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A CHANGE OF MIND

THE heaped up practical disasters of the time are ample cause for shadowed wondering, but modern man has also been confronted by psychological problems and questions which exacerbate all his other troubles. Perhaps these inner difficulties are as much philosophical as they are psychological, but the issues of philosophy have not been of much interest to us in recent years, while psychology is the chief intellectual preoccupation of the day. There may be various explanations for this turn of attention. An obvious one is the lack of satisfaction taken in external pursuits. Old-fashioned "ambition" now seems a rather primitive drive. Once "normal" goals no longer attract. People are beginning to realize that they are not really happy, and, feeling that they ought to be, ask themselves why. With the loss of interest in conventional objectives, and in the absence of alternatives, a wondering about meaning naturally arises. Questions and problems of decision appear where none existed before. Theories of personal fulfillment, some shallow, some rather involved, become popular reading. Old religions are revived and new ones are invented. Once taboo subjects are explored. People take up "gurus" the way they once took up collecting modern art or antiques. They go to encounter groups instead of the theater. And underneath all these frothy goings-on is felt the pressure of persisting but poorly identified questions.

Another way of accounting for the intense psychological interest of the times would be to see it as a natural consequence of the urbanization of the modern world. People who live in cities or an urbanized environment grow abstracted from the physical world, which technology has enabled them to deal with remotely. Their contacts with nature are several times removed by man-made buffers and controls. The "impact" of experience has become less and less physical, and is increasingly thought of in terms of human relations. For many, there is much more leisure. The intellectual life expands and becomes more cosmopolitan. "Theory" has increasing effect on the way people think. The theories may of course be either good or bad—sometimes they are very bad, as in the case of an obsessive ideology which paints everything black or white. Literature grows sophisticated and culture becomes self-conscious. The spread of literacy may play a part in this development, since while there are notable losses with the dying out of traditional and regional culture, there are gains in critical and reflective power with the spread of reading. Reading is after all very much a reflective skill. You pause and question, compare and judge. Doubt begins to have more authority than positive affirmation. The poets anatomize wastelands and look at great epics through the lens of parody. The ordinary man feels shut in by uncertainty and wonders if a knowledge that stands up under questioning will ever be possible for him. He is not envious of the academic luxury of unbelief.

Still another hypothesis to explain the press of psychological inquiry would be to regard it as a stage in man's own, distinctive sort of evolution. For man is fundamentally a *thinking* being. Whatever else he is, he is differentiated from other forms of life by his power to think and by his self-consciousness. Aristotle made this man's definition, and Descartes took the reality of thinking for the foundation of all his knowledge. It seems reasonable, then, to say that man is at his best when he thinks most independently and universally. While there are differences among men in their power to think, there is also an identity of basic mental process among all human beings. Frederick J. Teggart wrote in his *Processes of History:*

> There is, in short, an important body of evidence which indicates the "psychic unity of mankind." A typical example may be found in the remarks of Stefansson on the Eskimo: "Commonly," he says, "primitive people are supposed to have certain mental qualities, designated as instinctive, through which they vastly excel us along certain lines; and to make up for this excellence they are supposed to be far our inferiors in certain other mental characteristics. My own observations incline me to believe that there are no points in which they, as a race, are any more inferior to us than might be expected from the environment under which they have grown up from childhood; and neither have they any points of superiority over the white men, except those which are developed directly by the environment." . . . Similarly, writing of the Sea Dyaks of Borneo, Gomes says: "Allowing for differences in the environment, and consequent difference of similes, the idea expressed in many Dyak proverbs is precisely similar to that of some well known among the English." "The radical fundamental thoughts and passions of mankind all over the world, in every age, are much the same."

With this as foundation, then, we may recognize that there are cycles of development in human thought, and heights of achievement which rise from the foundation of a common potentiality. The intense hungering after what is spoken of as "self-knowledge" may be a kind of evolution of the mind itself, going on within the matrix created by various contributory facts, which stimulate and assist, and possibly release, but do not *cause* the development. It might be argued that neither philosophy nor religion can come of age without this sort of awakening, for until men are able to doubt, to question their assumptions, to wonder about their identity and the meaning of their lives, they remain, so to speak, only "believers" of one sort or another. It was the self-questioning of Socrates which made Plato choose him for the chief figure in the Dialogues, and Socrates maintained that his reasoned uncertainties were the only explanation for the Oracle's selection of him as the wisest man in all Athens.

This sort of questioning seems archetypal in relation to the development of individuality in human beings. It brings a harsh penalty—the loss of the happy conformity and peace of the Edenic state of consciousness. The harmony of unquestioning belief can never be known again. Having rejected the absolute authority of tradition and the rule of custom, men must now rely on their private judgment, their speculations, their guesses, their hopes, and on their intuitions, if they have them. A kind of anarchy ensues, which the Bible story calls the expulsion from Eden. In the Greek myth, the violator of the mindless serenity of the rule of Zeus, Prometheus, is punished for long ages because he awakened men's intelligence and resourcefulness, planting in them at the same time the seeds of disorder. Socrates was condemned for heresy and the corruption of youth, since an unbelieving and undocile generation of young men would work ruin in Athens, so his accusers claimed.

Total dependence upon oneself, and on one's own thinking, in an isolating sense, threatens the individual with loss of self in a shoreless universe—with having no anchor, no haven, no rock whereon to stand. Much of what is done today in the name of art or literature seems hardly muted screams for rescue from this state of cosmic isolation. As always, the metaphysics of nostalgia has its champions, but the law of consciousness, that *you can't go home again*, reveals its authority in every attempt to recapture the past.

This worm of doubt eats away at every fresh belief adopted to put an end to anxiety, to quiet the mind's Dostoevskian questions, or to restore the age of innocence. It sometimes seems that the fear of standing alone in the face of continued questioning leads to pretending that self-knowledge is a special kind of intoxication, produced by emotional encounter if not by some chemical means. The common characteristic of all these exhilarating distractions is that they do not last, so that there is always "something new," with each psychological specific having a brief interval of popularity in what can only be regarded as a fashion parade of "therapies." Well, there is

psychology and psychology, just as, in Plato's time, there was poetry and poetry. In one of his essays, W. H. Auden wrote:

> Two theories of poetry. Poetry as a means for inducing desirable emotions and repelling undesirable emotions in oneself and others, or Poetry as a game of knowledge, a bringing to consciousness, by naming them, of emotions and their hidden relationships.
>
> The first view was held by the Greeks, and is now held by MGM, Agit-Prop, and the collective public of the world. They are wrong.

We recalled Plato in this connection for the reason that his strong disapproval of the *mimetic* poets grew out of the fact that he recognized in the emotions these poets aroused a block to reflective thinking. The self-imagery they made popular with the Greeks rendered Socratic self-questioning almost impossible. (Eric Havelock's *Preface to Plato* reaches this conclusion. The poets, Havelock says, were the TV sets of their time, and their epics functioned as the tribal encyclopedia.)

Yet the other sort of poetry, which brings awareness of the emotions and their hidden relationships, is used by Plato throughout his writings. He was a poet before he became a philosopher, and the beauty of his work is undeniable. Philosophy is rooted in poetry—not poetry as a loose and permissive form, but poetry as the only speech with resources to convey the richest dimensions of philosophic meaning and resonance, to which the thinker turns, spontaneously or willingly, as needed for suggesting the octaves of what he has to say. Indian philosophy arises on the foundations of Vedic religion, and Greek thought, in its Pythagorean and Platonic phase, grows from the cosmological and psychological symbolism of the Mysteries.

Interestingly, the high philosophical religions recognize the need of humans to grow up as individuals, independent of tradition. There is thus no sound historical reason for thinking that the transition from conforming, collectivist societies to harmonious associations of psychologically and morally independent individuals *must* involve a long intervening period of anarchy during which men are made desperate by the emptiness of their own unbelief. Philosophical religions avoid creeds and their teachers know and declare that each one must find his own way through the relativities of doctrine to individual enlightenment. Krishna explains in the second discourse of the *Bhagavad-Gita* that only when his mind is "liberated from the Vedas" will Arjuna be free from delusion and gain indifference to all "teachings," for he will know for himself, in and through himself. Yet only a little before this Krishna has described the many benefits to be obtained from performing "all the Vedic rites." The doctrines belonging to the age are not to be destroyed, but to be outgrown. Certain Buddhist scriptures have a similar import, and the Buddha shows great reticence in giving teachings which can be converted into mere "beliefs," and then taken as substitutes for self-knowledge. Uncertainty, being honest, is better than self-deception, however euphoric.

This process of gradual emancipation from conventional belief is apparently one that is endlessly repeated at different levels of understanding. Only recently, a report of the work of scholars at the Claremont (Calif.) Graduate School's Institute for Antiquity and Christianity told about the translation of a Gnostic work, *The Origin of the World*, in which the serpent appears as benefactor instead of an enemy. In this version of the eating of the apple by Eve, the serpent explains that by eating she will "become like the gods in that you will know the difference between good and evil." The Papyrus containing the Gnostic scripture is said to be sixteen hundred years old, now being translated and published fully for the first time. (*New York Evening Post*, Sept. 12.)

What is of interest in these old scriptures, Indian and Christian, is the idea that man has his own course of evolutionary progress or

awakening to pursue—that this involves growth into individuality, which means the emergence of a pure humanness which is not the "product" of any local influence or conditioning, but rather a cosmopolitan freedom from such modifications. This evolution or development might be regarded as beginning with a kind of psychic mutation in the human race, showing itself not only in articulate thinkers but all through human life. However, it becomes most evident in the work of writers and artists, and, as a movement of the human spirit, has numberless roots in the past. It seemed to become conscious and widely evident, however, in what has been called "modernism." In their Preface to *The Modern Tradition*, Ellmann and Feidelson say: "What comes to mind is . . . something broadly imaginative, a large spiritual enterprise including philosophic, social, and scientific thought, and æsthetic and literary theories and manifestoes, as well as poems, novels, dramas." The emergence of modernism in the Western world has come more as an angry break, a rebellious declaration, than as a quiet outgrowing of the past, doubtless because of the brittle, inflexible character of Western religion and its uncompromising controls over thought and human freedom throughout long centuries. Belief in God—the God of the Old Testament—not only faded away: He was declared *dead* by Nietzsche; and religious sentiments were not only abandoned but *stomped on* by the revolutionists and radicals of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. So, logically enough, the authors of *The Modern Tradition* continue: "If we can postulate a modern tradition, we must add that it is a paradoxically untraditional tradition. Modernism strongly implies some sort of historical discontinuity, either a liberation from inherited patterns or, at another extreme, deprivation and disinheritance."

Earlier we spoke of the universality of the basic human qualities and capacities. It is of interest to find them appearing so faithfully in the peoples of the Western hemisphere, before the advent of Columbus. In *Aztec Thought and Culture* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), Miguel León-Portilla gives many illustrations of the philosophical ideas of the Nahua peoples of Mexico, one of which is that when humans are born on earth, they are, so to speak, "anonymous," without individual identity. This they must achieve for themselves, with the help of teachers. The growth into human beinghood was called obtaining a "face." Face here means ego: "It described the most individual characteristic of the human being—the very element which removed his anonymity." It was developed through self-discipline and education. León-Portilla says:

> "Face and heart," the Nahuatl image of the individual, appears to be an equivalent of our own modern idea of personality. Further, this concept was completely in accord with the intuitive nature of the thinking of the wise men. It was not a definition based on cold rationalization, but was fresh and full of vitality. The face reflected the internal physiognomy of man and the beating of the heart symbolized the source of dynamism in human will.

This book makes it plain that the Nahua philosophers—who are called *tlamatinime*, "the ones who know things"—have reached the stage of questioning what and how much they know. The *tlamatini* is the maker of manuscripts in black and red ink, from the bark of the wild fig tree; he teaches the people; he safeguards and hands on the wisdom transmitted from the past; he puts a mirror before the people, so that they will develop faces; he knows something of what happens after death. He is contrasted with the false teacher who "makes things complicated," who "brags and exaggerates." The codex elaborates on this pretender to knowledge:

> He is . . . a mysterious wizard, a magician, a witch doctor, a public thief, he takes things.
> A sorcerer, a destroyer of faces.
> He leads people astray;
> He causes others to lose their faces.
> He hides things, he makes them difficult.
> He entangles them with difficulties; he destroys them he causes the people to perish; he mysteriously puts an end to everything.

The *tlamatinime* were not priests, who knew only about the gods and the rituals; they were wise, being astronomers, guardians of the codices and preservers of knowledge, experts in calendars and chronology; and to them the people turned for real help. They were also the physicians. Their songs embodied their doubts and their wondering:

> Their quest for rational answers ultimately led them to question and to formulate problems in a philosophical manner about the very things the people accepted and believed. . . .
>
> Is there perchance any truth to our words here?
> All seems so like a dream, only do we rise from sleep,
> only on earth do our words remain.

The impermanence and hazard of earthly existence made these wise men call earth life a dream—a repeated theme in poems. The Aztecs performed human sacrifices, hoping to give longer life to the sun, which they feared would go out if not fed in this terrible way. But the wise men did not share this belief:

> The popular and public cult of the gods as expressed in sacrifice and the mystical militaristic vision of the Aztecs was differentiated from the *tlamatinime's* search for a new form of knowledge which might embody the truth. In their quest they explored the possibilities of a new way of saying "true words" about what "is above us, what is beyond." The adequate formulation of the theory they developed concerning metaphysical knowledge also found expression in their poetry.

While they practiced astrology, they believed in man's capacity to modify his destiny through the exercise of his will. They regarded the quest for selfhood, for "face," as requiring embodied existence, yet saw that this brought man into danger of "surrendering his heart to all things," which would mean loss of face. Inevitably, they were confronted by the ultimate question: Can truth be known? Is there a lasting foundation for human life? They pursued these questions through their mytho-religious traditions and on to a philosophical stage, León-Portilla says.

> Their speculation concerned man as a real being, possessing an origin, a definite nature, and faculties, and aware of the mystery of a life beyond death. They also studied man as the creator of a way of life, author of educational, ethical, legal, and aesthetic principles. The *tlamatinime* finally approached the supreme social and personal ideals—the mainspring of Nahuatl thought and action—the divine spark in man's heart which transforms him into an artist, a poet, or a sage. With this gift man would be capable of making things divine.

Nahuatl civilization is no more, but these testimonies to its greatness are a part of the record of human possibility, and of the unchanging character of the human quest.

REVIEW
"THE CRIME OF GALILEO"

ALONG with the decline of popular belief in the "certainties" of scientific knowledge, and the criticism of the metaphysical assumptions of much of scientific thinking by writers of the stature of Lewis Mumford and some others, a better sort of cultural history has been emerging. Scholars have been going back over the source materials of the past with greater respect for figures who have been neglected or forgotten because their opinions did not become part of the main stream of modern opinion. Other epochs are being studied, not merely as preparation for celebrating the "heights" of the present, but for a clearer understanding of the many-sidedness of men of the past. Frank Manuel's *Portrait of Isaac Newton* is a good example of this sort of research. Manuel discloses Newton as a human being, and not only the principal founder of physical theory. Whatever later scientific thinkers made of his laws of motion, Newton was no materialist, but a profoundly religious man, a practicing alchemist, a student of Jacob Boehme, and a natural philosopher wholly convinced that his mission in the world was divinely inspired.

With such books becoming available, it seems necessary to read history all over again. One man we have been dipping into lately for this purpose is Giorgio De Santillana, who teaches history and the philosophy of science at MIT. We first came across this historian through *Hamlet's Mill,* an erudite volume he wrote with Hertha von Dechend. Another of his books, *The Age of Adventure,* is a series of essays on particular individuals, among them Giordano Bruno and Nicholas of Cusa, both influential thinkers. The author gives long extracts from the works of the men treated in this book, and the reader gets a feeling for the substance of their minds. Bruno and Cusanus are key figures to go back to again and again. Both the liveliness and the profundity of these thinkers become evident in De Santillana's selections. There is this, for example, from Cusanus' *Learned Ignorance:* "The relationship of our intellect to the truth is like that of a polygon to a circle; the resemblance to the circle grows with the multiplication of the angles of the polygon; but apart from its being reduced to identity with the circle, no multiplication, even if it were infinite, of its angles will make the polygon equal to the circle." Cusanus contended that human knowledge can be no more than conjecture, and that the only escape from endless uncertainty is through mystical enlightenment. This, agreeably to Plotinian doctrine, is a reaching up to the infinite. Again the analogies of mathematics are helpful. Since the infinite may be symbolized by a circle of infinite circumference, and since the line describing an infinite circle will be straight, the attempt to discern it presents endless paradoxes. But there is a way out of this impossible situation, Cusanus proposes, for the reason that in some sense infinity is present in every finite thing—as, perhaps, the infinitesimal. This is the mystical link between the part and the whole. Finally, it is to Cusanus that we owe the conception of Deity in manifestation as a circle or sphere whose circumference is nowhere and whose center is everywhere.

The book by De Santillana that we now have is *The Crime of Galileo,* first published by the University of Chicago Press in 1955, and later reprinted by Time Inc. We were drawn to this book by reason of the transitions through which the image of Galileo has passed in recent years. For nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers, he was a hero—a victim of theological persecution and at the same time an ideal embodiment of the new spirit of science. Then, with publication of E. A. Burtt's *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science,* it began to be realized that the influence of scientific ideas about knowledge, based very largely on Galileo's division of the properties of things into the primary and secondary qualities, lay at the root of the reductive tendency of modern thought. Only the objective is real, the conclusion seemed to be, and this left the higher qualities of human

beings without a place in nature or in scientific inquiry.

Galileo longed to bring the educated, civilized men of his time to an understanding of the realities of the natural world for which Copernicus had supplied the theory and Galileo's telescope had shown the facts. He did not believe his work constituted any threat to the established faith and was unable to understand the opposition and intrigue which developed against him. His unusual ability to make himself appreciated was his undoing. This book by De Santillana shows his life from day to day, as he struggles indignantly against forces that neither logical demonstrations nor observable facts could overcome. His letters easily win the sympathy of the reader. In 1612 he wrote to Paolo Gualdo:

> I notice that young men go to universities in order to become doctors or philosophers or anything so long as it is a title and that many go in for those professions who are utterly unfit for them, while others who would be very competent are prevented by business or their daily cares which keep them away from letters. Now these people, while provided with a good intelligence, yet, because they cannot understand what is written in *baos* [a word coined by a comic playwright to indicate a learned language], retain through life the idea that those big folios contain matters beyond their capacity which will remain forever closed to them; whereas I want them to realize that nature, as she has given them eyes to see her works, has given them a brain apt to grasp and understand them.

One thinks immediately of the parallels in the present—of young men who go to the universities for the poorest of reasons. Actually, this book is filled with parallels. In his Preface De Santillana suggests the resemblance of the Oppenheimer case to the trial of Galileo, and even shows particular correspondences between the "Holy Office" and the AEC Board.

De Santillana wrote the book to demonstrate that Galileo's offense was only ostensibly a violation of the beliefs and dogmas of the Church; his real crime was his threat to authority and power, to vested interests which used the Church and the formidable apparatus of the Inquisition to silence and get rid of a man who would discredit rank upon rank of petty scholars and bureaucrats. His appeal was to the better minds of his time, and the influence he could command soon became manifest. Copernicus preferred to reserve his discovery for discussion among scientific initiates, wishing for a "Pythagorean privacy" of research. But Galileo noted that since Providence had given to human ingenuity the invention of the telescope, "perfecting our sight by multiplying it as much as forty times," the abstractions of Copernicus could now be understood by any good mind, and making this plain to the elite of his time, those who were the shapers of civilization, was the work he undertook. Trouble was inevitable:

> He was writing in a literary style upon philosophical subjects for the open ruling class, which included prelates, princes, gentlemen, and men of business, and this could not but threaten the caste privileges of the average literati. Hence he was made out to be, like Socrates, a "poisoner of the people." Terms were coined rapidly to designate his kind: "free mind," "proud curiosity," *"esprit fort,"* "lovers of novelties," "those Florentine minds which are too subtle and curious," in order to cast suspicion on activities as could not lawfully be impeached. The strange paradox of the drama is that those frightened clerics were dealing at last with what they had tried in vain to shape through the late Middle Ages, the orthodox natural philosopher. In him the junction *had* been effected between science and humanism. In Galileo's thinking there is nowhere to be detected the cold sneer of Valla, or the impenetrable and disdainful aloofness of Leonardo, or the dodge of the "double truth" so freely used by Pomponazzi and the Averroists, or the perilous fantasies of Pico or Campanella. He wants to act as consultant of the theologians in natural philosophy and help t hem understand correctly the new discoveries. The simple fact is that these were much too upsetting for unprepared minds, even for such minds as John Donne's.

In the historian's view, Galileo was the best Italian prose stylist of his time. His winning manners and ways made friends easily and he mistook admiration for understanding that would turn into strong support. The persistence which

brought him into great difficulties, De Santillana suggests, may be explained in this way:

> It remained Galileo's fate through life to create an excitement and consensus around him which had little to do with real understanding. His was the tragedy of an excess of gifts for, while the telescope was his key to success his real social strength lay in his extraordinary literary capacity, his brilliant repartee, his eloquence and charm, which gave him rank in a culture founded exclusively on belles-lettres and humanistic accomplishments. "You have a way of bewitching people," Ciampoli had said. His writing is, indeed, the one achievement of Italian Baroque prose that has survived the centuries. In that, his contemporaries could easily recognize a master; but what remained with them of his "incomparable demonstrations" was as dim as the memory of a symphony to an untrained ear. This Galileo could never bring himself to realize. As he talked reason to his hearers, he believed, he forever wanted to believe, that they were following the course of his thought, and he spent himself unsparingly in explaining and persuading. They applauded; but, when the time came, this success showed again and again as fool's gold in his hands. . . .
>
> His high-placed sponsors and "protectors" were very much like that United States senator who, when physicists from Los Alamos came to him with pressing pleas about dangers and moral responsibilities, cut them short reassuringly: "Believe me, gentlemen, I have always been a great friend of atomic energy." Galileo thought he was submitting briefs as a consultant and "friend of the court." To the court itself he was simply a patient under observation.

Dialogue on the Great World Systems was complete in December, 1629. This book put an end to Copernican obscurity. It was not technical, but it was done at the level of educated opinion, so well it was sure to persuade. De Santillana calls it "a charge of dynamite planted by an expert engineer."

The conspiracy against Galileo makes a detective story which is engrossing reading. Throughout, the author calls attention to more recent examples of the forces which defeated and punished Galileo. He shows that any man who plays a lone hand of poker with theocracy "needs a flameproof suit."

COMMENTARY
NON-VIOLENT SOLDIERS

THE report in Frontiers of the French General who has become an advocate of non-violence recalls a book by another general—Brigadier-General F. P. Crozier, who fought in the Boer War and World War I. By 1937, when his book came out, he had become a thorough-going pacifist and war-resister. *The Men I Killed* (Michael Joseph Ltd., London) is filled with the experiences of front-line action, with almost as much material on the British soldiers Crozier was obliged to threaten and sometimes to shoot to make them fight, as on the killing of the enemy. Although not "religious," he became a convert of Canon Dick Sheppard, a man so loved by the English people it was said that "he could lead the majority of the nation's people anywhere, save in the direction of pacifism." Influential as Sheppard must have been, we probably should not call Crozier a "convert," since he manifestly formed his own conclusions, although Sheppard and George Lansbury stood for the sort of leadership he hoped that England would follow.

Another side of his book relates to the hypocrisies of a religious establishment which interprets morality by the interests of empire. Men who actually do the fighting find religious apologetics for war morally revolting, while the occasional chaplain who condemns war is distinctly out of place at the front. Crozier tells this story:

> During the war an excited adjutant came rushing into the commanding officer's billet, in France, prior to a grand attack, and when asked by his colonel what the matter was, the youngster explained that the chaplain was preaching sedition in the market-square to the troops.
>
> "What's he saying?" the colonel asked. And the adjutant revealed that the chaplain had told the men that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ.
>
> "Of course it is," replied the colonel. "What fool ever said it was not! But what the devil has that got to do with us?"
>
> Now how does that tally with the utterances of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York? Who is right—priest or soldier?

Crozier, a man of feeling and exclamation, is different from de Bollardiere, who is analytical and reasoned in his views, yet both share in the unblinking honesty that seems a characteristic of many good soldiers. Courageous devotion to truth was for them the path to non-violence—a sequence of moral causation stressed by Gandhi.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves
WHAT TO DO NEXT

TWO visitors, today, at the MANAS office, both college graduates, both bright, intelligent, able to be useful in a variety of ways, but both at loose ends in respect to what to do next. They find little invitation in the existing society, and are beginning to realize that if their dreams are to come true at all, it will have to be by invention, not by taking any already visible course of action. One of them has what could be called a "classical education" in literature; the other is a chemical engineer who completed his schooling only from a feeling of obligation to his parents. He is not going to be an engineer.

One of them, from England, is wandering around Canada and this country, working now and then at odd jobs, looking for something to do that will have meaning for him. He is well read, thoughtful, and eager in mind, but right now feels pretty confused. The other fellow is married, thinking about a "piece of land, somewhere," and how to make a living on it after he earns the money to buy it. A long, hard pull.

There are probably thousands of young people like these two, over the country—over the world—and it doesn't seem as though education can do much for them, except, perhaps, that it might have helped them to recognize, a little sooner, that this is a time when individual invention will be their only real resource.

The way such problems are usually dissolved is by intense individual motivation. When there is a strong sense of direction, the landscape of the world "out there" is no longer so forbidding. Looking at it, you no longer see how empty it is, but recognize the oases where the particular people or situations connected with what you have decided to do happen to be. Education has an entirely different meaning for the individual who has decided what he wants to do. This seldom involves a "system" or a school, but the way to learn something in particular. It ought to be possible for young people to be helped to understand this—that education is *not* acquiring some thinly spread layer of the "cultural heritage," but only the means of getting what you need after you have decided what it is. Schools and colleges are really suppliers of utilities, not shapers of lives. The most that teachers can do is to stir in students the desire to shape their own lives, and perhaps provide some good examples of how this has been done. The rest is a matter of utilities.

In William Morris's *News from Nowhere,* the visitor to an England far in the future is talking to a guide who is showing him about the countryside, and he says something about how fresh and eager a summer in the country will make the children when they go back to school. The guide is puzzled. He doesn't know what "school" can have to do with children:

> "We talk, indeed, of a school of herring, and a school of painting, and in the former sense we might talk of a school of children—but otherwise," said he, laughing, "I must own my self beaten."

The visitor muses:

> I thought I had best say nothing about the boy-farms which I had been used to call schools, as I saw pretty dearly that they had disappeared; and so I said after a little fumbling, "I was using the word in the sense of a system of education."
>
> "Education?" said he meditatively, "I know enough Latin to know that the word must come from *educere,* to lead out; and I have heard it used; but I have never met anybody who could give me a clear explanation of what it means."
>
> You may imagine how my new friends fell in my esteem when I heard this frank avowal, and I said, rather contemptuously, "Well education means a system of teaching young people."
>
> "Why not old people also?" said he with a twinkle in his eye. "But," he went on, "I can assure you our children learn, whether they go through a "system of teaching" or not. Why you will not find one of these children about here, girl or boy, who cannot swim, and every one of them has been used to tumbling about the little forest ponies—there's one of them now! They all of them know how to cook; the bigger lads can mow; many can thatch and do odd jobs at carpentering; or they know how to keep shop. I can tell you they know plenty of things."

Still condescending, the man from the past, whom they call "Guest," explained:

> "Yes, but their mental education, the teaching of their minds."
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> "Guest," said he, "perhaps you have not learned to do these things I have been speaking about; and if that's the case, don't you run away with the idea that it doesn't take some skill to do them, and doesn't give plenty of work for one's mind: you would change your opinion if you saw a Dorset lad thatching, for instance. But, however, I understand you to be speaking of book-learning; and as to that, it is a simple affair. Most children, seeing books lying around, manage to read them by the time they are four years old; though I am told it has not always been so. . . ."

Well, the conversation goes on this way, it developing that the young pick up what they need when they need it, including French and German, and also Latin and Greek, although how they acquire these old languages so casually is not explained. It is very much a William Morris argument, but before setting it aside as impractical we might remember that it has much in common with Rousseau's ideas, and also the ancient Greek conception of leaving intellectual work until the later years, and not blighting childhood and adolescence with heavy academic studies. Herbert Read has shown what this does to children's creative capacities along about eleven or twelve.

It is obvious that Morris's version of *paideia* has come into existence in his story and is functioning just the way it ought to—the whole community teaches the child—and in an atmosphere like that, motivation is born quite naturally. But leaving education to the community wouldn't work in our society, we say. Perhaps it wouldn't work very well. This could be said to have been the reason that A. S. Neill started Summerhill and ran it the way he did—to make a community that would have an educational influence. So, if we can allow a near-genius to bear witness on possibilities, this much can be accomplished even today. And when we begin finding fault with Neill, it is well to consider that he had the whole weight of contemporary culture against what he was trying to do. But where there is true community, the weight of culture is for, not against, natural and spontaneous educational effort. The same answer could be given to critics of Morris's optimism about children just "picking up" so much without formal instruction. Morris wrote a Utopia, but that doesn't mean his goal is not an ideal to work for.

Wherever people create an atmosphere that sparkles with enthusiasm for the discovery of meaning, the use and development of individual talent, and generates an over-arching vision of happy, useful people working well together, community-makers are at work, even if it's only once a week on a Saturday afternoon. They would do it all the time if they could, and when more people do such things, more will be able to do them all the time.

It doesn't really matter that such undertakings can't be applied at the "mass" level in public education. The "mass" level is what needs changing, and this can be done, today, only little by little and by slow accumulations of individual strength and invention. The kind of thing Daniel Fader did and reported on in *The Naked Children* (Bantam) was the beginning of some community with the little nucleus he worked with to teach English and reading and speaking to the ghetto children in a Washington, D.C., junior high school (and so was what he did before that in the reform schools described in *Hooked on Books*). The mass sort of education won't be changed and can't be until it stops being mass, until the whole society begins to transform itself and divide itself into more community-like units. A lot of small forces are working for change in this direction, but there is a long way to go. Meanwhile, the bright spots created by rather extraordinary people with personal strength, a sense of drama, and a way of cutting through red tape and bureaucracy remain things to take note of, since they represent in principle what needs to happen everywhere. Endless invention, no master plan.

And when it does happen, the prospect of going out into the world won't seem so bleak, so unpromising, so darkly discouraging to young men who are not geniuses but are resolved to spend their lives doing something a little better than what the world has to offer.

FRONTIERS

A Non-Violent General

WHEN, during the Algerian war, torturing Algerians to obtain information became a common practice by the French, General Andre de Bollardiere asked to be relieved of his command and made public his refusal to use torture. It was French policy to suppress reports of these methods—as became evident in the government's banning and confiscation of Henri Alleg's *The Question*, an Algerian editor's description of how he had been tortured for thirty days by French paratroopers.

General de Bollardiere was punished with a two-month prison sentence for speaking out. He was not heard from again until last year, when another general justified the torture used in Algeria in a book. De Bollardiere replied in another book—*Bataille d'Alger, Bataille de l'Homme* (Battle of Algiers, Battle of Man), and began speaking to audiences in a way that grew into a statement of the non-violent position. He is now working with adherents of non-violence, advocating basic socio-moral change and a transformation of the army. An interview with him at Lyon in November, 1972, was printed in a French journal devoted to non-violence, then in translation in a German periodical, and it appeared in English in the October issue of *Fellowship*. "Violence," he told his questioner, "holds no attraction for me any more, since it has proven itself fully unworkable." The former French officer is at home in history and gives numerous illustrations of non-violent means of defense. Since he used the language of national defense, he was questioned about the idea of the nation. Replying, he said:

> I do regard the nation as a reality. The fact is that corresponding to historical developments a certain number of people have been living together in a national space (how else should one describe this state of affairs?) for several centuries—beyond this, of course, they belong to various ethnic groups and consider it unacceptable that the particular character of each not be respected (I am a Breton and you know our determination to manage our own affairs—non-violence and regional self-government come thus together). And these people have more in common than structures: namely a definite feeling of belonging to a common whole. Now beyond these realities are concepts—the concept of national defense, of an army—which cannot be developed boundlessly without proving themselves to be dangerous. Consequently, one must continually put these concepts in question. . . .
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> As far as the army is concerned, obviously the concept must be questioned and newly thought through. For the nation, the people themselves must bring forth and articulate their own concept of national defense. Not a small group of technocrats. That is not to say that the army should not one day disappear. From the day when the people cease to be subjects and become real citizens, the army will doubtless become superfluous for security—at least as a profession. Non-violence in any case requires a radical transformation of the army, as we know it.

Fellowship summarizes a later interview with General de Bollardiere by a *New York Times* writer, concluding:

> He called the French Indochina war, in which he served five years, "absolutely mad, useless, unwinnable." The acts of violence committed there "degraded the French and, later, the Americans." He spoke of the crucial importance of a people's will to win and how completely the Americans had overlooked that factor, believing that military strength could overcome the "incredible resistance, the ferocious will" of a people determined to be independent. "Unfortunately," he continued, "the Vietnamese chose violence, too. But if the energies of the people had been put in the service of non-violence, as Gandhi did in India, the result would have been fantastic."

He means, of course, a non-violence thoroughly schooled in the Gandhian temper and philosophy. Speaking of the Czech resistance to the Soviet invasion of 1968, he said that Czech non-cooperation obliged the Russians to send one armored division home because the morale of the soldiers dissolved in the face of civilian resistance, but that because "previously to these events no groups were trained in clearly non-violent actions, these methods of defense did not last." He is convinced that sustained non-violent resistance

would have caused the whole Russian army to be sent back to Russia, along with the tank troops.

A news release from the International Independence Institute tells about the progress being achieved on the land provided for black farmers in Georgia through the land trust program earlier described in these pages:

> This is the year everyone has been working for at New Communities, Inc. in Georgia. As the rich harvest comes off the fields—corn, soybeans, peanuts, sweet potatoes, etc.—all those involved are rejoicing to know that the total farm income this year (around $500,000) will more than compensate for the last four years of struggle to keep the land and realize some of the dreams which have kept us going. Twelve permanent and 150 part-time workers have been involved in this crop season at New Communities, the first major land trust in the United States.

Future plans include diversification to increase income and spread it throughout the year. A roadside market is planned to distribute NCI produce and also crops grown by small farmers in the region. An educational program, helped by an HEW grant, is reaching 115 students. Meanwhile, in Maine, a TV program put on by University of Maine gave viewers throughout the state a chance to compare detailed land-use plans by private developers with the methods of the Sam Ely Community Land Trust. When the audience was asked to register preference, 3000 calls jammed the switchboard, voting two to one for the land trust approach.

Persons interested in keeping up with such developments should write to the International Independence Institute, West Road, Box 183, Ashby, Mass. 01431, which publishes a newsletter six times a year.

On the other side of the ledger is the report of the growing operations of multinational farmers made by George L. Baker in the *Nation* for Nov. 5. These enormous corporations are increasingly going abroad for good land and cheap labor, introducing industrial farming technology, including Green Revolution techniques, wiping out the subsistence farming of the regions invaded, and fitting the operations on the land into the complete scheme of growing and packaging and marketing operations. They move around to suit their economic preferences. In Hawaii, for example, pineapple growing is slowly being phased out by Del Monte and Dole, as these companies move to the Philippines, Thailand, and Kenya for lower labor costs.

> No matter where you turn, the evidence mounts that overseas farms and factories are turning world agriculture into a kind of extension service for American agriculture. . . . The value of fresh fruits and vegetables imported from Mexico rose to $513 million in 1970, Up from $327 million three years earlier. Most of the operations there are financed by American firms, fleeing this country to avoid rising wages.

There are similar trends in Central America, Argentina, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. These big farmers claim they are feeding the world, but many of their products are "luxuries" in comparison with food that the still hungry people need in the countries from which such products will be exported. Mr. Baker sees these operations as pure mercantilism, and it is hard to disagree. He says in one place:

> Both the Green Revolution and the "offshore" [out of country] developments by American food factories have as their ultimate purpose the quasi-colonization of world farmers. . . . While our farming leaders would like us to believe that large-scale land ownership is the only way to conduct farming enterprises, Orville Freeman (former Secretary of Agriculture) offered another conclusion recently: "Looking specifically at agriculture, evidence from various parts of the developing world indicates that intensively farmed small holdings are generally considered more productive on a per acre basis than larger holdings."

Mr. Baker's survey of agribusiness abroad gives support to the UN official who said that without careful management the Green revolution could lead to "a conflagration of violence that would sweep through millions of lives."