VOLUME XXVIII, NO. 42
OCTOBER 15, 1975

IN SOME SENSE HEROES

IN *Persuasion and Healing,* Jerome Frank shows the importance of what he terms the "assumptive world" which each human being has or constructs, on the basis of which he responds to experience, makes his decisions, and chooses his goals. The assumptive world is made up of our opinions about the nature of things—our hopes and fears, conscious or unconscious, and our deliberated convictions, strong or weak, about ourselves and others. In its shallow areas the assumptive world may be subject to constant flux, while its depths remain still save for some great change, in a decisive moment, of the direction and reach of our awareness. There, one might say, at the heart of individual life, sits the helmsman, if there is a helmsman, and there, if we are able consciously to enter this region of choice, lies the only freedom worth talking about.

In the field of this admittedly vague yet profoundly important idea, grows the inchoate longing, the slowly stirring but hardly articulated hope, the psycho-spiritual tropism which may, during years to come, shape the character of the age that is coming into being. That this is a time of change hardly needs repetition or proof. Change is in the air. No serious writer speaks of the human condition without drawing attention to the present phenomena of change. "Crisis" is a word almost worn out from over-use. "Transition," nearly as familiar, suggests a great bridge arching up and out into the future, but incomplete—broken off, as it were, in the middle. We can say a great deal about the avenues and structure of the bridgehead on our side of the abyss, but as to the farther shore, we can't see it at all, and in moments of depression wonder whether it really exists.

Well, if the future is somehow wrapped up in the present, if our ends are implicit in our means, then we have at least some clues—abstract and philosophical, or "psychological," if this seems more comfortable—yet clues to the kind of future we may be making. If, indeed, we have any part in creating the human world.

But that is the issue, the radical contention, the aspiring resolve, and the hungering, holistic demand behind the present movement of the human spirit—that there *is* a helmsman, that the world does have meaning, and that we are responsible for its fulfillment. This affirmation grows apace; the rejection of mechanism, of reductionism and determinism, is more animated and explicit with each new wave of human expression; but a natural anxiety results from realizing that with the theoretical transfer of decision-making from the environment to ourselves, since what we gain in subjective moral satisfaction we lose in precision and particularized certainties. For *how,* after all, does human freedom work? What is effective decision, in contrast, say, to going through the motions of a self-fulfilling prophecy?

If the "will" is real, it is none the less a mystery. Ego strength is a phrase belonging to the psychological empiricists. It describes a resource that may spring from simple stubbornness, or come, instead, from a vision so clear that no obstacle can produce dismay. We often don't know how to tell the difference. Pondering the popularity of leaders such as Hitler, Stalin, Senator McCarthy, or some of the Birchers, A. H. Maslow remarked (in *Eupsychian Management*):

> In a nation in which most people do not have an identity or a real self, in which they are all confused about right and wrong, about good and evil, in which they are basically uncertain about what they want and what they don't want then they are apt to admire and succumb to and look for leadership to any person who seems to know definitely what he wants. Since the democratic leader, the non-authoritarian person in

general, is apt to be marked by tolerance and admission of ignorance, by willingness to admit that he doesn't know everything, sometimes for less educated people the decisive paranoid authoritarian then can look very attractive and relieve the follower of all anxiety. . . .

> The person who is able to be decisive who is able to make a decision and stick to it, who is able to know definitely what he wants . . . who is less influenced by contradiction—such a person is in general more apt to be selected out by others as leader. I think this may be one reason why so frequently obsessional persons are more apt to be chosen as the administrative type or the executive type or the leadership type. They are simply more predictable, more definite about what they like and dislike, less changeable. The fact that this may be for pathological reasons need not be visible to the psychologically unsophisticated person.

This is the sort of introspective reflection and analysis that is becoming natural to us. Its value is self-evident. In the long run, it will have a large influence in making the assumptive world of the future. It is perturbing, perhaps, to consider the possibility that a good many people "do not have an identity or a real self," yet this is also a way of suggesting that the present is a time when "real selves" are in process of getting born—becoming, that is, consciously self-aware. And like any birth process, it brings pain and turmoil as well as a certain delight.

We are trying, now, to develop the helmsman in us. If, without helmsmen, we settle for the leadership of Hitlers and Stalins (other, more recent figures could also be named), then we need helmsmen—even junior, inexperienced helmsmen—very badly, and had best give their development our primary attention.

But how?

Four years ago, in the Autumn issue of *Social Research,* Hannah Arendt dealt with this question in a way that helps us to understand our great difficulty in finding a secure and satisfactory answer. Writing on "Thinking and Moral Considerations," she begins by recalling her impressions of Eichmann, whose trial she reported from Jerusalem. The main thing she noticed about Eichmann was the ease with which he switched from one assumptive world to another. A change in his circumstances automatically changed his views. He didn't, you could say, have any mind of his own. No "real self." Miss Arendt makes this revealing comment:

> However monstrous the deeds were, the doer was neither monstrous nor demonic, and the only specific characteristic one could detect in his past as well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic inability to think. He functioned in the role of a prominent war criminal as well as he had under the Nazi regime, he had not the slightest difficulty in accepting an entirely different set of rules. He knew that what he had once considered his duty was now called a crime, and he accepted this new code of judgment as though it were nothing but another language rule. To his rather limited supply of stock phrases he had added a few new ones, and he was utterly helpless only when he was confronted with a situation to which none of them would apply, as in the most grotesque instance when he had to make a speech under the gallows and was forced to rely on clichés used in funeral oratory which were inapplicable in his case because he was not a survivor. Considering what his last words should be in case of a death sentence, which he had expected all along, this simple fact had not occurred to him, just as inconsistencies and flagrant contradictions in examination and cross-examinations during the trial had not bothered him. Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to conventional, standardized codes of expression and conduct have the socially recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking attention which all events and facts arouse by virtue of their existence. If we were responsive to this claim all the time, we would soon be exhausted; the difference in Eichmann was only that he dearly knew of no such claim at all.

Hannah Arendt ends her introductory paragraph by saying, "This total absence of thinking attracted my interest," and it should attract ours. If the dramatic illustration of an Eichmann's inability to think—to select an assumptive world with some principles behind it, to which he would stick—can help us to understand the problems of finding a helmsman in

ourselves, then some small credit might be assigned to his account, even though "he" had practically nothing to do with it.

Recently we quoted a passage from John Schaar's *New American Review* (No. 8) essay on Authority, some of which will bear repeating here. At the time of the founding of the United States, he said, "the doctrine and sentiment were already widespread that each individual comes into this world morally complete and self-sufficient, clothed with natural rights which are his by birth, and not in need of fellowship for moral growth and fulfillment." The focus of effort was then on the satisfaction of personal needs and desires. Millions of Europeans and others came here with the main idea of having freedom to get rich.

> Millions of Americans strive for that goal, and what is more important, base their political views upon it. The state is a convenience in a private search. . . . We have no mainstream political or moral teaching that tells men they must remain bound to each other even one step beyond the point where those bonds are a drag and a burden on one's personal desires.

This seems a fair account of the assumptive world common to a great many people in the United States (elsewhere as well), although it is a world that now exhibits multiplying defects.

It is of interest to reflect that the prime function of Thomas Paine, in the years immediately before and during the American Revolution, was to smash as effectively as he could the typical assumptive world of the colonists, which included high-minded loyalty and devotion to the British crown. Paine, as most historians agree, was the greatest single force in inspiring self-confidence and loyalty to the idea of freedom and self-determination among the Americans. We might say that he communicated what was historically "relevant." Through his inspiration the spirit of the future, which was in the air, was brought down to practical embodiment in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and in the vision and declared ideals of the Founding Fathers. But what was morally relevant—ethically and philosophically relevant (in *Paine's* thought, we should note)—was hardly brought down at all. This is the plain implication of John Schaar's apt character sketch showing the motivations of the people of the young republic. Today, to simplify a bit, the young republic has been "growing up" for two hundred years, and we have multinationals, oil conglomerates, and agribusiness and a great many other examples of the garden variety of 1776 motives brought to maturity. These motives now threaten the welfare of the planet, and illustrate, in another way, not stupidity but "a quite authentic inability to think." A great many of us still feel the way we did two hundred years ago—"morally complete."

Well, we sometimes think we know what agribusiness ought to do, what the oil people ought to do, and what the politicians ought to do besides resign; and we may feel sure that Eichmann could have worked out an assumptive world of his own—one that would have prevented him from adopting the insane postulates of the Nazi State—but do we know how we should think about our own less clearly defined problems? Do we know how to start putting in charge of our lives a helmsman who doesn't always feel tied hand and foot?

What, indeed, is it to *think?*

With some apology for the magnitude of the task, Miss Arendt sets out to answer this question as well as she can. And here we should like to suggest that this sort of essay—this inquiry into the nature of thought, as distinguished from the tangible end-products of rationality—represents the height of human undertakings in these times. At the risk of refutation by tomorrow's historians, we propose that this sort of self-conscious philosophizing and questioning *is* the progressive mutation our epoch embodies and gives expression to. (One finds these themes, more or less clearly expressed, in the work of Maslow, in Annie Dillard, in Theodore Roszak, and implicit as foundation in a poet or two.) The paragraph of

introduction to the main body of Miss Arendt's essay deserves quotation:

> The trouble is that few thinkers ever told us what made them think and even fewer have cared to describe and examine their thinking experience. In this difficulty, unwilling to trust our own experiences because of the obvious danger of arbitrariness, I propose to look for a model, for an example that, unlike the "professional" thinkers, could be representative for our "everybody," i.e., to look for a man who counted himself neither among the many nor among the few—a distinction at least as old as Pythagoras; who did not aspire to be the ruler of cities or claim to know how to improve and take care of the citizens' souls; who did not believe that men could be wise and did not envy the gods their divine wisdom in case they should possess it; and who therefore had never even tried his hand at formulating a doctrine that could be taught and learned. In brief, I propose to use a man as our model who did think without becoming a philosopher, a citizen among citizens, doing nothing, claiming nothing that, in his view, every citizen should do and had a right to claim. You will have guessed that I intend to speak about Socrates, and I hope that no one will seriously dispute that my choice is historically justifiable.

Curiously, the kind of thinking Socrates does, and endeavors to inspire in others, is, in a notable and evident sense, resultless. Miss Arendt calls it "meditation," as distinguished from "deliberation," since deliberation is meant to arrive at a conclusion which is, for that cycle of thinking, the end of the line—the product: you make something or do something specific. "Meditation is not the same as deliberation, which indeed is supposed to end in tangible results; and meditation does not aim at deliberation although it sometimes, by no means very often, turns into it." Socratic thinking is a meditation on thinking:

> It is in its nature to undo, unfreeze as it were, what language, the medium of thinking, has frozen into thought—words (concepts, sentences, definitions, doctrines), whose "weakness" and inflexibility Plato denounces so splendidly in the *Seventh Letter*. The consequence of this peculiarity is that thinking inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics. These frozen thoughts, Socrates seems to say, come so handy you can use them in your sleep; but if the wind of thinking, which I shall now arouse in you, has roused you from your sleep and made you fully awake and alive, then you will see that you have nothing in your hand but perplexities, and the most we can do is share them with each other.

Thinking, in short, is dangerous and unsettling. A man who thinks far enough to become contemptuous toward past delusions and present egoisms may become a cynic or even a nihilist:

> What we commonly call nihilism—and are tempted to date historically, decry politically, and ascribe to thinkers who allegedly dared to think dangerous thoughts—is actually a danger inherent in the thinking activity itself. There are no dangerous thoughts; thinking itself is dangerous, but nihilism is not its product. Nihilism is but the other side of conventionalism; its creed consists of negations of the current, so-called positive values to which it remains bound. All critical examinations must go through a stage of at least hypothetically negating accepted opinions and "values" by finding out their implications and tacit assumptions, and in this sense nihilism may be seen as an ever-present danger of thinking. But this danger does not arise out of the Socratic conviction that an unexamined life is not worth living, but, on the contrary, out of the desire to find results which would make further thinking unnecessary. Thinking is equally dangerous to all creeds and, by itself, does not bring forth any new creed.

But not thinking, as a safety or protective measure, is far more dangerous. You take the ready-made code of your time, and if it is bad, you swallow and accept it anyway. Or if you don't think at all, you may embrace the worst of codes with eagerness, claiming it as "duty," as Eichmann did. "How easy it was," Miss Arendt remarks, "for the totalitarian rulers to reverse the basic commandments of Western morality—'Thou shalt not kill' in the case of Hitler's Germany, 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor' in the case of Stalin's Russia."

Well, if thinking has such formidable consequences, opening us up to the embarrassments which afflict anyone who goes

beyond the assumptions of his time, what keeps the real thinkers—who must be in some sense heroes—going? Socrates declared it to be *eros,* the love of wisdom. Love of wisdom is also love of the good:

> If thinking dissolves normal positive concepts into their original meaning, then the same process dissolves . . . negative concepts into their original meaninglessness, into nothing. This incidentally is by no means only Socrates' opinion; that evil is mere privation, negation, or exception from the rule is the nearly unanimous opinion of all thinkers. (The most conspicuous and most dangerous fallacy in the proposition, as old as Plato, "Nobody ever does evil voluntarily," is the implied conclusion, "Everybody wants to do good." The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never made up their mind to be either good or bad.)

The concluding portion of Hannah Arendt's paper is devoted to an examination of Conscience. What is it? She takes her answer from Socrates and Shakespeare. Conscience is the "other fellow" in the human being's dialogue with himself about life, for this is a part of thinking. Conscience may be a resonance of the voice of *eros,* for all we know. "You must see to it," she says, "that the two who carry on the thinking dialogue"—yourself and your conscience "be in good shape, that the partners be friends." As Socrates would say:

> It is better for you to suffer than to do wrong because you can remain the friend of the sufferer; who would want to be the friend of and have to live together with a murderer? Not even a murderer. What kind of a dialogue could you lead with him?
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> What makes a man fear this conscience is the anticipation of the presence of a witness who awaits him only *if* and when he goes home. Shakespeare's murderer says: "Every man that means to live well endeavors to live without it," and success in this endeavor comes easy because all he has to do is never to start the soundless solitary dialogue we call thinking, never to go home and examine things. . . . He who does not know the intercourse between me and myself (in which we examine what we say and do) will not mind contradicting himself, and this means he will never be either able or willing to give an account of what he says or does; nor will he mind committing any crime since he can be sure that it will be forgotten in the next moment.

All men, wise or foolish, brilliant or dull, have the capacity to carry on this inner dialogue, Miss Arendt points out. It is the natural need, function, and fulfillment of human life. Conscience is not just for emergencies, but, like the capacity for thinking, its light must be invoked.

REVIEW
A "PEACE NEWS" REVIEW

TWO items in *Peace News* for July 11 make an interesting contrast. One is by Timothy Kidd, who proposes that all working people be given one year off (with pay) out of seven: "the idea behind the sabbatical scheme [the professors have applied it for years] is that everyone should be given a chance to do everything—learn a new skill, write a novel, journey to Bhutan, stare at a sunflower, build a house."

While this idea was first suggested in America by Kenneth Lamott, he was anticipated, the *PN* writer notes, by God, who said in Leviticus (25, iii): "Six years thou shalt sow thy field and prune thy vineyard and gather the fruit thereof; but in the seventh year shall be a sabbath of rest unto the land; thou shalt neither sow thy field nor prune thy vineyard." American legislators and bureaucrats were not impressed, but J. Paul Getty liked the idea(!), and a Harvard economist said it might work. After gathering and explaining the logic behind the proposal, Mr. Kidd quotes the economist as pointing out: "the GNP will go down but then it will grow more rapidly from a lower base, particularly if training is a big feature," then adds:

> For some odd reason, the sum of human happiness is not measured by the GNP. The scheme would most benefit those people who are stuck in repetitive, boring, or dirty jobs, and also housewives and the low-paid. For that reason the scheme will be principally opposed by shareholders captains of industry, and the bourgeois press.

Well, it probably *would* work, especially if the big firms most able to afford this plan were to set an example, but we find the *Peace News* editorial discussion of the issue of work more appealing—and *Peace News,* incidentally, is *not* a member of the bourgeois press. On page 2 of the July 11 issue there is this statement:

> It is a facet of this society that we regard work as a problem at all. In a properly integrated world there need be no awareness of work as a separate experience from living itself. We have come to hate work because it is always done for the benefit of others and bears no relation to our collective development. Yet work in its pure form is synonymous with creativity, and, as Wilhelm Reich states, it is, with love and knowledge, the wellspring of peace. PEACE NEWS involves itself in the struggle to escape the clutches of the bureaucratic and technological monster, by supporting workers' cooperatives and work-ins where the people manage the production process themselves, and by working collectively ourselves.

The two views of "work" suggested by these quotations reminds us a little of what James Farmer said in 1968 (in the *Progressive* for January of that year) about the ghettos of the United States:

> Paradoxically, the black man must, I think, strengthen the ghetto on the one hand, and continue to provide an exit on the other. He must build the economic and political power of the ghetto as he simultaneously fights for open-occupancy housing, which eventually will destroy the ghetto, but will provide the Negro with a new potency as a full American.
>
> This is bound to be a long and agonizing process, encompassing a series of progressive and regressive steps—some dramatic, some prosaic, some violent, some passive. . . .

The point is, giving people relief from ghetto-like jobs does seem to be important, and worth advocating; but even more important is establishing ideas and examples of work that are totally inconsistent with the cultural ghetto created by meaninglessness. One more thought: What if the multinationals and other conglomerates—including the monsters of oil and agribusiness—all started to give their many employees sabbaticals, according to this plan? Should they have one cheer, two, or none? Conceivably, if the ecological economists are right in their predictions, such problems may soon become academic, since smallness along with labor-intensive farming, industry, and craft are likely to become the only means of survival.

Peace News, as a venture, doubtless has its problems. Any human undertaking which involves

relations with the existing economy, while attempting to alter the foundations of human behavior, is going to have problems. This is, as Karl Polanyi said in a similar connection, like trying to rebuild a house, from the ground up, while living in it. Such fragile institutions, yet wonderfully tenacious of life, deserve not only our recognition, but our friendly support, especially when a product of tangible excellence grows out of their work. The temper of the conscious efforts on the part of the *Peace News* people is well expressed in the following:

> For many people the alternative just doesn't exist. Their ability to imagine a different society is severely limited by the pressures of the media and the rigidity of their daily lives. For others, progress means the steady consolidation of state socialism which could so easily become the new fascism of the 80s. However strong the alternative movement were to grow, we would still have to resist the ever renewed repressions of the state, which is going to grow stronger still before it "withers away." . . . If we gain time to reflect on our situation, if we can have more time for play, if we can discover our real needs, the power of the state over us is lessened.

Following is the *Peace News* circulation ad: "SUBSCRIBE—it costs £5 for a year, £2.67 for six months [about $12.50 and $6.70]; 10% discount for those with little money. (We also do swaps, *e.g.,* Devi Prasad is giving us one of his handmade coffee pots in exchange for a subscription.) We also do a trial subscription—a real bargain at 60 p. ($1.50) for 5 issues. Send your cheques and postal orders to 8 Elm Avenue, Nottingham, U.K."

One of the valuable functions of *Peace News* is to provide a forum for debate and exploration of theories of peaceful social change, which involves, of course, analysis and criticism of violent forms of social action. There is a natural association of peace with *justice* in the minds of many pacifists, and while peace may be negatively defined as the absence of armed conflict, justice has no simple characterization. But since many believe—as is natural and more or less substantiated historically—that no peace can endure save on the foundation of justice, there is continuous argument on how to establish justice in order to obtain peace. Inevitably, therefore, there has been a tendency to accept "revolutionary" violence on the ground that it is socially necessary for putting an end to the inequities which make peace impossible.

In *Peace News* articles and reviews during the past several years, and now in a *Peace News* pamphlet, *On War—National Liberation & the State* (50 cents), Nigel Young has been pointing out that this growing tolerance of revolutionary violence ignores the characteristic patterns of social process that have been described by distinguished social scientists such as Max Weber and Barrington Moore. Nigel Young contends that the "ethical pacifism" of the 1930s was vulnerable to this intellectual (and moral) weakness for the reason that it gave little attention to sociological studies of the state, war, and revolution. These studies, he maintains, make it clear that the very structures necessary to revolutionary violence produce results which negate not only the goals of most pacifists, "but are in fact quite contrary to those held even by most of those who embark on violent struggle."

The applications of violence by a determined revolutionary elite, he shows, "do not free *people* but rather liberate forces:"

> They are revolutions that liberate the forces of modernity, the mobilization and organization of men and resources, and the centralization of control in a context of nationalism and technological development linked to military action. Such patterns do not create or sustain the political orders of freedom. These orders emerge always in revolutionary crises as soviets, or communes, or councils of soldiers and workers. Too often such democratic impulses are co-oped by authoritarian and elitist groups, and turned to the advantage, either of their own interests or to create a new bureaucratic or military class.

The recently published *Unknown Revolution* by Voline provides absorbingly interesting confirmation of this analysis in respect to the early emergence of bureaucratic control in the Russian

revolution, and Mr. Young observes that Leninism did not "degenerate" into bureaucratic Stalinism, but *planned* the controlling apparatus. "My idea," Lenin said, "is bureaucratic in the sense that the party is built from the top downwards." The decentralist hope of an opposite pattern of social organization was flatly rejected and its champions suppressed or liquidated.

In a general comment, Young says:

> The linkage of revolution to militarism and war in the twentieth century is certainly a direct one—both in the sense that revolutions have involved or been related to internal (civil) and external wars (military defeats, conquest, or foreign intervention against revolutions), and in the sense that they are analogous. As well as acting as a precondition of revolution, war has tended to be a model for the revolutionary process itself. Like most modern wars revolutions have been fundamentally state-building and centralizing enterprises—even building on existing state structures. They have emphasized the industrial underpinning of the enterprise. They have elevated technical modernity as a value in itself. They have each mobilized on the basis of nationalist appeals as much as more directly political ones. They have been bureaucratically organized and hierarchically led. In common with wars of national liberation, the earlier revolutions had strong intellectual elements in the leadership, and have seen themselves as quasi-military operations.

Elsewhere he says:

> The bureaucratization of *war*—its centralization and its mass "democratic" base—represents the essential ingredient in the centralization and bureaucratization of the state itself. Both are achieved in the name of "the people" and "the nation. In addition, of course, modern war and its techniques would be unthinkable without the development of heavy industry.

There remains the problem of communicating these insights in terms of the general comprehension, interest, and understanding of common folk, to whom sociological generalizations are likely to be opaque. For this purpose we read once again the passages on industrialism in Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* (Indian Self-Rule) written in 1908. As the years go by, Gandhi's insight seems more and more impressive. (So does the wisdom of Lao tse.) A little book addressed to Indians may not have the language appropriate for the general reader in the technological West, but a corresponding simplicity should be possible. Developing it is a task before us all.

COMMENTARY
BOTH ENDS OF THE SITUATION

A GOOD thing to read in connection with the Platonic discourse on Love (see "Children") is the chapter on Education in Buber's *Between Man and Man.* Buber says:

> What we term education, conscious and willed, means *a selection by man of the effective world:* it means to give decisive effective power to a selection of the world which is concentrated and manifested in the educator. The relation in education is lifted out of the purposelessly streaming education by all things, and is marked off as purpose. . . .
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> Trust, trust in the world, because this human being exists—that is the most inward achievement of the relation in education. Because this human being exists, meaninglessness, however hard pressed you are by it, cannot be the real truth. . . . Because this human being exists: therefore he must be really there, really facing the child, not merely there in spirit. . . . He need possess none of the perfections which the child may dream he possesses; but he must be really there. In order to be and remain truly present to the child he must have gathered the child's presence into his own store as one of the bearers of his communion with the world. Of course he cannot be continually concerned with the child, either in thought or in deed, nor ought he to be. But if he has really gathered the child into his life then that subterranean logic, that steady potential presence of the one to the other is established and endures.
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> The educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil only at one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative relation would burst asunder, or change into friendship . . . friendship . . . is based on a concrete and mutual experience of inclusion. It is the true inclusion of one another by human souls.
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> . . . in this realm of the education of character, of wholeness, there is only one access to the pupil: his *confidence.* For the adolescent who is frightened and disappointed by err unreliable world, confidence means the liberating insight that there is human truth, the truth of human existence. When the pupil's confidence has been won, his resistance against being educated gives way to a singular happening: he accepts the educator as a person. He feels he may trust this man, that this man is not making a business out of him, but is taking part in his life, accepting him before desiring to influence him. And so he learns to *ask*. . . .
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> Confidence implies a break-through from reserve, the bursting of the bonds which imprison an unquiet heart. But it does not imply unconditional agreement. The teacher must never forget that conflicts too, if only they are decided in a healthy atmosphere, have an educational value. . . . Not for a moment may he conduct a dialectical maneuvre instead of the real battle for truth. But if he is the victor he has to help the vanquished to endure defeats, and if he cannot conquer the self-willed soul that faces him (for victory over souls are not so easily won), then he has to find the word of love which alone can help to overcome so difficult a situation.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
SOME MUSINGS

IT took at least two hundred years of developing scientific practice to eliminate both *ethos* and *eros* from the modern conception of knowledge—dispassionate, objective, indifferent to human ideas about good and evil—and we are now in the midst of sudden and mighty efforts to put them both back into knowledge and education. The air rings with the ardor and polemics of the campaign.

Why, it is seldom asked, did we decide to get rid of *ethos* and *eros* in the first place? What lay behind the concerted drive, carried forward by so many conscientious and righteous men, to eliminate both morality and feeling from the scientific idea of knowledge? Why did we want to "purify" the truth to the extreme of its present sterility?

There is more than one explanation. Galileo's argument for focusing on the "primary qualities" of things in nature—that weight and size and movement can be dealt with mathematically, and therefore with some certainty—led to the view that our subjective perceptions and values are only reflexes of our experience of the physical world. Thus the secondary qualities—what we feel, smell, taste, etc., and our poetic responses to them—need little or no attention. E. A. Burtt puts what happened in an often quoted passage:

> *Now, in the course of translating this distinction of primary and secondary into terms suited to the new mathematical interpretation of nature, we have the first stage in the reading of man quite out of the real and primary realm.* Obviously, man was not a subject suited to mathematical study. His performances could not be treated by the quantitative method, except in the most meagre fashion. His was a life of colors and sounds, of pleasures, of griefs, of passionate loves, of ambitions, and strivings. Hence the real world must be the world outside of man; the world of astronomy and the world of resting and terrestrial objects. The only thing in common between man and this real world was his ability to discover it, a fact which, being necessarily presupposed, was easily neglected. . . .

Another reason for barring feeling from science was the obvious need to get rid of "wishful thinking." In science, plausible rationalizations of some personal bias—religious, egotistical, æsthetic, indeed, *any* sort of bias—is a very bad thing. Actually, modern science came to birth and grew from infancy to pugnacious youth in an environment suffused with every sort of special pleading, but most obviously religious special pleading, which naturally made the scientists wary of all religious ideas. After they had exposed as false a great many church-endorsed notions about the natural world and its parts, it was logical for them to believe that the world would be better off without any sort of religion. First, they said, "Don't believe, find out." After a century or so they began saying, "Don't think, find out," which ruled out metaphysics as no more than attenuated religion. Above all, they said, don't *feel.* "Our science cannot coexist with the subtleties of self-deception feeling inspires."

Well, these rules and warnings in many cases had some historical justification, and they were at least half-true in the way they were first applied. There is always *some* truth in any sensible redressing of balances. But the other half of the truth has been largely ignored—except for the stubborn souls outside the pale of the conventional wisdom—and now, being ourselves determined to redress balances again, we tend to neglect the historical reasons for the determined "objectivity" of the scientific theory of knowledge.

What would be true symmetry of thought on this great question? Is it possible for love and impartiality (a better word than objectivity) to work together?

For some of the ingredients of an answer to this question—you have to start somewhere—we resort to selective quotation from Robert Cushman's *Therapeia* (Chapel Hill, 1958), an exposition of the entire Platonic philosophy conceived as "therapy" for the condition of

mankind. The following is condensed from the chapter, "The Role of Love in Knowledge":

> . . . love is initially defined as any desire for something or other, and, in human nature, two species of desire are distinguished. These are forthwith identified with "the two ruling or guiding principles." The one is desire for pleasures and *is* identical with man's appetitive nature. The other aspires after the best. When this [latter] opinion, controlled by intelligence, holds the balance of power in the soul, its force is called *sophrosune,* good sense, or self-restraint. But when sensuous desire irrationally controls, its rule is called *hubris* or excess; and its overreaching takes sundry forms, depending upon the particular appetite which presently holds sway.
>
> Love, as one side or aspect of the spiritual, mediates between the human and the divine to establish community, which is already potential. Love may expel alienation between individuals and admit intimacy in its stead. Amity operates universally, not merely among sentient beings, but also at physical and physiological levels of existence. It is eros which everywhere introduces unity in diversity and is the author of "consonance" and "agreement." Love is said to be a "purveyor of friendship between gods and men."
>
> If man is to have converse with divine reality and be turned around from Becoming [the flux of the natural world] to true reality, then Plato evidently is ready to entrust to eros the requisite power of communion.
>
> For Plato, shame is the tell-tale sign of contrariety in the human spirit—a contrariety becoming self-conscious and issuing in crisis. In the case of Alcibiades, Socrates touches the nerve of philosophic love, hidden in the bosom of one whose waking thoughts and prevailing incentives incline upon prosaic advantages and sensuous satisfactions. . . . the soul is "prophetic" in the sense that, where a measure of self-knowledge is induced, it is found to be inspired and borne upward toward reality by an inherent and irrepressible love of Being.
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> Eryximachus got at the heart of Plato's conception of the role of love in education when he said: "The master-physician is he who can distinguish between the nobler and baser loves, and can effect such alteration that the one passion is replaced by the other; and he will be deemed a good practitioner who is expert in producing love where it ought to flourish but exists not, and removing it from where it should not be."
>
> Love, then, belongs to the province of the Spiritual and it possesses, with the whole of the Spiritual, a mediating function. But there is an ambiguity about love in its very nature. It is the offspring of Resource, its father, and of Poverty or deficiency, its mother. The ground of *philia* is desire, and desire is aspiration toward that, of which, presently, there is deficiency. Analogously, in the *Symposinm,* eros signifies a want of which at the same time it is the desire of repletion. So love symbolizes or, better, manifests the actual condition of man as he exists, halfway between ignorance and wisdom. This is to be contrasted with the condition of the gods; for since they are already wise, they do not pursue wisdom.

The extraordinary good sense in so much of what Plato says here seems obvious. His comment on the present condition of man—halfway between ignorance and wisdom—might be taken as a defining characteristic of all common problems, while the ambiguity of love is certainly a part of this "halfway" situation.

You might say that Plato brings a certain clarity to the subject of love—a clarity verified by individual reflection on human experience. He also brings a certain fuzziness—a lack of the sort of definition we have become accustomed to in our scientific treatises. Well, the clarity we need, and the fuzziness we can afford. Finality, for people only halfway from ignorance to knowledge, would certainly get us into the worst sort of trouble—Plato called it "double ignorance," or the plight of those who are convinced they know when they don't.

FRONTIERS
Psychology in Transformation

THE rock, as Ortega remarked years ago, when thrown in the air, has no need to consult itself in order to determine where, and how fast, it should come down. The rock has no problems of identity. It descends wherever the law of gravity bestows it, and its motions, as Galileo showed, are predictable.

The science of the motions of rocks (and other objects with definable mass) has, therefore, a certain delighting reliability. The physicists, as they sometimes give us to understand, know what they are about. That is, up to the point where physical reality dissolves into nuclear mysteries and their definitions become a reflection of instrumentation, they know what they are about. But the area of reliability in physics remains very large, whatever may happen at its borders, and when an engineer says something about the strength or weakness of building materials or the dynamics of fluids under pressure, we are likely to pay close attention to what he says. The chance of error or ambiguity seems very slight.

In short, you can codify physics. You can put a great deal of physics into numbers and compile manuals containing a vast amount of reliable information. Physics is a comprehensive exhibition of the diversities which nonetheless demonstrate the uniformity of nature—the *dependability* of natural law. There is little argument or difference of opinion among physicists except at the fringes (or foundations) of their science. And from this admirable consensus on what it means to be a physicist and practice physics, we have taken our idea of what *Science* is.

Human beings, however, are not rocks, and they are not to be understood by a science modeled on the behavior of rocks. Human beings are under the necessity of consulting themselves in various ways in order to decide what to do next. In fact, the right to do this sort of consulting and to act as we choose as a result has the name of man's most precious possession—his *freedom.* Can there ever be a science of the behavior of beings who insist that they are in some sense—some ultimate sense—unpredictable; and who, in their most admired representatives, confirm this conception of being human again and again?

This question—very much to the fore in the present—is behind the emergence within the past twenty-five years of a vigorous revolt against academic psychology, called, for lack of a better name, "Humanistic psychology." In an article in the *Los Angeles Times* for last April 6, Eleanor Hoover puts the matter well:

> Psychology has always had an identity crisis. As an outgrowth of philosophy and wanting to earn its spurs as a "real" science, a young psychology needed the security of imitating medicine and physics. From medicine it took the sickness model and studied pathology. From early physics, it took the mechanistic idea of studying the parts and not the whole. It chopped behavior up into segments like reaction time and worked with worms, rats, dogs and apes that could be managed and controlled.
>
> The results were often criticized, in the profession and out. Ten years ago, writer-critic Gerald Sykes called psychology "a raw ungainly science" and declared: "We know less about ourselves than about any other portion of society, and our lack of self-knowledge is now our most acute social problem. . . . I would like to know what psychologists have done to help us."
>
> Now the debate between the "new, psychology and the "old" raises the same basic questions: What is science, what is psychology, and what should it be studying? Most crucial—what is man?

The two sides of the controversy—the old and the new psychology—may be represented by spokesmen. Eleanor Hoover says:

> Maslow was the first major American psychologist to postulate that man is an evolutionary creature whose higher nature is just as "instinctoid" (his word) as his lower nature . . . and to see problems, difficulties and "sickness" arising when this upward-evolution—this need for "self-actualization"—is blocked. "This higher nature, Maslow said, "includes the need for meaningful work,

for responsibility, for creativeness, for being fair and just, for doing what is worthwhile and for preferring to do it well."

Meanwhile, at a recent American Psychological Association convention, Donald Hebb spoke disapprovingly of those who want psychology "to deal directly with the mystery of existence now." He continued:

Some of this is simply antiscience . . . which we needn't bother with here. When someone thinks a science can be run that way, there is much to be said. Subjective science? There isn't such a thing.

But what if the essential reality of man is subjective? Is man, then, inaccessible to scientific inquiry, and if so, which should we abandon—science or man?

At issue, of course, is "objectivity." Humanistic psychologists demand that this term be re-examined and that the subjective be let back in—where they believe it always has been anyway. They say that overwhelming evidence shows that we "choose" what we see or perceive as surely as we choose our words or a new pair of shoes. What the humanists call for is a new science of ordinary and extraordinary subjective experience.

Meanwhile the humanistic psychologists have formed an active organization—the Association for Humanistic Psychology—which has at least two professional journals reflecting and exploring the views of the members. A recently conducted survey of the outlook of humanistic psychologists revealed the hope of developing "a new science adequate to a holistic study of man," with "a shift of emphasis from personal growth toward social responsibility"—toward an "ecological ethic." (This was reported in the August *Newsletter* of the AHP.)

Commenting, Liz Campbell, the conductor of the forecast, remarked:

The probability of the above trend being realized is uncertain. It represents one possible future. Overall societal trends do not support the acceptance of a transformation image of man.

Other considerations occur. One of the difficulties of an organized body of humanist psychologists lies in the need for canons of scientific validity to take the place of "objective" impersonal evidence. The common ground among humanist psychologists tends to lie almost entirely in the area of consensual agreement on subjective findings, and if man is indeed capable of continual self-transformation—and if the moral or ethical factor assumes increasing importance as a result—then it is a serious question whether a "New *Image* of Man" (the title of Eleanor Hoover's article and of similar surveys and reviews) expresses an adequate goal for the humanistic psychologists. Liz Campbell's expression, a "transformational image of man," moves in the right direction, but it seems likely that there can never be a suitable "image" for the subjective reality of a being who discards poorly designed images of himself with every step of his growth toward self-knowledge. Image and Self may be simple opposites. Subjective reality may be the only reality which *cannot* be an image.