is dead. Means have been transformed into ends, the production and consumption of things has become the aim of life, to which living is subordinated. We produce things that act like men and men that act like things. Man has transformed himself into a thing and worships the products of his own hands; he is alienated from himself and has regressed to idolatry, even though he uses God's name. Emerson already saw that "things are in the saddle and ride mankind." Today many of us see it. The achievement of well-being is possible only under one condition: if *we put man back into the saddle.*