

TOWARD A VOLUNTARISTIC SOCIETY

IN Review for last week, Dr. William Ryan makes two poignant comments which illustrate the truth of Karl Mannheim's rule: "The fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of politics into problems of administration." Not that Dr. Ryan's thought can be characterized as "bureaucratic." Rather, he is concerned with exposing the futility of bureaucratic reductionism. His first comment concerns the gross inadequacy of the referral system in relation to problems of mental health. The second comment returns to politics the unsolved problems of mental health, and while politics may have no solution for them either, he at least takes them out of the category of "problems of administration," where they manifestly do not belong.

The trouble with the referral system, as Dr. Ryan shows, is that it hides the almost total inadequacy of the categories of diagnosis on which it relies. He speaks of the case of a woman, a depressed and defeated working-class housewife, whose alcoholic husband is missing for days at a time; of whose five children two are in diapers, another enuretic, the others being an older sickly girl and a boy who is failing in school; who has daily headaches and stomach-aches, whose anxieties lead to fights with her neighbors, and who in desperation is herself seeking consolation in drink. How will she be "referred" by the social worker in contact? As a case of "depression"? Someone with "marital problems"? Dr. Ryan comments:

Aside from the probable futility of referring such a client for counseling or therapy, . . . one must consider the question of whether it is even appropriate to make such a referral—to abstract, as it were, a "disease" from this complex of problems. Her "depression" is a condition that might seem quite natural in view of what is happening to her. To call

her situation a marital problem seems, not only to her but to most people, a rather glaring understatement.

Dr. Ryan's second comment has to do with "responsibility" in relation to such situations. Who is to be called to account for the stupidities and cruelties of the referral system? There is, Dr. Ryan observes, "a hidden assumption, made by many, that all persons who are handicapped by emotional disturbance are entitled to services to lessen their handicap," when, as a matter of fact, "society has made no such commitment and there is no mechanism for providing such services to all who need them, or even to all who request them."

It would be easy, of course, to turn such material into a slashing indictment of Western affluent society, and this is often done. Yet there is a sense in which, looked at from the historical point of view, the mental health situation in Boston (where Dr. Ryan's study was made) has grown into its present character of insoluble dilemmas by a somewhat "natural" course. For many years, psychotherapy has been identified as a specialty in medicine. The first psychiatrists were doctors who became interested in problems of emotional disturbance, since these are eventually reflected in malfunctions of the organism. The agencies which have come into being to deal with these problems at a public level represent, on the one hand, the compassionate desire of public-spirited citizens to aid the unfortunate, and, on the other, the need of the municipality to deal with the gross phenomena of mental illness whenever they disturb the social order. Those who began these efforts almost certainly had no expectation that a time would come when, for reasons very few people now wish to look at closely, the problems of mental health would grow and grow until they reached their present massive proportion—such, as Dr. Ryan says, that one out of four or five of

everybody living in Boston needs some kind of help.

Now the agencies devoted to mental health in Boston are certainly in some sense "bureaus," and since the responsible people involved could not help but become aware of the extent of these problems, which were flooding in and around and over the facilities provided, they tried to do what they could in an administrative way. They made a survey of their own functioning, and Dr. Ryan's report was the result. The survey is doubtless useful as a guide to correction of overlapping agency activities and obvious administrative mistakes, but its primary value is in demonstrating that the present conception of "mental health," or "mental illness," is utterly inadequate to convey the nature of the actual conditions in Boston and other cities and towns in the United States.

You could say that, from the public point of view, the report does exactly what it should—return the problem to the people, since the agencies created by the people have neither the character nor the resources to deal with this problem. Mental health agencies, after all, are not charged with the total redesign of modern society, and this seems to be what is called for, from the evidence in Dr. Ryan's report.

If we accept the meaning of Dr. Ryan's second comment, to the effect that the existing society has made no commitment to provide mental health service to all who need or ask for it, we are also accepting its implication that mental health is a political problem that can no longer be administratively delegated to the agencies that were created to deal with mental and emotional handicaps.

But is mental health properly conceived of as a political problem? We can say this: It may be called a political problem in the sense that its devastating inroads are consistently ignored by politicians who represent the ideological *status quo*. Why should they ignore these effects? Because they can do nothing about them; that is, they can hardly fail to recognize that there is no

administrative solution for the problem of mental health, on the scale that it presently exists, and they can make no promises about remedying such a situation. In short, it is not a problem to which present concepts of political manipulation can be made to apply. It must, therefore, be ignored.

Those who take cognizance of the mental health problem in terms of its actual seriousness are limited to social thinkers and revolutionary analysts. It is plain, for example, that the French socialist writer, Andre Gorz, is able to write about the basic causes of emotional disturbance in a way that would be quite impossible for anyone seeking office in the existing society. One could go from Dr. Ryan's report to the following passage in Gorz's book, *Strategy for Labor*, and make direct cause-and-effect correlations:

Economic, cultural, and social development are not oriented toward the development of human beings and the satisfaction of their social needs as a priority, but *first* toward the creation of those articles which can be sold with the maximum profit, regardless of their utility or lack of utility. . . . The social repercussions of the process of production on all aspects of life—work condition, leisure, education, entertainment and mass consumption, city planning—are not absorbed by any social project tending to humanize the social process, to give it meaning, to further social aims. The social processes, instead of being dominated and governed by human society, dominate *it*; they appear as "accidental" social results of private decisions and they proliferate anarchically: dormitory cities, urban congestion, internal migrations, various kinds of misery and luxury. . . . Mature capitalist society, therefore, remains profoundly barbaric as a *society*, to the degree that it aims at no civilization of social existence and of social relationships, no culture of social individuals, but only a civilization of individual consumption.

Why is this diagnosis, so plainly to the point, ignored? It is ignored for two quite obvious reasons. First, it attacks the profit motive, and the profit motive, having been put on the defensive from precisely such criticism, has been elevated in the *mores* of Western democratic society to virtually a religious principle. It is held to be identical with human freedom. The second reason

it is ignored is that the diagnosis is made in the context of a demand for power. Any socio-moral analysis which depends for its vindication on the achievement of political power is bound to be opposed by those who are *in* power and regard its maintenance as the primary means to obtaining human good.

Now what the men who hold or seek power will never admit, or do not even know, is that the polemics of the power-seeker inevitably shut out awareness of all those values to which power has no access. Accordingly, he moves in a universe of truncated values. He may *pretend* that the system of government he defends or advocates will support or generate those higher values that are really out of all relation to power, but he can never deliver those values because they cannot be coerced into existence. They are entirely under the control of individual human beings. Accordingly, it does not much matter what kind of ideology is held to be the one true system of government. If the system rests on power, its arguments in behalf of higher values are certain to be specious.

Those arguments invariably lead to élitism and self-righteousness. Take the moral argument for Capitalism. It involves the claim that individualism in economic enterprise builds character. It follows that those who have indifferent or no success in economic enterprise are lacking in or without character. People with poor or bad character are undeserving. *Therefore*, their problems, although perhaps pitiable, cannot be made into a fundamental indictment of the ethical foundations of the profit-making system. This would be a moral contradiction in terms and is not to be allowed. So, solutions for the ills described by Andre Gorz are only improvised, since rigor in meeting them would mean redefining them—in terms which are virtually subversive to the existing system.

Every ideology based upon power suppresses its essential problems. It converts them into administrative matters. If it fails to do this, it

might as well abdicate, since admitting them to be *intrinsic* problems would amount to confession that its power is incapable of producing the good that has been promised.

It is of course true that non-coercive methods by people who neither use nor seek power accomplish good within the framework of power-structures. But as the balance in decision-making swings from the non-powerful to the power-users, the good diminishes in direct proportion. It is then that the ugly symptoms of coercion-managed affairs emerge, providing "evidence" that a more forceful exercise of power is now required. So, by an application of Gresham's law, the good done by the non-powerful is driven out by measures deriving from power, and then, in time, only the desperate remedies of a man like Gandhi can turn the tide of a steadily degrading situation.

A curious illustration of the way in which this equation works is provided by various encounters Danilo Dolci had in Russia, which he describes in his book on planning, *A New World in the Making* (Monthly Review Press, 1965). Dolci had asked to meet Soviet administrators concerned with planning and he visited city after city for this purpose. Many of the planners had prepared themselves to answer questions along certain lines and were nonplussed when Dolci turned attention away from such details, with the question, "What are your problems?"

Almost invariably, he got first a reflex answer: "We have no problems." But since Dolci is a disarming man, and since he had not come to gather material for an attack on the Soviet Union, occasionally one of these officials would break down and talk about their problems while his colleagues glared at him. During a meeting in the Moscow region, the following interchange took place. Dolci writes:

"What are your chief difficulties?" I ask.

"We have no difficulties," is the reply.

"On the contrary," puts in the head of the planning office of the "sovnarkhoz." "We do have difficulties and often very serious ones at that."

"Sometimes we are not sure whether we can count on the arrival of raw materials. We draw up our plans before we know, for example, the size or the quality of the national cotton crop. Or another example. We have to build electric trains and power houses to electrify the railways. The generators for the trains are a new type, however, which are being experimented with elsewhere. They may well arrive late and we are in danger of falling down on the plan."

Such problems are of course a long way from the area of "mental health." However, there are problems behind problems. In a paper, "Problems and Unproblems in Soviet Social Theory," published in the *Slavic Review* for March, 1964, Lewis S. Feuer describes a daring study made by a Leningrad group of social scientists. The study sought "to ascertain the relation between the subjective feelings of workers and their objective output." The study, Mr. Feuer says, was "carefully designed," and after reporting its disclosure that production was directly correlated with the feelings of the workers—dissatisfaction could reduce production from 10 to 20 per cent, and satisfaction could raise it from 10 to 15 per cent—he continues:

Their most unusual finding, however, was that the chief cause for dissatisfaction with one's job was (what they called) "the poor organization of industry." A workingman, for example, would report in the morning at his factory, but the necessary raw materials would not be on hand for manufacturing to begin. The workingman would then receive his basic daily wage, but through no fault of his own he would earn no production premia. This situation was wholly unlike the experience of American workers, for whom managerial inefficiency is not a primary factor in job discontent. The Leningrad sociologists are clearly, however, circumscribed in the use they can make of their problems. They do not ask: to what factors in the functioning of the Soviet economy do the workingmen attribute the poor functioning of industry? To what extent do they regard such malfunctioning as inherent in planned economy? To what extent do they regard it as arising from remediable bureaucratic abuses, malpractices, and inefficiencies? The poor organization of industry, it was found, was the chief reason for the high labor turnover, for the wandering from job to job. Why have the unions failed to express the workers'

discontent? Is there a repressed longing to express their dissatisfaction in political terms?

Such were the unproblems which emerged as Soviet industrial sociologists outlined their work, the boundaries of their studies which may be seen but never mentioned. . . . Political sociology in general remains forbidden territory in Soviet political science. What kind of person selects a career in the Communist Party apparatus? How does he compare in honesty, initiative, and intelligence with those who choose ordinary professions and livelihoods? To what extent does the political functionary tend to be a mediocrity who enters the cadre in order to achieve a distinction and dominance over others which he could in no other way? Does the Communist Party tend therefore to be a mediocracy? Was the denouncing of the heretic intellectual and unorthodox a device for upward social mobility which endeared the "cult of personality" to many mediocrats? Is this the social root for the anti-intellectualism which wells up so readily in Communist ranks? To such questions, as to all unproblems, the answer given is the official rhetoric of the place of the Communist Party as the vigilant vanguard of the Soviet people.

Needless to say, research as revealing of some corresponding evil as Dr. Ryan's explorations were of the problems of emotional disturbance in Boston could not be published, or even investigated, in the Soviet Union. Dr. Feuer makes this plain in his probing efforts to persuade Soviet thinkers to consider the causes of Stalin's policy of terrorism and his "mistakes," for which all thoughtful Russians, he says, feel deep-lying guilt. A young Soviet intellectual, asked for an explanation of the Stalinist era, said simply, "I am not a specialist in this field." This sort of evasion was consistently the rule:

A lecturer at the Institute of International Relations pursues his labors by reading the critiques of America by Americans, and rewriting them in the clichés of the decline of capitalist society. He too is facile in depicting the common man's alienation in Western society, but when asked about the Stalinist era and present-day Soviet alienation will just pass the former over with an unctuous phrase of how regrettably bad it was, and then go on to a glib misdescription of an all-contented Soviet citizenry. . . . One Soviet sociologist in Tbilisi said that when something unpleasant has occurred, we prefer to avoid speaking about it; that was why they avoided

discussing the causes of Stalinism. I replied that in America the depression was unpleasant, but that we analysed and discussed its causes. The point, of course, is that a terrible guilt is felt about Stalinism, large numbers were involved in its operations, and that is why the phenomenon is repressed by making Stalin the bearer of all that was rotten in themselves, and mitigating it all with the mild, de-emotionalised word, *oshibki* [meaning a "mistake," made by someone who "meant well"]. No American felt guilty for the advent of the depression; therefore no one feared the analysis of its causes. The continuing use of *oshibki* as an explanation for a whole era's distortions is a sign that the mentality of that era persists. For there is a callousness in equating the millions of destroyed lives with a child's spelling mistakes through the use of the same word. (*Survey*, April, 1964, London.)

To possess power is to be able to control the behavior of other people. In order to enjoy at the same time the consent of the controlled, it is psychologically important for the man exercising power to be thought of as *right*. Any idea which suggests that he may be wrong, or any fact which has this implication, is dangerous. If possible, such a fact will be ignored by men having the power; or, if this is impossible, it will be suppressed; or, if suppression is impossible, it will be branded as a clever deception of the enemy, so that anyone who considers it seriously is thereby discredited. Thus the Berkeley student revolt was Communist-inspired, since it is inconceivable that middle-class American youth could themselves be dissatisfied with the generous policies of the leading state university of the nation.

And Prof. Feuer found it very difficult to convince a Soviet professor of philosophy that the influence of Catholic "philosophical journals" had not increased in the United States because of John Kennedy's election to the presidency. Since, in Russia, "the philosophical views of the head of the government do become those of the universities, . . . he found it hard to conceive that the religion of the American President was not reflected in the American universities." The duty of Soviet philosophers, "in the government's eyes, is to

serve as officers of ideological warfare against the West and against 'ideological coexistence'."

It becomes obvious that the need of modern man is for a society in which basic problems can be openly admitted without shaking the foundations of the existing order. We shall probably never have a society which does not have problems, so this ought not to be the declared objective. And only a society which rejects the politics of power can be free of the temptation to hide and deny its problems. Power always rests on the claim of righteousness, and righteousness rests on the ability of the powerful to contain their critics and suppress evidence to the contrary. Only those who do not fear to lose power—because they do not have it, do not want it, would not use it if they had it—can afford to seek, see, and accept the truth.

So, paradoxically, in these days of the maturing contradictions of power-based societies, the only people who have much hope of doing the right thing are those who will never claim that they are right. And they will do the right thing because they will do what they do voluntarily, without response to or notice of power. Fortunately, behavior of this sort is often extensively possible within structures created partly by power, and by this means power may eventually be nullified or made irrelevant. Some authority may remain, but it will be essentially moral authority and in large measure self-vindicating. This voluntaristic society will no doubt have imperfections, and people who are impatient of them can always go back to the rule of power-structured societies. This will be possible since the only way a voluntaristic society can come into being is within the matrix of the old, coercive system, which is likely to be with us for a long, long time.

REVIEW

A REVOLUTIONARY CLAIM

FAR-REACHING contentions in behalf of extrasensory perception are presented by Sir Cyril Burt in the March issue of the *Journal of Parapsychology*. In his paper, "The Implications of Parapsychology for General Psychology," this writer gathers various supports for the view that the findings of parapsychology undermine the assumptions of physicalist psychology and suggest that quite other foundations are required for a scientific theory of even ordinary perception.

Sir Cyril first summarizes the experimental evidence for the reality of extrasensory perception under several headings, including telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, retrocognition, psychokinesis, and mediumistic utterances, saying that even if the case for these forms of non-physical perception is not altogether proved, the weight of experimental demonstrations is now so great that the claims of parapsychology for attention cannot be honestly ignored. He then points out that they are ignored by the physicalists, not on experimental grounds, but for philosophical reasons. The latter position is quoted from C. E. M. Hansel, a British psychologist, in terms of "general *a priori* arguments":

The whole body of scientific knowledge compels us to assume that such things as telepathy and clairvoyance are impossible. If therefore the statistical data rule out explanations in terms of chance, then the results can only be accounted for by some kind of trick.

A colleague of Prof. Hansel, Dr. Willis, has summed up the logic of the opposition to ESP: "the whole argument can be put in a nutshell: the conclusions advanced by parapsychologists would be utterly incompatible with the cardinal assumptions on which present-day psychology rests; hence present-day psychology, if it is to remain a science, cannot possibly accept these alleged supernatural manifestations at their face value, much less subscribe to the unscientific

speculations put forward to account for them." To which Cyril Burt rejoins:

But plainly this "argument from incompatibility" is a two-edged weapon which cuts both ways: it would equally apply that the "conclusions of parapsychologists," once they are solidly established, would introduce a radical change in the assumptions on which present-day psychology is said to be founded.

After reviewing the "cardinal assumptions" of the mechanists—which assert that no communication can take place between human beings except on the basis of the "laws of mechanics" and by wholly material means—Sir Cyril points out that they are the assumptions of Newtonian physics and in many cases no longer in use in areas of science which, while not a part of psychology, may be enormously significant for psychology. The writer observes:

Above all, the crucial processes in the brain—the transmission of nervous impulses—takes place at the synaptic knobs, which are so minute that we have every reason to suppose that they must be governed not by [Newtonian] laws . . . but by the laws of quantum theory. This modernized view is accepted and emphasized by Sir John Eccles, who is, I suppose, the foremost neurologist of the present day. Eccles, indeed, regards the brain, not as a generator of mind or consciousness, but rather as a detector of extraneous influences, such as those we commonly refer to as mind or will.

By means of this and other evidence Cyril Burt is able to say that "in postulating agencies that are specifically psychical, we are not in fact straying beyond the legitimate bounds of natural science." He contends, in short, that not only so-called paranormal perception, but *any kind of perception*, is beginning to be regarded as involving the nonphysical reality of *consciousness*, so that mechanistic theories of perception are inadequate for normal perception as well.

Sir Cyril now moves to the argument that *all* perception may be in some measure extrasensory, and that the contribution of sense awareness may be only supportive, selective, and qualifying. He gives the basis for this view:

. . . so far as my own limited investigations go, it would appear that, both in paranormal experiences and in mystical experiences (which in my view belong to the same category), concrete sensory experiences—visions, voices, and the like—form the exception rather than the rule. And when they do occur, they appear to result from the same mechanism which psychoanalysts have demonstrated in the case of dreams; namely, the conversion of the real or "latent" content into a hallucinatory or "manifest" content. The real contents usually have the character, not of extrasensory *percepts*, but of intuitions, hunches, feelings, of half-conscious moods, or imageless thoughts, or even at times just an impulse to do this or say that. And all these of course are, by their very nature, "extrasensory."

It is on such grounds, which he finds consistent with the "concrete" imagery of clairvoyance ("I believe," he says, "the content transmitted is not itself of sensory nature"), that Sir Cyril formulates his basic outlook:

I am therefore tempted to propose a kind of interpretive *volte-face*. Instead of trying to explain extrasensory perception by analogy with ordinary perception, as described in the stock textbooks, we ought, I suggest, to interpret ordinary perception in the light of what we have learned about ESP. Parapsychology appears fully to confirm the view upheld by Bergson, James, Eccles, and others: that the brain is (in Sherrington's pregnant phrase) simply "an organ of liaison between mind and the physical world." And what I call my mind seems to have, as its most distinctive property, a capacity for *clairvoyance*. By clairvoyance I mean the *direct* apprehension of some object, situation, or event; that is, an apprehension which is not mediated (though it may be limited or qualified) by the physical processes taking place in my sense organs and nervous system. This, so I would maintain, is the normal basic form of the cognitive relation, not a paranormal or exceptional form. It is in any case a correct first-hand description of the ordinary experience of perception; and those who maintain that it is misleading or scientifically untenable can only do so by insisting that our everyday experiences are in fact illusory.

It would be helpful, for those who at this point are feeling a little uncomfortable, to turn to Richard Held's contribution, "Object and Effigy," in *Structure in Art and in Science* (Vision+Value series, edited by Georgy Kepes, Braziller, 1965),

for an illuminating description of the problems of accounting physiologically for the facts of visual perception. Not mechanistic theory, which uniformly breaks down, but the simple and as yet unexplained reality of *pattern recognition*, is the primary concern of the present-day psychology of perception. It is certainly not unreasonable to suggest that this power of pattern-recognition, which, as Mr. Held shows, leaps far beyond the information provided by the senses, may be the "*direct* apprehension" of which Cyril Burt speaks. (Collateral reading in the work of Adelbert Ames, Jr., would also prove interesting.) Sir Cyril continues:

The material brain, with its accessory mechanisms of sense organisms and sensory nerves, has been evolved, not to generate consciousness—a feat which no mere physico-chemical structure could possibly accomplish—but rather to transmit, and at the same time limit and direct, the mind's unique power of clairvoyance so that, under ordinary mundane conditions, they are selectively concentrated on the objects or situations—or those aspects of them—which are of vital importance for the survival of the physical organism and of the species to which it belongs. When for the time being these practical requirements are ensured, then the wider range of our clairvoyant powers becomes manifest, as for example in the deeper insight of the poet, the artist, or the mystic who sees "the earth and every common object . . . apparelled in celestial light," "glowing with an intrinsic meaning and a glamour of their own."

Sir Cyril defends his postulation of "mental entities or agents in addition to physical ones" by arguing that "if modern physicists are now ready to postulate nuclear types of interaction which are irreducible to mechanical interactions and which were wholly unrecognized by nineteenth-century scientists, there can be no longer any objection to the psychologists' postulating psychical types of interactions which are unrecognized in other branches of contemporary science." He says that while behaviorism and psychoanalysis once embodied a wholesome antidote to superficial introspection, these schools ended by converting their methodological postulates into metaphysical dogmas, with the result that "psychical processes

and psychical phenomena—the very crux of psychology as a separate branch of science—were either bluntly denied or blandly dismissed as of no scientific importance." For this reason, modern mechanistic psychology is impoverished:

. . . today general psychology finds itself hammering away at the dead end of a blind alley. As a basis for practical action in the fields of education, industry, psychiatry, criminology, and the complex social and ethical problems of the present day, it has proved itself not merely useless, but in many respects positively harmful. It is scarcely too much to say that at the moment the most fruitful investigations in the field of psychology are those being undertaken, not by psychologists, but by physicists, neurologists, pharmacologists, sociologists, and educationists—investigators who feel no compulsion to reject concepts and hypotheses that make free use of such categories as mind and consciousness. . . .

The main implication of parapsychology can . . . be condensed into a syllogism, "ESP," we are told, "is a phenomenon which ought not to occur if the physicalist's assumptions are sound and if behaviorism is the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." But ESP does occur. Therefore behaviorism is not the whole truth, and the physicalist's *Weltbild* collapses.

Cyril Burt says nothing of the humanistic psychologists; he makes no comment on the new scientific epistemology proposed by Michael Polanyi; and he seems quite innocent of the extent to which psychoanalysis has reversed itself and turned into a phenomenology of the human spirit. Yet all these developments might be included in his catalog of "the most fruitful investigations in the field of psychology." Nonetheless, in his own way, he states the case for all these pioneers.

COMMENTARY

A STRIKING ANTICIPATION

MORE than a quarter of a century ago, in the British journal, *Philosophy*, for October, 1940, Prof. H. H. Price, of Oxford University, wrote on telepathy and clairvoyance in a way that illustrates the essential reasonableness of Sir Cyril Burt's proposals (see Review). In this paper, Prof. Price said:

If clairvoyance does occur, as I am persuaded it does, our ordinary theories of the human mind, or of physical nature, or perhaps of both, are badly wrong somewhere. For if those theories were wholly right, it would not occur at all. . . . Now I myself have got no theory of Clairvoyance to offer. I only want to make certain tentative suggestions as to the directions in which we might look for one. First, I want to suggest, as I did before in discussing Telepathy, that perhaps we are asking the wrong question. Perhaps what we should seek a causal explanation of is the absence of Clairvoyance rather than its presence? In that case the proper question to ask, anyhow in the first place, would be this: Why is our ordinary perceptual experience limited in the way that it is? Why is it confined to those material objects which happen to exercise a physical effect on our sense-organs? Ought we perhaps to assume that Clairvoyance is our normal state, and that ordinary perception is something subnormal, a kind of myopia? The question you ask depends upon the expectation with which you begin. Ought we to have expected that by rights, so to speak, every mind would be aware of everything, or, at any rate, of an indefinitely wide range of things? The puzzle would then be to explain why the ordinary human mind is in fact aware of so little. We might then conjecture that our sense-organs and afferent nerves (which, of course, are physiologically connected with our organs of action, *i.e.*, with the muscular system) are arranged to *prevent us from attending* to more than a small bit of the material world—that bit which is biologically relevant to us as animal organisms. We might still have an unconscious "contact"—I can think of no adequate phrase—with all sorts of other things, but the effects of it would be shut out from consciousness except on rare occasions, when the physiological mechanism of stimulus and response is somewhat deranged. In that case, what prevents us from being clairvoyant all the time is—in M. Bergson's phrase—*l'attention à la vie*.

For a general grasp of the kind of a universe such thinking permits or requires, Prof. Price turns to the philosophical speculations of Leibniz:

. . . when we consider the new facts which Psychological Research has brought to light, some of these metaphysical speculations begin to wear a different look. We find that some of them do at least provide a conceptual framework into which supernormal cognition can be fitted, whereas it appears to be an inexplicable oddity so long as we stick to our ordinary (ultimately Cartesian) views of mind and of Nature. For example in the *Monadology* of Leibniz every monad has clairvoyant and telepathic powers, not occasionally and exceptionally, but always, as part of its essential nature. Every monad represents the entire Universe from its own point of view (Clairvoyance) and the perceptions of each are correlated with the perceptions of all the rest (Telepathy). In fact, what Leibniz calls "perception" is always both clairvoyant and telepathic. Moreover, he tells us that this perception is to a greater or lesser degree unconscious. I do not say that the system of Leibniz is workable as it stands. But I do suggest that we may gather useful hints from it.

Speculative systems, Prof. Price points out, often provide the basis of the science of the future, as was the case with non-Euclidean geometry and the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus. And Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the Will anticipated some of the theories of psychoanalysis. In any event, the "fit" of his remarks with the contentions of Sir Cyril Burt is worthy of attention, and some may find the parallels as exciting as they are persuasive.

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

HOW WILL THEY MAKE A LIVING?

A SMALL but influential number of psychologists and educators are urging parents of teen-agers and college students to do what they can to bridge the gap between the generations—a gap which has always existed, but is far wider, today, according to John D. Black, Stanford University student counselor. The present young, Dr. Black thinks, "are more mature and more competent in making decisions than we were because they have had more freedom." He counsels parents to "read what the students are reading and discuss it with them." "Listen to their music," he says, as "an integral part of the culture and a clue to the concerns of each generation."

Dr. Black believes that the life ahead of today's young people will be unimaginably different from what their parents looked forward to, and he fears that this generation of students is right in thinking "their education may not be preparing them adequately for the uncertain future they face."

Some parents are making an effort in directions indicated by Dr. Black. Recently, in Los Angeles, at a gathering of people interested in Jungian psychology, the speaker played three of Bob Dylan's songs—the favorites, "Blowin' in the Wind," "The Times They Are a 'Changin'," and "Like a Rollin' Stone." Partly because the words were first read to the audience—so that the unsuspected simplicity of the lyrics became familiar—people listened with what seemed a kind of reverence. Of course, the introductory remarks of the psychologist contributed to this mood, since he spoke at some length about the gripping effect of Dylan's style, the spontaneous appeal of his imagery, and the enormous popularity he has achieved with the young while remaining independent of any "group." But while the new sense of "folk" Dylan has originated may charm older listeners, for a great many the most difficult

thing to understand is the profound break with all the familiar securities, unmistakable in these songs. There is a sense in which Dylan's music promises that the young whom it represents have no intention of relating to the culture to which their parents belong, and that the practical side of this decision doesn't really concern them. Anxiously people ask, Will they ever go to *work*, or even graduate properly from *school*? How can such people possibly *fit in*? That this idea of "fitting in" is precisely what the young reject seems appalling. Parents who think of growing up in terms of making a home, having babies, and supporting a family are understandably distraught.

Whether or not these young people will be able to create a milieu in which they can support and raise families remains to be seen. And while this problem doesn't worry them the way their parents think it should, the fact is that the very "affluence" which the parents have striven so hard to attain, is itself behind the acquisitive atmosphere which the young are determined to avoid. There is a sense in which the difference between them and their parents is not a generational gap at all, but the result of rapidly changing values, which makes communication extremely difficult.

This is not to hide the fact that there is a frightening, self-destructive side to the revolt of the young, more evident in some than in others; but it must also be recognized that a decisive moral awakening is behind their break with the present society. It can be argued that the "restraints" practiced by the previous generation were often not really evidence of self-discipline, but a response to the get-ahead psychology. If genuine self-discipline had been a part of their home life, the young would have acquired it by osmosis. It should be added that many of them did.

That the revolt of youth represents an actual change in values is revealed by the fact that it is world-wide—occurring wherever there is a mature, welfare-state society. An article in the

Nation for April 17, by the Dutch sociologist, Piet Thoenes, discusses the emergence in Holland of the Provos—short for Provocateurs—youthful "rebels from affluence" who, although they are exceedingly small in number, "have elected one candidate to the Dutch legislature, utterly unnerved the bureaucracy of Amsterdam and attracted world attention." What is a Provo? Dr. Thoenes answers:

A Provo is against the dead symbols of a dead society, against official religions, against any kind of authority and obedience, against heroism and martyrdom. He is, above all, a nonconformist, a lover of things new. He is always on the move, restless, even faithless and elusive.

His problem may be: how is a man without any ties to become or remain involved in the world around him?

The Provos, according to one of their leaders, organize new art shows, on the street; and since this disturbs traffic the "show" often takes on the character of a political demonstration. There are beats and hipsters among them, "prepared to try anything between Zen and Yevtushenko"; others are "thinkers" who write about art and anarchism for periodicals such as *Provo* and *Revo*. Some are activists who organize demonstrations against war, sit-ins, teach-ins, and forums. Dr. Thoenes adds that the Provos have made history by proposing what they call "white plans" for reform—such as the suggestion of community-owned bicycles to end the traffic chaos of Amsterdam. The writer comments:

It is this attitude, be it a flirtation with anarchism, or an attempt at new styles of engineering, that gives Provo its political flavor. It has the detachment from the existing system necessary for really interesting negative comments, and by its honest, if sometimes flighty, attempts to try new solutions shows real concern and perhaps develops a stature that surpasses the traditional form of generational conflict.

Speaking of the inability of older people to assimilate the changes that are taking place, Dr. Thoenes says:

Perhaps the blame should be placed on the generation of our fathers, who taught us about social institutions, social processes and social behavior as though they were eternal truths. Certainly we have doubts that never troubled them. But we did, after all, inherit a few things—ideas about duty and courage and obedience—that shouldn't be touched. There we know where we stand and what it is that we must defend.

Now, suddenly, part of the younger generation hits us precisely on the points where we thought ourselves reasonably safe. No one really understands where these young people came from. They seem to have escaped our educational devices. Who taught them? Who brought them up? There they are, suddenly, in the center of the stage, throwing smoke bombs at the royal galaxy.

And in the Netherlands of all places. One of those nice little countries, so clean and tidy; wealthy, self-assured, quiet and friendly. Not one of those eternal trouble spots erupting once again, but NATO'S dearest child. Is it just accident a little shower on a pleasant April day? Or is there something rotten in the state of Holland, and is Provo just another sign of the decay of the West?

While pondering such questions, it is useful to know that groups calling themselves Provo are springing up elsewhere. Members of the Los Angeles "chapter" drove into Watts one evening, not long ago, in a truck bearing the sign, "Let the Poor Give to the Rich," and hauled off some garbage which they later deposited in Beverly Hills. If this was conceived as a Provo sort of "happening," something has plainly been lost through importation.

FRONTIERS

Vietnam and the Press

IT is often possible to recognize the strain of moral contradiction in the treatment of the war in Vietnam by certain newspapers. In theory, the news in a paper is supposed to provide objective reporting, while the opinions of the publishers appear on the editorial page. In fact, however, the way the news is reported may be a much more accurate index of the feelings of the editors. A case in point is the *Christian Science Monitor*, which gives careful attention to the opinions of leading citizens who oppose the war, and publishes detailed reports by foreign correspondents who reflect informed opinion abroad, yet editorially deplors the groundswell of horror, demonstrations, and vocal condemnation of American policy. Moral outrage is politically unmanageable; direct demands that the war be stopped are impatient of the decision-making processes by which the war came about, and a newspaper expressing sympathy with such demands would find itself in an objectively anarchist position.

Yet the obscenity of this war can escape no decent and informed human being. So, while the *Christian Science Monitor*, in an editorial on the recent (April 15) parades and protests against the war, in both New York and San Francisco, called the demonstrations "impractical," and incidentally minimized the number of participants in the New York parade (speaking of 100,000 to 140,000 people, when eye-witnesses said between 300,000 and 400,000 took part), this newspaper gives space to the expressions of such men as George F. Kennan (former ambassador to Russia), Edwin O. Reischauer (former ambassador to Japan), Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times*, John Kenneth Galbraith, and U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations. Reporting Mr. Reischauer's testimony before a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last February, the *Monitor's* Washington correspondent wrote:

"Hawks" and "doves" on the Fulbright committee seemed to agree with Mr. Reischauer's analysis that the United States got into the war by inadvertence following "two major mistakes"—backing revival of French colonialism in 1945, and "in stepping up the unsound situation in 1954 which the French left behind them." . . .

About China Mr. Reischauer said it is "certainly the proudest people in the world", far weaker than most Americans think; not "bound on a course of blatant external aggression"; and probably hugging its "small nuclear capacity" because it seriously thinks the United States is about to attack it. The United States ought to help China enter the UN, he asserts, to educate it in what is going on in the world. . . . what basically worries Japan is that the United States may be slipping into their own mistake of trying to control Asia by force. It won't work, he said.

The *Monitor* for May 13 printed a staff-written article headed "War Opposition Builds in U.S.," reporting fresh Congressional dissent. These protesters are called "neither doves nor peaceniks nor moralists," but "practical men of affairs" who believe that "present American policy is promoting a wider war." They include 29 Democratic Congressmen, Republicans who were responsible for their party's recent "white paper" on Vietnam, and even members of President Johnson's own staff. The critics see the recent escalation as militarily useless, regarding it as "punitive terror bombing that achieves nothing but a stoking of war passions on both sides." The story continues:

Under bombing, they point out, North Vietnam has hardened, not softened its position on negotiations. Under bombing it has increased its infiltration of troops to the South. . . . President Johnson, critics argue, now has begun an uncontrolled and uncontrollable spiral. Military logic, they suggest, has taken over—as was evidenced once again in this week's transfer of the American part in pacification in South Vietnam from civilian to military direction.

This writer concludes:

Persistent doubts are being renewed as well among thoughtful Americans as to how much suffering can—morally or practically—be imposed on

the South Vietnamese people in the name of defending their and other Southeast Asian countries.

The new critics hold no brief for Viet Cong terrorism, but they suspect that for South Vietnamese civilians American bombs are less discriminating—and more devastating—than Viet Cong assassinations. They know that over 1.7 million South Vietnamese—more than a tenth of the population—are refugees. And this, if it is to no purpose, bothers the conscience of many.

With the ever-increasing complexity of international affairs, with the fantastic powers of the presidency—including, as we have discovered, even the authority to send close to half a million troops to Vietnam with no declaration of war—it is all but impossible for the public to have much effect on foreign policy. The new critics now are beginning to attempt the impossible.

The same issue of the *Monitor* contains UN Secretary-General U Thant's "grim warning" concerning the recent escalation, which he fears is "the initial phase of World War III." U Thant quoted Secretary of Defense McNamara's January statement that the bombing of Hanoi "is a penalty and not a restriction," in which the Secretary went on to say he did not believe that bombing could "significantly reduce the actual flow of men and material to the South." U Thant agreed with this and gave his view that North Vietnam is reluctant to accept the help of troops that has been offered by China. The Secretary-General said: "The fact that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam], a developing nation, is continuing to withstand the pressure of an enormously superior power has been and still is the essential factor which has prevented an enlargement of the conflict beyond the frontiers of Vietnam.

In a situation of this sort, with the facts as provided, what remains for the people who are completely horrified by this war to do, except to increase the "demonstrations" the *Monitor* calls "impractical"? As the *Monitor* staff writer has said, it is now "all but impossible for the public to have much effect on foreign policy."