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WAR AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

WHAT contribution can the social sciences make in behalf of human betterment—as, for example, toward the elimination of war? Well, what can the social sciences do? It is often said that a branch of science reaches maturity when it is able to make reliable predictions. The verification of a theory is basically the confirmation of some sort of prediction. The social sciences, then, may tell us something about what people will do, given certain circumstances, certain provocations. It is reasonable to say that the social sciences may give us instruction concerning the causes of war. They ought also to inform us in some measure about conditions which are likely to make for peace.

With knowledge about the way people behave and the reasons for their behavior, we are in a position not only to predict certain forms of behavior, but to *cause* them. This, also, the social sciences may be able to accomplish, given a free hand.

Finally, it is conceivable that the social sciences could provide a description of the circumstances in which people are most likely to be original, creative, and self-reliant. Little is known, as yet, about the origins of creativity in human beings, but we know quite a lot about how the creative faculty is stunted or suppressed. One must remain suspicious of any sort of formula for creativity—since formula is the opposite of creative action and could hardly become the means to such behavior—but a general description of the conditions under which notable creative achievements have taken place might be extremely useful without in any sense becoming a formula. This is of some importance to our question, since original, creative, and self-reliant people are not particularly susceptible to the suspicions and the dark, self-fulfilling prophecies which take nations into war.

It is obvious that what we are talking about is the kind of knowledge about man that is called social psychology. From the viewpoint of the social community, psychology has two roles. Psychology knows how to exercise a conditioning influence. This is one of its roles—by far the most familiar and the best known. The other role lies in the tasks of the educator.

There is a striking contrast between these roles. A conditioning influence is supposed to produce a concrete result in behavior. Its use illustrates both the predictive and the manipulative skills of science. An educative influence has an opposite purpose and effect. It is intended to free the mind of the student of all past conditionings—that is, of the prejudicial conditionings—so that he will be in a position to think for himself. A conditioning influence draws the individual toward a pre-selected conclusion or form of behavior. An educative influence exhibits alternative conclusions or forms of behavior, encouraging independent choice.

Quite plainly, there is a built-in schism in the science of social psychology which displays its tensions as soon as ethical questions are raised. Who has the right to condition a human being? We can get into word-trouble, here, since someone may argue that training a child in problem-solving is a form of conditioning. But that is *not* conditioning; rather it is providing the child's mind with exercises which enable him to look in every direction for possible causal relations. The conditioning influence would be present only if the teacher fostered in the child a feeling-tone of snobbishness concerning the particular class of problems they were working on; a specialist teacher could of course do this without meaning to.

Mothers do a great deal of conditioning of their children, simply by showing their feelings. No doubt the child's instinctive awareness of danger is greatly supplemented by the spontaneous reactions of the mother to what the child does. Perhaps, in this context, we could call the conditioning process *training*. The trades and professions are filled with intricate processes of conditioning or training along traditional lines. We should hesitate to condemn this sort of influence, although it is necessary to point out that *rationalization* in technology has been enormously delayed by the resistance of countless conditionings. The problem is to recognize the difference between a conditioning which has become a barrier to growth and one which is a kind of takeoff platform for new developments. Thus many subtleties enter the field of evaluation. The objective, you could say, is to learn how to equip people with the minimum of necessary conditionings and then turn them loose.

If we can import the term "conditioning" into the region of social relationships, we might then identify law as a form of self-conscious social conditioning. We make laws and then do what we can to make people "obey" them. Often an effort is made to develop a psychological atmosphere in which there is actual horror of breaking the law. This suppresses the rational basis of law, but it seems to make the system operate more smoothly. There are areas where subconscious responses obedient to the law seem to be a good thing. A safe driver conforms to the traffic laws without thinking about it. The tradition of absolute obedience to the orders of the captain of a ship seems on the whole a good one, although the question of where the captain's authority should cease has to be raised when you come to a situation such as that portrayed in the *Caine Mutiny*. And this leads directly to questions about the "obedient" Germans who did what Hitler told them to do, and all the invasions by the conditioning process of the traditional region of free decision belonging to Renaissance Man. It is the borderline cases which need attention, for they are shaping the freedoms of tomorrow's society.

Today, the problem of war confronts the practitioners of the social sciences at two levels. There is first the traditional level created by the basically humanitarian orientation of the sciences. War is a bad thing and science ought to try to do something about it. There are so many obvious, common-sense things a dispassionate observer could say about how wars start that "science" seems a somewhat pompous term to apply to works which contain such material. Yet the heart of science is dispassionate observation, so that science has made an enormous contribution to even nonscientific studies. We imagine that the Hoover War Library is filled with much valuable commentary of this sort.

The second level at which war confronts social science is new—the level of desperate emergency. This calls for something more than leisurely, gentlemanly, scholarly research. The objective questions of war and peace have become *existential* questions. The quantitative aspect of the threat of war has somehow overflowed and changed its quality. The capacity of a man to give an order that may destroy ten or fifteen million human beings, and bring a response that within hours may destroy ten or fifteen million more—this is not just "war" as we have known it, but the prospect of immeasurable evil. Thoughtful men cannot live in proximity—some of them in *causal* proximity—to immeasurable evil without being stirred to think as they have never thought before. This kind of thinking is now beginning to affect the practice of the social and psychological sciences and is entering the reflections of those who have the habit of concern about the values these sciences attempt to deal with.

There is the question: How well equipped are the social sciences for this kind of thinking?

The subject of social science, its object of study, is the behavior of human beings. Every science starts out with description. After a while, when a body of descriptive literature has been

accumulated, daring individuals try their hand at prediction. This is the way physics, the parent of all the present sciences, got its start, and that is the way all the other sciences began, if only to prove that they were truly "scientific." It was natural, therefore, for the social sciences to want to develop a body of data which would enable them to make predictions. And that is the way it went. In time; the scientific image of man became the sort of man whose behavior you could predict. That was the way science worked, and if you wanted scientific knowledge of man you cut him down to a scientific size. You dealt with what you could measure, predict, and manipulate in human beings. You studied man as a "thing" because science knows how to study things. Since to be scientific is to have control, and since to have control is to be in a position to produce the good, it is logical to keep on studying and redefining man until you know enough about man to control him. And that, it was assumed in a heady scientific spirit, would be the day!

There was resistance, of course, to this view, but only among the classical humanists or from an occasional scientist who had been lucky enough to have philosophical interests. The spirit of the Enlightenment—Upward and Onward for Humanity with Science, and Education—gave the practitioners of science their moral justification, and who would believe that the very principle of Progress, scientific "objectivity," was in fact an anti-human principle! The opponents of "man is a thing" social science registered objections, but theirs were lonely voices crying in the wilderness. The eminent psychologist, William McDougall, wrote his protests in excellent books like *Body and Mind* and *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution,* but not much attention was paid to them. Not until Alexis Carrel's *Man the Unknown* was widely read, in the early thirties, and a decade or so later Ortega's *Toward a Philosophy of History* made its impact, did the intellectual opposition to "man is a thing" science get articulately under way as a recognizable "position." There were other influences, of course, a major one being Robert M. Hutchins' Great Books movement; another, the publication, in 1938, of W. Macneile Dixon's epoch-making Gifford Lectures, *The Human Situation,* and still another in Joseph Wood Krutch's earlier book, *The Modern Temper.*

There is no question, however, about the majority position. Oppressed by that position back in 1940, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, of Yale University, told the story of a student who had submitted a doctoral thesis on the subject of free will, concluding from his investigations that there was no basis at all for responsibility in human conduct. This brought a wry response from one of the examiners. If the contentions of the thesis were correct, how could its author be rewarded with a degree? The examiner facetiously addressed the candidate:

> Here's a question; if you can sir,
> Please supply a simple answer.
> Was your novel dissertation
> Product of predestination,
> Result of native drive and knowledge,
> Effect of home and school and college?
> Why, if so, should *you* have credit,
> Even though your name may head it?
> Why not graduate some actor
> Who died ere you became a factor?
> If, however, no causation
> Accounts in full for its creation,
> Why should *you* be made a doctor,
> And not some other don or proctor?

The delightful humor of these verses is all we need to show the content of the social and psychological sciences during the first half of the twentieth century. Their central thrust was toward abolition of the individual as a causal agent. It is ironic that the social scientists, avowedly working in behalf of the human race, found it necessary to dehumanize mankind in order to practice their science with exactitude, in accord with the example of the older scientific disciplines. By the 1950's, intelligent observers began to see certain ominous effects of this reductive process. Three books among many may be mentioned as reflecting a horrified awareness

of its socio-psychological consequences: William L. Whyte's *Organization Man,* Roderick Seidenberg's *Post-Historic Man,* and Erich Kahler's *The Tower and the* Abyss. Diluted and more or less ineffectual versions of this criticism began to appear by the dozen in the popular attacks on conformity.

But all these analyses, the good as well as the mediocre and compromised imitations of the good ones, were in the classical rationalist tradition. What was needed, and what we did not get, was the fiery affirmation of a William Blake, the transforming emotion of a Walt Whitman. No doubt we did not get it because we were not ready for it. The culture of the United States was far too well fed, far too satisfied with itself to entertain such existential emotions.

In Europe, however, the experience of the dehumanizing process took place at the political level. The Nazis and the Communists were not academicians passing their time with the evolution of the scientific method. They would not wait for that far-off day in the Greek Kalends when the Method would at last show us how to direct impersonal historical forces into the pattern of the good society. They were men with guns. They took control. That the individual was now, scientifically speaking, a cipher, fitted in rather precisely with the *Götterdämmerung* mood of both these revolutions. The Nazis had their collectivist myth, the Communists theirs. We know the slogans. We have even repeated them in the politer terms of the reformist, academic vocabulary. Reconstruction of mankind by the eugenics formula is a prime Nazi doctrine when you pass from literary to practical scientific applications—when you begin to *enforce* its mandates. Or if, on the other hand, you believe that environment makes the man, a few massive liquidations of "cultural complexes" that will not submit to the new mold can hardly be avoided when you consider the Golden Age that is coming to birth. We of the West do not, of course, believe in such extreme measures—we have an evolutionary, not a revolutionary, welfare state—but we are involved in the assumptions which lie behind these measures by our struggle with the Communists for world power and for the hypothetical "security" which, like the classless society, is supposed to result after the contest is over. To win through to *our* idea of the good society, we seriously consider the sacrifice of five, twenty-five, or seventy million killed, to be not too great to maintain our present position. This is a curious victory for the Communists. They have forced us to adopt their ruthlessly anti-human ethic in the name of human values.

Just as the European application of the dehumanizing formula was political, not theoretical and academic, so the reaction against it has been activist, not merely literary and speculative. There is a sense in which the Existentialist movement was born in the underground of the resistance to the German occupation of France. It was a philosophy of action created by pared-down, desperate men—but men who gained determination to *remain human* from their extreme situation. There is a kinship between the thought of Camus and the thought of Viktor Frankl. Their luminous affirmations arose from agonizing decision. While the lines of Existentialist thought are now known to extend far back into European history, following them into the past brings you to men who did not need to wait for the pressure of circumstances to experience a comparable agony of decision. They found in their own complex natures the subjective prototypes of the pressures that would later be historically acted out in the life drama of European man.

Today, it is fair to say, the *living* thought of Europe is of existentialist origin. The root is again man, but in a non-ideological sense. What the historical consequences of this view will be is impossible to predict, but in principle the historical initiative has been seized by men who are indifferent to intellectual abstractions about man and history. There is now only one rising tide in

European history—the tide which takes the moral integrity of man as a fact given in the primary experience of consciousness. It is impossible to read such recent European thinkers as Ortega, Silone, Levi, Simone Weil, Camus, Milosz, and certain of the contemporary continental and British playwrights, without coming to this conclusion. The ideological nightmare is over. That the new declaration of human dignity is framed in a mood approaching despair does not mar the achievement, it gives it a heroic quality.

In the United States, the course has been somewhat different. Here, not war, not the boot of the invader, not the torturers and murderers of an insane bureaucracy, but the spreading malaise of guilt, the sick self-contempt of aimless satiety, the revolting professionalism of the apologists of a vulgar and acquisitive culture, the gnawing consciences of men who slowly discover that their lives are spent in useless and anti-human pursuits—all the psychic and physical uglinesses which men have created in a kind of adolescent triumph over their better selves—have begun a cycle of awakening. Certain springs of the human spirit are starting to flow. They are, so to say, *uncaused* expressions of the reality in man which come from beyond the confinements and sequences of the historical process. They are Promethean protests against the abdication of man as the maker of his destiny.

One might make a hypothesis that we are approaching one of those strange and unearthly moments in history when time seems to stand still, when new moral or spiritual energies are released by a wonderful conjunction of the being of time with the being of eternity. There are such moments in the lives of individuals. A. H. Maslow calls them "peak experiences." Our religious tradition refers to the "beatific vision," and other traditions use other terms. J. Arthur Thompson, questing for words to describe the emergence of man in the evolutionary process, spoke of a "retuning of the psychic fibers" of the incipient human race. It is plain, at any rate, that we have not been able to do without some conceptual account of transcendental experience which has a transforming influence on human attitudes and behavior. And if, with the extraordinary self-consciousness of the age, the manifest longings on the part of so many for a world community, the rapidly spreading appreciation for the diversity and variousness of other, once-alien cultures, there should come a kind of "social" peak experience, it is at least possible that a new rhythm of humane historical relationships could be established in the world. We have some knowledge of the unconstrained unity which pervades small societies of free, self-respecting and self-reliant individuals—if not in societies, in families where the order of freedom is maintained by intuitive consent—and can sometimes feel the magic of its contagion. The quality of lives lived in this fashion has no familiar definition, but it is not outside our experience and it certainly represents one of the most profound longings of our hearts. This quality provides the motive for the heroic striving that has labored—with what failure in direction or ill-conceived design is not important—for the realization of every utopian dream.

Where are we, in relation to our subject? What, here, is the point? The point is that, when it comes to the nature, origin, and expression of this motive, the social sciences have exactly nothing to say. The social sciences treat man as the object of history. As Clyde Curran says, "The hope that the lot of the individual will improve when the impersonal historical forces that shape his destiny are better understood and controlled, is not convincing." The social sciences speak to man's condition, but they do not speak to *him.* For the social sciences, man as the subject, not the object, of history, does not exist.

This can no longer be said of the science of psychology. Oddly enough, from being the most slavishly imitative of the sciences in its idea of "method" (imitative of the classical "thing" sciences), psychology has rather suddenly become

a pioneer in the development of a new attitude toward man. The cause—if we need a cause—is probably the impact of psychotherapy on academic psychology. Psychotherapy takes place in an existential situation. The therapist deals with sick and suffering human beings. He begins no doubt with theories, but somewhere in the process the human being in the therapist takes over. He loves, or he experiences compassion. The power of feeling reshapes theories. What a man feels and does ultimately determines what he is, and what he is determines what he thinks about himself and about man. This transformation of psychotherapy within a half a century is perceptively chronicled by Ira Progoff in *The Death and Rebirth of Psychology.* Henry Murray, of Harvard, probably called the turn back in 1940, when he wrote in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* for April of that year:

> . . . psychoanalysis is entirely concerned with man's inner life and everyday behavior, and academic psychology but faintly so. The analysts spend eight or more hours of the day observing, and listening to what a variety of patients say about the most intimate and telling experiences of their lives, and they spend many evenings at seminars exchanging findings and conclusions. The professorial personologist, on the other hand, spends most of his time away from what he talks and writes about. He labors over apparatus, devises questionnaires, calculates co-efficients, writes lectures based upon what other anchorites have said, attends committee meetings, and occasionally supervises an experiment on that non-existent entity, Average Man. He makes little use of the techniques that analysts have perfected for exposing what occurs behind the stilted laboratory attitude. In addition, the analysts have read more and to better profit in the great works of literature (collections of the best guesses of highly conscious men), and their practice has served to sensitize and broaden their awareness.

All that is now changed. Today the pioneers in academic psychology are often themselves therapists of one sort or another. Psychology has recovered its soul, the subject of its study. Man is no longer an object, no longer a thing. The "thing" scientists are of necessity always on the lookout for what is the same in the objects of their study. They need to find sameness in order to make generalizations, in order to manipulate and make predictions. The advanced psychological quest, as Werner Wolff suggested a few years ago, is to discover in man, not what is the same, but what is *unique.* This is almost the same as saying, what *makes causes.* It is the pursuit of the indefinable presence in man of that factor, element, "entity," or whatever which is unconfined by history and the mechanistic process, yet may *enter* history and sometimes change it.

The new psychologists stand at the threshold of a new epoch in the practice of their science. They have discovered existential man. The existential man can change his life from within. He remakes conditions. Here, by implication, is the only field of fruitful labors which lies before the social sciences. The problem is only superficially that of making peace. The real problem is finding out how to release the energies in men which are capable of making peace.

REVIEW

OF INCREDIBLE MEMORY

AUGUST 6 marks the seventeenth anniversary of the A-bomb blast which leveled unsuspecting Hiroshima. For reasons easy to comprehend, the unprecedented extent and variety of large-scale suffering which visited the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still seem contemporary, not a matter of the "past." The threat of atomic war has increased rather than decreased during the intervening years, so that the story of the first bomb continues to be retold—or rather many interlocking and interdependent stories carrying different themes are brought to us in contemporary writing. Among recent books are *Japan Subdued—the Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific* by Herbert Feis, and *Children of the Ashes* by Robert Jungk.

Mr. Feis' volume explores the "high level policy" contention of ample justification; he seems anxious to endorse the view that the bomb saved lives by shortening hostilities and was therefore excusable. But questions have to be asked, and G. F. Hudson, reviewing *Japan Subdued* in the April *Encounter,* indicates that here we have another example of convenient oversimplification caused by the sort of thinking that usually emerges when the focus is on military objectives. For example: It is commonly believed in this country—if not always in Great Britain—that the *kamikaze* attacks which revealed the lengths to which the Japanese would go stemmed from nothing more than desperation or a kind of crazed patriotism. But while the individual pilots who flew to their deaths (see *The Divine Wind,* reviewed in MANAS for Nov. 15, 1961) may not have seen beyond their willingness to die for emperor and country, the Japanese military government had a rational plan in mind. Mr. Hudson shows that the prospective American invasion might have been repelled sufficiently to make possible a negotiated peace with the Japanese peace party, which would have taken control if a temporary stalemate had been reached. According to Mr. Feis:

> The Japanese had four-and-a-half times as many *kamikaze* planes as the American staff planners supposed. They were kept in tunnels for the day of invasion and hundreds of well-camouflaged and dispersed airstrips had been prepared for them; they could even take off from roads and no problems of landing existed for them, for they were not meant to return from their single one-way flights. The Japanese army was determined to hold on until the invasion; its leaders believed that, if they could repel it, they could then obtain a negotiated peace which would have averted an American military occupation of the Japanese homeland. Their attitude was not, as it is generally represented to have been, one of mere blind fanaticism, a wilful disregard of the obvious realities of their situation; it was based on a rational calculation of military prospects even though there was a willingness to accept losses from the bombardment of Japanese cities which might have daunted soldiers in most countries of the world and did daunt the civilian advisers of the Japanese monarchy.
>
> A peace party had existed in Tokyo ever since the beginning of the year.

What do we learn from this information? Simply that assumptions based upon military strategy are never adequate, and if this be so in respect to the prospective invasion of Japan, the assumption that the A-bomb constituted a necessary sacrifice can also be challenged, although on other than military grounds.

Robert Jungk's *Children of the Ashes* tells how the explosion of Aug. 6 set off a chain reaction of psychological as well as physical mutations, and still threatens us today. Mr. Hudson points out that the *higaisha* (the survivors), truly the "children of the ashes," are not only the Japanese who managed to escape death by blast or radiation sickness, but also ourselves. "We also," writes Hudson, "in whatever country of a world in which nuclear weapons are now numbered by thousands, are [merely] so far survivors." As to observable consequences in Hiroshima, Mr. Jungk reports tragic continuations of suffering:

> In mid-June, 1959, a medical congress took place in Hiroshima at which the consequences of total bodily exposure to radioactivity were discussed. A specialist from Tokyo University then announced that the Hiroshima survivors must expect to be stricken by a wave of "hitherto unidentified sicknesses." In particular the incidence of boils, both harmless and malignant, had increased considerably. It was only now that the secondary consequences of the disease were beginning to become apparent in large numbers, these included damage to the brain mechanism, to the heart, to the pulmonary organs and to the circulation of the blood, as well as premature senility.
>
> More shocking to most people than announcements of this kind, however, are the stories that appear from time to time about the genetic consequences of radiation.
>
> Even the most vehement advocates of a "complete break with the past" could not ignore the story of the 13-year-old schoolboy Kenji Kajiyama. On August 7, 1945, Kenji's mother had come to Hiroshima to look for the remains of her aunt. While digging in the rubble she apparently had received a dose of radioactivity that, though not of great strength, was enough to damage the child in her womb, for she was five months pregnant. Four months later Kenji was born, a perfectly healthy child. Thirteen years later he was to die, the victim of a catastrophe that had taken place before his birth.

From the standpoint of Eastern philosophy, it is in no sense fantastic to link such tragic happenings with accounts of teen-agers who maim or kill "innocent" adults. Throughout the world there is a feeling that hidden disaster may find us defenseless at any time, and in such an atmosphere many sorts of violence may be psychologically considered a reaction to a world malaise. But there is another side to the Hiroshima story. While by Sept. 7, 1945, the leading Hiroshima newspapers had reported a reduction of population from 390,000 to 130,000, even survivors due to face a lingering death went patiently and bravely to work at rebuilding their community life on the same site.

Fantastic determination and courage appear in all the annals of the *higaisha.* Mr. Jungk tells the story of two young people who survived to permanent ill-health, who could never have children, whose previous hopes had all been ruined, but who resolved to labor for a world of greater understanding. The crippled wife of Ichiro Kawamoto put her and her husband's feelings to Mr. Jungk in these words:

> We have reached the conclusion that inhumanity begins with the contempt and neglect of the individual. The atomic weapon is the end product of this indifference toward the many individual, inexchangeable and irreplaceable human beings. We must protest against the bomb. But that is not enough. We must also try to change the attitude of man to man. Had the atomic explosion never happened I should now be an average dancing teacher and I should perhaps never have understood how much we need one another—how much each of us needs every other human being in the world.

Those who enjoyed the delicate instructiveness of the motion picture, *The Mark,* may here think of something said by the psychiatrist (played by Rod Steiger)—that he could wish all the people of his city to experience grievous sickness, because of the resources freed in them as they start to get well. Certainly "the children of the ashes" at Hiroshima have shown how much courage and constructive determination is possible for man *in extremis.* And where and when, for our time, are we likely to find a more appropriate symbol of both Crucifixion and Resurrection?

COMMENTARY
AN EXISTENTIALIST WRITER

To the great majority of the reading public, Henry Miller is the author of a once-banned book, *Tropic of Cancer,* who has been the behind-the-scenes object of several "obscenity" prosecutions. We mention him, not to rehearse the circus events of this legal debate about morality, but to call attention to a quality in Miller's writing which accounts for the devotion of many of his admirers.

Miller is probably less bound, less touched, by contemporary institutions than any other practicing artist of the time. His work is spontaneously, not traditionally, humane. He says exactly what he thinks, and this generates a power over readers who would like to feel the same freedom. Whatever one may think of writing which involves stubby Anglo-Saxon epithets or barnyard-type descriptions of amorous adventures, still to be reckoned with are the impact and importance of passages like the following, which begins with the role of the psychoanalysts in modern society:

> The analyst everywhere is fighting a hopeless fight. For every individual whom he restores to the stream of life, "adapted," as they put it, a dozen are incapacitated. There will never be enough analysts to go around, no matter how fast we can turn them out. One brief war is enough to undo the work of centuries. Surgery of course will make new advances, though of what use these advances are is difficult to see. Our whole way of life has to alter. We don't want better surgical appliances, we want a better life. If all the surgeons, all the analysts all the medicos could be withdrawn from their activity and gathered together for a spell in the great bowl at Epidaurus, if they could discuss in peace and quiet the immediate, drastic need of humanity at large, the answer would be forthcoming speedily, and it would be unanimous: REVOLUTION. A worldwide revolution from top to bottom, in every country, in every class, in every realm of consciousness. The fight is not against disease: disease is a by-product. The enemy of man is not germs, but man himself, his pride, his prejudices, his stupidity, his arrogance. No class is immune, no system holds a panacea. Each individually must revolt against a way of life which is not his own. The revolt, to be effective, must be continuous and relentless. It is not enough to overthrow governments, masters, tyrants: one must overthrow his own preconceived ideas of right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust. We must abandon the hard-fought trenches we have dug ourselves into and come out into the open, surrender our arms, our possessions, our rights as individuals, classes, nations, peoples. A billion people seeking peace cannot be enslaved. We have enslaved ourselves, by our own petty, circumscribed view of life. It is glorious to offer one's life for a cause, but dead men accomplish nothing. Life demands that we offer something more—spirit, soul, intelligence, good-will. . . . The earth is our creation and we must accept the fruits of our creation. As long as we refuse to think in terms of world good and world goods, of world order, world peace, we shall murder and betray one another. It can go on till the crack of doom, if we wish it to be thus. Nothing can bring about a new and better world but our own desire for it. . . . *(The Colossus of Maroussi,* 1941.)

A man who writes like that is a luminous moral influence upon his time.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

[We present here a report of a recent "Science and Religion" conference for two reasons: first, several of the participants are educators; second, the group represents no "institution." The concerns and interests expressed revolve around the aims and ends of the educational process, and the discussions which took place seem symptomatic of the new spirit of the times—an approach to human problems from the philosophical point of view.]

A GROUP which calls itself "Conference on Science and Religion" held its sixth annual all-day conference at Claremont, California, on Saturday, June 9. I am not familiar with the history or background of this group. However, the members attending that conference represented many disciplines.

The program presented Dr. Ira Progoff, Director of the Institute of Depth Psychology at Drew University, who spoke on the theme, "The Psychological Dimension of Religion." His morning talk was entitled, "Long Range Perspectives," and the afternoon topic was "Psychological Procedures for Spiritual Growth." However, it seemed that his morning address was actually on procedures—the specific procedures of depth psychology. He presented what is, I am sure, a familiar talk concerning his own methods of therapy, using the depth approach. The afternoon meeting included a panel discussion with two other participants, Dr. Floyd Ross, Professor of World Religions, Southern California School of Theology, and Dr. Herman Harvey, Professor of Psychology, University of Southern California, who asked questions regarding Dr. Progoff's methods.

Dr. Progoff begins "where the person is"—suggesting that rapport is built with the client by means of casual conversation. Usually the individual wants to talk about himself and his difficulties as he sees them. When rapport is established, somehow the client comes to have a "depth" experience, a "symbolic experience."

Dr. Progoff defined carefully his meaning of "symbolic experience." He distinguished between what we usually call a symbol, and what he considers a symbol to be. Common symbols, those considered by Freud, for instance, or the typical ones of our lives—the flag—are actually, he suggests, "signs." One thing stands for something else—that is a sign. A symbol, on the other hand, is essentially an individual experience of something that represents an unfolding, on-moving idea. Symbols, as Dr. Progoff uses the word, cannot be universal as such, since they present private meanings.

The moment of such an experience, or creative insight, is the moment when therapy begins. Dr. Progoff believes that the individual reaches a greater depth, or height within himself (he indicated that terms such as "up" and "down" are unfortunate in referring to areas "within" the individual not subject to dimension), when he has such an experience. This might be a symbolic dream, or a psychic experience—he gave the example of a person's feeling himself one with nature. He then encourages his client to return to this experience by concentration on it. If it came originally as a dream, the return to it is sought in a waking condition. As the individual speaks of the continuation of his experience and his perception of its meaning, Dr. Progoff takes notes. The client is encouraged to express the thoughts and feelings which his creative insight brings to him in the form of poetry, paintings, or by some other medium. Examples of the poetic expressions were read.

Members of the afternoon panel presented their questions to Dr. Progoff, with results such as the following:

Question: Do you help your client interpret his experience?

Answer: No. We do not stop to interpret. The process must not be stopped, if it is to be productive. Analysis halts the process. The depth experience

itself brings insights in time about the individual's problem and its causes, which make analysis, as we usually think of it, unnecessary. . . . In most cases the person realizes that his real difficulties are within himself. No matter how much heredity or environment may have affected a person, his actual problems are internal.

Question: Do you have any failures? Most therapists do. What about your failures?

Answer: I cannot say that I really have failures. I begin with a client. If after three or four weeks we are not getting anywhere, we stop. It isn't so much that we have failed, but rather I discover that this person is not really ready to look deeply at his life. You know some people have a disease or illness (physical), and it is really better for that illness to continue. As a matter of fact, though, many clients have come to me who have been the "failures" of psychotherapists. Some have worked out of their problems.

This comment, if taken without reference to context, might seem to be both too simplified and too generalized in relation to the endless complexities of therapy. However, later discussion provides further definition of what is meant by "love"—and the indication is plain that Dr. Progoff's attention is as much focused upon the maturation of the therapist, as teacher or helper, as upon the patient. For instance:

Question: What is the real tool you are working with?

Answer: Well, perhaps every therapist, if he is committed to a sincere desire to help and has a faith in a process, arouses his client, not by certain methods, but by the very influence of the commitment itself.

Question: In the examples you have given us today your clients have expressed their insights in some cases in the form of typical Christian symbolism. Do you encourage, or expect such return to former symbolism-security?

Answer: Definitely no. I am not at all concerned as to the particular form a client's expression takes, as long as he reaches the level beyond the ordinarily psyche and sees himself and his problems truly. His release from his conflicts finds many forms of expression. Sometimes he returns to former patterns of symbolism familiar to him, sometimes he does not. The process of growth from the old perception to the new has been expressed in many ways. One woman said that during the period of change she had a feeling of screaming inside.

Question: But most psychotherapists base their approach to the client and their work upon the common symbols, the value judgments of the culture in which they work, or the culture of their clients. Otherwise there would be no standards for progress toward maturity. If you do not encourage the individual's approach to the values of a culture, how do you measure "improvement?" You must have some value judgment you use.

Answer: Yes, I do. Just one, I guess. I would call it love—not in a personal sense; but a love of one's fellow man. If a client can come to feel this, whatever symbols he finds to express this are right for him. I would say he has been "cured" if he has such an understanding.

Dr. Progoff's answers were given slowly, quietly, and modestly. He gave the impression that he was thinking about each question carefully, that the answers did not come easily because each one required much further thought.

He expressed a hope that the time would come when the method he is using would not be thought of as just "therapy." He feels that depth of insight and the resulting self-understanding should be thought of as growth. And such growth should take place in every human being.

FRONTIERS

"Anthology of Zen"

THE attractions of Zen Buddhist psychological emphasis have become apparent through the innumerable books and articles on the subject which are currently circulating. Something in Zen seems to strike home, reaching from one stratum of the beatniks to the existential philosophers, subsequently echoing in numerous directions. The "pure" Zen disciple is presumably not interested in the cultural influence of his tradition and will not discuss Zen in this context, save to say that it cannot really be explained by intellectual description. But, while the powers of reason may not unveil the essence of Zen, it is also likely that reason stops far too soon in evaluation, and that germinal perspectives may be considered with benefit by even the casual reader.

Currently at hand is one of the best collections on Zen writing we have yet encountered, *Anthology of Zen* (Grove, 1961), edited by William Briggs. Most of the contributors are Japanese Zen disciples, and their writing is consistently lucid and stimulating. An excellent foreword—conforming to the Zen tradition, and happily unpretentious—is contributed by William Barrett, who writes:

> Since some of us first got involved with Zen, the bibliography on the subject has been swelling like a gigantic snowball. New books are constantly being published. More than this they are actually being bought in large quantities by Americans, and presumably read. It hardly seems possible to think of the interest in Zen in this country as a passing fad. Of course, one would be naive to think that all Americans who are reading about Zen are also putting it to practice with the single-minded passion that the old Zen masters demanded. I am not sure that that is possible in America today: you would have to be able to create a space around yourself, a zone of silence that most of us, immersed in the world and with limited means, cannot manage. Maybe, though, some Zen practitioners are tough enough to do it. But whatever the degree of practical application, with all the reading about Zen something is bound to get through to the American consciousness.
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> If nothing else, the need for Zen is there or the books wouldn't be bought, and this need becomes more conscious of itself as need through Zen. Western religions have been in appalling decadence for the last two centuries. I hope this last remark will not be taken as offense by all the good people who go to church or synagogue and try seriously to regulate their lives thereby. *Sauve qui pent*—they are doing what they need to do. Nor is the decadence I speak of the loss of faith through the centuries of scientific and historical criticism. That kind of criticism is really negligible now, and it should have had long ago the effect of turning religion away from false objects to its own real sources. The decadence I speak of—and I have in mind Christianity principally—is the fact that the religious symbols no longer operate potently upon the Western psyche. They no longer unlock the life-giving waters; their hold on the unconscious has weakened, or else has receded so far into the unconscious as to be lost and shriveled, and so are painfully misunderstood, as in the tragic case of Nietzsche. None of our painters has convincingly depicted the symbol of Christ for centuries.
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> Where this decadence began would take us far back in the history of the West, and this is not the place to attempt any lengthy diagnosis. The Oriental religions at least traveled a different path, and remained in touch with the natural and abysmal depths of the human soul.

The power of Zen to transform thinking, in Mr. Barrett's and Mr. Brigg's opinion, lies not in a superior system of thinking but in the realization that *all* the "systems" must eventually be transcended. If Zen should succeed in transforming the religious consciousness of the West, Zen will accomplish this not by "doing something," but simply by being there—as a continual challenge. Mr. Barrett concludes:

> Personally, I think of my own exposure to Zen in the light of the remark by W. C. Fields (which might in fact be incorporated in the *koan,* the Zen manual of paradoxes): "My first wife drove me to drink—I'm eternally indebted to her." No blessings are ever unambiguous—certainly not Zen. The self, ourselves, into which Zen tells us we must look is not all green pastures; it is also a no man's land, an unreclaimed waste, pitted with foxholes, barbed wire, quicksand. Still, there ought to be a lot of Americans

who would prefer to take their risks with this rather than abide forever with Dr. Norman Vincent Peale.

The article, "How Altruism is Cultivated in Zen" (Kite and Nagaya), is an interesting treatise on an aspect of Zen influence sometimes considered to be nonexistent. The Zen Master does not talk about the good works that people ought to do, but, in suggesting the means by which a Vision of Identity may finally be reached, he prepares the way for a realization of the fundamental spiritual identity among all living creatures. And what more basic orientation in respect to "altruism" could be imagined? The authors write:

> At dawn, as Shakya Muni Buddha gazed up at the bright star of morning, he awakened to the truth. He realized that everything in the universe—not only human beings, but also birds, animals, mountains, rivers, trees, grasses, and all things else—possesses Buddha-nature. This was the beginning of Buddhism; and Zen is the continuation of this living experience. . . . This is the tradition and it is also the very life and soul of Zen.
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> What it really teaches us is that he who has once entered samadhi and seen his own original aspect must not lose this state of mind and must carry on his daily life from this very mind itself. Thus, for the very first time the egotistical mind is annihilated and the altruistic mind begins its work. It is then that creative power beyond the imagination of ordinary men wells up. Until one has realized this one can never comprehend what is called in Buddhism the "Great Compassionate Heart."
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> When a man has entered samadhi, his deeds exhibit a greatness beyond the capacity of the ordinary man who is possessed of attachment. This is called samadhi-power. As the purpose of zazen lies in cultivating this free realm oneself and helping others to cultivate it, its purpose is not the renouncing of the ordinary world, but rather the cultivation of creative and dynarnic power which can manifest itself in the affairs of everyday life, regardless of one's occupation.

Zen is not exclusive. The native "Buddhahood" to which the soul of man is to be "recalled" by Zen is a state of mind in which one lives, as one writer puts it, "unshackled by beliefs in cultural fictions." From the religious point of view, Zen suggests a radical reinterpretation of Christianity, but this can and should mean an increase, rather than decrease, of perceptivity. Another essay in *Anthology of Zen,* by Stewart W. Holmes, suggests the nature of such Christian "re-interpretation ":

> In summary: Through what I may call a self-training in Zen I am learning again to live directly and spontaneously. (Jesus: "Except ye become as a little child, ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven.") This progressive emancipation from the tyranny of fictions (both perceptual and symbolic) is freeing me of the conflicts based on dualisms. These dualisms are part of our culture, part, for me, of the traditional interpretations of Christianity. I have tried to show how through Zen I am experiencing a liberation from my enslavement to dualisms and dogmas and an enriching of the myths. These myths seem meaningful to me as I live in eternity this day—meaningful because they are consistent with my present world view. (This world view is based on my current knowledge of cultural anthropology, general semantics, and the philosophy and "facts" of other branches of science as this knowledge has been processed in my organism.)
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> Looking behind the dualisms and dogma and all the other culture-derived symbols and perceptual constructs is helping me to live each moment more creatively. I can process my input—input from words of and about Jesus and the Buddha, input from some problem or from a picture or landscape—relatively free from concerns not pertinent to the structuring and living of each event.