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CREEPING ETHICS

IT is too soon, perhaps, to speak of the new philosophizing mood apparent in so many directions as a "wave," but it is certainly not too soon to say that it may become a wave of potent influence in the not distant future. This mood is not really vague or indecisive, although it has certain traits which past criticism has commonly spoken of in these terms. Such characterizations depend more upon what you think is happening than upon precise definition of what you experience of expressions of this mood.

The general scope of this discussion may be initially framed by a quotation from a book on cultural anthropology by Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and its Transformations* (Cornell University Press, 1953). Prof. Redfield sets out to show the change in human attitudes from what he calls the "primitive world view" to the modern outlook. He proposes that Western civilization had its earliest beginnings in an environment of belief in a universe of moral forces with which human beings have constant and decisive relations. This world view, you might say, survived in the West until Elizabethan times and found its last great expression in the plays of Shakespeare—as, for example, in *Macbeth* and *Hamlet*, in which cosmic, political, and personal situations are exhibited as interrelated dramas played out concurrently. The basic idea of the ancient or "primitive" view is briefly stated by Prof. Redfield: ". . . nature is part of the same moral system in which man and the affairs between men also find themselves [so that] man's actions with regard to nature are limited by notions of inherent, not expediential, rightness." Essentially, the difference between the ancient and the modern view is the difference between regarding the universe as morally significant, and doubting or refusing to conceive of that significance at all. He writes in summary and conclusion:

> If we compare the primary world view that has been sketched in these pages with that which comes to prevail in modern times, especially in the West, where science has been so influential, we may recognize one of the great transformations of the human mind. It is that transformation by which the primitive world view has been overturned. The three characteristics of that [primitive] view . . . have weakened or disappeared. Man comes out from the unity of the universe within which he is oriented now as something separate from nature and comes to confront nature as something with physical qualities only, upon which he may work his will. As this happens, the universe loses its moral character and becomes to him indifferent, a system uncaring of man. The existence today of ethical systems and of religions only qualifies this statement; ethics and religion struggle in one way or another to take account of a physical universe indifferent to man.

With this quotation, the stage is now set for a moralist's field day, involving extensive comment of the "Little Man, What Now?" variety. The trouble with most moralists, however, is that they jump too soon. It was not only the rise of science which overturned the primitive world view. The embodiments of that view in Western religion were at once childlike and corrupt. There is a sense in which you could argue that the representatives of modern man who took the lead in attacking religion were thinkers who had internalized their sense of moral order and who saw in the free play of the mind and in uninhibited scientific investigation a moral principle which for them had to come *first*. What we are suggesting is that the impetus of science would not have moved in the direction of materialism by reason of some implicit logic in the discoveries of science, but was driven in that direction by the puerility of religious thought and the arrogant imperialism of theological authority. As Bertrand Russell

pointed out in 1925 (in his introduction to Frederick Lange's *History of Materialism):*

> Historically, we may regard materialism as a system of dogma set up to combat orthodox dogma. As a rule, the materialistic dogma has not been set up by men who loved dogma but by men who felt that nothing less definite would enable them to fight the dogmas they disliked. They were in the position of men who raise an army to enforce peace. Accordingly we find that, as ancient orthodoxies disintegrate, materialism more and more gives way to skepticism.

The moral drive behind the origins of modern materialism becomes quite plain in the writings of Julien de Lamettrie, eighteenth-century author of *Man a Machine,* whose argument against religion illustrates Russell's analysis. Lamettrie said:

> If Atheism were universally disseminated, all the branches of religion would be torn up by the roots. Then there would be no more theological wars, there would no longer be soldiers of religion, that terrible kind of soldier. Nature, which had been infected by the consecrated poison, would win back her rights and her purity. Deaf to all other voices, men would follow their own individual impulses, and these impulses alone can lead them to happiness along the pleasant path of virtue.

This Rousseauist optimism, born with the scientific revolution, and at the dawn of the industrial revolution, has lasted us until the twentieth century. It provided the beckoning gleam of idealism for the Idea of Progress—an enthusiasm which was the core of humanitarian thought for some two hundred years. Coincidence or not, it is a fact that this view of human nature accompanied the long conquest of external nature, both horizontally and vertically, that has been achieved by modern technology. So long as we had a great lot of work to do—continents to people, rivers to harness, forests to raze, cities to build, seas to master with steam—we were not overtaken by what A. H. Maslow terms the "neuroses of success." We all—or nearly all of us—believed with Lamettrie that obedience to "individual impulses" would alone lead us "to happiness along the pleasant path of virtue." But now, we find that, having caught up with our dream of progress, we have neither happiness nor virtue. In Dr. Maslow's words:

> . . . wealth and prosperity, technological advance, widespread education, democratic political forms, even honestly good intentions and avowals of good will have, by their failure to produce peace, brotherhood, serenity, and happiness, confronted us even more nakedly and unavoidably with the profundities that mankind has been avoiding by its busy-ness with the superficial.
>
> We are reminded here of the "neuroses of success." People can struggle on hopefully, and even happily, for false panaceas so long as these are not attained. Once attained, however they are soon discovered to be false hopes. Collapse and hopelessness ensue and continue until new hopes become possible.

A number of critical saturation points in our "progress" have been reached in the twentieth century. For example, the expansion of Darwin's evolution theory in the doctrines of social Darwinism became an absolute *reductio ad absurdum* with the discovery of nuclear fission and the dropping of the first atom bomb. Again, within the past twenty years we have become aware of how fearfully technology can be turned against human beings in the apparently quite innocent field of food processing. Dozens of common foods have either been devitalized or rendered actually harmful by the techniques of organic chemistry, in order to increase their shelf-life or to permit shipment to distant points for eventual consumption. The books of men like Lewis Mumford pinpoint in dozens of ways the pattern of man against himself, armed by the compulsive routines of mass production and mass distribution. An apt summing up of many of these tendencies was cited from Erich Fromm in a recent (Mar. 21) Frontiers article:

> The nineteenth century said: God is dead, the twentieth century could say: man is dead. Means have been transformed into ends, the production and consumption of things has become the aim of life, to which living is subordinated. We produce things that act like men and men that act like things. Man has transformed himself into a thing and worships the products of his own hands; he is alienated from

himself and has regressed to idolatry, even though he uses God's name. Emerson already saw that "things are in the saddle and ride mankind." Today many of us see it. The achievement of well-being is possible only under one condition: *if we put man back into the saddle.*

But *how* do you put man back into the saddle?

Dr. Maslow has a generalized answer: "The cure for this disease is obvious. We need a validated, usable system of human values, values that we can believe in and devote ourselves to because they are true rather than because we are *exhorted* to 'believe and have faith'." Dr. Maslow is working on this project. Meanwhile, let us look at some other aspects of the problem.

We know, for one thing, that moralizing exhortation will not work. The modern idea of truth is alien to the influence of propaganda, and exhortation *is* propaganda. Truth, in the scientific view, is the result of a conscious experience of some aspect of reality. Truth is not something overheard, but a conclusion about the nature of things which anyone can reach for himself by going through the same steps of discovery. Truth, in short, has been depersonalized, isolated from revelation, and identified as something which must be in some sense demonstrable.

This means that we can't go back to the old way of "believing" that there is a moral order in nature or the universe. The ancient view of "immanent justice," as Prof. Redfield characterized it, may fill us with nostalgic longings, but we can't just "accept" it. We envy the faith of antique peoples, much as Tolstoy envied the faith of his peasants, but we can't embrace it. Our sociologists visit the precincts of stone-age societies as outsiders looking in, then write glowing accounts of these pleasant valleys of moral order, looking down from their cold plateaus of technologized disenchantment.

We can no longer abide the brave new worldish doctrines of man bravely confronting an alien universe of blind forces moving inexorably toward its final heat-death. The present feeling isn't so much a pitiful longing for a Friend behind the cosmic veil as it is a demand for universal meaning, for a sense that something worth understanding is going on in the world—a conception of general purpose that we can participate in, to enrich the human purposes which now seem drawn on so small a scale as to be unworthy of *members* of the world. These hungers break out in dozens of places, and they keep on coming. Often they take the form of the straining of a specialist to stretch the sense of meaning he finds in his work to a wider significance, not because he wants to for himself, but because his work seems to require it. A good illustration of this "stretching" process occurs in an article by a psychiatrist in the Winter, 1961-62, issue of *Landscape*. The writer, Harold F. Searles, is on the staff of Chestnut Lodge, Rockville, Maryland. In this article (a portion of Dr. Searles' book, *The Nonhuman Environment),* the author expresses the view that mental health involves a concern "with the *total* nonhuman environment, including the inanimate as well as the living elements in it." This is in addition, of course, to a reflective awareness of relationships among human beings. What strikes us, in reading this article, is the thorough coverage in functional terms of ideas which, thousands of years ago, would have been stated in a theological or metaphysical vocabulary. It seems not too much to say that Dr. Searles is declaring for universal pantheism, but in terms of psychic or "spiritual" need rather than as a religious or moral ought. In his introductory paragraph, this psychiatrist speaks of "moments of deeply felt kinship with one's nonhuman environment" which "are to be counted among those moments when one has drunk deepest of the whole of life's meaning."

For contrast to illustrate the distance travelled in thought by modern man in a brief half-century, we quote a passage from Bertrand Russell, taken from one of his early writings. Setting down the outlook of the scientific philosopher of that generation, he said:

> That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labor of the ages, all devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.

We do not quote this as a means of extracting from Dr. Searles a repudiation of what Russell says. He is no metaphysician and is busy with other things. Here it is pertinent simply to point out that Dr. Searles is engaged in an entirely different *mood*—a mood which is responsive to the hungering hearts of the sick people he is trying to help; and one must doubt that the long thoughts he submits to view in this paper are no more than psychological placebos proposed for their pragmatic value in therapy. He begins:

> My thesis is that this [nonhuman] environment, far from being of little or no account to human personality development, constitutes one of the most basically important ingredients of human psychological experience. It is my conviction that there is within the human individual a sense of *relatedness to his total environment*, that this relatedness is one of the transcendentally important facts of human living, and that if he tries to ignore its importance to himself, he does so at peril to his psychological wellbeing. . . . By "relatedness" I mean a sense of intimate kinship, a psychological commitment to the structural relationship which exists between man and the various ingredients of his nonhuman environment. This experience of relatedness involves a maintenance of our own sense of individuality as a human being, a knowing that however close our kinship, we are not *at one* with it. The mature human being knows that he is irrevocably, irreversibly a member of the human species, and can rejoice as well as despair in this knowledge. It seems inevitable that the human being will experience varied and conflictual feelings about his non-human environment, for mankind's position in regard to this environment is existentially a conflictual position. He is grounded in nature, and yet is unbridgeably apart from it.

One interesting thing, here, is the precision with which the paradox of human awareness of both union and apartness is described. You do not get this precision from hortatory exclamations borrowed uncritically from religion, and you seldom get it from even the subtler expressions of mystical religion. A man who reaches to a feeling of kinship with the world of nature by this kind of psychological investigation will hardly be carried away by emotionalism: to feel unity without loss of individuality—this is to be a whole man.

Dr. Searles discusses the increasing loss of touch with the natural environment caused by the intrusions of technology. Even the farmer begins to live a life remote from the soil. In California, there is an expression, "windshield farmers," applied to the wealthy land-owners of the large agricultural valleys who drive around inspecting their holdings without getting out of their cars, while migrant laborers or Mexican nationals and wetbacks do the work. In other ways, the average American, especially the urban American, has many barriers of technological devices raised between him and the nonhuman world. Further: "Not only has man in our culture lost, to a large degree, contact with nature; he does not view the manufactured substitutes in his possession as cherished objects with which he has had, as it were, a richly meaningful shared experience."

The mechanical alienation of man from the natural environment, Dr. Searles feels, has brought about simultaneously a deep deprivation in the sense of relatedness and a (largely unconscious) *overdependence upon* that environment. Now comes what seems an important diagnostic insight:

> I believe that the actual importance of that environment to the individual is so great that he *dare* not recognize it. Unconsciously it is felt, I believe, to be not only an intensely important conglomeration of

things *outside* the self, but also a large and integral *part* of the self.

If such a psychodynamic process goes on in our culture to a large extent, as I believe it does, then it becomes understandable that we are inordinately vulnerable to the anxiety that we become, or stand revealed, as nonhuman. Our personalities have become so invaded by elements of the nonhuman environment with which we have unconsciously identified, or, to put it in a more accurate way, the institutions of our culture have so greatly hindered us from psychologically differentiating ourselves from the nonhuman environment, from growing out of that state, normal in infancy, of subjective oneness with the totality of the environment that, in a real sense, we *are* less than fully human.

I believe that this psychodynamic formulation illuminates certain features of one of the most important and pressing situations in our culture: our living under the imminent threat of atomic annihilation. Our basic fear is that the most alien portion of our nonhuman environment (the inorganic portion of it, in the form of the atomic bomb) will rise up and destroy us, along with the rest of humanity and much of all the rest that is animate in our environment.

It seems to me that the members of our culture (and likewise the members of cultures in the other highly technological nations, including Russia) tend to *project* the "nonhuman" part of the self and perceive it as a nonhuman thing which threatens the conscious self with destruction, it is too threatening to let oneself recognize the extent to which the nonhuman environment has, as it were, already invaded and become *part of* one's own personality.

What Dr. Searles is saying, put into the old world-view vocabulary of immanent justice, is that when human beings deny a portion of the universal life, it responds, under the law of Karma, by invading the offenders and intruding insistently upon them, claiming the undifferentiated elements of their being. The resulting pain is a symptom of the psychic ill which can be cured only by restoring a natural or "true" sense of kinship with the whole of life.

Well, we had planned to quote a number of writers to illustrate what we have called "creeping ethics"—amounting to a non-animistic and self-conscious return to ancient universalism, without the adventitious aids of allegory, symbolic imagery, and personification—but since our space is used up, Dr. Searles will have to stand for them all. There is a sense of *direct encounter* with the laws of life in the work of such thinkers, even though, as we must admit, the expression, "laws of life," is probably unacceptable to most of the individuals in this category. What is of especial value in this work is its insistence upon an experiential vocabulary, and the constant search for substantial referents for whatever ideas are proposed. In time, we have no doubt, the result will be the emergence of the outline of a new ethical philosophy of religion, whose general propositions will amount to a manifest consensus of basic ideas, and whose particulars will remain to be filled in by each one for himself.

REVIEW
ALIENATION—AND SIDE EFFECTS

IN a paper titled, "An Antidote Against Separation," two Purdue University teachers—Edith Weisskopf-Joelson, psychologist, and Robert Perrucci, sociologist—start out with a simple illustration of an "alienation" which almost everyone shares—"whether he knows it or not":

> Let us suppose a member of a primitive, tradition-bound tribe were to visit the United States and were to be a house guest in a "typical" American family. Moreover he would be able to make observations and comparisons which are as complex as the ones made by a highly sophisticated scientist in the United States.
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> His attention may be captured, among many other things by the family car. He may find it a fascinating object, and may want to know who built it; maybe he would like to have a chat with the amazing person who can put together an object of such intricacy. To his amazement, his host would not be able to tell him the name of the "artisan" who built the car. Instead, he would give him the "clan name," such as "Chevrolet," and would further indicate that a vast number of people have contributed to designing and putting together this amazing machine. And, what's worse, our visitor would be told in no uncertain terms that his plan to visit the "Chevrolet clan," and to get to know the originators of the specific car owned by his host, would be unrealistic and may be responded to with bewilderment.
>
> More generally speaking, the primitive man would soon find out that America's relationships to his *Umwelt*, i.e., to the objects which surround him, is peculiarly impersonal. He would compare it with analogous conditions in his own society, where he is not only a close friend of the people who had made each of the objects he uses, but where he also knew where the materials from which these objects were made came from; for example, he would remember the tree which gave the wood which his bench was made of. He would know the man who owned the tree, and remembered how this man had courted his wife under the shade of this tree. The condition of Western Man I am describing is one instance of what Fromm calls alienation, meaning a state of unrelatedness of a person to himself, to his fellowman, and to his environment.

"Whether he knows or not." This phrase occurs continually in Frank Gibney's analysis of socially irresponsible behavior, titled *The Operators* (Bantam, 1961). For the men who sell to large government agencies, attempts to "beat the game" don't seem to be *against* anyone, but simply smart living. The opening paragraphs of *The Operators* indicate how easy it is for an up-and-coming salesman to neglect any considerations of social responsibility in public contracts:

> The morning of another good business day dawned bright and clear. The reputable executive had two Alka-Seltzer tablets and a cheerful breakfast and sent his children off to school with fatherly counsel.
>
> Once in the office, he took care of the mail and some routine desk chores and settled at least one small but irritating personnel problem: when one of his middle-rank salesmen asked for a raise, he turned him down, but suggested with the broadest of winks that the man had carte blanche to go heavy on his expense account until the matter of raises came up formally late in the fall. Then he took an hour out with his personal income-tax consultant, who had just found a happy device for altering repair and depreciation costs on some rental property for a handsome tax "profit." Before their conference was quite over, he handled an urgent long-distance call from his lawyer and unofficial investment counselor, who had found a good insolvent manufacturing company which was ripe for a nice tax-loss merger.
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> A few minutes before one, the reputable businessman walked over to his club, where he habitually lunched and played squash on the company expense account. There he entertained two visiting college classmates at a lavish meal; he insisted on signing the check. Back in the office, he had time to detail one of his assistants to "take care of" the building inspector with jurisdiction over their new plant site, thus getting as much red tape as possible out of the way. In the meantime his secretary had drafted several routine letters for him to sign. Among them was a note to an executive of a smaller firm with whom he had just signed a contract, thanking him for the gift of a new-model TV set.
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> At a brief conference later in the afternoon he congratulated his firm's controller on a bookkeeping device that was handily padding a few of the firm's more controversial accounts. . . .

Mr. Gibney notes that this businessman would probably be highly indignant if anyone suggested that his activities were criminal and technically punishable by fine or imprisonment. He would say, "Everybody is doing it!" and he would be right. Now the man of philosophical inclination will care very little how much money anyone is "making," and as little, perhaps, about how he is making it, but he *will* be concerned about what the many people who are socially "alienated" could be making of themselves. Mr. Gibney continues:

> The obviously criminal act, the acknowledged illegality, is only a small part of the Operators' total activities. We must include also the wide area of legal but immoral sharp practices in business, labor and politics, often severely damaging to society but generally subtle enough to keep just beyond effective range of society's formidable but fixed legal gun positions.
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> The very definition of "operator" must be made arbitrary and harshly comprehensive. For the Operator thrives on moral, not to say legal sleight-of-hand—it is no accident that modern slang use of the word derives originally from the eighteenth-century English slang for skilled pickpocket. Often the Operator is considered a pillar of the community. He may be, and in recent criminal cases has turned out to be, a Chicago architect, a prosperous automobile dealer in Denver, a member of Congress from Massachusetts, a physician in Omaha, a respected lawyer in Philadelphia or a veteran Internal Revenue Service agent in New York.
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> The Operator may be a bigtime juggler of corporations or a smalltime accountant skillfully barbering a friend's income tax. He may be a salesman padding his expense account to meet the payments on his car. He may take bribes or give them, whether the bribing involves a political scandal or a simple shift of business from one wholesaler to another. He may be a partner in a crooked accident-insurance racket, or a prosperous store owner with a weakness for faked markdowns. Or, all too likely, he may be just a decent, God-fearing American who had to put his finger in the till one day and never found the strength to pull it out.

Returning to the Weisskopf-Joelson and Perrucci paper, we encounter in a foreshortened analysis of Albert Camus' *The Stranger* a clear indication that the psychological orientation of the "alienated" and the practices of the "operator" are clearly two faces of the same coin. In this analysis, based largely upon a study of Leites, alienation is found to be represented by the following attitudes:

> The world is experienced with indifference, detachment and lack of effect.
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> The world is experienced as unintelligible. A world which is viewed with indifference cannot become intelligible, since the feeling of understanding requires some degree of emotional involvement.
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> "All value judgments [have ceased] to be self-evident." Values cannot be experienced without involvement.
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> Alternative courses of action which would be viewed as crucial choices by the non-alienated person, are perceived as leading to identical results.
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> Negative motivation is predominant. The alienated person tends to engage in actions "for want of anything better to do." To the question "why?" he may reply with "why not?"

It is not going too far afield to wonder whether the householders who are building government-specified bomb shelters are doing any more than continuing the fantasy of alienation in which they live—a fantasy in which any grass-roots values of their own can have little or no place.

COMMENTARY
CURRENTS AND CROSS-CURRENTS

THE contents of this week's MANAS seem to divide into accounts of two great currents in human thought and attitude. One of these currents finds its end in a state of alienation, while the other is constituted of a sweep of human longing for wholeness and relatedness with the world around us. There is no doubt a connection between the technical alienation of the inhabitant of a modern technological society (see Review and lead article), the intellectual alienation of the academic specialist (see Frontiers), the philosophical alienation of the early Bertrand Russell, the pathological alienation described by Dr. Searles (see lead article), and the moral alienation of the "operators" (see Review).

Then, to represent the other current, there are the psychologists and sociologists who seek grounds for a post-scientific restoration of meaning to relationships with the rest of life, the vigorous campaigning of Mildred Loomis (see "Children . . . and Ourselves"), and the student who contributes the Frontiers article.

What makes these currents? The simplest answer is that they result from the long-term inter-relation of philosophy and conduct.

Philosophies—or, more generally—religions go bad, or are found to be inadequate, and this produces an indignant and sometimes a destructive reaction against them. And since religions deal, or attempt to deal with human experience as a "whole," the revolutionary arguments against religion are stretched into "total" systems of thought, in the hope of filling the abysses of human longing. It takes quite a while for men to realize that the particularist doctrines of the revolt, born of the partisan righteousness of its campaigners, cannot make a total philosophy of life, whatever their limited validity. But by the time this realization comes, the slogans of revolt have been woven into the fabric of thought and become an almost endless series of secular "truths." Then come dozens of minor struggles and reforms, compromises, adjustments, new assimilations, and the slow birth of purified religious philosophy. Once again, thoughtful men resolve not to repeat the mistakes of the past. They see virtuous but narrow men living out the prejudices of the old current, and they see careless, irresponsible men eagerly exploiting the short-term "freedoms" skepticism technically allows. It is a time when, if the moralists can be made to keep their all-too-easy solutions to themselves, more of the open-minded members of society may be able to see what is actually going on, and consolidate the future synthesis at a higher level of balance than we have ever had before.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
THE GREEN REVOLUTION

[The following discussion is a paper by Mildred J. Loomis on the relationship between Ralph Borsodi's influence and a number of constructive trends in socio-philosophical thinking (see also MANAS for January 10, Frontiers). As Mrs. Loomis makes clear, this type of survey serves the aim of MANAS—which is to "search for principles capable of supporting intelligent idealism under the conditions of life in the twentieth century." Unfortunately, space limitations have obliged us to cut small portions of Mrs. Loomis' article.]

IN the early 1940's, *The Christian Century* published a series of articles which Ralph Borsodi and I wrote on productive living, decentralization, anti-governmentalism and the free society. In "The Return of the Productive Home" (Nov. 26, 1941) I compared the educational and character-building experiences available on a modern homestead with those in an apartment or urban home. A year or so later in a two-part item, "Live on the Land," I described the pattern of living our family had developed at Lane's End Homestead after fifteen years of teaching and religious education. Recently I came across some of the 150 fan letters which resulted—most of them enthusiastically approving; a few scornful of an effort to "turn the clock back"; one said, "I'll wager in ten years you'll have gone back to town and teaching!" But now in 1961, it is not ten, but twenty automation-laden years, one world war, half a dozen recessions, hundreds of thousands of unemployed, and scores of social critics. (Included would be C. Wright Mills: *White Collar, The Power Elite,* etc.; Wm. L. Whyte: *Organization Man;* Lewis Mumford: *Condition of Man,* etc.; David Riesman: *The Lonely Crowd;* Erich Fromm: *The Sane Society;* Vance Packard: *Hidden Persuaders, Wastemakers,* etc.; Camus: *The Stranger;* Sartre: *Nausea;* Fairfield Osborn: *Our Plundered Planet;* Paul Goodman: *Growing Up Absurd.* All of these point up the negative influences on life in modern centralized, industrialized culture.) The Loomises are still happily homesteading on the self-same spot, more convinced than ever that . . . the decentralist direction is socially desirable.

In the July 28, 1943, *Christian Century* Mr. Borsodi elaborated three points: that home- and small-scale production of certain commodities (food, clothing and housing) is cheaper and more efficient than mass production; that modern industrialism helps create war by producing more iron and steel than can be used in peaceful pursuits—that the chief market for the surplus of our metal industries is war; and that science and power could be used in a new way—to develop a technology for reducing labor in home and community production instead of expanding industry and promoting the national state. This article he titled "The Green Revolution."

For me this term had a most welcome connotation. I had often heard Mr. Borsodi use the term when I was his assistant at the Suffern, N. Y. School of Living. But so far as I know this was the first time it had appeared in print to designate the social philosophy and practice he recommended.

Dr. Willis Nutting later defined and developed the concept of a green revolution in *The Reclamation of Independence.*

What has happened to the "green revolution" in the 20 years since it titled a published article? Certainly the term didn't catch on. No one uses it today. But—and this is more important—if we look closely we will see that the *ideas* contained in that label have fared better. There are today many groups and many, many individuals involved in implementing the concepts that are wrapped up in "green revolution."

For that term, rightly interpreted, would signify all the trends moving opposite the red revolution. While the red (Russian) revolution was bloody and violent, the green revolution includes all the quiet, non-violent forces in the direction of liberty that use persuasion and education. While the red revolution put the government and the State on top, the green revolution holds each individual person supreme. The red revolution put land, money and property into the hands of the government; the green revolution transfers these to the actual use of and control by individuals. In short, the red revolution means

control and domination of people; the green revolution means the freeing of people. Let it be clear of course, that the red revolution is not restricted to Russia or the territory it controls. There are individuals, agencies and processes in *every* nation seeking to control and dominate the purposes of other individuals. . . .

Who make up the Green Revolution?

First, I would list the country folks—those who live on family farms and modern homesteads because they not only share most of the elements common to others in the green revolution (non-violence, freedom, individual action, etc.) but they have an additional one—the actual green of their fields and woods. Strangely—or not so strangely—these country people are largely an *un*-organized group. At least they are not organized occupationally. Certain groups, like the Grange, the Farm Bureau or the Farmers Union, speak for *some* of them. (Occasionally these groups slip over into the governmental [red] side of the ledger.) All of the religious denominations have their rural departments—especially active are the Rural Life Association of the traditional Peace Churches and the Catholic Rural Life Association. Of course I would put here the School of Living homesteaders who are finding a center in their annual Homesteading Festival. Closely allied with these are the conservation groups, the Isaac Walton League, The Friends of The Land, Malabar Foundation, The Audubon Society, *Landscape*, The Four-H, Youth Hosteling.

A large and growing section of the Green Revolution are the new Health Groups—well defined, all concerned with the prevention of disease, with teaching individuals the responsibility and methods for maintaining their own health without resort to drugs, shots, medical experts or authority. They emphasize conservation and improved methods of tilling the soil, the use of whole, undevitalized food, good nutrition and in many cases simpler diet and simple living. Leading this group is Rodale Press with its books and magazines, *(Organic Farming and Gardening,* and *Prevention)* whose readers now number in the hundreds of thousands. There is the Bio-Dynamic Farming Association of Chester, N. Y.; Natural Food Associates of Atlanta, Texas; The American Academy of Applied Nutrition for doctors and dentists and The Modern Nutritional Society, its companion group for lay members; Clinical Psychology; The Natural Hygiene Society with its various schools and sanitariums; the National Health Federation protesting governmental action dangerous to health; and several groups working especially for the prevention and treatment of cancer—The Independent Cancer Foundation, The Foundation for Cancer Treatment, and Foundation for Cancer Prevention.

Another big section of the Green Revolution, in my thinking, are those hundreds of groups working to restrain or decrease government encroachment in individual lives. . . .

Also of course, are included those groups dedicated more specifically to economic changes in the direction of freedom: The Cooperatives with their hundreds of enterprises and branches and thousands of members; the Henry George Schools; the Association for Economic Education; *Christian Economics,* Free Economy Association, Equitist League. We must include too the intentional communities, some old like Fairhope, Ala. and Arden, Del.; and the many newer ones, Bayard Lane, Suffern, N.Y.; Van Houten Fields, West Nyack, N.Y.; Sky Valley, Pomona and Three Fold, Spring Valley, N.Y.; Tanguy Homesteads, Glen Mills, and Byrn Gweled, Huntington, Pa.; Melbourne Village, Melbourne, Fla.; Celo, Burnsville, N.C.; Quest, near Detroit, York Center near Chicago; May Valley Coop. Community near Seattle; Gould Farm in Mass., the several Bruderhof groups; The Vale at Yellow Springs, Ohio; Koinonia, Americus, Gal; Oakhurst, Calif.; and others. Along this line too are the peace groups—those protesting that particular action of government called war: The Fellowship of Reconciliation, War Resisters League, Women's League for Peace and Freedom, Peacemakers, Peace Action, *Peace News,* Peace Centers Foundation, Friends Service Committee, and more.

In the area of philosophy and religion groups are calling for freedom from dogma, doctrine and authority, both secular and religious, worldly and other-worldly. . . .

In education countless agencies have a conscious orientation toward the unfolding and supremacy of the individual—among adults the Humanist University, Fundamental Education, Putney School, Great Books; concerned mostly with children are Summerhill, Shimber Beris, Cornelian Corner, LaLeche League, Natural Childbirth Association. There are countless types of psychological therapy to assist personality development; . . . Nor would we omit certain courageous journals and their editors like *Liberation, Views and Comments, The Independent, The Realist, Minority of One* and *Manas.*

There are many, many others, both here and abroad. I have listed the hundred or so groups in which I personally know, or correspond with, some active person. From their letters and journals pouring into our School of Living office I get a sense of an unusual ferment in our social milieu. Some will be surprised to find themselves on a green-revolution list; they will regard others as strange companions. (Perhaps we should have a survey or census to determine who agrees to such a listing.) But all these have a common concern for individual freedom and growth. Some see farther and more clearly than others. Some sanction less government than others. Some see only one aspect of freedom—others have a broad concept of freedom. Some want, and can use, more freedom than others. But because of their common direction I propose we call ourselves the Green Revolution.

What is needed, it seems to me, is an exchange among these groups that we may learn from one another; that in most cases we grow out of a too narrow specialization. For instance, could not the members of those groups calling for individual action in health, benefit from the knowledge in the government and academic groups—and vice versa? It would be wonderful to find folks in the philosophical, peace and humanist groups really coming to grips with governmental and economic reforms; and it will be heavenly when all of us learn to communicate with one another about our specialties as scientologists and general semanticists can teach us to do. We can be sure that the Green Revolution is no small, one-sided task. As Ralph Borsodi puts it, "We need re-education in all major areas of living," As R. M. Hutchins said it, "The crusade to which we are called is to procure a moral, intellectual, social and spiritual revolution throughout the world."

While reformers have called for new programs, the people in the groups listed here have been *working* away at all the many reforms that individuals found significant for themselves. And now we have the network of active, voluntary education-action groups which I have indicated. This slow, unheralded undercurrent has now developed visible counter-trends. It is like the grass which gradually and inevitably advances over a bare and blasted spot of earth.

(Carlyle called grass "the forgiveness of nature.") This counter-trend is without organization and without a staff. (Wouldn't some person as liaison between all these groups be useful?) And it is without a name. Twenty years ago we suggested a name the Green Revolution. But the experience and the reality had not yet come into existence. Now there are new groups, new relationships, new processes, new habits, and new institutions developing. These can grow strong enough to replace the old order if it meets catastrophe. If it doesn't, the new will one day replace the old shell by outgrowing it. These ways are full of hope and freedom, of life and growth—as Nature herself is.

FRONTIERS

What Is Psychology?

[This article is a letter by an undergraduate student in psychology, addressed to a teacher of psychology in another school.]

PRESENTLY, I'm studying at _____State College. My title is that of "Junior" in "Psychology." After a couple of weeks had passed in this semester, I thought that possibly I had some questions which ought to be asked. So I took these questions to two of my instructors. Briefly, what follows are my questions and my paraphrasing of the answers, or rather responses, I obtained.

If I am to be academically a student of psychology, then I wonder what material or data I can expect to study; for, if I am to study in that subject, my interest must be in that material. The data of psychology, these two instructors told me, are partially the "objective" data of "sense" experience, which can be tested experimentally—*i.e.*, empirical facts. Thus, psychology is the study of behavior. Physiology is helpful in understanding behavior, but psychology is *not* physiology, it's something else. That "something else" pertains to mathematics—as statistics; to chemistry—on a microscopic level; to physics—if you're particular in your chemistry. But, again, *psychology* is not any of these, I was told; it's something else. In effect, psychology is a science of its own. At this point I couldn't help but think to myself: "Yes, gentlemen, I believe I understand what you're telling me; but this is not what I inquired about." So I asked where, in their opinions, do philosophy, religion, and literature (if there are such distinctions) fit in—where are these studied in psychology? (Nothing, or very little, has been said about these subjects except in a history of psychology course.) Neither of the professors indicated that they would discuss the influence (if not the importance) of such matters as parapsychology—this subject was "too controversial"; or the anticipations of Eastern philosophers, mystics, etc., in their observations of Man, Society, Nature. "None of this is the datum of psychology, *now,"* I was told.

I inquired further: What of history, of economics, of politics? Surely *some* of these subjects must be material for psychology! "Simmer down, little boy, hold your horses"—this is what these men seemed to say. Once again, I was told that these were not the interests of the majority of American psychologists.

They suggested that if psychology is to be a science, it must follow that its data are "scientific." Therefore, psychology deals with observable, testable, causal, mechanistic, verifiable behavior. If you are interested in literature, they said, maybe you should be in literature; if you are interested in philosophy, maybe you should be studying philosophy.

They then confirmed one another's suggestions that these are fine studies to have as a background, but they are not the materials of psychology—psychology is something else.

So I pushed a bit more: How or where does the philosophy of James fit into this picture which they were painting for me (other than as a historical curiosity)? I suppose I shouldn't have asked. I was given an answer the next day in a lecture: James's philosophy was important in its stress on pragmatism, but his theory of emotions stimulated a great deal of behavioral research. Therefore, his theory of emotions was more important to psychology.

I asked what their impressions were of Jung's work in mythology, his archetypes, etc. One instructor said: "I find him hard to read." The other said that Jung was not always scientific.

I had just begun to read *Crime and Punishment*—so I asked how this book might fit into psychology. I was told that it was "literature," and while it might have deep psychological meanings, those meanings were properly psychological only to the extent that they could be verified by experiment. (I wonder how the statistician would handle Dostoevsky?)

"Essentially," I asked myself, "what have I been told?" What were these men suggesting? What were their assumptions? Their premises? The answers were brief: these men thought (as I understand them) of psychology as a study of a causal, mechanistic, behavioral science. One of these gentlemen, a Doctor of Psychology, suggested that a dualism exists between scientific and non-scientific data. If psychology is to be scientific, then psychologists had better stick to that which is scientific. "Can you restrict a just-emerging study in such a manner as this?" I wondered to myself.

Next, I suggested my interest in myself. I implied that I was interested in developing certain aspects of myself. "You should be in therapy if you are interested in awareness of yourself or in knowing yourself," I was told. "And if you want to sit on the other side of the couch, you should go into clinical psychology or analysis." "But remember," one of them warned, "these are difficult studies." Here I reacted on "non-verbal" levels. "What kind of a suggestion is this?" What was this man implying? Could he be suggesting that I should merely pick "an easy way out" in my academic life? A multitude of such questions filled my non-scientific mind.

Had they been suggesting earlier that the following of psychology is a study which perpetuates a "split" in our lives? Must this developing study of psychology copy other disciplines of scientific methodology at the expense of the subjects it purports to study: namely, human beings?

These, briefly, are some of the responses I have been receiving to my inquiries.

I should at least point out that there is another side (or many other sides) to the responses I have received. Many times these same men have spoken of the limits of their particular studies. They have set forth their premises and assumptions. They have recognized the importance of studying the "organism-as-a-whole." They have asked questions or presented problems which, they suggested, may have nonverifiable (in the laboratory, that is) implications. In almost all instances, my questions have been greeted with interest and followed by what seemed friendly suggestions. But I wonder, are there truths outside of scientific truths?—"scientific" in the sense used in this letter? Are there facts which are not "scientific facts," which I could find as being real and pertaining to a self-fulfilling life? And if there are such truths, is it possible that some of them, at least, ought to be the material of psychology?

All of this is probably, at best, grossly prejudiced and biased by my grievances, dissatisfactions, needs, etc., of this moment.

Right now, I am not really sure why I've written, but as I reread this letter it seems to be the letter I planned to write. Yet on paper it looks as though I'm bitter, pleading, projecting; maybe observing, maybe enquiring, and maybe searching.

I don't believe that the issue I have pointed, if one has been pointed, is whether to be scientific or non-scientific. There seems to me to be something more fundamental than that. And here I find myself confronted by the question: Is not my "something more" as vague as the "something else" of these psychologists?

Is the light so dim that merely reaching for it, extinguishes it?

Perhaps these problems and questions are common to others. I suppose that I'm asking something of someone, but I am not sure that I am altogether ready to realize what it is that I am asking.